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1973
HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPT OF AUTHENTICITY

Douglas MacKay Kellner

1973

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, in the Faculty of Philosophy, Columbia University
ABSTRACT
Heidegger's Concept of Authenticity
Douglas MacKay Kellner

In Heidegger's Concept of Authenticity I work out an interpretation of the distinction between an authentic and inauthentic existence that is set forth in Being and Time. I attempt to bring out the fully articulated, complex structure of Heidegger's analysis in order to correct what I consider partial, misleading, or false interpretations of authenticity that dominate the voluminous literature on the subject. As I develop my own interpretation, I criticize the widely accepted view that authenticity is a way of being toward death and that one constitutes one's authentic existence solely through one's relation to one's own death. On the basis of this interpretation, held by Löwith, Sartre, Püggeler, Demski and many other prominent Heidegger scholars and major modern philosophers, it is even argued that Heidegger is a nihilist (de Waelhens, Schulz), who has a "death ethic" (Adorno), which is his "private religion" (Körner). I argue that this widely accepted interpretation overemphasizes one of the constitutive moments of authenticity and neglects the full structural content of Heidegger's concept. I believe that the misinterpretation is partly the result of overlooking the importance of the chapter on "Temporality and Historicity". This chapter indicates that the individual's authenticity is constituted through his struggle for liberation and authentic selfhood in one's historical world and not merely through a solipsistic relation to one's own death. I argue that only by understanding the relation between the authentic resolve, one's authentic being toward death, and the constituents of authentic historicity such as the heritage, fate and destiny, repetition, the moment of vision, and the struggle for
Introduction

In attempting to study and interpreting Heidegger's philosophy, one must first grapple with his language. Heidegger's

philosophy is rich in content, yet deeply embedded in his own language. Some

concepts are borrowed from classical philosophical thinkers and are part

of his own vocabulary; other concepts are his own creations, or

innovative words which he has chosen to coin to convey his philosophical concepts.

In all honesty, Heidegger is a great believer in words, their meanings

and etymology, and often we will try to re-decipher a forgotten concept

over a clarification of a word which currently has a different sense. This

intricate linguistic procedure makes the translation of Heidegger's language

into an appropriate English an important yet problematic procedure. I

shall take special pains to render Heidegger's language into a viable English,

shall provide a detailed elucidation of his most important concepts that.
There is a deep concern today for the problems of authenticity, liberation, self-transformation, and autonomy. I believe that Heidegger's concept of authenticity as set forth in Sein und Zeit has much to contribute both to the philosophical clarification of these problems and the personal concern for authenticity and liberation. This study will carry out a thematic inquiry into Heidegger's distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity as a dialectical contrast between two ways of being-in-the-world. I shall seek to work out the fully articulated, complex structure of the concept of authenticity in order to correct what I consider a partial, incomplete and often misleading, or false, interpretation of authenticity that dominates the voluminous literature on authenticity and Heidegger's Sein und Zeit. In my interpretation I shall strive for a clear, comprehensible presentation of Heidegger's sometimes difficult analyses.

The difficulties in reading and interpreting Heidegger's philosophy are notorious. One must first wrestle with his language. Heidegger's terminology is complex, very deeply embedded in the German language; some categories are borrowed from classical philosophical sources and are re-coined in his own vocabulary; other concepts are his own neo-logisms, or ordinary words which he has chosen to develop into philosophical concepts. As is well known, Heidegger is a great meditator on words, their meanings and etymologies, and often he will try to re-trive a forgotten, covered-over signification of a word which currently has a different sense. This intricate linguistic procedure makes the translation of Heidegger's language into an appropriate English an important but problematical procedure. I shall take special pains to render Heidegger's language into a viable English, shall provide a detailed elucidation of his most important concepts that
relate to our subject matter, and shall attempt to distinguish between special Heideggerian senses of his terms from their ordinary senses or from the senses intended by other thinkers. I shall also indicate where I disagree with translations in the Macquarrie and Robinson English rendition of *Sein und Zeit*.

The second problem the Anglo-American reader faces in confronting Heidegger is the philosophical framework and background of *Sein und Zeit*. Heidegger was heavily steeped in Greek, Medieval, and German philosophy, in Husserl's phenomenology, and in the themes of what is today called existentialism. In this regard, the concept of authenticity has a privileged position in *Sein und Zeit*, because, as I shall attempt to demonstrate, it can be more readily elucidated in language comprehensible to the English-speaking philosophical world than Heidegger's ontological problematic, his interpretations of other philosophers, or some of the anthropological themes in *Sein und Zeit*. I shall try not, however, to oversimplify Heidegger's philosophy, or to dilute the strong philosophical brew he devises, nor shall I cover over the explosive content of his distinction between authentic and inauthentic existence. Although I shall relate Heidegger's analyses to current Anglo-American philosophical concerns and our present social predicament, I shall not hesitate to call attention to Heideggerian procedures that challenge our philosophical presuppositions, as for example when Heidegger's concept of authenticity puts into question our distinction between normative and descriptive language. Nor shall I gloss over the challenge to our everyday sense of self, our socially conformist tendencies, our inauthenticity that Heidegger confronts us with. Indeed, one of the benefits of reading Heidegger is his putting into question our philosophical prejudices and our complacent commonsensical view of our being-in-the-world.

A serious difficulty that blocks the way of many readers in gaining
a clear understanding of Heidegger's concept of authenticity is the prevalent interpretations of authenticity in the secondary literature. Heidegger's interpreter's are, for the most part, mystifiers, or misleading simplifiers. The majority are more obscure than Heidegger, and heavy-handedly repeat his jargon without his originigical philosophical talent, his vision, his prolonged meditations on the problems he handles. In regard to our theme, the mystifications and distortions of Heidegger's followers have created a widely accepted interpretation of authenticity as a way of being toward death in which one, supposedly, constitutes his authentic existence solely through his relation to his own death. On the basis of this interpretation, it is argued, for example, that Heidegger is a nihilist who maintains a solipsistic "death ethic" which is his "private religion." A detailed criticism of this wide-spread and prevalent interpretation of authenticity explicated in terms of being toward death will take place in this study. I shall argue that this interpretation mystifies Heidegger's doctrine of authenticity by over-emphasizing one of the constitutive moments of authenticity and by failing to perceive the full conceptual content of Heidegger's concept of authenticity. I believe that the problematic of authenticity in Sein und Zeit has been misread and misinterpreted by a generation of Heidegger's interpreters who have overlooked the importance of the chapter on "Temporality and Historicity." This chapter, I shall argue, indicates that the individual's authenticity is constituted through his relation to his historical world and heritage, and not merely through a solipsistic relation to his own death. My analysis will suggest that the resoluteness that constitutes authenticity does not take

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This interpretation is discussed and criticized in Division III.
place in a solely subjectivistic self-interest but in a struggle for liberation in the historical world. I shall show how this concept of authenticity provides an interpretation of the individual's selfhood, autonomy, self-determination, commitment, and responsibility, and provides the basis of a doctrine of radical individualism. I shall emphasize constituents of authenticity overlooked or not sufficiently emphasized by previous interpreters and hope to work out the full concept of authenticity that encompasses the interconnectedness of all its constituent structures.

Another problem of interpretation, which I shall note here, but not thematically develop, is that recent interpretations of Heidegger's philosophy have approached the problem of authenticity from the perspective of the later Heidegger, whose turn from the existential anthropology and problem of authenticity in Sein und Zeit to more purely ontological concerns in his later writings have prompted his followers to neglect Sein und Zeit and authenticity\(^1\), or to read the later Heidegger into his early work. Unfortunately, those who interpret authenticity (and Sein und Zeit) from the perspective of the later Heidegger (whose concern is the question of being) often read into Sein und Zeit a questionable interpretation of the concept of authenticity in that work. For example, Richardson defines authenticity as a "transcendence unto Being which is proper to itself" (p. 83), and defines the constitution of the authentic self as a "transcending beings to Being" (p. 50), which requires a recollection of the "ontological dimension"

\(^1\) A survey of Heidegger literature dating from the 1950's to the present day shows that there has been no major thematic inquiry into authenticity. In fact, Pereboom in his generally excellent and comprehensive subject index to his Heidegger-Bibliographie fails to list Eigentlichkeit! The most recent studies in English have ignored the question of authenticity, even when they have explicitly interpreted Sein und Zeit. Schmitt's Martin Heidegger on Being Human (New York: Random House, 1969) limits himself to a few cursory remarks on our topic. Olafson's Persons and Principles (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1967), which offers an "ethical interpretation of Existentialism," limits discussion of authenticity to a few scattered footnotes.
But this explication interprets authenticity in terms of the so-called ontological difference (Being-beings) which is not thematically developed in Sein und Zeit, and thus anticipates a later mode of thought which is not found in the analyses of authenticity in Heidegger's early work. In this study I shall solely focus on authenticity in Sein und Zeit, referring to later works only when they elucidate the topic under consideration, and will not investigate the much debated problem of the relation between Sein und Zeit and Heidegger's later works.

Thus my interpretation of authenticity will be based on a reading of Sein und Zeit and will not be concerned with the problems in Heidegger's later philosophy. I wish to de-mystify Heidegger's concept of authenticity both from the interpretation that interprets authenticity as a way of being toward death and that interprets authenticity in terms of Heidegger's later philosophy. I hope to disclose the liberating core of authenticity that is found in Heidegger's Sein und Zeit, but which has been buried over by his interpreters. I shall, in this study, be primarily concerned with interpreting Heidegger's philosophy and not criticizing it. Some critical remarks noting limitations and deficiencies of Heidegger's concept of authenticity will be reserved until the conclusion.

This study will first (Division I) set forth Heidegger's analysis of "The Fall into das Man." In this division we shall discuss Heidegger's conception of an inauthentic existence, and examine some specific inauthentic

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Richardson, William. Martin Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1963). A recent example of the interpretation of authenticity in terms of a meditation of Being and what the author calls an "ontological reflective turn" (p. 87) is found in Erickson's Language and Being (New Haven: Yale, 1970). This interpretation will be criticized in a later chapter.
ways of being. This analysis raises the problem of liberation and self-
transformation, and the philosophical question of the philosophical status
of Heidegger's concept of authenticity. Next, (II) we shall inquire into
the possibility of "Extrication and Individuation" from an inauthentic
existence. We shall see how the experiences of anxiety, one's own death,
conscience, and guilt make possible the movement toward an authentic
existence. Thirdly, (III) we shall set forth Heidegger's concept of an
authentic existence, and shall confront the problem of the interpretation
of authenticity. In conclusion, we shall comment on the possibility of an
ethical interpretation of Heidegger's concept of authenticity. Finally, we
shall see how the problems raised in this study bear on some central
philosophical problems of the present age.
Division One

THE FALL INTO DAS MAN

Heidegger claims that human beings are always future-oriented (zukunftsorientiert) and always project themselves towards future possibilities, understanding itself in terms of possibilities which it is to be. (2) The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence. Accordingly, these characteristics which can be exhibited in this being are not 'pretensions' present-at-hand; they are always possible ways for it to be and only that” (S2, 42). Because

"Dasein" is one of these semantic Heideggerian concepts that define translation, which I shall follow the convention of the translation of Being and Time, as shall leave is untranslated (cf. Being and Time, p. 27). A literal English translation would be "there-being," but this strikes one as clumsy and artificial. "Dasein" is an important philosophical term for such German philosophers as Kant and Hegel where it signifies "existence," "presence," or "life," and has refer to the being of god, angels, people or any existing objects. Heidegger limits the application of Dasein to human beings, thus Dasein for Heidegger refers to our being-in-the-world with its unique characteristics and ways of being which Heidegger explicates in his existential analytic.

Heide and Zell (Heidegger: Manuscript, 1963). Zell and Zell will be referred to occasionally as Z., and page references will be in the German edition. The
Heidegger begins his "Theme of the Analytic of Dasein"¹ by stating:

"We ourselves are the being whose analysis stands as the problem. The being (Sein) of this being (Seinden) is always mine (je meines)" (SZ 41).²

My being is the problem which stands at the center of the existential analytic in SZ. Heidegger stresses that I am always delivered over to my own being, and that I always have a relationship to my being. Moreover, this being concerns me; it is my being that is at stake (es geht um). My being is a matter of vital importance to me. The being at stake, the being toward which I relate myself and am concerned with are possible ways to be. These ways to be are my possibilities. Existence means in this analysis: to stand toward one's possibilities. This analysis elucidates two of Heidegger's propositions concerning the essence of human being: (1) "The 'essence' of this being lies in its 'to be' (Zu-sein)" (SZ 42). The claim here indicates the temporality of human being: its being related to its future, its being toward its being in time. Heidegger claims that human being is always future oriented (sich vorweg) and always projects itself toward its future possibilities, understanding itself in terms of possibilities which it is to be. (2) "The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence. Accordingly those characteristics which can be exhibited in this being are not 'properties' present-at-hand; they are always possible ways for it to be and only that" (SZ 42). Because

¹"Dasein" is one of those special Heideggerian concepts that defies translation, thus I shall follow the convention of the translators of Being and Time and shall leave it untranslated (cf. Being and Time, p. 27). A literal English translation would be "there-being," but this strikes one as clumsy and artificial. "Dasein" is an important philosophical term for such German philosophers as Kant and Hegel where it signifies "existence," "presence," or "life," and can refer to the Dasein of God, angels, people or any existing object. Heidegger limits the application of Dasein to human being, thus Dasein for Heidegger refers to our being-in-the-world with its unique characteristics and ways of being which Heidegger explicates in his existential analytic.

²Sein und Zeit (Tubingen: Niemeyer, 1963). Sein und Zeit will be referred to hereafter as SZ, and page references will be to the German edition. The
I stand related to my possibilities and am concerned with them and because I can choose my possibilities and can determine my being, my being is not a thing or an object but a Seinkonnen, a potentiality-for-being (cf. SZ 86, 144, 167, 232-3).

Dasein is always mine in this or that way to be. It has itself always made some sort of decision as to the way in which Dasein is always mine. The being which in its being has this being at stake, comports itself toward its being as its ownmost possibility. In each case Dasein is its possibility, and it 'has' this possibility, but not just as a property, as something present-at-hand would. And because Dasein is always essentially its own possibility, it can in its very being, 'choose' itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only 'seem' to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic—that is, something made its own (sich zueigen ist)—can it have lost itself and not yet won itself (SZ 42-3).

Dasein can be authentic: it can choose to be authentic, and can choose its own possibilities, appropriating, making its own (sich zueigen) those possibilities through which one constitutes an authentic existence. But Heidegger claims that at first and for the most part most people are not authentic: they have not chosen authenticity or appropriated their own possibilities; they are inauthentic.

