Other Others
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In a world filled with manufactured objects, huge volumes of expression and
communication streams in all kinds of media that provide a massive and seemingly-
unceasing supply of stimulation, distraction, and other activity, we still feel compelled to
create a separate category of artifacts/situations that we identify as aesthetic artifacts.
How do these objects and expressions distinguish themselves from other kinds of things
and why does it matter enough to maintain that distinction? To what extent is the identity
of aesthetic object, particularly literary ones, connected to authorial identity? And how is
that identity specified as a mode of subject enunciation—is it marked or unmarked as a
formation?

As categories, the “aesthetic/literary” and the “authorial subject” each depend upon a
construct of alterity in which the notion of “other” is crucial, definitive, and structurally
formative. But is this construct useful and/or sufficient? Might we conceive specificity—
the particular character and quality of aesthetic expressions—without alterity and broaden
the notion of enunciative modalities beyond that of formed within a subject/other
configuration?

From within an eco-poetics—not a study of themes in an ecological mode—but an
ecology of the politics of aesthetic systems—such approaches are not only warranted, but
required, and might offer a reconstructive rework of some of the assumptions on which
contemporary art practices work in the culture. What is the work done by poetic making,
what does it tell us about human identity and expression, and what is the particular value
for which it serves as exclusive or at least essential warrant?

I want to begin by briefly describing the terms of that alterity as a founding tenet
aesthetic/literary practice as a belief and then suggest an alternative construct, an “other”
other, that is premised on the notion of specificity without alterity.

Then, I want to turn attention to the enunciation of authorial subjectivity as a
symptomatic example of conditions of identity formation in this cultural moment, and
consider the insights it offers about a concept of among-ness as a possible alternative to “othering”.

Then, in a few broad strokes, I want to make a quick gesture towards the third theme in this project, the formation of enunciative modalities within the current media/medial conditions of culture, where I see a kind of monstrous absorption of self into an “object infinitely Grand A” that is a meme of me-ness in a world of networked /distributed subject (mis)formation.

Finally, conclude with a reiteration of the concepts of specificity without alterity, amongness as an alternative to “othering” in enunciative systems, and literature after language within an eco-politics of aesthetic-poetic making.

So: aesthetics without alterity, authorial (subject) identity, enunciative modalities, and a few conclusions.

**Aesthetics/poeisis**

[Duchamp] A full century has passed since Marcel Duchamp systematically exposed the frameworks—the institutionalized conventions and “consensualities” as I call them—or embedded assumptions on which aesthetic identity was/ois constructed. Duchamp’s gestures were very much about cultural-cognitive-performative frames, in the sense meant by (later) Erving Goffman. Duchamp pointedly identified the crucial moves by which a work of art is set apart from the world of ordinary things: pointing, naming, framing, signing, placing, and declaring the identity of an object as art. His exposure of these frames did not end their use, needless to say, and the culture industries of fine art continue to flourish. We long ago recognized the dependence of cultural activities on institutions and social practices. Still, we—artists, writers, performers—persist in the innovative traditions that challenge, over and over again, these same boundary conditions even as we produce work we believe has a purpose not fulfilled anywhere else in the culture.

[Fluxus] But this is ancient history. We grew up working on/in these assumptions through modernism’s experiments: At mid-century, the activities generated under the rubric of Fluxus, among other event-based initiatives, worked to eliminate those boundaries that had set art apart from life. Paradoxically, in an attempt to achieve that
goal of “sublation” --the full absorption of fine art into life practice -- so that no more distinction could be maintained, Fluxus, like minimalism, pop, conceptualism, and other experimental forms, managed to show how significant, resistant, persistent, and resilient that line of distinction actually is. The nude people participating in a 1960s Happening may be inviting any/all others to participate, but the audience/participant boundary could not be more clearly marked by the states of (in this instance) nudity and dress in the crowd, not to mention body language, facial expression, and other features that distinguish spectators from actors in the scene.