The two modes of being of authenticity and inauthenticity (these expressions have been chosen terminologically in a strict sense) are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein is characterized by mineness. The inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any 'less' being or any 'lower' degree of being. Rather, inauthenticity can characterize Dasein even in its fullest concretion—when it is busy, excited, interested, and ready for enjoyment (SZ 42-3).

In Heidegger's hermeneutic, the two basic ways to be, the two fundamental possibilities of existence, which I can choose or fail to choose, are authenticity and inauthenticity. These ways to be are a matter of concern

translations will be my own, although I often rely on and sometimes follow Macquarrie and Robinson's rendition in Being and Time (New York: Harper and Row, 1962).
to me and my being is always at stake in one of these modes. I shall take this dialectical contrast between two opposed ways of being as an interpretive key to exhibiting Heidegger's concept of authenticity. The starting point of the analysis is inauthenticity, not being authentic. Heidegger argues that most people are not aware of their mineness, of their possible authenticity, and have not chosen their own possibilities. He writes: "When Dasein is absorbed in the world of its concern (which means at the same time in its being with others) it is not itself. Who is it, then, who has taken over being as everyday being—with—one—another?" (SZ 125). This perhaps perplexing statement introduces Heidegger's argument that most people are not themselves when they are absorbed in the work world of everyday concern and in the social world (Mitsein) of their interpersonal relationships. This paradox raises the question of authenticity and requires a clarification of who has taken over our selfhood in our everyday being and how and why the everyday self is an inauthentic self who lacks authentic self-being. This situation raises the problem of selfhood: What does it mean to be a self? What is authentic selfhood? We shall begin by showing what it is to not be a self, to be inauthentic, and then we shall later show how most people on Heidegger's account do not possess a self because they lack the essential characteristics of authentic selfhood.

Our quest for authenticity thus begins with Heidegger's inquiry into the everyday self. The question of authenticity is first brought into our attention thematically in SZ 27 where Heidegger engages in a behavioral analysis of how everyday Dasein interacts with others in its everyday social world (Mitwelt). His method is to describe "certain ways of being" that disclose the structures of the everyday self (SZ 126). His remarks on the self in SZ #25 (and elsewhere in SZ) indicate that the self is to be
interpreted neither as an ontological substance with certain properties, nor as a self-evident given that requires no ontological analysis. Rather, the problem of the self is to be clarified by "exhibiting phenomenally a definite kind of being" (SZ 117); i.e. what is at stake is a phenomenological description of ways of being which explicates how the self is in its everyday "dealings" (Umgang): "The task is to make visible phenomenally the kind of this being-with-others (Mitdaseins) in its closest everydayness and to interpret it in a way which is ontologically appropriate" (SZ 116).

We shall see in this chapter how Heidegger's description of the everyday self introduces us to his conceptions of (A) das Man and inauthenticity. We shall then examine (B) some of the inauthentic ways of being of the das Man self, such as (1) idle talk, (2) curiosity, and (3) ambiguity. Finally, (C) we shall discuss Heidegger's analysis of falling into inauthenticity, and shall attempt to ascertain (1) why we fall and (2) if there is a way out.

A. Das Man and Inauthenticity

We shall how focus upon some familiar phenomena of the everyday world which are conceptualized by Heidegger in a new and interesting way. His concepts should call attention to some features of our experience and ways

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Heidegger criticizes traditional concepts of selfhood in SZ #25 on the grounds that traditional ontological prejudices stand in the way of gaining a genuine understanding of the phenomenon of the self and must be removed if we are to obtain access to the "thing itself." This activity of breaking through distortions and clearing away obstacles to understanding is what Heidegger means by a "phenomenological destruction" of the tradition, and is carried out with the positive intention of clarification and conceptual understanding. The specific problem of the "being of the self" will be considered in a later section on "The Authentic Self."
of being which we do not usually explicitly focus upon, and should awaken us to the inauthenticity of our everyday social existence. The everyday phenomena under investigation are what Heidegger calls the "ontic" and are distinguished from his concepts which are "ontological." A clarification of his procedure should help elucidate the much disputed problem of the relation between the ontic and the ontological in Heidegger's Sz. Heidegger presents us with a framework of ontological concepts for interpreting our everyday ontic experience. Ontological concepts are said to explicate the "being of entities" (Sz 12), and conceptualize "primordial structures of experience" (Sz 54) that are essential and "determinative" for human being (Sz 16-7, 44). They explicate the most "basic concepts" (Sz 10) of a given subject matter and "lay bare" and exhibit (Sz 37) the conceptual structure of that subject matter. The subject matter or region presently under consideration is "average everydayness," the way we are "at first and for the most part" in our everyday work world and social world. The ontological concepts in this division thus provide the conceptual structure of an ontology of social existence and denote characteristics purportedly common to and shared by all historical societies.

Heidegger contrasts his ontological problematic with "the ontical inquiry of the positive sciences" (Sz 11). Hence I suggest that the ontic-ontological distinction, in terms of its use in Sz, be taken as a categorical distinction between different types of categories. Ontic categories, in this explication, are those of the special sciences which are concerned with particular empirical subject matters such as, for example, American society, stimulus-response conditions for a specified experiment, or the sexual behavior of Australian aborigines. Ontological categories, on the other hand, are a type of general philosophical category that describes, for instance, social being as such,
the categorical structure of nature, and human sexuality in its invariant
universal structures. Heidegger holds that ontological inquiry is "more
primordial" (SZ 11) since it explicates the basic concepts of experience that
constitute the subject matter in question (SZ 10-12, 16-7, 44-5, 54-5).
Moreover, he claims that his existential ontology lays the foundation for the
ontic sciences of man (SZ #10), and thus is superordinate to the various ontic
sciences (SZ 10, 45, 49-51, 247, 293). But the roots of the ontological
analysis "are ultimately existentiell, that is, ontical" (SZ 13), i.e. the
ontological is always rooted in the ontic for Heidegger (this methodological
dictum comprises Heidegger's empiricism: the ontological analysis must
always be empirically founded and verified). The philosophical method which
Heidegger utilizes in his ontological conceptualization of ontic phenomena
is phenomenology (cf. SZ #7). Although much has been written about Heidegger's
phenomenology,¹ it has not been sufficiently emphasized that Heidegger uses
the phenomenological method to secure an ontic grounding of his ontology.
This is clear both in his scorn for "free floating" philosophical constructions
cut off from experience (i.e. SZ 272, 295), and in methodological remarks
indicating that his concepts encompass "primordial structures" of experience
and aim at "a stable coinage for the appropriate structural concepts" (SZ 54-5).
Moreover, Heidegger constantly appeals to experience so that his ontological
concepts and analyses can be "confirmed" or "attested to" through ontic
phenomena (SZ 243f, 267f, 305f). The ontological categories of, for example,
our social existence are derived from our understanding of our everyday

¹ For a general summary of Heidegger's phenomenology see Herbert Spiegel-
For more recent interpretations see W. B. Macomber's The Anatomy of Disillusion:
Martin Heidegger's Notion of Truth (Evanston: Northwestern, 1967) and Richard
existence (what Heidegger calls our pre-ontological understanding: SZ 15-7, 312-5) and from the special ontic sciences. He argues that ontological analysis is "accomplished by repeating what has already been ontically discovered, and by purifying it in a way which is ontologically more transparent" (SZ 51). Thus the ontology of social existence we shall now examine is rooted both in the ontic social sciences and in our pre-ontological non-reflective understanding of social existence. Because Heidegger's ontological analysis purports to describe the social existence of all historical societies it lends itself to describing out current forms of social existence and can be illustrated by ontic examples which, theoretically, should provide both evidence for Heidegger's analysis and an ontic exemplification of his ontological categories. His ontological categories further describe forms of inauthenticity (SZ 44) in our everyday ways of talking, understanding, seeing, interpreting, and acting. Moreover, these categories are interconnected with a concept of authenticity which recommends modifications of these ways of being. Thus after explicating some of Heidegger's ontological categories we shall raise the question of whether his social ontology contains a critique of social existence.

The first phenomenon to be noted is the daily nagging concern over how one stands in his worldly pursuits. This calculation of how one differs from the other is operative, Heidegger claims, both when one believes he has fallen behind the others and wishes to catch up, or when he is ahead and strives to maintains his advantage.¹

¹"Im Begangen dessen, was man mit, fur und gegen die Anderen ergriffen hat, ruht standig die Sorge um einen Unterschied gegen die Anderen, sei es auch nur, um den Unterschied gegen sie auszugleich, sei es, dass das eigene Dasein—gegen die Anderen zuruckbleibend—im Verhältnis zu ihnen aufholen will, sei es, dass das Dasein im Vorrang über die Anderen darauf aus ist, sie niederzuhalten" (SZ 126).
The watchful concern over how one stands is disturbing to everyday Dasein who constantly worries about its position and social standing. This phenomenon of "keeping up with the Joneses" is all too familiar to us today. In our status-conscious society governed by the thrust toward upward mobility and by climbing the social ladder, one defines his position and measures his worth by the quantitative standards provided to indicate where one stands in the race for success and advancement. Social class, income, grade average, IQ, property, consumer possessions, money, and other quantifiable items are the measuring rods. Heidegger calls this phenomenon of calculating one's standing "distantiality" (Abstandigkeit).

Although the concern over "how one stands" is often inconspicuous it stubbornly dominates our daily affairs to such an extent that we generally live in subjection (Botmassigkeit) to the others. For in order to maintain my standing I must do what they approve of, praise, command and require, thus submitting to an often subtle domination by the norms and conventions of my society. Hence, I must be careful to follow prescribed ways of behavior so as to maintain my "good standing" in the public world. Heidegger's remarks could be further developed to elucidate the phenomena of conformity and "other-directedness."

For on Heidegger's account it is this submission to the other

"Other-directedness" is a popular term developed by David Riesman in The Lonely Crowd, (New Haven: Yale Press, 1950). Riesman provides a massive and interesting documentation of what he calls the "other directed" character, but he claims that this phenomenon is especially descriptive of modern, particularly American, man and is contrasted with different "character types" which Riesman claims were dominant in other societies and eras. Thus, Riesman sees "capitalism, industrialism, and urbanization" (ontic) as the determinants of "other-directedness," whereas Heidegger sees concern over one's standing (Abstandigkeit) leading to subjection and domination (Riesman's "conformity") as tendencies of social being as such (ontological). In this regard, it is interesting to note that Riesman implies that all the various "character types" and "social structures" examined in his research induce conformity attained through various socialization processes (which Riesman describes and compares
and concern over how one stands which induces one to conform to the ways to be of the public. Submitting to an other-directed existence has serious implications for my conception of selfhood. For when I live in the eyes of the others I am as they see me; thus, I gain my conception of who I am by what they say about me and how they react to me. Afraid of "losing my standing" I refrain from doing what is unaccepted and criticized by them and thus conform to their patterns of behavior, becoming like them, one of the many, thus losing my own possibilities of thought and action.¹

Thus, one's concern over where he stands (Abständigkeit) keeps one in bondage (Botmässigkeit) to the others with whom he shares the world. For in calculating its "distantiality" Dasein places itself under an inconspicuous domination whereby the other directs and dictates what one must do: what is acceptable, advantageous, required, frowned upon, forbidden, and so forth. The inconspicuousness of the other's control resides in the fact that the others are not any definite others. The others, Heidegger stresses, are

¹ in detail) that ensure that the individual "adjusts" to the social order. In dialogue with Riesman and the sociologists, Heidegger could claim to "undercut" the various differences in socialization from one society to another so as to provide an "ontological" conceptualization of the structures that are invariant and universal in all societies, and thus could help explain what insures conformity in any social context. However, when I use the term "other directedness" and "conformity" in interpreting Heidegger, I do not wish to restrict it to Riesman's use, but rather intend it as an explication of what Heidegger claims goes on in every society in every age.

¹ "Das Dasein steht als alltägliches Miteinandersein in der Botmässigkeit der Anderen. Nicht es selbst ist, die Anderen haben ihm das Sein abgenommen. Das Belieben der Anderen verfügt über die alltäglichen Seinsmöglichkeiten des Daseins" (SZ 126).
interchangeable and faceless. Moreover, I belong to the others myself and hence enhance their power. This unobtrusive identification with the others serves to increase their domination, for by investing my power in them I help create a gigantic anonymous abstraction that becomes what Heidegger calls "the dictator" of everydayness, *das Man*. Hence, in Heidegger's account, the "anonymous one," "they," "the others," *das Man*, comes to exert its constraints and control over everyday *Dasein* who willingly submits to its dictatorship. But who, one might wonder, is *das Man*? Heidegger answers:

The 'who' is not this one, not that one, not oneself, and not the sum of them all. The 'who' is the neuter, the 'they', *das Man* (SZ 126).

Heidegger's conception of *das Man* is one of his most controversial and suggestive ontological concepts. Whereas one could plausibly translate *das Man* into French as *le On*, it resists successful, accurate translation into English, thus I shall retain Heidegger's German "*das Man*" to call attention to the fact that, like "*Dasein,*" "*das Man*" represents a very special and important conception for Heidegger. The interesting and untranslatable feature of the German "*das Man*" is that Heidegger takes the pronoun *man* which connotes "one, we, you, they, people," and molds it into a substantive noun

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1 "Diese Anderen sind dabei nicht bestimmte Andere. Im Gegenteil, jeder Andere kann sie vertreten. Entscheidend ist nur die unauffällige, vom *Dasein als Mitsein* unversehens schon übernommene Herrschaft der Anderen" (SZ 126).

2 "Das Wer ist nicht dieser und nicht jener, nicht man selbst und nicht einige und nicht die Summe Aller. Das 'Wer' ist das Neutrum, *das Man* (SZ 126).

3 "Das Man has been variously translated as the "they" (Macquarrie and Robinson), the "one," the public, the herd, etc. These translations have varying degrees of contextual appropriateness, but none of them seems to adequately work in all the contexts within which Heidegger utilizes "*das Man*," hence I shall retain the German, *das Man*, so as to remain as faithful as possible to Heidegger's conceptions—which is one of the foremost interpretative keys to the contrast authenticity-inauthenticity.
preceded by the neuter *das*, thus creating a substantive neuter which skillfully expresses the anonymous yet efficacious character of *das Man* that Heidegger wishes to elucidate.¹

To further elucidate the structure of his conception of the anonymous public, *das Man*, Heidegger refers back to his analysis of the shared environment suggesting that an inspection of the structure of the environing world (*Umwelt*) shows the ubiquitous predominance of *das Man*. The fact to focus upon is that when one utilizes public instrumentalities (*Zuhanden*) one is like any other person who makes use of such things as the subway, telephone, newspaper, traffic lights, and is thus indistinguishable and anonymous, for these instruments are designed to be used by anyone. This interchangeability and anonymity dissolves one's own Dasein into that of functioning as any other so that as one becomes absorbed in the instrumentalities of the public world, one becomes indistinguishable from any one else. It is in this indistinguishability and inconspicuousness that the dictatorship of *das Man* is concealed.²

If this were confined to using public instruments and media it would, of course, be quite innocuous. But Heidegger claims that *das Man's* domination

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¹ I might point out that in order to avoid confusion between the ontic and ontological one must keep in mind that *das Man* is an ontological conception for Heidegger and does not refer to something that we encounter in the world (ontic). Instead, one should see that Heidegger is describing and interpreting certain phenomena in terms of his conception of *das Man*, and is not inventing a new entity that has hitherto been undiscovered. Rather, we are offered a new way of seeing some familiar structures of our everyday experience, the conceptual interconnectedness of which are explicated in Heidegger's conception of *das Man*.