[Alys] The frames remain and the mythology of “participatory” art practiced in/as contemporary public art activities has been scathingly criticized by Claire Bishop, whose Artificial Hells analyses the directed, instrumental, quality of much of this work and the palliative poverty of its claims. Francis Alys’s When Faith Moves Mountains, however, is a vivid demonstration of recognition of various dimensions of futility. Conceived in the face of Peruvian regime change in which a faltering democracy replaced a functional dictatorship, the piece embodies many of these complex contradictions of participation and its myths in a fully self-conscious way. What looks like progress, and stands for social movement, is often, as the piece shows, a mere distraction to real issues and political complexities, not their solution. The work of art cannot do the work of fixing the world, as Alys knows. But what is the work that art does do?

[Morris/Rausch] Certain foundational works of Conceptualism in the arts provide a useful touchstone here. The contrast between Robert Morris’s 1963 Statement of Aesthetic Withdrawal and Robert Rauschenberg’s 1953 Erased deKooning show how dramatically the framing act works. One, Rauschenberg’s, is a way to clear space, it is an oedipal gesture, classic in that sense, in its expression of the anxieties of artistic succession, the need to declare one’s place internally, within those traditions of recognition and canonization that still operate to this day. By contrast, Morris’s work plays with the nature of aesthetic warrant, the legitimizing act, performative and socially/culturally sanctioned and recognized. The “withdrawal” depends upon an a priori conferral, assumed and denoted, and the frame left by the act of withdrawing aesthetic quality and content is heavily marked—in fact, constitutes, like Duchamp’s signing, the quintessential act of attention to that which is declared missing (in the first case, originality of expression in form, in the second quality as a distinguishing feature).
If aesthetic activity sets itself apart, makes itself “other” than the rest of human activity, then what is the purpose of this setting apart? Thus the value and identity of the aesthetic reside in that fact of deliberate production, not in any of the traditional constructions of value in this production. By contrast, from classical poetics through modern avant-gardes, such values have been described variously: as emotional catharsis, moral uplift and/or epistemological enlightenment, sensual pleasure or entertainment, or political/ethical efficacy. These are freighted with expectations and requirements that are not essential to literary/aesthetic work, but which it is asked to do as justification on some cost analysis of moral accounting: to be redemptive, instructive, restorative, or salvific. Dependent on the “otherness” and “apartness” of the aesthetic, this expectation generates the idea that aesthetics is to take on all of the moral/ethical work not done elsewhere in the culture.

This supposes a moral superiority to the making of works of art – the “otherness” as a critical stance (the whole critique of critique currently in vogue meant to undo this, but seems, instead, to spiral endlessly). But what if we, those of us present who attend to the productions of literary and art realms, are simply part of a marginal community attached to esoteric language (and graphic/acoustic) acts with a specific pedigree in a narrowly defined and carefully monitored pedigree of ideas? Given the shrinking zone of rarified aesthetics, are we (however self-identified) just a subculture fan group? A perhaps accurate, but still substantively insufficient, description of the work done by literary critics, poets, scholars, artists and their historians? Art and poetry have very little percentage share in the real-time markets of cultural capital, and to some extent, I would argue, pace Duchamp, Fluxus, and the legacy of Conceptualism, we are still working under assumptions about the impact of literary/aesthetic activity formulated from a 19th century world—as surely as certain political theory is still framed on analysis of 19th century capitalism and the mechanics of capital/labor relations, which, of course, do not hold true—as per the endless repetitive use syndrome around the term “neoliberalism”. I had a major recent wake-up call when my doctoral students made clear to me that “literature” was not a category they recognized as in any way significant among other cultural practices—a moment that underpins this talk and its questions.

But back to the issue of the work done as and by aesthetic activities. A series of performance works done by Lorraine O’Grady in the 1980s provides a dramatic enactment of what I have been pointing to here as the quintessential feature of aesthetic work—the capacity to call attention to attention. I borrow this formulation from Charles
Bernstein, in his poem “Klupsie Girl,” which contains the following: “Poetry is like a swoon / but with this difference / --it calls us to attention.”