² "In dieser Unauffälligkeit und Nichtfeststellbarkeit entfaltet das Man seine eigentliche Diktatur" (SZ 126).
and everyday Dasein's submission extends into every aspect of our daily life so that how we understand, talk, interpret, and act is controlled and circumscribed by the indefinite public. In an important and revealing passage we read:

We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they (man) take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the 'great mass' as they shrink back; we find 'shocking' what they find shocking. Das Man, which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of being of everydayness (SZ 126-7).

Thus, our submission to das Man is not, Heidegger claims, limited to making use of public instrumentalities; for instance, taking a subway ride to the Museum of Modern Art. The significant and deadly domination of das Man consists in designating and prescribing certain possibilities of my everyday being. For I am to take pleasure in art as they take pleasure; I am to see and judge paintings as they see and judge; I am to feel anxious about the "masses" on the subway and street as they are anxious; I am to be overtly shocked (or titilated) by the attractive girl in the miniskirt as they disapprove (or approve)—in short, I am to think and behave as one does, comme il faut, as the French put it.

The important consequence of this pervasive dictatorship is that in prescribing the kind of being of everydayness das Man tends toward averageness (Durchschnittlichkeit) as its characteristic way to be.¹ Das Man, Heidegger

¹"Das Man hat selbst eigene Weisen zu sein. Die genannte Tendenz des Mitsseins, die wir die Abständigkeit nannten, gründet darin, dass das Miteinandersein als solches die Durchschnittlichkeit besorgt. Sie ist ein existenzialer Charakter des Man. Dem Man geht es in seinem Sein wesentlich um sie (SZ 127).
implies, has its interests to protect (what is "at stake" : es geht...um), and thus prescribes what it regards as acceptable and what is not acceptable, what it shall grant success and what it shall condemn to failure. This care for averageness results in the levelling down (Einebnung) of all possibilities of being.¹

Calculating one's standing, submission, averageness, and levelling down constitutes the publicness (Offentlichkeit) of das Man (SZ 127).² Publicness controls Dasein's comprehension of its being-in-the-world for everything that is said or done is interpreted and understood in terms of das Man's ways of understanding for "das Man itself prescribes the way of


²The phenomenon of the "public" dominating and levelling down possibilities of understanding was analyzed by Kierkegaard in The Present Age: "In order that everything should be reduced to the same level, it is first of all necessary to procure a phantom, its spirit, a monstrous abstraction, an all-embracing something which is nothing, a mirage—that phantom is the public." (London: Fontana Press, 1965; p. 66). But Kierkegaard, unlike Heidegger, sees the rise of the levelling public as an historical phenomenon distinguishing the present age from situations of the past. This emphasis on the present situation of the existing individual differentiates Kierkegaard's existence philosophy from Heidegger's ontological Dasein analysis. But despite differences in methodology and emphasis there is a basic similarity between Kierkegaard's dissection of the present age and Heidegger's analysis of the levelling process of public opinion, the tyranny of the anonymous mass, and the threat to authenticity that the individual faces through conforming to social practices. Heidegger's conception is presented in language so close to Kierkegaard's that one receives the impression that Kierkegaard was an important source for Heidegger's conception of the anonymous dictator of everydayness, das Man. The following samples from The Present Age should make this clear:
interpreting the world and being-in-the-world which lies closest" (SZ 129). Thus a certain average understanding, a levelling down common sense controls everyday Dasein's understanding, and restricts its possibilities of understanding to what is shared and passed along in public. But despite its power over everyday Dasein, das Man's understanding does not, in Heidegger's view, have any special claim to cognitive priority, but rather covers over, obscures, and blocks Dasein's access to the "things themselves":

Publicness proximally controls every way in which the world and Dasein get interpreted, and it is always right—not because there is some distinctive and primary relationship of being in which it is related to 'things', or because it avails itself of some transparency on the part of Dasein which it has explicitly appropriated, but because it is insensitive to every difference of level and of genuineness and thus never gets into the 'heart of the matter'. By publicness everything gets obscured, and what has thus been covered up gets passed off as something familiar and accessible to everyone (SZ 127).

Publicness not only controls Dasein's possibilities of understanding and interpreting ("they say"), but also influences its way of acting. For not only is das Man the repository of belief and opinion, but it also prescribes how one must act if he is to be accepted and win general approval ("thou shalt", "you should", "you must"). Thus by setting down social norms and moral rules das Man controls and prescribes Dasein's possibilities of acting.

The public is, in fact, the real Levelling-master rather than the actual leveller, for whenever levelling is only approximately accomplished it is done by something, but the public is a monstrous nothing...This abstraction which the individuals so illogically form, quite rightly repulses the individual instead of coming to his help...Made up of such individuals at the moments when they are nothing, a public is a kind of gigantic something, an abstract and deserted void which is everything and nothing, the most dangerous of all powers and the most insignificant (ibid, pp. 66-70)
This both restricts Dasein to socially accepted behavior and by tacitly relieving the individual of the patos of choice and decision takes away the burden of personal responsibility: "Because das Man seems to make all one's judgements and decisions, it takes away responsibility from the individual Dasein" (SZ 127).¹ For when questioned as to why one performed or failed to perform any given action, everyday Dasein can always appeal to das Man for justification invoking the defense that one says, does, would do, should refrain from, and so forth. And as das Man's anonymity makes it impossible to pinpoint responsibility on anyone in particular, in effect, Heidegger ironically suggests, "in Dasein's everydayness that through which most things happen is that of which we must say 'it was no one'" (SZ 127).

In this way everyday Dasein abdicates its responsibility to das Man and is thus disburdened (entlastet) of its answerability for its actions. By disburdening Dasein, das Man accommodates one, making things easy for him who goes along with das Man and its ways to be.² "Take it easy", das Man recommends, and although the phrase is innocent enough, it conceals das Man's tendency to deprive Dasein of its possibilities of thought and action by disburdening it of its personal responsibility, and by accommodating it to public opinion and ways to be. "And because das Man constantly accommodates the particular Dasein by disburdening it of its being, it retains and reinforces

¹Macquarrie and Robinson translate the phrase "nimmt es dem jeweiligen Dasein die Verantwortlichkeit ab" as "deprives the particular Dasein of its answerability," but I wish to bring out the implication of "responsibility" in Verantwortlichkeit, and will later argue that a concept of responsibility can be extracted from SZ.

²"Das Man entlastet so das jeweilige Dasein in seiner Alltäglichkeit. Nicht nur das; mit dieser Seinsentlastung kommt das Man dem Dasein entgegen, sofern in diesem die Tendenz zum Leichtnehmen und Leichtmachen liegt" (SZ 127-8).
its stubborn authority" (SZ 128). Thus,

Everyone is the other, and no one is himself. Das Man
which supplies the answer to the question of the 'who' of
everyday Dasein is the 'nobody' to whom every Dasein has
already surrendered itself in being-among-one-another (SZ 128).\(^1\)

We now see that, in Heidegger's interpretation, the "who" of everyday
Dasein is das Man, therefore das Man is the self of everydayness. Hence,
everyday Dasein is not itself, because it is das Man. Das Man, then, has
"taken over" one's selfhood in one's everyday being-with-others. The
phenomenon upon which Heidegger is founding his interpretation is what we
call conformity: the tendency of other-directed Dasein to act and think as
they do, thus divesting itself of its individuality and its possibility of
constituting its own self-being. The everyday self, the way of being that we
have just described, is explicited in terms of "calculating one's standing,
averageness, levelling down, publicness, the disburdening of one's being and
accommodation" (SZ 128). This tendency to behave as the others constitutes the
"constancy" (Ständigkeit) of everyday Dasein: its habitual behaving in much
the same way as everybody else, resulting in certain regularities and uniformities
in social behavior in both the individual and the group. This constancy and
conformity are the mark of the self of everydayness, the public self. But
this tendency toward other-directedness, submission, and averageness is,
Heidegger stresses, the mode of inauthenticity. Hence, the "constancy"
(Ständigkeit) of the everyday self is really an inconstancy, a "failure to stand
by one's self" (Unselbstständigkeit). Therefore,

\(^1\)"Jeder ist der Andere und Keiner er selbst. Das Man, mit dem sich
die Frage nach dem Wer des alltäglichen Daseins beantwortet, ist das Niemand,
dem alles Dasein im Untereinandersein sich je schon ausgeliefert hat" (SZ 128).
In these ways of being, one is in a state of inauthenticity and failure to stand by one’s self (Unselbständigkeit) (SZ 128; italics mine).

Everyday Dasein, in Heidegger’s interpretation, exists inauthentically. At this point we face a crucial hermeneutical problem. For what is the status of the concepts "authentic" and "inauthentic"? How is Heidegger using "inauthentic" in his claim that everyday Dasein is in a "state of inauthenticity"? In this chapter we have seen that for Heidegger inauthenticity represents a way of not being oneself that is conceptualized in terms of the structures of das Man, and interpreted in the hermeneutic of authenticity. The interconnection of das Man with inauthenticity and the contrast of the das Man self (inauthentic self) with the authentic self suggests that Heidegger’s hermeneutical project contains a negative evaluation of das Man, hence it seems that "inauthenticity" is a condemmatory concept used to express a negative evaluation. For does not the tendency of das Man toward averageness and a conformist submission in its state of inauthenticity indicate a character of mediocrity, banality, and negativity? Does not Heidegger’s language of inauthenticity then express a negative judgment? His analysis implies that everyday Dasein not only lacks something (authenticity), but also exists in an inferior or blameworthy mode of being. Thus, is Heidegger not warning us that Dasein’s domination by das Man indicates a dictatorship over the individual through the mass, group, or society that poses a threat to individual being-a-self? Is he not criticizing and negatively characterizing das Man and the everyday self?

The problem is this: since Heidegger is admittedly engaged in a hermeneutic of everyday existence, one could expect that the phenomena being described would be interpreted in terms of a hermeneutical projection. In this context,
it does seem plausible to interpret the hermeneutic of das Man as a critical, negative evaluation of social forms of everydayness. But this interpretation is put into question by Heidegger's claim that he is not engaged in a "moralizing critique of everyday Dasein" and his counter claim that he is doing "pure ontology":

It may not be superfluous to remark that our interpretation has a purely ontological intention, and is far removed from any moralizing critique of everyday Dasein and from the aspirations of 'culture philosophy' (SZ 167).

This disclaimer raises extremely difficult problems which are central to the question of interpreting authenticity. For the question arises as to whether authenticity-inauthenticity are evaluative or descriptive categories. Although it has seemed that these categories are evaluative, Heidegger claims that his intentions (and thus categories) are purely ontological, which might lead one to conclude that Heidegger's categories are purely descriptive. In fact, this is exactly what interpreters of Heidegger's SZ who took into consideration the problem of the status of the language of authenticity have concluded. Löwith, for instance, in an early article (1930) stressed the neutrality of Heidegger's "formal ontological assertions", which are completely "neutral" and "indifferent" to all valuational claims,¹ thus sharply ruling out the possibility of a normative dimension in Heidegger's text. This interpretation was later proclaimed by Vietta who argued that Heidegger's language of authenticity was purely descriptive.

¹Löwith, Karl. Theologische Rundschau, N.F. II (1930), Heft 1, p. 60.
(reine Beschreibungslehre). Confirmation that this interpretation corresponds to Heidegger's intentions can be found not only in the passage cited on SZ 167, but also in Heidegger's remarks that Gerede does not have a "disparaging signification" (SZ 167), that Verfallen "expresses no negative evaluation" (SZ 175) and that it is not a "bad and deplorable ontic characteristic which could perhaps be removed in a progressive stage of human culture" (SZ 176), and finally on SZ 222 where he states that the assertion that Dasein is in a state of "untruth" because it is constantly falling excludes any "ontic negative evaluation". But despite the disclaimers of Heidegger and his interpreters there are good grounds for putting into question the rather dubious claim that Heidegger's language of authenticity has no evaluative dimension.

First, as noted, his language does have evaluative connotation if one takes his concepts in their ordinary signification (i.e. inauthenticity, Unselbständigkeit, Gerede, Entfremdung, etc.). And we shall see that Heidegger's own formulations and explications of his concepts seem to be rather strikingly "negative" or "positive", suggesting that his language has the same function as traditional evaluative language (i.e. to condemn, criticize, elicit change, recommend modifications, guide action, propose alternatives, etc.). And we shall see that when Heidegger himself characterizes his concept of authenticity he admits that an ideal of existence underlies his interpretation, (SZ 310) indicating that authenticity is an ideal for Heidegger which he is recommending as a modification of inauthenticity. This contrast and analysis suggests that

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2 Orthodox Heideggerians who take the utterances of the later Heidegger as definitive for interpreting SZ stress the purely ontological aims of Heidegger and cite his later texts to support the claim that one should not look for evaluative or ethical claims in SZ.
Heidegger does maintain an "axiological dualism" which he dialectically develops, spelling out oppositions and differences between authentic and inauthentic ways of being. This dialectical contrast would imply that the analysis of inauthenticity contains a negative critique of the everyday self whereas the concept of authenticity projects an ideal of being human. But since Heidegger himself denies that authenticity and inauthenticity are evaluative terms, the family of concepts which contrast authenticity with inauthenticity become thoroughly problematical according to the widely accepted doctrine which neatly separates statements into "descriptive and evaluative".

My proposal in clarifying this problem of the interpretation of the language of authenticity—a proposal which I now offer as a hypothesis for development, examination and qualification—is that the authenticity-inauthenticity dialectic contains both an evaluative and descriptive dimension, and can be interpreted as an undercutting of a strict descriptive-evaluative distinction. Thus I suggest that traditional evaluative and descriptive dimensions are interconnected in Heidegger's language of authenticity which can be taken as providing an ontological grounding for the evaluative dimension. This would imply that the language of authenticity provides a new evaluative language that would replace traditional evaluative concepts, which would be shown to be deficient in an as yet unspecified sense. The analytical problems and implications of this proposal and the problems of an ethical interpretation of authenticity will not be taken up in detail until we have concluded our study of the concept of authenticity.

Thus in regard to the question of the status of Heidegger's language of inauthenticity I would tentatively propose that a careful study of Heidegger's language and descriptions (cf. especially SZ 126-30, 167-80) discloses a
basically negative interpretation of das Man and publicness which should become clear and explicit in the course of this chapter. Heidegger's language would thus seem to indicate that he is carrying out a critique of everyday Dasein, and a disclosure of the threat to the individual that the levelling tendencies of das Man contain. This proposal is plausible not only in terms of Heidegger's language and its explication, but also in regard to the origins of his categories and analyses which were derived in part from the culture critiques of Kierkegaard (as I have suggested), and perhaps also Nietzsche, Scheler, Simmel (all cited in SZ), and, no doubt, many other writers whom the young Heidegger zealously and attentively studied. Heidegger's project, then, in this regard, consists of a purification of "ontic" phenomena, analyses and categories into ontological concepts (cf. SZ 51), which he seems to put on a plane prior to ontic separation into descriptive and evaluative. But since the ontic material which was ontologically purified and refined by Heidegger was often intended as evaluative (i.e. either as a critique of the present age, bourgeois society, or capitalism, the possibility of an evaluative interpretation seems to be a quite plausible return to the sources from which Heidegger received both inspiration and concepts (this is clear in the case of Kierkegaard whose critique of the present age provided Heidegger with some of his most important concepts). At any rate, it is highly doubtful whether Heidegger can be construed as engaging in the "value-free" description advocated by Max Weber in Heidegger's day and taken over by most current social scientists today. And it is questionable whether Heidegger could maintain that he was doing the kind of "pure phenomenology" advocated by Husserl. Thus it seems plausible to maintain that the interpretation of das Man and inauthenticity contains a negative evaluation and functions as a critique of everyday ways of being.
But since Heidegger conceives of himself strictly as an ontologist in $SZ$, my attempt to elucidate what I take to be the evaluative dimension in $SZ$ is a hermeneutical effort to say what is left unsaid in the text of $SZ$, to bring to light a dimension of $SZ$ that is not explicitly developed by Heidegger and his interpreters, and to seize hold of an interpretive possibility that will enable $SZ$ to contribute to our contemporary philosophical situation. Moreover, since Heidegger suppresses the evaluative import of his interpretation, even explicitly denying it, my attempt to make explicit the evaluative dimension operative in $SZ$ does violence to his intentions of doing pure ontology, but does not, I believe, distort or misrepresent his actual performance (one must often distinguish between intention and performance). Implicit in this interpretation is the assumption that the evaluative force and function of authenticity adds an important dimension to $SZ$, which gains increased interest and importance by a clarification of the full import of authenticity. I hope to make convincing these assumptions in the course of this work. At present, I wish to carefully examine Heidegger's language of inauthenticity to discern its critical-evaluative connotation and usage.

B. Inauthentic Ways of Being

We have now examined Heidegger's analysis of some essential tendencies of being-with-others which he claims are ways of Unselbständigkeit and inauthenticity ($SZ$ 128): "As the das Man self, the particular Dasein has been dispersed (zerstreut) in das Man and must first find itself. This dispersal characterizes the 'subject' of that kind of being which we recognize as concernful absorption (Aufgehen) in the world we encounter as closest to us" ($SZ$ 129). In interpreting this statement, we shall see that everyday Dasein is not only absorbed and dispersed into everyday tasks and dealings, work, uses of public conveniences, and social roles and functions, but also falls into inauthentic ways of being exemplified in everyday modes of talking, understanding, interpreting,
and seeing. These ways to be of das Man are modes of inauthenticity and show how one loses his authentic possibilities and becomes ensnared in "the groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness". The starting point and presupposition of the analysis is that "Dasein is at first and for the most part absorbed in das Man and mastered by it" (SZ 167). Let us now elucidate the terms "absorption" and "dispersion" and then examine the specific inauthentic ways of being.

The term *absorption* (Aufgehen) is one of the words Heidegger uses to denote the condition of being lost in das Man. *Aufgehen* connotes in German such things as absorption, as when sugar is absorbed (geht in etwas auf) in coffee; consumption as when a house is consumed by fire; being deeply engrossed or lost, as when we say of someone that they are "lost in thought"; or leaving no remainder, as when in mathematics one says "4 geht in 16 auf". *Aufgehen* thus suggests a complete absorption, immersion, being engrossed or consumed with no remainder, and is used by Heidegger to describe Dasein's absorption in the dealings of concern (cf. SZ 54). Unfortunately, Heidegger never gives a detailed elucidation of *Aufgehen* but his references to it on SZ 113, 129, 175, et passim, and its connection with *benommen*, *Zerstreuung*, and *Verfallen* makes it clear that Heidegger intends *Aufgehen* to describe a state of being absorbed in the world of concern such that one is completely immersed (lost) in instrumental and public concern. Thus, *Aufgehen* suggests an absorption in the world and a condition of *loss of self*.

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1 In a footnote on *Being and Time* p. 80 the translators note that "Aufgehen means literally 'to go up', or 'to rise' in the sense that the sun 'rises'". It is exactly this sense that is mute in Heidegger's use of *Aufgehen* that I am elucidating.
through an absorption in das Man and inauthenticity. For when Dasein is absorbed in das Man it is absorbed in inauthentic ways of being, and is cut off from its authentic possibilities. This condition is further described with the concept Zerstreuung.

Zerstreuung is another rich and suggestive word that signifies "dispersion, scattering, dissipation, diffusion, diversion, absence of mind"—all of which convey a sense of fragmentation of self, a scattering and dispersion of one's selfhood into multifarious activities, roles, preoccupations. The term is introduced on SZ 56 and 67 as a dispersion into activities of concern but in the passage cited above (SZ 129) we see that it refers to one's dispersion into the ways of being of das Man. ¹ The three prevalent ways of being which Heidegger introduces as "definite phenomena" of everydayness into which the inauthentic self is absorbed and dispersed are idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. In interpreting these phenomena we again encounter the problem of whether Heidegger covertly injects evaluative judgments into his purportedly ontological descriptions. For before beginning his analysis he disclaims any intention of doing anything but a purely descriptive ontology, implying that his analysis should be interpreted as a non-evaluative description of the everyday ways of being which reveal the "disclosedness of das Man" (SZ 167). But again Heidegger's concepts, their explication, their interconnection with the fall into inauthenticity, the contrast between inauthenticity and authenticity, and Heidegger's stress on self-modification on SZ 130 and 179 indicates an evaluative dimension which suggests a critique of das Man and inauthentic ways of being.

¹ Heidegger often seems to use absorption (Aufgehen) and dispersion (Zerstreuung) interchangeably. But we shall see that Zerstreuung takes on some further characteristics in the section on Neugier, that helps us distinguish it from Aufgehen. The source of the concept Aufgehen may have been Augustine or Paul who spoke of man's "absorption" or "being lost" in the world in their Christian metaphysics of human being. Zerstreuung could be a translation of Pascal's divertissement (this sense will come put in the section on Neugier). The translation of theological concepts into the language of secular metaphysics is a recurrent operation in SZ which we shall frequently encounter.
1. **Idle Talk (Gerede)**

The first phenomenon that Heidegger describes is das Man's way of talking which he calls *Gerede*. Although he claims that he does not intend this term to express a "disparaging" signification, it is difficult to translate this term into an English equivalent that is not "disparaging". Hence, *Gerede* has been variously translated as idle talk, chatter, hearsay, and gossip.

The phenomenon Heidegger is talking about concerns the relation between language, understanding, interpretation, and the subject matter of these activities (cf. *SZ* 167-8). His analysis implies that das Man's way of talking is based on an inauthentic understanding which serves to alienate Dasein from its authentic possibilities. Thus I believe that it is valid to interpret *Gerede* as a mode of inauthenticity. To support this claim let us examine Heidegger's analysis.

Heidegger begins with the simple point that discourse is always about something. Thus, discourse expresses an understanding of what is being talked about. Moreover,

In language, as a way things have been expressed or spoken out, there is hidden a way in which the understanding of Dasein has been interpreted...At first, and with certain limits, Dasein is constantly delivered over to this interpretedness, which controls and distributes the possibilities of average understanding and of the mood belonging to it (*SZ* 167-8).

Heidegger claims that language contains an "interpretation" constituted by das Man's average understanding, so that to a certain extent we are prisoners of language. But language itself, on Heidegger's account, is not a distorting prism which serves to prevent one from gaining direct access to the phenomena being talked about. For how one appropriates and makes his own the understanding that is communicated in discourse depends on one's relation to the subject matter that is being talked about. For example, one can have a **direct** relation to the object of understanding: i.e. one can have appropriated and
drawn his understanding from the "things themselves". Heidegger calls this phenomenon of direct appropriation *primordial understanding*. Or, on the other hand, one can understand what is being talked about without being directly acquainted with the subject matter itself. In this case, one has not appropriated his understanding from the phenomena but has merely grasped "what is said in the talk". This distinction between primordial understanding and grasping "what is said in the talk" serves as a foundation for Heidegger's analysis of *Gerade*, and provides a concrete explication of the dialectical contrast between authentic and inauthentic ways of understanding.

Attending only to what is said in the talk leads to a superficial and unfounded understanding. The clue that discourse is based on an inauthentic understanding is such phrases as "they say...", which implicitly implies that, "it is so because they say it is so". It is in this manner that das Man, the "they", levels down understanding to the averageness of what is passed along in the talk. This method of communicating prevents one from gaining a primordial understanding of phenomena appropriated from a direct experience of the "things-themselves". Instead, one listens to what is said in the talk and passes it along as the "facts of the matter". Thus, das Man's averageness spreads to ever widening circles and takes on the air of authority.

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1 "Man versteht nicht so sehr das beredete Seiende, sondern man hort schon nur auf das Geredete als solches. Dieses wird verstanden, das Woruber nur ungefahr, obenhin: man meint dasselbe, weil man das Gesagte gemeinsam in derselben Durchschnittlichkeit versteht" (SZ 168).

It is this process of "gossiping" and "passing the word along" that constitutes idle talk (Gerede): "a process by which its initial lack of grounds to stand upon (Bodenständigkeit) becomes aggravated to complete groundlessness (Bodenlosigkeit)" (SZ 168). Heidegger's interpretation is convincing, for any attending to the phenomenon of gossip, rumor, and hearsay will disclose that this way of "passing the word along" eventuates in complete groundlessness, and thus perpetuates an inauthentic understanding. But this phenomenon is not confined to discourse. It also takes the form of "scribbling" (Geschreibe) in which the groundlessness is not so much based on hearsay as on superficial reading. A consequence of this phenomenon is that it is often the case that in reading and hearing about what is going on, one does not know what is mere hearsay and what is directly appropriated from the actual state of affairs. Nor can one discern whether something has been "drawn from primordial sources with a struggle" or has been merely received from a second hand source. Furthermore, the average understanding feels no need to draw this distinction for it feels it understands everything and has received all the information it needs to "be in the know". Indeed, idle talk guards itself against any exposure of its groundlessness for were one to critically challenge its sources, it would founder on its lack of evidence and would lose credence as mere "hearsay".

The most harmful thing about this way of talking is that "passing the word along" develops an inauthentic understanding which closes one off from one's authentic possibilities of understanding, interpreting, and talking. But everyday Dasein who maintains himself in idle talk is satisfied with its condition, believing nothing is closed off from it, since it can reduce anything it hears to its averageness. Anything is accessible to idle talk for it "is the possibility of understanding everything without previously making the thing one's own" (SZ 169). Thus, through idle talk everyday discourse degenerates into groundless chatter which levels down Dasein's understanding to what is accessible
to getting passed along in the talk. In so doing, idle talk closes off any possibility of gaining an authentic understanding by covering over the things themselves with the groundlessness of what is said in the talk. Idle talk is therefore a "perversion" of a genuine act of disclosing which enables one to directly appropriate what is being disclosed and thus gain a primordial understanding. This perversion is not a conscious deception. But, rather, in the mere act of passing along gossip, idle talk covers over the closes off the phenomena, thus preventing a genuine disclosure.\footnote{\cite{note1}}

Dasein thus finds itself hermetically sealed in the averageness of das Man's understanding. Believing one understands what is passed along in the talk, one feels no need for further inquiry and discovery. Thus, everyday Dasein continues to pass the word along and aggravates the tendency to develop an inauthentic understanding.\footnote{\cite{note2}} In this way Dasein becomes a prisoner of das Man's averageness and is therefore alienated from authentic possibilities of understanding. This analysis brings out the subtlety and inconspicuousness of das Man's tyranny and domination. Merely by engaging in the familiar practice of idle chatter, Dasein falls into one of the inauthentic ways of being of das Man,

\footnote{\"Das bodenlose Gesagtsein und Weitergesagtwerden reicht hin, dass sich das Erschliessen verkehrt zu einem Verschliessen. Denn Gesagtes wird zunächst immer verstanden als 'sagendes', das ist entdeckendes. Das Gerede ist sonach von Hause aus, gemäss der ihm eigenen Unterlassung des Ruckgangs auf den Boden des Beredeten, ein Verschliessen\" (SZ 169).

\footnote{\"Dieses wird erneut dadurch gesteigert, dass das Gerede, darin vermeintlich das Verständis des Beredeten erreicht ist, auf Grund dieser Vermeintlichkeit jedes neue Frangen und alle Auseinandersetzung hintanhält und in eigentümlicher Weise niederhält und retardiert\" (SZ 169).}
and becomes ensnared in the bonds of inauthenticity. As Heidegger forcefully puts it:

This way in which things have been interpreted in idle talk has already established itself in Dasein. There are many things with which we first become acquainted in this way, and there is not a little which never gets beyond such an average understanding. This everyday way in which things have been interpreted is one into which Dasein has grown in the first place, with never a possibility of extrication. In it, out of it, and against it, all genuine understanding, interpreting, and communicating, all re-discovering and appropriating anew, are performed. In no case is a Dasein, untouched and unseduced by this way in which things have been interpreted, set before the open country of a 'world in itself' so that it just beholds what it encounters (SZ 169).