The call to attention, framing of experience, a significant/i.e. signifying act—first act of semiosis—the making of distinction, difference, or, differance in the dynamic Derridian arche-trace, Charles Peirce’s move from ‘firstness” of the plentitude of the world into the “secondness” of distinctions as a foundation for the signifying semiotics of thirdness. But semiosis is not bound by or constrained to the symbolic, to language, or to human communicative circuits, and in a moment I will give an example of what I mean by this and how it works.

But the point of the O’Grady framing action is to conceive the specific identity of aesthetic activity without opposition, otherness as specificity. The frame encloses, not alterity, not pitched against, but within a social space and field. Its setting apart-ness is not oppositional, but delimiting, identifying a location within, not an address from outside. Directed energies are captured in advance by their oppositional strategies, while the notion of “amongness” makes it possible to conceive aesthetics outside of directed purpose, as a call to attention of specificity-of events, people, locations, circumstances, etc., not an act of oppositional critique. Assigning alterity to poetics always condemns literature/aesthetic activity to directed, instrumental, labor as the moral salvific of the culture.

Attention to the work of attention—from which all else follows—is the defining characteristic of aesthetic activity, its distinctive identity among the rest of activity in the culture. Specificity without alterity, a condition of distinction among activities, removes the claim to moral superiority that inheres in perceiving the rest of the cultural activity as “other” to the aesthetic, a claim that has attached itself from habit of a line of critical theory as if it were an automatic property of aesthetics. That claim can only be justified by action after and through the work, it is not inherent in the simple definition or character of poetics or aesthetics.

But to what extent, then, does the identity of an aesthetic work as aesthetic rely on a concept of authorship that is also “other”—a category of exceptionalism, not so much in what is expressed, as in how the category of authorship is constructed? And this is the segue to a consideration of authorial subjectivity as a historical idea, theoretical construct, and contemporary condition.

Authorial (subject) identity
[Conjectures] I want to begin with a somewhat long view here, and consider the ways authorial identity has come into being historically. In 1759, Edward Young published a book with the title *Conjectures on Original Composition* which included a statement contrasting “original” and “imitation” as modes of poetic production. The “original may be said to be of vegetable nature,” he said “it rises spontaneously from the vital root of genius; it grows, it is not made; imitations are often a sort of manufacture wrought up by those mechanics, art, and labor, out of pre-existent materials not their own.”

Young’s comments were being made in a context different from our own. But his distinction was an answer to questions about forgery and authenticity being asked as practices of poetics were being prised free from the habits of imitation that had been condoned in an era in which the “ancients” were not only to be admired, but copied. More complicatedly, the texture of composed verse, its very contents and materials, were often a pastiche in earlier eras. Classical authors “cited” by paraphrase, inclusion, and without bibliographical references or standards. Medieval authors felt free to reuse earlier texts in Commonplace books, compiling source materials into a mix of textual fragments without clear pedigree or provenance. In addition, many “translations” of earlier texts were as much invention as faithful rework, and the authenticity and integrity of the textual record can hardly be guaranteed for works whose original manuscripts are long lost and gone. We copy what we have, and so the processes of appropriation are at the heart of our cultural legacy. Young’s comments on the “original” are harbingers of an era to come, not a scolding against practices past. The Parisian librarian Jean Hardouin, writing at the very end of the 17th century, even suggested that nearly ALL ancient texts had been forged by medieval monks (as had coins, inscriptions, and other texts on antiquities, and thus any notion of authorial identity was suspect to say the least.

[Macpherson Chat] The scandals of the 18th century – James Macpherson’s “translations” of the works of Ossian and Thomas Chatterton’s elaborate “Rowley” manuscripts – partook of a culture in which their pseudo-authorial activities were becoming suspect. In effect, the whole enterprise of authorship, coming into the 18th century, began to have a business stake in its practices as well as an identity stake. Celebrity was nothing without income to attach to it. Authors wanted to be paid more than an initial fee, and for that to happen, their identity and “authority” had to be recognized within an institutional framework that was legal as well as economic.
So in the 18th century the concept of authorial identity is troubled. The Statute of Anne is published in 1709 as a protection of copyright—by which is meant, the right to publish, make copies, and was largely a move to protect publishers against piracy. Authors did not have material ownership of their expressions, few rights in fact, and the 18th century is the era in which the idea of intellectual work becomes property, and authorship becomes an economic identity as a crucial component of its aesthetic distinction.

As a theoretical construct, authorship remains very fluid in the 18th century, with ideas of imitation, invention, substitution all active as a shifting ground on which the figure of the author takes new shape. Literary authors had existed since antiquity, particularly classical antiquity, with long periods of lapsed attention or cultural use for the concept. The Romantic era clinches that contest, and the moderns inherit its over-inflated hyperbolic rhetorics of originality, interiority, and individual expression as a legacy fraught with all the conflicts embodied in the counter-rhetoric from Edgar Allen Poe’s “Philosophy of Composition,” to T. S. Eliot’s 1921 essay on “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” to the deconstruction into Roland Barthes’s “author-function” and so on, through current apparent abandonments of authorial originality as a feature of aesthetic expression. We are all familiar with the paradox of the name recognition accorded those writers/artists most keen to undo any claim to originality, but whose celebrity identities function as full commodities and brand memes in wide circulation.

How far have we come in the intervening three centuries? We have passed through the peak of Romanticism, with the elevation of talent to the place of full enthronement, celebrated the individual voice, and seen its demise—sort of. Poetry, literature, once high status activities, have sunk far below the other culture and entertainment industries—music, sports, film, games, and lifestyle production—and to have a “brand” as a writer is well, not exactly an aspirational goal among the broad population. Poetry is no longer a major player on the cultural stage, and outside of a greeting card it seems downright unpleasant, a sort of punitive linguistic act requiring patience, sensory deprivation, device abstinence, and other unpleasantnesses while being subject to language either obscure or pedantic, too structured or too confessional, accusatory or hortatory in some way that is impossible to manage.

[Twitter—handles] Contemporary condition—a eager participatory collaboration, a kind of pseudo-abandonment of authorial identity, since the twitter handles remain and
each line can be tracked back to an “author”, but the swimming pool bathing in it approach to language, the swill and output streams of verbal effluvia, unchecked, unedited, and unconstrained by decorum, have produced the flarf-iest flarf work imaginable. Originality and authorship, long banished in their authenticity, are here given their full expression as banality. All language is borrowed language, reworked, rethought.

[Penguins] Absorbed into a collective identity? A parlor game, except for the ways it mimics the larger communication field, the one in which social activity and communication participate in a massive multi-player online environment, in an addiction to exchange, but more profoundly, absorbed into systems and suction vortices that propel cultural momentum at a scale and speed in which the fact that the social functions as a medium becomes fully apparent. More on this as I move to towards my final points. Another parallel phenomenon is on the rise, the creation of collaborative and collective identities and practices. Not yet fully mature, but emerging on the sidelines of what feels more and more like an exhausted foreground (art shows filled with derivative works, recycled ideas, post-post-neo-non-anti-and so on ad tedium), is a form of collaborativity that seems driven by the activity of connection as much as by the need to make art or writing as a product. Experiential, communicative, affective, and motivated by absorption, the work does not necessarily turn its invested labor into commodity, but into immediacy

[Inflection] Authorship/individuation not a matter of originality, but of inflection, trace identity, that mark of differentiation. In this children’s exercise, what makes one square different from another is the graphical handwriting. The squares are not unique expressions of something, but distinctly differentiated expression as something—trace works of different hands. Here the concept of amongness begins to take visible form, as a way of thinking specificity without alterity. Specificity is inherent in any event, instant, action, instantiation—the fundamental condition of beingness is characterized by specificity, fundamental Heraclitan notion of change, impossibility of repetition and sameness, or George Spencer Brown’s first statement in Laws of Form, A=A if only and only if A≡A.