Heidegger's language stressing the "groundlessness" (Bodenlosigkeit) of idle talk which "perverts" (verkehrt) the act of disclosing to a "closing off" (Verschließen) and "uprootedness" (entwurzelten), and his claim that "all genuine understanding, interpreting and communicating" are achieved as a struggle against idle talk, offers support to the proposal that Geređe refers to a negatively evaluated mode of inauthenticity through which Dasein gets cut off from its authentic possibilities. For Heidegger exposes the groundlessness and superficiality of the way of talking of das Man, warning that while engaging in idle talk one's understanding is uprooted and cut off from "its primary and primordially genuine relationships of being" toward the world, the other, and one's self (SZ 170). This "uprootedness" involved in idle talk leads to a constant activity of uprooting, in which one is alienated from an authentic relatedness to the world, other and self as it encloses itself in the inauthentic
understanding articulated in idle talk.¹ For while engaging in idle talk, Heidegger claims that Dasein is in a state of "free-floating" groundlessness ("in der Schwebe"). Moreover, he claims that this uprooted and groundless state is concealed from one for, "the uncanniness of this floating remains hidden from it under their protecting shelter" (SZ 170).² Thus one of the ways in which one is trapped into inauthenticity is the activity of idle talk which cuts off, closes off, and covers over Dasein's primordial relation to and understanding of its being-in-the-world. This being closed off from "primordial", "genuine", and "authentic" possibilities indicates a negative evaluation of das Man's way of talking—a proposal that seems to be suggested and supported by Heidegger's explication and description of Gerede.

2. Curiosity (Neugier)

The next phenomenon that explicates inauthentic ways of being which constitute the self of everydayness is Neugier, that can be translated as "curiosity". Curiosity signified a tendency toward seeing which belongs to everydayness. This tendency is not limited by Heidegger to what we might consider a mode of perception, but rather "expresses the tendency toward a

¹"Das Gerede, das in der gekennzeichneten Weise verschliesst, ist die Seinsart des entwurzelten Daseinsverständnisses. Es kommt jedoch nicht als vorhandener Zustand an einem Vorhandenen vor, sondern existenzial entwurzelt ist es selbst in der Weise der ständigen Entwurzelung" (SZ 170).

²"In der Selbstverständlichkeit und Selbstsicherheit der durchschnittlichen Ausgelegtheit jedoch liegt es, dass unter ihrem Schutz dem jeweiligen Dasein selbst die Unheimlichkeit der Schwebe, in der es einer wachsenden Bodenlosigkeit zutreiben kann, verborgen bleibt" (SZ 170).
peculiar way of letting the world be encountered by us in perception" (SZ 170).\footnote{Wir bezeichnen sie mit dem Terminus Neugier, der charakteristischerweise nicht auf das Sehen eingeschränkt ist und die Tendenz zu einem eigentümlichen vernehmenden Begegnenlassen der Welt ausdrückt" (SZ 170).} Heidegger notes the striking priority accorded to "seeing" as an access to entities in the world both by everydayness and by such thinkers as Aristotle, Parmenides, and Augustine (cf. SZ 170-1). He claims that philosophy and science have been from their genesis in the Greeks oriented by sight as the primary relationship toward the world and the way of access to truth. Earlier in SZ, Heidegger analyzed the modes of sight with which we orient ourselves to the environment and work-world (Umsicht), and the public world (Rucksicht and Nachsicht).

With these considerations in the background, our analysis will now show how curiosity represents an everyday tendency "just to perceive" and is a mode of inauthenticity.

Curiosity is a way in which one's absorption in the world of concern manifests itself. Usually everyday Dasein is absorbed in the workworld, carrying out tasks, laboring, performing. This concern is guided by what Heidegger calls "circumspection" (Umsicht), a way of seeing, utilizing, manipulating, and managing the tools and instrumentalities of the environment (Umwelt). But circumspective concern may take a break either by finishing its tasks or resting. Then circumspection becomes free and can relax, look around, day dream, and enjoy itself without concerning itself with the instrumentalities of the workworld. Sight, then,
releases itself from a focus on the tasks at hand and seeks relief, escape, "getting away from it all".¹ This tendency toward utilizing one's leisure time to get away from one's work is not a harmless escape in Heidegger's view, but rather gets one entangled in an alienating way of being. For,

When curiosity has become free, however, it concerns itself with seeing, not in order to understand what is seen—that is, to come into a being toward it—but just in order to see. It seeks novelty only in order to leap from it anew to another novelty. In this kind of seeing, that which is an issue for care does not lie in grasping something and being knowingly in the truth; it lies rather in its possibilities of abandoning itself to the world (SZ 172).

Curiosity thus signifies a way of seeing solely for the sake of having seen in which mere curiosity rather than a desire for understanding is operative. This phenomenon, like idle talk, is a familiar one that is currently attested to in a way unforeseen by Heidegger by the proliferation of such information media as television which allows one to "see" everything without having comprehended anything. Curiosity is also marked by superficiality and groundlessness. The curiosity seeker craves sight after sight, hopping from one thing to another, "to be in on it" without really having been involved at all. This absence of genuine interest or involvement can be illustrated by the young socialite who goes from one cultural or social event to another merely to see, to be seen, and to be able to say, "I've seen that". Heidegger's criticism would be that this curiosity seeker really has not seen anything, because genuine seeing requires a dwelling alongside something, or as we might say, a getting involved in something.

¹"Die Sorge wird zum Besorgen der Möglichkeiten, ausruhend verweilend die 'Welt' nur in Ihrem Aussehen zu sehen. Das Dasein sucht das Fern, lediglich um es sich in seinem Aussehen nahe zu bringen. Das Dasein lässt sich einzig vom Aussehen der Welt mitnehmen, eine Seinsart, in der es besorgt, seiner selbst als In-der-Welt-seins ledig zu werden, ledig des Seins beim nächsten alltäglichen Zuhandenen" (SZ 172).
Neugier, in Heidegger's analysis, has three essential characteristics:

(1) It is a restless state of agitation that is always "on the move" (Unverweilen). In this state of being on the move one never stops and interrogates, concentrates, or mediates on anything, but constantly seeks the new.¹ Neugier literally signifies in German "greed for the new", suggesting that curiosity is always craving the new and is thus endlessly in search of another novelty, the "latest", the "modern", "today". But this never ending search for novelty never really seeks to appropriate or dwell alongside the object of its search but, "it seeks novelty only in order to leap from it anew to another novelty" (SZ 172). In this way curiosity abandons itself to the world and gets carried along by the current happenings and events, the latest fads and fancies with which das Man amuses itself. Thus, curiosity is the search for the constant possibility of:

(2) diversion. Zerstreuung is the second characteristic of curiosity which we now see refers both to everyday Dasein's dispersion into the manifold activities of concern and ways of being of das Man, and the restless search for novelty and diversion, for which Pascal coined the term divertissement. Since curiosity is always searching for novelty and distraction it is never involved in or concerned with any one subject matter or thing. Nor does it feel any of the wonder and amazement at the world which is requisite for scientific and philosophical

¹"Sie sucht daher auch nicht die Musse des betrachtenden Verweilens, sondern Unruhe und Aufregung durch das immer Neue und den Wechsel des Begegnenden" (SZ 172).
understanding. Instead it constantly distracts itself with more diversions, surrendering its possibilities of understanding to a never ending search for the new. Thus, curiosity has the characteristic of:

(3) "never dwelling anywhere, dwellinglessness" (Aufenthaltslosigkeit). This term connotes a loss of dwelling or an estrangement of "being-in". For "being-in", in Heidegger's interpretation, in its "primordial signification" means dwelling, residing, being familiar with, so that one "encounters" or is even "touched by" those entities alongside of which one dwells (cf. SZ 12). Thus, an authentic being-in is a dwelling alongside entities with which one is familiar and involved. Curiosity, though, is in a constant state of motion that is everywhere and thus nowhere, avoiding all genuine involvement. Thus, by virtue of being always on the move and frenetically seeking novel distraction, Dasein is constantly uprooting itself. Almost in the manner of a Hegelian synthesis, Aufenthaltslosigkeit contains and is the dialectical outcome of Unverweilen and Zerstreuung.

Another dimension of curiosity, explicated in a later chapter on temporality (cf. SZ 346-9), is the tendency of curious everyday Dasein to lose itself in the present. A detailed analysis of this phenomenon (found in the passage cited above) would require an examination of Heidegger's concept of temporality, but for present purposes we can note that the restless search for novelty represents for Heidegger an alienation from one's past and future. For the "movement" of curiosity is a "making present" (Gegenwartigen) that

"Die Neugier hat nichts zu tun mit dem bewundernden Betrachten des Seienden, dem , ihr liegt nicht daran, durch Verwunderung in das Nichtverstehen gebracht zu werden, sondern sie besorgt ein Wissen, aber lediglich um gewusst zu haben" (SZ 172).
abandons itself to the "now", closing off its past which it "forgets", and its future which it "flees".\textsuperscript{1} Thus, in its temporal meaning, curiosity is an evasion which flees and forgets and which alienates Dasein from its being-in the world and its authentic temporality.

To ascertain the evaluative nature of Heidegger's analysis of curiosity, let us ask what is Heidegger criticizing in his depiction of curiosity, and what is he advocating. The negative side of this question is summarized in the three essential characteristics of curiosity delineated in the past several pages. I wish to show here how each characteristic has its opposite positive side which is suggested by Heidegger's description. Unverweilen, being on the move, restlessly seeking ever new possibilities can be contrasted with a meditative, contemplative, dwelling alongside the world that seeks to fully understand and appropriate and ground itself in the subject matter or involvement concerned. The everyday search for distraction craves novel diversions and sees possibilities as mere things to be consumed, enjoyed, and forgotten, and is contrasted with an amazed wonder that quietly brings itself into an authentic understanding, thus making possible authentic disclosing and interpreting. The result of everyday curiosity is a "dwelling-lessness", an uprooted state of never ending mobility and change which can be contrasted with the rooted, at home dwelling alongside the world in which one calmly and penetratingly surveys and discloses his world. Heidegger's language in the section on curiosity is full of suggestion, allusion, and intimations that contrast pro and con attitudes and that projects opposed ways of being.

\textsuperscript{1}"In making present...Dasein has been alienated (entfremdet) from its ownmost potentiality-for-being, which is based primarily on the authentic future and on authentically having been. But in so far as making-present is always offering something 'new', it does not let Dasein come back to itself and is constantly tranquillizing it anew" (SZ 348).
What claims to be a description of an everyday tendency toward seeing, then, becomes a contrast between two world orientations, two radically different ways of relating to one's environment. This method and language suggests and sketches out an ideal of existence that stands in radical contrast to the "everyday way of being" that is portrayed in negative connotations.

Heidegger's scope is vast and his intention is ambitious. Neugier, if it is to be an effective ontological category, must be broad enough to encompass a wide variety of phenomena, and concrete and suggestive enough to evoke definite ontic correlatives that embody the concept. Thus, Neugier, if successful, can be used to depict and suggest the ways of being of such types as a hedonistic pleasure seeker, superficial tourist, a restless collector of superfluous "useless and pointless knowledge" (Dylan), a frenetic involvement in trivial everyday matters, a salesman moving from place to place peddling his wares, a conformist submitting to ever new fads and novelties, and whatever type of mobile diversion seeking that happens to be prevalent in any environment. What is striking about this analysis is not only the suggestiveness of Heidegger's text, but also the consistent critique of whatever forms of everyday behavior are directly suggested to the reader, such that the curiosity seeker appears in a negative context in which curiosity is contrasted with another way of being which does not partake of the alienating characteristics pictured. Here, we are not concerned with a characterization of Heidegger's positive ideal, which in any case is only suggested here in obscure outline without a conceptual clarification. Instead, I wish to as clearly and directly as possible indicate the structure, conceptualization, and "shading" of an inauthentic existence, and to show how Heidegger negatively evaluates this way of being.
What I have tried to show is that curiosity, like idle talk, is a way of alienation through which Dasein loses its authentic possibilities and emmeshes itself in the grip of inauthenticity. Moreover, curiosity is interconnected with idle talk. For idle talk tells Dasein what one must do and see: "what's new", "what's the latest", "what's happening". The uprootedness of idle talk is further aggravated by curiosity that never stops to achieve a genuine understanding but is always on the move.¹ This restless, uprooting activity supposedly provides what is called a "lively life", and indeed curiosity for which nothing is closed off, and idle chatter in which everything is understood supports this supposition. These two phenomena are interconnected with and help constitute a third way of being through which the "being of everydayness" is disclosed: ambiguity.

3. **Ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit)**

We have seen that idle talk and curiosity are the dialectical opposites of a genuine understanding and discourse which is directly appropriated from the phenomena, and which dwells alongside the world and draws its discourse from a genuine understanding ("primordial sources"). But since in our everyday being with others "passing the word along" and restlessly seeking distraction are such prevalent modes of behavior, it is often difficult to decide what reveals a genuine understanding and what does not.² For, "everything looks

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¹ "Das Gerede regiert auch die Wege der Neugier, es sagt, was man gelesen und gesehen haben muss. Das Überall-und-nirgendsein der Neugier ist dem Gerede überantwortet. Diese beiden alltäglichen Seinsmodi der Rede und der Sicht sind in ihrer Entwurzelungstendenz nicht lediglich nebeneinander vorhanden, sondern eine Weise zu sein reisst die andere mit sich" (SZ 173).

² "Wenn im alltäglichen Miteinandersein dergleichen begegnet, was jedem zugänglich ist und worüber jeder jedes sagen kann, wird bald nicht mehr entscheidbar, was in echtem Verstehen erschlossen ist und was nicht" (SZ 173).
as if it were genuinely understood, genuinely taken hold of, genuinely spoken, though at bottom it is not; or else it does not look so, and yet at bottom it is" (SZ 173). Hence, Heidegger argues that our Mitsein is pervaded with an ambiguity which pertains to our relation to ourselves, the world, and the other, and that this ambiguity is interconnected with idle talk and curiosity.

Heidegger's analysis of ambiguity on SZ 173-4 is extremely difficult, so I shall attempt in some detail to unravel the thread of what I take to be his main argument. The phenomenon seems to be particularly important for Heidegger stresses that not only does ambiguity effect the way we talk and act, how we manage our affairs and enjoy ourselves, but it also becomes a potentiality-for-being that constitutes how we conceive our possibilities and how we project ourselves into the future.1 Hence, ambiguity is a dominant way of being that has far reaching consequences for our everyday being-in-the-world, and is, we shall see, a salient characteristic of inauthenticity.

The basic characteristic of ambiguity that I wish to make clear is that ambiguity is an inauthentic way of relating to the future that cuts one off and alienates one from authentic possibilities. Thus, we must discover how ambiguity relates itself to the future and how it projects Dasein into inauthentic possibilities. This analysis should disclose the interconnectedness of ambiguity with idle talk and curiosity.