[Cloud gate] But I want to bring this discussion back here, not just to literary or artistic notions of authorial identity, but to the insight offered by contemporary work into the fundamental construction of self. Is it possible to think enunciation and identity without the subject/other construction? Also without “alterity”—and if so, does it offer a way to
think beyond the colonial/power structure relations that are inscribed into the “othering” of the world. Here, again, I am hinting at the eco-politics of “other others” than those by which we have been governed/disciplined in the past. I offer two radically contrasting images of engagement and reflection. The first is Cloud Gate, the Anish Kapoor sculpture whose seductive force of engagement, with any crowd, is that it immediately poses the viewer a dilemma of self-identification and local. Where am I? Who is I that I am in that? I is a reference point, part of the enunciative system. The concept of enunciation, subject formation, is embedded in the assumption that all human communication is an act initiated by someone to someone for some purpose. In making the communicative act, the I of the speaker immediately assumes the you of receiver—mechanistic, non-psychological, this is a socio-cultural understanding of the technological/instrumental aspects of communication. Useful, for a moment, to describe subject formation within these terms, structurally.

Writing in *The Material of Poetry*, Gerald Bruns makes the important observation that “subjectivity” is not constituted merely by what we say/speak, by our own speech acts, but by what we receive, listen to, and language by which we are addressed either passively or actively, individually or within a group. This observation, so often overlooked in constructing theories of the authorial subject (even if used in constructing critical insights into the produced or enunciated subject of media artifacts, discourses, and spaces), is what underpins my proposal to think about the specific identity and forms of the nodal, distributed, transactional subject of networked media environments, to which I will turn my attention in a moment.

This is the second “other” to which I want to pay attention, the subject of enunciation, the “other” I now associate with lessons from linguistic, psychoanalytic discourse, a construct essential to the anthropological, cultural, social, systems of power through the machinations of the symbolic. This is the “other” conceived as that which provides the subject its sense of itself as a subject. To cite Emile Benveniste’s 1970 formulation: *But immediately, as soon as he attributes the role of speaker to himself and takes possession of the language, he materializes the other before him, no matter what degree of presence he attributes to this other. All uttering is implicitly or explicitly an allocution, which posits an allocutor.* *(Langages, Mars, 1970)* Erica Hunt’s recent work on pronouns examines the critical aspects of such positionality, the discourses of othering that replicate the violence of race, in particular, but also class, gender, ethnicity, and other categories germane to identity politics and their consequences.
As to enunciation? It is always context dependent. It relies on “shifters”—terms whose value can only be determined in situ. I/you—by contrast to she/he/they/them which are identifiable, have a stable relation to a referent. Space and time, here/there, now/then are shifters, though the second term in each pair can be given a stable referent. These shifters are constituting structures of discourse. Linguists intent on finding features of “language” as a universal human system note that the distinction between I/you is something that is present, at the very least, implicit, in every human language system. If we suggest that middleware contains rules for conditions of utterance, of production, then we ask who occupies the “I” or “you” position in any digital enunciation? You know that only by being present to the utterance, or its representation, a place holder that is filled by the speaker. This matters because the production of enunciated discourse also produces and enunciated subject, that is, not an individual, but a position in relation to the discourse, its power structures, and its operations. For Kristeva, this is the basis of her analysis of the subject in a politics of linguistics and semiotics. For Lacan, this becomes the foundation of a theory of the subject of language. Neither assume a speaker who uses language as a subject, but rather, see the constitution of a subject as a language act. (Language is not something the subject uses, but something that makes the human subject.) This changes everything, since the dynamic production of a subject through enunciation can also be identified in the structuring principles of interface and middleware. Teasing out the precise modes of address that middleware builds into its protocols so that these are manifest in an interface is a little tricky—the linguistic features of I/you he/she are present in language, but seeing/describing the working of point of view systems of the graphics, the positioning of viewers into a place/time, suturing and interpellation of subjects into discourse is more complicated.

[Kusama] Yayoi Kusama’s “The Souls of Millions of Light Years” offers a dramatic contrast to Cloud Gate’s dis-location games. This image of a viewer taking a selfie in its midst is the perfect image/object on which to begin to move towards discussion of the constituted subject position of current medial environments and their enunciative apparatuses… No I/you here, only a proliferation of me, the me who sees itself endlessly, not as an other, but as a refracted self. No other is necessary, not the mirror game of Lacan’s infant, finding its self in an illusory image, but the self-device loop endlessly replicated. Who is the subject of enunciation in this instance? In all of these works, the author/artist is the directing force, of course, that is neither challenged nor obviated, but the circumstances of enunciation are for the viewer are a reification of millions of other others in this instance—whereas the Cloud Gate game is always located in social space,
the Kusama is unsocial illusion refracted to infinity—the image of the objet infinitely Grand A—the million mirrored self.

[Kalle] At an extreme to this, and raising other issues, is the work of the sound artist, Kalle Laar. His work titled Call the Glacier consists of a telephone hooked to a microphone within a melting glacier. You call the phone and when it picks up, the sound of the melting, cracking ice is what you hear. This is not pseudo-sentence, it is sound. But the “call” is an act that produces the receipt. I have called the glacier, asked for its sound, a sound in the world. It doesn’t “speak” in the usual sense, but it allows me to hear, to consider, to attend to the sound of its breaking, its dissolution, and being. This positionality as an aspect of enunciation allows us to think through human language relationally rather than oppositionally.

[Call] What is the enunciative activity of the world? If Call the Glacier is a call, an appeal, an attempt to engage, it is a call structured by the artist, obviously, not the glacier. The glacier is not sentient, it is not a being able to “speak” in any sense. Quite the contrary, the point is rather that it is not, and thus, the call is not to an other, but simply, an act of access to an acoustic experience as a phenomenon. In this situation, the spatial condition of listening is an enunciative formation not directed, not coming at me, not constructed in an I/thou formation of address.

[Cage] Instead, the experience allows me to be located amongst the multiplicities of sounds. These are not all language sounds, not at all, they are the sounds of the world, its articulations and expressions, and the subject becomes constituted within the field, matrix, of perception. The “me” is the underappreciated theoretical concept here, thought usually only in its narcissistic insular self-engagement, rather than as a replete transactional centralized node in the system of exchanges that constitute sentience and/or sensation without direct address. I have a relation to the sound, the experience, and am in a position in relation to it—but I am not made the “other” of its subject formulation, nor, vice versa. Again, I am among enunciations, not addressed by them or constituted in a binaristic structure of exchange, rather, in a location or position, of relations.

[Reas] Many enunciations in the current world are not human, not even animate, but machinic, electronic, produced within and from networked exchanges of signals and code. The pixilated images that stream non-stop in the works in Casey Reas’s Linear Perspective evoke an unexpected response—nostalgia. The longing for something
irrecoverable is provoked by their inherently ephemeral quality, but also, by the way they configure our relation to ourselves through new media. For all their richly contemporary state of the art style these works seem to reach for a lost human subject, as if Reas were trying to revive a moment in which the humanity and technology were sweetly, even innocently, bound to each other. I felt, looking at the flickering, drifting, rapidly reworked images, as if I were seeing some captured idea of the machines’ notions of who we are, or were, at a moment so removed from the present that only a trace memory remains of the lives we lived in this mortal form. Distance from the possibility of human subjectivity, that interplay of interiority/exteriority and self to self and other mediated through signs and images, seems poignantly remote. These affective works assert a pull on the heart, as if marking an irrevocable loss: the changed relation to the enunciative capacities of the machines, their own ability to articulate a subject position to which we no longer have exclusive claim. I cannot locate myself as a self, and yet, I watch, absorbed and fascinated, as if addicted to the impossibility of the very activity for which I most yearn. If only I might, could, find, see, a face I know. Nothing holds stable, the machine processes relentlessly, beautifully, eloquently. But the human subject cannot constitute itself in such circumstances, only remember that it was once able to do so. Thus the longing is set up, as a generative tension between viewer and screens, whose hypnotizing images draw us in and hold our gaze without any chance of a gaze returned. We glance off the blank stares of pixilated faces that nullify specificity even as they embody a proliferating difference. The visceral effect of this combination of beauty and sadness, plentitude and void, is profoundly ineffable. This is the nostalgia for the lost (human) subject of technology.