Everyday Dasein in the mode of ambiguity, Heidegger claims, pretends to be interested in certain projects, talks about what must be done, and then

1"Die Zweideutigkeit betrifft nicht allein das Verfügen über und das Schaltenmitdem in Gebrauch und Gennus Zugänglichen, sondern sie hat sich schon im Verstehen als Seinkönnen, in der Art des Entwurfs und der Vorgabe von Möglichkeiten des Daseins festgesetzt: (SZ 173).
abandons this concern for what is currently "up for discussion". Ambiguity isn't ever serious about carrying through anything for it is always "on the scent" for the latest diversion and concern. This "being on the scent" exhibits the movement of curiosity and is directed by idle talk, thus we see how das Man's ways of being work together to entangle Dasein in das Man so that its authentic possibilities are suppressed.\(^1\) Ambiguity is spurious and ungenthine in that it is not really interested in translating its projects into action, but is content with surmising and scenting out new plans. This immersion in abstract possibility that disdains actualizing and carrying through projects confines one to what Kierkegaard described as the aesthetic level of existence, which he distinguished from the ethical sphere of commitment and action. Heidegger's contrast is between a non-committal dallying in "surmising" and "scenting out" (geahnt and gespurt), and a carrying through and staying with one's project. He argues that Dasein is always acquainted with what is "under consideration" or "up for discussion" (vorliegt), and "what 'really' must be done" (SZ 173). In fact, everyone seems to know what's going on and what should be done, and everyone has suggestions and ideas as to what to do. But if by chance something which "they" had been surmising about really does get carried out, then "they" are "indignant" for "in that case the opportunity to keep on surmising has been snatched away" (SZ 176). For if what has been surmised actually happens one is forced to take a stand on the matter and such an involvement ambiguity shuns.

---\(^1\)"Dieses Auf-der-Spur-sein, und zwar vom Hörensagen her...ist die verfänglichste Weise, in der die Zweideutigkeit Möglichkeiten des Daseins vorgibt, um sie auch schon in ihrer Kraft zu ersticken" (SZ 173).
Heidegger is trying to work out a contrast between a mere surmising and scenting out possibilities, and an active involvement in carrying through a project and committing oneself to it. He is claiming that one of the salient characteristics of everyday Dasein is a non-committal, superficial and irresponsible ambiguity that is always on the scent of something but never really "into" anything. For ambiguity, actually carrying out a project is seen to be a "drag" since it is already on the scent of something new and sees what was earlier surmised about as "out of date". In following this ambiguous way of being Dasein can never really engage in any definite projects or concerns for das Man is already on the scent of something else and if one wishes to keep up he must abandon his project for what is the new matter of interest. The result is that,

In the ambiguity of the public interpretedness, talking about things ahead of the game and making surmises about them curiously, gets passed off as what is really happening (das eigentliche Geschehen), while taking action and carrying something through gets stamped as something merely subsequent and unimportant. Thus, Dasein's understanding in das Man is constantly going wrong (versieht) in its projects, as regards the genuine possibilities of being (SZ 174).

Ambiguity goes hand in hand with curiosity and idle talk to alienate Dasein from its authentic possibilities. For everyday Dasein entangled in the ways of being of das Man is constantly uprooting itself in a process of ever increasing flight and distraction. Idle talk keeps surmising about what is happening and what "they" are doing, curiosity constantly keeps

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"Sofern nun aber die Zeit des sich einsetzenden Daseins in der Verschwiegenheit der Durchführung und des echten Scheiterns eine andere ist, öffentlich gesehen eine wesentlich langsamer, als die des Geredes, das "schmeller lebt", ist dies Gerede längst bei einem anderen, dem jeweilig Neuesten angekommen." (SZ 174).
Dasein in a state of perpetual motion, seeking ever new novelties and diversion, which ambiguity passes off as "the latest"...and then passes it by as "out of date".

Dasein is always ambiguously 'there'...that is to say, in that public disclosedness of being-with-one-another where the loudest idle talk and the most ingenious curiosity keep 'things moving', where in an everyday manner everything (and at bottom nothing) is happening.

This ambiguity is always tossing to curiosity that which it seeks: and it gives idle talk the semblance of having everything decided in it (SZ 174).

Again we note Heidegger's condemnatory language and his scornful remarks on how "loud idle talk" and "ingenious curiosity" create the semblance of activity, significance, and involvement, in which "nothing" is really happening. The impression that Heidegger creates is that everyday Dasein ineffectually surmises about doing things, but never really makes it. In this sense, the inauthentic individual is a failure. But this tendency is far from laughable and harmless since being-with-one-another is profoundly influenced, Heidegger states, by das Man's tendency toward idle chatter, curiosity, and ambiguity. For the other (including oneself) is seen in terms of what they say about him; hence, what gets passed along about one is constitutive for how one is in the eyes of das Man. Therefore, the possibility of a genuine relatedness is poisoned for "into primordial being-with-one-another, idle talk has slipped in" (SZ 174). Everyone has his eye on the other to see what he is doing and is simultaneously aware that the other is watching him.

Being-with-one-another in das Man is by no means an indifferent side-by-sideness in which everything has been settled, but rather an intent, ambiguous watching of one another, a secret and reciprocal listening-in. Under the mask of 'for-one-another' an 'against-one-another' is in play (SZ 175).
This untrustful, ambiguous way of being with others contains the core of Sartre's doctrine of being-for-others as conflict (cf. Being and Nothingness, Part three). But whereas Sartre claims that conflict is the fundamental constituent of all human relations, Heidegger limits his diagnosis to a way of being of das Man that can be modified and transformed. For Heidegger, being-with-others is conflict only if idle chatter and ambiguity are operative as ways of being with one another. And although Heidegger claims that these inauthentic ways of being govern Dasein in its average everydayness, he does not condemn Dasein to a never ending absorption in these possibilities with no hope of extrication. Thus, Heidegger both exposes the sometimes hidden ways of being that keep Dasein in bondage to das Man, and discloses the possibility of liberation as he reveals a way toward authenticity through which one modifies the alienating ways of being described. A failure to note this results in one-sided misinterpretations by such critics as Buber who neglect the dialectical structure of Heidegger's analysis, and the possibility of an authentic way of being that allows for authentic relatedness based on an authentic understanding, disclosure, involvement, and commitment.

As for ambiguity, it seems to be an even more prevalent and destructive phenomenon today due to the accelerated pace of modern life which puts one into a state of perpetual motion, where one is driven to constantly adjust and re-adjust, changing with the times, keeping up with all that's new, pushing oneself ever forward and ahead, keeping constantly up to date, going along with the tempo, novelty, and changes of modern life. The phenomenon of ambiguity therefore seems to be implicated in a particularly harmful fashion in modern industrial-technological society with its increasingly rapid modernization, change, and development. In such a situation there is an ever more abundant proliferation of possibilities which gives one the opportunity to
continuously surmise about what to do, scenting out ever new things to do, and thus failing to get involved in anything because one is foundering around in everything.

We have been following Heidegger as he sketches out the ways of being through which Dasein alienates himself from his authentic possibilities. I suggest that Heidegger's analysis portrays this condition in a critical manner such that one is induced to view these ways of being with distaste, and to critically question one's everyday practices and behavior, thus rendering problematical one's most taken for granted, simply accepted ways of being. In the context of everyday life it is generally clear what Heidegger disapproves of and criticizes, and his depiction of such things as gossip and idle talk, escapism and frenetic diversion seeking (Neugier), and a non-committed immersion in mere surmising (ambiguity) is especially striking. The das Man existence, then, is portrayed as an irresponsible, non-committal, superficial, mediocre, conformist condition which Heidegger describes as "uprooted", "groundless", "null", and "alienated".

To further develop this interpretation we must examine more closely the interconnection between the ways of being examined in this section and the inauthenticity of das Man. I have stressed the interconnectedness of idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity while exhibiting and describing these everyday ways of being. What will concern us in the next section is "the kind of being which belongs to this interconnectedness" (SZ 175). This interpretation will further explain how Dasein becomes das Man and how the phenomena described in this section constitutes the inauthentic self and indicates a negative evaluation of this condition.
C. Falling and Inauthenticity

Idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity describe how Dasein is in its everydayness. "In these, and in the way they are interconnected in their being, there is revealed a basic kind of being (eine Grundart) which belongs to everydayness; we call this the falling (Verfallen) of Dasein" (SZ 175). In introducing "falling", Heidegger says that this term does not express any "negative evaluation", but should be taken as signifying that "Dasein is at first and for the most part within (bei) the world of its concern" (SZ 175).1 But since for the most part Dasein's being within the world of concern has the character of being absorbed in das Man's publicness, falling thus describes the absorption-dispersion into inauthenticity and, as the title of this chapter indicates, is used to describe "the fall into das Man". And since the concept of falling serves as the source and explanation of Dasein's inauthenticity, Heidegger's disclaimer of the evaluative nature of his hermeneutic should be put into question. In this section we shall see how falling describes the movement of inauthenticity and indicates why everyday Dasein becomes ensnared in the ways of being of das Man.

Falling can be characterized as the root metaphor through which Heidegger describes the dispersion and absorption of everyday Dasein in das Man and inauthenticity. In this sense it describes the "motion" of everydayness and is thus an "ontological motion concept" (SZ 180). The term is appropriate and suggestive because it indicates a dynamic process of falling away from oneself and falling into the world. Heidegger makes it clear that what he

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1 It may not be superfluous to mention that Heidegger does not wish the fall to be interpreted in a theological sense (cf. SZ 176 and 179-80).
means by "falling into the world" is "falling into das Man":

Fallenness into the world menas an absorption in being—with-one—another in so far as this is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity (SZ 175).

The fall into das Man is thus explicated by the term absorption which we now learn "has mostly the character of being lost in the publicness of das Man" (SZ 175). Everyday Dasein is, in Heidegger's interpretation, benumbed or fascinated (benommen) by das Man, and is thus induced and coerced into public roles and everyday ways of being. In this way Dasein falls into das Man's ways of being and forfeits its ownmost potentiality—for-being, losing its authentic possibilities of understanding, seeing, interpreting, and experiencing, thus falling deeper and deeper into inauthenticity:

Through the interpretation of falling, what we have called the inauthenticity of Dasein may be defined more precisely. In no way, however, do the terms 'inauthentic' and 'non-authentic' signify 'really not', as if in this mode of being, Dasein were to lose its being altogether. Inauthenticity...is a quite distinctive kind of being-in-the-world—the kind which is completely benumbed by the 'world' and by the Mitdasein of others in das Man. Not-being-itself functions as a positive possibility of that entity which, in its essential concern, is absorbed in a world. This kind of not-being closest to Dasein and in which Dasein maintains itself for the most part (SZ 175–6).

We can now better understand Heidegger's perplexing claim that the "who" of everydayness is not I myself. This seeming paradox is explained by the fall away from myself and the fall into the das Man self. For by falling into the ways of being of das Man one falls away from one's authentic possibilities of

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In a footnote on Being and Time p. 220, the translators suggest that in translating "an die 'Welt' verfallen" as "falling into the world", the preposition 'into' is hardly the correct one. The idea is rather falling at the world or collapsing against it". I quite disagree with this remark and suggest that the preposition "into" is the better translation, which is elucidated by the terms Aufgehen and Zerstreuung.
being-a-self, and falls into a set of possibilities which alienate and cut it off from its possibility of authentic self-being.¹ And since everyday Dasein's "fundamental constitution" is falling, this means that at first and for the most part everyday Dasein falls into das Man's inauthentic ways of being, which means that everyday Dasein is inevitably inauthentic.

1. Why does one Fall?

At this point, one might ask why everyday Dasein always falls into das Man. Why is there such an attraction and power exerted by das Man that Dasein loses itself? Why does Heidegger believe that everyone falls into das Man? The following analysis should provide some indications which should help explain how and why Dasein at first and for the most part falls into das Man and inauthenticity.

Heidegger first notes that everyday Dasein finds the ways of being of das Man tempting (versucherisch).² In our analysis of idle talk, we have seen how Dasein lets the public interpret the events and happenings of the world, taking over their account as a factual report of "what's going on" or "what's it all about". In this easy appropriation of information Dasein

¹"Das Gerede erschliesst dem Dasein das verstehende Sein zu seiner Welt, zu Anderen und zu ihm selbst, doch so, dass dieses Sein zu...den Modus eines bodenlosen Schwebens hat. Die Neugier erschliesst alles und jedes, so jedoch, dass das In-Sein überall und nirgends ist. Die Zweideutigkeit verbirgt dem Daseinsverständnis nichts, aber nur, um das In-der-Welt-sein in dem entwurzelten Überall-und-nirgends niederzuhalten" (SZ 177).

²"Wenn aber das Dasein selbst im Gerede und der "öffentlichen Ausgelegtheit ihm selbst die Möglichkeit vorgibt, sich im Man zu verlieren, der Bodenlosigkeit zu verfallen, dann sagt das: das Dasein bereitet ihm selbst die ständige Versuchung zum Verfallen. Das In-der-Welt-sein ist an ihm selbst versucherisch" (SZ 177).
relieves itself of the burden of searching for its own truths, of thinking things through for oneself, of criticizing and seeing through the distortions and concealments of publicness. Heidegger claims that by giving into this temptation to making things easy, Dasein is disburdened by das Man. Further, falling into das Man relieves Dasein of the responsibility for what it says and does, for if questioned or criticized, it can answer, "they say that... everyone does that...one doesn't do such things...". By disburdening Dasein of its responsibility for its choices, das Man accommodates Dasein by inviting it to go along with the crowd and play the game existence their way, promising one benefits and rewards if one follows the rules.

Secondly, tempted Dasein is tranquillized. This category takes on special connotations in the Pill Age, but the tranquillizing Heidegger is thinking of follows from the supposition of das Man that one's successful adjustment is a sign of making it, that one is "really living" in a das Man existence, and that "everything's all right", as it should be. But Heidegger warns that while disburdened Dasein tranquilly accommodates itself to das Man's temptations, it becomes more deeply enmeshed in das Man becoming trapped in the confines of complacency and self-deception.

Since the public interpretedness has already become a temptation to itself in this manner, it holds Dasein fast in its fallenness. Idle talk and ambiguity, having seen everything, having understood everything, develop the supposition that Dasein's disclosedness, which is so available and so prevalent, can guarantee to Dasein that all the possibilities of its being will be secure, genuine, and full. Through the self-certainty and decidedness of das Man, it gets spread abroad increasingly that there is no need of authentic understanding or the mood that goes with it. The supposition of das Man that one is leading and sustaining a full and genuine 'life' brings Dasein a tranquillity, for which everything is 'in the best of order' and all doors are open. Falling being-in-the-world which tempts itself is at the same time tranquillizing (SZ 177).
But Dasein's being-tranquilized in its das Man existence is not a state of calm or serenity, but is rather an "uninhibited hustle", a frantic plunge into ceaseless activity. While falling Dasein never comes to rest. For "the tempting tranquillizing aggravates the falling" (SZ 178). This movement of Dasein falling further and further away from itself into the "groundlessness and nullity" of das Man is characterized by Heidegger as a "downward plunge" (Absturz). But Dasein in its striving for upward mobility and increased consumption believes that things are getting better all the time, that it is making the ever higher climb into the "good life". This falling away from a primordial understanding of its ownmost potentialities into the herd existence, this whirling away of its freedom and autonomy is, in Heidegger's conceptualization, the movement of turbulence (Wirbel).