So, as I come to the end here, I want to make a very broad-strokes sketch of the larger field in which we as “subject-selves” are operating, and constituting those “selves” in:

(New) Medial enunciative modalities

[Apparatus] Though theories of subject enunciation are developed in linguistic/literary/critical studies, they are also able to be analysed in visual structures and expressions. Development of theory of subject—in film theory/apparatus studies (this anthology was published in the early 1980s)—took many cues from studies of perspective, not just as mechanistic technology (though it is that) but as an enunciative system.
[Perspective and Perspectives] Who speaks and who is spoken in an image, when these issues are posed as issues of control and power, not language in a literal sense? These are graphical systems of enunciation, not linguistic, and the inscription of positionality within them is marked by the way they embody and construct a point of view system. Point of view is an explicit assertion that a place from which a representation is made includes a place into which a viewer is positioned. As surely as linguistics markers—I and you, here and there—incribe point of view, so do graphical systems.

[Data] Current unmarking of enunciative frames—an aspect of middleware, screen display, authoring and publishing platforms, even though the rules of discourse and constraint produce a whole array of subject positions in their disciplinary workings.

[HCI] We might want to take theories of enunciation into analysis of the interface, for instance, and to consider its subject positions and positionalities. But the idea that in every instance of communication, someone is being addressed by someone for some purpose my not hold here any more than it holds in the complex condition of the natural world, where I am among sounds, but not addressed directly, I am located, but obliquely, constituted by amongness, not otherness. What if the subject/object distinctions, like other binaries, are no longer sufficient to explain the conditions of individuated being, identity, and enunciation, but only hark back to mechanistic constructions of identity in which it is the other against which the self makes itself. Can we rethink this into a more open set of constructions of subject formation?

[Screen] Because this view, here, is the view that never exists. We are not in a relation of other to the screen spaces.

[Selfie] The devices put us into endless engagement with the devices, are not in a social relation, but in that same amplified condition of refractive “me”-ness that is in the Kusama mirror world. All me, all the time— How many emails a day addressed to me? How many x, y, or z. Facebook—my collective identities/subjectivities as friend of X.

[Monster] But they also put us into this fictive gaze of the screen-other, the non-human being, which is neither sentient nor social, but nonetheless constitutive. The critical shift is recognition that that not every articulation is intended as communication, but is constituting us in a mediated and enunciative interaction. We receive these expressions without direct address, by hearing, over-hearing, being within the field of perception. I do
not have to be the “you” to an “I” who speaks in every instance. I may, instead, be something else—present to a field of enunciations and expressions of which I am a part, but not a binaristic other in the construction. Alternative constructions exist—pluralistic, not binaristic, present, but not oppositional or defining. I need not be in a relation of alterity with all enunciative acts. These are the “other others” of my title.

Can we take this back into consideration of the construction of identity and ask whether authorial identity is a privileged case of identity formation or whether, like the works of art I showed, is a formation symptomatic of current conditions of cultural and enunciative production?

**Conclusions**

So, I posit, that we accept the aesthetic not as other, different, but as a zone among others, with is specificity residing in a meta-practice of the “call” or “frame” performed as a deliberate act of “making” and see the possibility of an authorial identity that directs our attention to the enunciation of the world, without, necessarily, imagining one’s “self” as a construct of an “other” –but rather as part of, among, and within the world. That deconstruction, the taking apart of apart-ness, is the eco-politics that I mentioned at the outset.

**After Speaking in Tongues**

Symbols, writing, got here circuitously, through chipping stones and making lines in sand, culling pigments from earth and hollowing gourds until their echoes sounded aloud and even louder. Sticks and bones, the stuff of rhythm, flicker in the eyes, days in regular chopping, walking, scraping—body to body, hand in hand, animal chest and its own beating systems heart and blood, palpable breath.

Poetics grows up domesticated, like a dog, its bark reverberating in a group, then on a stage, holding forth. With meter and metrics the art advances, structured from body breath and motion, the short bursts and the long holding, the exhalation and the inward draw, into the chest, into the stomach, feet, hands. The stomping effect of form on language is to make it perform like song. All that went on a long time, after all, and the somatic pleasures of verse account in some large part for its popularity, letting the tricks of staccato and accent roll around in the mouth and on the tongue. The meaning of verse is an effect but the metric of it is the sound fact. On it goes, into shape-forms, numbers of this and that circumscribed, proscribed, adhered to. Dance steps for the intellect. Perform
accordingly. Alterations and exchanges. Forms also come in the luggage, hitch a ride on a trade route, get noticed at court, picked up off the street, overheard in the market, found in the back rooms, the bar rooms, the public square. The whole panoply of possibilities is populated by variant species of some things that are the same and some that are other. Human speech, human speaking, that prevails, even with the use of drums, guitars, the flutes and clarinets that take our breath away, even with all of these overarching them all is speech. Acts. Language. Synthesizer. The final transition to a light load on a heavy processor outputs as simulation. We don’t mind, amused by the voice that is not ever ours. The machines should be allowed to talk, to us, for us, with us, their servile guiding tone, responsive to requests. Not a threat. Not even a hint or whisper of an intelligence comes through. Nor should it. The sub sub level of production is in the offerings to use, in the new vocabulary of out-sourced sound files and types, the tones of inaudible and audible outputs take their place alongside the sighing springs and snapped elastic of an earlier era.

Gone the wooden slat slaps, the churn slurp, the creaking bridge and carriage wheels, the whip cut through the air, the chain pull and tackle pinch. Vanished the fire sparks and chimney wind, the grinder’s wheel and water paddle. Absent the hooves on stones and cobble, the crier’s noise, the vendor’s cries, the hawker’s call and drawbridge’s rise in pitches and starts against the background of the water. Barely anymore the factory whistle or the church chimes’ tolls the sound of cows the brush of water against their knees the goats’ short bleat and lambs’ forlorn call for their ewes. The texture of traffic, motors, apparatuses and operations layered into all that, putting hard edges into the softer meter of industrial verse. The terms of production became ones of conception and the mechanical operas with their brute battle against the sentimental sensations moved into the available real estate of the soundscape. We used these new techniques and measured our own humanity against them, with them, knowing ourselves to be immune, more or less, to the greater destructive forces of the times, maybe, except, and then saw the modernity that absorbed belief, took it over, ran with it, made the sheer drive towards some impossible pace of progress into a religion whose chants were increasingly not those of the breath the body the sigh. The role of accompaniment turned over into lead and result is not at the service of but subjection to a new regime, a discipline, a set of nodes and nodal modalities, mobilities, acuities. Not language of machines, not language in machines, not language coming into or out of machines, but the very takeover of soundnoise rhythms, produced how where, and so our self-adjusting ears adapt and produce alternate interiorities and external vibrations unlike the other sounds of prior utterance. A helicopter overhead beats with its wings and praises its own
singing. The noise music and the sound forms all escape and make new waves into the world. Our transformation hardly matters and goes with little notice unspoken, unsung. The time of tongues is past.