This 'movement' of Dasein in its own being, we call its downward plunge (Absturz). Dasein plunges out of itself into itself, into the groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness. But this plunge remains hidden from Dasein by the public interpreted-ness, so much so, indeed, that it gets interpreted as a way of 'ascending' and 'living concretely'.

This downward plunge into and within the groundlessness of the inauthentic being of das Man, has a kind of motion which constantly tears the understanding away from the projecting of authentic possibilities, and into the tranquillized supposition that is supposition that it possesses everything, or that everything is within its reach. Since the understanding is thus constantly torn away from authenticity and sucked into das Man (though always with a sham of authenticity), the movement of falling is characterized by turbulence (Wirbel) (SZ 178).

Heidegger's language describing the fall as an (Absturz) and a (Wirbel) in which "Dasein plunges out of itself... into the groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness" such that it is "constantly torn away from authenticity and sucked into das Man" makes it clear that he considers the fall into das Man a rather baleful and detrimental state of affairs. In the section on "falling" where Heidegger shows the interconnection of the
fall into das Man with inauthenticity, one clearly receives the impression (substantiated throughout the text) that Heidegger considers inauthenticity a most undesirable, though prevalent, condition. Thus, I believe that Heidegger's avoidance of moralistic categories and his general (though scanty) critique of the language of morals and values should not blind us to the basically negative evaluation of das Man which is rather strikingly portrayed in the passages we are examining.

This interpretation is further supported by Heidegger's description of how Dasein falls further away from itself into self-entanglement and what Heidegger calls alienation. Heidegger claims that the state of passive activity in which tempted, tranquilized Dasein finds itself becomes aggravated through an increasing entanglement in the varied ways of being offered by das Man. This leads to an experimentation with various life-styles, an exaggerated self-dissection seeking motives and explanations for its behavior from widely variant sources and cultures. Through this desperate introspection and self-analysis Dasein becomes entangled in its inauthentic self, lost in the labyrinth of a mystified fragmentation. It is this entanglement in a wide variety of "strange" (fremd) interpretive schemes and categories that Heidegger calls alienation (Entfremdung). One thinks of the often exaggerated and sometimes far-fetched interpretive claims of such things as psychoanalysis, Zen, oriental mysticisms, and all the pseudo-religious, philosophical, and scientific cults that abound today, and one sees that once again Heidegger has touched upon one of the ways in which one can fall into the "groundless-ness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness". But let us reflect on Heidegger's own words:

With special regard to the interpretation of Dasein, the opinion may now arise that understanding the most alien cultures and
'synthesizing' them with one's own may lead to Dasein's becoming for the first time thoroughly enlightened about itself. Versatile curiosity and restlessly 'knowing it all' masquerade as a universal understanding of Dasein...When Dasein, tranquillized, and 'understanding' everything, thus compares itself with everything, it drifts along toward an alienation (Entfremdung) in which its ownmost potentiality-for-being is hidden from it. Falling being-in-the-world is not only tempting and tranquillizing; it is at the same time alienating.

Yet this alienation cannot mean that Dasein gets factically torn away from itself. On the contrary, this alienation drives it into a kind of being which borders on the most exaggerated 'self-dissection', tempting itself with all possibilities of explanation, so that the very 'characterologies' and 'typologies' which it has brought about are themselves already becoming something that cannot be surveyed at a glance. This alienation closes off from Dasein its authenticity and possibility, even if only the possibility of genuinely floundering. It does not, however, surrender Dasein to an entity which Dasein itself is not, but forces it into its inauthenticity—into a possible kind of being of itself. This alienation of falling—at once tempting and tranquillizing—leads by its own movement to Dasein's getting entangled (verfängt) in itself (SZ 178).

Here I wish to make an important point. The most obvious application of the "fall into das Man" to one's own environment is interpreting it as a fall into society. Now there is much talk today about "mass society" and in the USA one hears constantly about "middle America", the "silent majority", or the "American way of life". Heidegger's analysis of das Man and inauthenticity applies quite relevantly to these phenomena, but I believe the fall into das Man should not be limited to falling into mass society. Rather, das Man could be applied to any group that has well-defined boundaries, a common language and communication systems, a set of shared norms and behavior patterns, or a life-style or ideology that its members share and identify with.1 Thus the fall into das Man could refer to any condition in which one conforms to group behavior, divesting oneself of his individuality, by complacently

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1 On SZ 129 Heidegger writes" "Das Man is an existentiale: and as a primordial phenomenon, it belongs to Dasein's positive constitution. It itself has, in turn, various possibilities of becoming something concretely characteristic of Dasein. The extent to which its dominion becomes compelling and explicit may change in the course of history". This passage indicates that das Man has many socio-historical concretions. I would further suggest
submitting to the language, habits, rituals, and norms of the group. One should therefore be clear that Heidegger’s das Man is an ontological concept encompassing ways of being that cut across group boundaries, permeating all minorities, subcultures, and conflicting groups. For Heidegger could argue that the most varied and different types and groups exhibit the ways of being of das Man in their social interaction; i.e. that businessmen and hippies, reactionaries and revolutionaries, philosophers and prostitutes all conform to their group, do and say what they command and recommend, engage in idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity, and flee from their authenticity, despite quite different economic interests, social status, and political beliefs. Thus I would suggest that the categories and analyses that we have examined throughout this chapter apply with equal relevance not only to a dominant cultural group ("Middle America"), but also to sub-culture groups, and in fact to anyone who identifies with, conforms to, and tries to keep up with and advance in any well-defined group.

Therefore I suggest that the reader can apply Heidegger’s categories to whatever groups he finds in his own environment. In a university situation one finds that these categories apply equally well to people who fall into fraternities or sororities (social cliques), drug groups, political groups, or athletic groups. Moreover, "one" can pass from one group to another and although his life-style and the things he does may change, his falling into idle talk, curiosity, ambiguity, his finding security in "their" protecting shelter (i.e. group acceptance and identity), and his conforming and submitting to group authority and pressure may remain constant. Outside the university, that das Man not only applies to various historical societies but also to groups within that society.
one can easily cite corporations, the military, office and factory situations, and government bureaucracies as phenomena for the das Man appellation. Finally, I might point out that those who doubt the pervasiveness of das Man can find an ontic exemplification of Heidegger's concept in Mead's conception of the "social self" and "generalized other",\(^1\) or Fromm's conception of "character structure" and his analysis of "Man in Capitalist Society"\(^2\) for empirical confirmation of the presence of a "dictator of everydayness" similar to Heidegger's das Man. In fact, the concept of the social self, the centrality of the self-other relation, and emphasis on the role of socialization in the constitution of selfhood has become an increasingly accepted doctrine in many current schools of thought.\(^3\)

These considerations raise a final question. If das Man is such a pervasive and ubiquitous phenomenon, is there a way out of the state of inauthenticity? Are we forever condemned to inauthenticity?

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\(^3\) See, for example, the writings of Mead, Dewey, and other "social pragmatists"; Binswanger, Buber, Marcel, Sartre, and many "existentialists"; Sullivan, Fromm, and many Neo-Freudians; and of course Marx and his followers. But despite this convergence on similar themes, the interpretations of the phenomena vary tremendously. Heidegger's equation of the das Man self with "not being oneself" (inauthenticity) provides a negative-critical extreme that could be contrasted with Mead's concept of the social self and "generalized other" as a positive extreme; i.e. Heidegger criticizes socialization processes which Mead and others positively evaluate as necessary and beneficial for self-development.
2. Is there a Way Out?

The motion of falling (tranquillizing, tempting, alienating, and entangling) has been characterized as "turbulence" and a "downward plunge" into "the groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness". Heidegger claims that this condition "makes manifest that thrownness which can obtrude itself upon Dasein in its moods" (SZ 179). Heidegger's reference to "thrownness" on SZ 179 and its analysis should show what is at stake in the question of the possibility of a way out of inauthenticity:

Dasein's facticity is such that as long as it is what it is, Dasein remains in the throw, and is sucked into the turbulence of das Man's inauthenticity (SZ 179).

This passage is ambiguous and could mean two quite different things:

1) Heidegger could be arguing that since facticity and falling are constituents of Dasein's existence, Dasein is constantly and irrevocably "thrown" into the turbulence of inauthenticity and is therefore forever imprisoned in das Man with never a hope of escaping. In this case the "as long as it is what it is" would refer to Dasein's facticity, and if "facticity" is taken to be "thrown-fallenness", the implication could be that Dasein is eternally "sucked into the turbulence of das Man's inauthenticity". This interpretation could be both deterministically and fatalistically construed and would condemn Dasein to never ending inauthenticity, ruling out a priori any possibility of extrication, individuation, and authenticity.

2) Or, Heidegger could be arguing that as long as Dasein remains in the turbulence of inauthenticity it will be sucked into das Man's alienating ways of being. But in this interpretation the "as long as it is what it is" would refer to being absorbed and dispersed in das Man's ways of being from which, possibly, one can extricate oneself by going through a process of self-transformation. This interpretation would allow the possibility of a
modification of inauthenticity and would require a radical conversion to extricate oneself from the "turbulence" of an inauthentic, das Man existence.

For Heidegger's concept of authenticity to have any force and persuasiveness we must seize upon the second interpretation as the only plausible basis for the possibility of authenticity. In order to support this interpretation one must clarify the phrase "remains in the throw" and raise some further questions about the nature of the fall. This analysis should serve to show how the possibility of extrication and authenticity emerges as the "way out" of Dasein's fall into das Man and its alienation from its self-being.

The first problem is that various associations surrounding the terms "thrownness" and "fallenness" might easily lead one to believe that Heidegger maintains some type of fatalistic determinism. But it would be a mistake, I believe, to simply conclude that the phrase "remains in the throw" and the structures of "thrownness" and "fallenness" signify determinism. For Heidegger constantly counters the possible deterministic implications of these phrases and concepts with the insistence that Dasein is not only thrown and falling, but is also projecting and freely choosing. On Sz 148 he speaks of the "enigma of thrown projection" which an adequate concept of man must account for, implying that projection (freedom) is equiprimordial with thrownness (facticity). Therefore one can say that Dasein is "thrown" into projection, freedom, decision, and possibility. The structure of "projection" will be discussed in a later section, and I wish merely to allude to it here in order to mitigate against any harshly deterministic interpretation that might be imposed on Heidegger's concept of "thrownness" and the phrase "remains in the throw".

Thus, although "thrownness" might suggest dark associations of a
fatalistic determinism, this is a questionable reading of Heidegger's text. For, as we shall see, the possibility of authenticity presupposes freedom and undercuts any unqualified condemnation of Heidegger as a deterministic fatalist. Furthermore, thrownness clearly does not imply that Dasein is a "play thing" of external forces. In describing idle talk, Heidegger emphasizes that it "does not first arise through certain circumstances which have effects upon Dasein 'from outside'" (SZ 177). The same is true of all existential phenomena and ways of being so far described. Inauthenticity is not foisted upon Dasein by an unalterable deterministic process that necessitates Dasein's remaining a prisoner of das Man from birth to death. Rather, Heidegger describes the fall as a movement away from self-being and into das Man's ways of being which tempt, tranquilize, accommodate, and shelter everyday Dasein such that it falls ever deeper into inauthenticity and becomes das Man. But I would argue that this does not imply that Dasein is thrown forever into inauthenticity or that "inauthenticity" is Dasein's "essential nature", but rather that Dasein is thrown into a condition by which it is fascinated and drawn into the world of das Man, and thus falls into inauthentic ways of being.\(^1\) Thrownness does, I believe, signify the inexorability of inauthenticity and alienation in that "at first and for the most part" Dasein is thrown into a condition (concern, Mitsein, das Man, publicness) from which it becomes

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\(^1\) In Division Two of SZ, Heidegger stresses the primordiality of authenticity, and claims that inauthenticity is founded upon authenticity, implying that a das Man existence is a deficient way of being, a fall away from one's authentic being (SZ 317-18). But since Heidegger claims both that authenticity is more primordial than inauthenticity, and that "at first and for the most part" Dasein exists inauthentically, we should perhaps distinguish between "ontological primordiality" and "genetic-historic primacy". Then we can say that although inauthenticity is the way most people are most of the time (zunächst und zumeist), authenticity is really ontologically more primordial. This proposal will be elucidated in a later chapter on the authentic self.
absorbed and dispersed into inauthentic-alienating ways of being. But this does not rule out the possibility of extrication and authenticity, for although "at first and for the most part" Dasein is inauthentic, the phrase "for the most part" signifies that inauthenticity prevails as a characteristic of everydayness "for the most part", leaving open the possibility of extrication and modification. Hence, I suggest that Dasein "remains in the throw" of inauthenticity only as long as it persists in the ways of being of das Man. In the interpretation I shall develop, Dasein can extricate himself from das Man and choose the project of authenticity. It is this project of extrication and individuation that will be the subject matter of the next division.

Another interpretative problem we face is ascertaining the ontological status of "falling". In his definition of "Care as the being of Dasein", Heidegger makes it clear that falling is one of the a priori constituents of Dasein, along with existentiality (projection) and facticity (thrownness) (SZ 192).\(^1\) If falling is an essential determinant of Dasein than we must ask how can Dasein escape from the fall. Can Dasein indeed halt the fall? Can Dasein reverse the movement of falling and come from the das Man self to its own self? Or is there a sense in which Dasein is always and forever falling? If so, does authentic Dasein have its own way of falling?

Again, let us note that both falling and existentiality constitute human being equiprimordially (SZ 148, 179, 181). Moreover, Heidegger constantly stresses that the alternative between an authentic and inauthentic existence is always at stake for us and that our potentiality for being a self can either be won, lost, or forfeited. Thus, falling is only possible for a

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\(^1\) cf. also SZ 176 where Heidegger describes falling as "eine existentielle Bestimmung des Daseins selbst"; and SZ 179 where falling is defines as "eine wesenhafte ontologische Struktur des Daseins selbst". 
being whose existence is such that it can either be itself (authentic) through choosing and appropriating its own possibilities, or not be itself through adopting the ways of being of das Man. Therefore, falling does not signify that Dasein falls into a way of being from which it can never hope to escape. Rather:

Falling, as a kind of being of this being-in, affords us the most elemental evidence for Dasein’s existentiaility, (i.e. its possibility of existing either authentically or inauthentically). In falling, nothing other than our potentiality-for-being-in-the-world is at stake, even if in the mode of inauthenticity. Dasein can fall only because being-in-the-world understandingly with its moods is at stake for it (SZ 179; parenthetical addition mine).

This passage suggests a clarification of the scope of "falling". The fall into the world and into the ways of being of das Man is a determinant of human being, but its tendency to fall into particular ways of being can be reversed, thus a modification of inauthentic ways of being is on Heidegger's account possible. What is at stake are two sets of opposing ways of being, in which authenticity and authentic ways of being appear as the negation and modification of inauthentic ways of being. This contrast indicates that Dasein is not forever imprisoned in the grips of das Man's inauthenticity, but can extricate itself from inauthentic ways of being and can choose its authenticity. The first step in liberating oneself from das Man is seeing into inauthentic modes of behavior and grasping these ways of being as ways of being to be modified. Heidegger's hermeneutic of das Man and inauthenticity aids in this putting into question one's social being, I believe, by providing a new way of looking at our everyday life that brings attention to some blameworthy characteristics and tendencies which we usually overlook and cover over. Thus, I take his hermeneutic of inauthenticity as a critique of the ways of being of das Man that serves to induce us to critically
examine the phenomena at stake and therefore functions as traditional 
evaluative language. But as most people are in bondage to das Man, tightly 
chained to its ways of being, one needs more than a conceptual understanding 
of the phenomena of everyday life to find the way out of inauthenticity. 
In the following passage, Heidegger previews the struggle one must go 
through to extricate oneself from das Man:

If Dasein discovers the world on its own and brings it close, 
if it discloses to itself its own authentic being, then this 
discovery of the 'world' and this disclosure of Dasein are 
always accomplished as a clearing-away of concealments and 
obscurities, as a breaking up of the disguises with which 
Dasein bars its own way (SZ 129).

Secondly, then, we must break through das Man's chains of bondage and 
ilusion by a "clearing away of concealments and obscurities" and a breaking 
up of the "disguises" (social masks, personae, false consciousness) which 
"bar one's way" from authenticity. The experiences which enable us to 
perform this breakthrough will be discussed in the next chapter dealing with 
extrication and individuation. In sum, what is at stake is a changing one's 
life, a modification of one's inauthentic ways of being-in-the-world.

Heidegger writes:

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\text{Authentic being-one's-self does not rest upon an exceptional} 
\text{condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached} 
\text{from das Man; it is rather an existentiell modification of} 
\text{das Man—of das Man as an essential existentiale (SZ 130).} \]

Asking oneself how an existentiell modification of das Man is possible 
should help clarify and concretize Heidegger's concept of das Man and the 
relation between the ontic and the ontological in SZ. For if das Man is

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1"Das eigentliche Selbstsein beruht nicht auf einem vom Man abgelösten 
Ausnahmzustand des Subjekts, sondern ist eine existenzielle Modifikation 
des Man als eines wesenhaftgen Existenzials" (SZ 130).
taken as a pure ontological concept, an abstraction, a structure found in some a priori realm of conceptual purity, then obviously it would be impossible to existentially modify it! But if we conceive of "das Man" as a set of inauthentic ways of being, characteristics, and tendencies—the structural interconnectedness of which is represented by the concept "das Man"—then one sees that the modification of the das Man self is carried out by modifying inauthentic ways of being (such as idle talk, curiosity, etc.). Thus, what is at stake is not a modification of an abstract ontological structure (a conceptual feat), but rather a changing one's ways of being: a seizing upon one's inauthentic ways of being such that one modifies their way of being-in-the-world.

Authenticity is therefore a way of being-in-the-world. It is not an unusual psychological state reached only by a special "spiritual" discipline, nor does one "transcend" worldly involvement. It is rather a modification of one's relation to das Man and everydayness such that one does not surrender oneself to the authority of das Man, and does not blindly follow das Man's ways of being and the dictates of publicness.

Authentic existence is not something which floats above falling everydayness; existentially, it is only a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon (SZ 179).
Division Two

EXTRICATION AND INDIQUIDUATION
In this division we shall examine some of the experiences and disclosures that make possible the modification of the inauthentic self. We shall turn from Heidegger's analysis of das Man and the ways of being of the inauthentic self, to an analysis of certain experiences which Heidegger claims undermine one's confidence and security in the everyday understanding-interpretation of das Man, and thus disintegrate das Man's authority and dictatorship. The phenomena which Heidegger selects as the modifiers of the inauthentic self are anxiety, death, and conscience-guilt. We must discern how these usually negatively evaluated phenomena serve a positive function in Heidegger's notion of self-modification.

The themes I shall introduce to interpret the process of Dasein's liberation from its inauthenticity and for its authenticity are extrication and individuation. The term "individuation" (Vereinzelung) is Heidegger's and refers to an individuation of the authentic self from the das Man self. "Extrication" is a term I am introducing to cover a family of concepts Heidegger uses to describe Dasein's liberation (Befreiung) from inauthentic possibilities (SZ 264, 303, 344, 122, 198), the withdrawing or extricating (entziehen) of Dasein from das Man's ways of being (SZ 169, 296, 299, 383), and the act of tearing oneself away or being torn away from das Man's publicness (entreissen; SZ 263, 383-4). I shall use these themes of extrication and individuation as an interpretive context in which we can work out the ways that anxiety, authentic being toward death, and conscience awaken Dasein from its slumber in das Man, arouse Dasein out of its complacent absorption in publicness, and disclose its lostness, alienation, and inauthenticity in inauthentic existence. These phenomena are, in Heidegger's interpretation, "ontological". That is, he claims they are universal constituents of human being which disclose fundamental insights into what it
is to be human, and which, if properly understood, have a transformative effect. In the course of this division I hope to make clear a model of disclosure found in *SZ* which describes in every case a break or rupture in one's absorption in everyday experience, and which reveals insights into one's inauthenticity that free the individual from the domination of das Man. What is at stake is an interconnected series of experiences which extricate and individuate Dasein from the tyranny of das Man, and which are thus the conditions of the possibility of authenticity.

Before beginning our inquiry, I wish to stress that the phenomena we shall examine in this division, in my interpretation, are not the sole constitutives of authenticity. Therefore, one should note the provisional nature of this division which only begins the disclosure of Heidegger's concept of authenticity. I put special emphasis on this point because many interpreters of Heidegger have fixed upon death and anxiety, conscience and guilt, as the exclusive constituents of authenticity. I hope to show that this wide-spread interpretation which equates authenticity with being toward death, or which explicates authenticity exclusively in terms of the phenomena we shall examine in this division, is misleading as an interpretation of Heidegger is concept of authenticity. To avoid the deficiencies of what I take to an erroneous interpretation of authenticity, I propose that anxiety, death, and conscience are but the beginning of a process of self-transformation. Hence, I wish to make it clear that in the course of my interpretation I shall take care not to over-emphasize the role of death in Heidegger's conception of authenticity, and therefore intend to offer a perspective from which we can free Heidegger's concept of authenticity from what I consider a constrictive interpretive perspective.

Let us then begin by inquiring how (A) anxiety functions as a liberating-disclosive phenomenon that extricates Dasein from its lostness in das Man
and individuates it for the choice of authenticity. Next, we shall see how (B) the awareness of death plays a similar extricating-individuating role. I shall discuss in detail the relation between death and authenticity, and will provisionally indicate my opposition to those interpretations of authenticity that I believe exaggerate and distort the role of being toward death in Heidegger's concept of authenticity. After explicating Heidegger's notion of authentic being toward death, I shall note how Heidegger's contrast of das Man's evasion of death with authentic being toward death provides an example of a distinction between authentic and inauthentic ways of being. This analysis will lead to a brief excursus, in which I shall offer further remarks on the relation between the evaluative and descriptive dimensions in Heidegger's hermeneutic of authenticity. To conclude our examination of the conditions of the possibility of the modification of the inauthentic self, we shall examine Heidegger's conception of (C) Conscience, Guilt, and the Call to Authenticity, including an interpretation of conscience as (1) The Call to Authenticity, and (2) Dasein's Understanding the Appeal and Guilt.

What is at stake in this division is the possibility of a transition from inauthenticity to authenticity. Our guiding question will be: What makes authenticity possible? i.e. What are the conditions of the possibility of authenticity? An explication of the structure of an authentic existence will not be worked out until the next division.

A. Anxiety as a Liberating-Revelatory Disclosure

Anxiety, in Heidegger's interpretation, is not conceived as a state of "mental disorder", or as a depressive, unhealthy condition, but is rather interpreted as a "distinctive mode of disclosure...one of the most far-reaching
and primordial possibilities of disclosure" (SZ 182). In this section I shall interpret anxiety as an extreme experience that extricates and individuates inauthentic Dasein, and as a special mode of disclosure (Grundbefindlichkeit) that helps make possible authenticity. Again, as in the previous division, we shall pass back and forth from personal experiences and empirical phenomena (ontic) to the structures and concepts with which Heidegger describes and interprets these phenomena (ontological). Our concern will be to examine Heidegger's claim that anxiety "brings Dasein back from its absorption in the world" (SZ 189; extrication), and that anxiety "individualizes Dasein and discloses it as 'solus ipse'" (SZ 188; individuation). This inquiry should thus show how anxiety helps make authenticity possible

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1 In his analysis of anxiety in SZ #40, Heidegger makes the following claims for the disclosive function of anxiety: (1) anxiety "simplifies" Dasein in such a way as to make manifest the "primordial totality" of its "structural whole" (SZ 182); (2) "discloses primordially and direct the world as world" (SZ 187, 188); (3) reveals Dasein's "being-in" as "an individualized, pure, thrown potentiality-for-being" (SZ 188); (4) "individualizes Dasein and thus discloses it as 'solus ipse'" (SZ 188); (5) discloses Dasein's "not-at-homeness" in das Man; and (6) in What is Metaphysics anxiety takes on a further disclosive function, playing a fundamental role in the revelation of Nothingness (which in turn has something to do with making possible a grasping or experiencing Being as a Whole). My perspective on anxiety is restricted by my focus on authenticity, thus only claims 3–5 will concern us in this section. Thus, I shall solely focus on anxiety from the standpoint of its role in the modification of the everyday self.

2 Heidegger's remarks on SZ 184-5 that "One of Dasein's possibilities of being is to give us ontical 'information' about itself as an entity", that ontological interpretation must not overlook "the positive phenomenal bases" for its interpretation, that a "phenomenological interpretation" must strive to understand and conceptualize (zu Begriff bringen) the ontic experience upon which it is based, and that the interpretation "only carries out the explication of what Dasein itself ontically discloses" (SZ 185) makes it abundantly clear that Heidegger wishes to provide a firm ontic grounding for his ontological analysis of anxiety, and that his concept is derived from and grounded in an experience of anxiety.
by disclosing to Dasein in a forceful way its lostness in das Man and by liberating it for its authenticity.

Since Heidegger assigns anxiety such a major role both in his existential analytic and in his hermeneutic of authenticity, perhaps I should make some preliminary remarks on the disclosive significance of "mood" that Heidegger maintains. He argues that Dasein's being is most directly disclosed to it through its moods, a claim we cannot here fully examine and explicate.¹ Heidegger's first point is that we are always in some mood (angry, happy, bored, indifferent, and so on), and that these moods reveal to us how we are doing, how things are going: "a mood makes manifest 'how one is', and how one is faring" (SZ 134). This "moodiness" is such a pervasive and ordinary aspect of our daily life that we usually attach little importance to our moods. Philosophers have reinforced this tendency to overlook moods by interpreting them as noncognitive, fleeting, ever-changing phantoms having no philosophical significance.

Secondly, Heidegger stresses that mood is not only an indication of how we are currently faring, but "from an ontological point of view we must leave

¹ "...die Erschliessungsmöglichkeiten des Erkennens viel zu kurz tragen gegenüber dem ursprünglichen Erschiessen der Stimmungen, in denen das Dasein vor sein Sein als Da gebracht ist" (SZ 134; cf. also SZ 136, 138). A stimulating if not satisfactory inquiry into moods carried through in Auseinandersetzung with Heidegger is found in Otto Bollnow's Das Wesen der Stimmung (Klostermann: Frankfurt, 1943).

Heidegger's most comprehensive term for "moods" is Befindlichkeit. Since this term indicates our "being attuned" or emotional attunement to the world an accurate Heideggerian translation would be "attunement". One should keep in mind that Befindlichkeit is intended as a mode of disclosure for Heidegger that reveals the totality of being-in-the-world and not just one's "psychological states" (thus Macquarrie and Robinson's "states of mind" is a most unHeideggerian translation for it uses a psychological concept that Heidegger scrupulously avoids). Thus, although I shall refer to anxiety as a "mood" on the grounds and that this best serves my purpose of interpreting the extricating-individuating role of anxiety, I am not urging that Befindlichkeit is best translated as "mood".
the primary discovery of the world to 'bare mood' as a general principle" (SZ 138). This statement indicates that mood not only discloses our current "being disposed", but also reveals far reaching insights into our being-in-the-world, thus serving as a primary mode of disclosure (SZ 135–8).

Heidegger claims that there is one mood that is especially significant as a revelatory phenomenon. This mood is anxiety (Angst) which is designated as a "basic state of being" (Grundbefindlichkeit). This means that Heidegger takes anxiety to be a universally recurrent phenomenon of human existence, a constitutive determinant of human being. Thus, although anxiety will be provisionally interpreted here as an indication and undermining of inauthenticity which begins a process of self-modification, it is never completely "overcome" or negated. To understand the important role of anxiety in Heidegger's philosophy we must clearly grasp the paradox that it is anxiety, usually considered a pathological ailment, that enables one to begin breaking through the domination and constrictive control of das Man's dictatorship, and thus become free for the project of authenticity. This positive liberating-disclosive function of anxiety is the distinctive feature of Heidegger's interpretation and sharply distinguishes his concept from psychiatric concepts.

The starting point for the hermeneutic of anxiety is Dasein's fallen absorption in das Man (SZ 184). In an earlier chapter of SZ Heidegger argued that the instrumental complexes which we daily utilize were concealed in the inconspicuousness and obviousness of habit and familiarity (SZ, I, Chapter III). It is only when a means-end relationship breaks down that the structure of the instrumental complex reveals itself (SZ 75). Similarly in the social world the individual finds himself in the center of a referential totality of social relations which are for the most part taken for granted, since like instrumental relations they are generally inconspicuous and obvious. Thus,
in both the environmental world (Umwelt) and the public world (Mitwelt),
one’s "being-in" is an outgoing absorption into the world of concern and
solicitude. The everyday world is a familiar one.

I wish to suggest here that the role of the broken hammer in Heidegger's
disclosure of the work-world (SZ #16) is assumed by anxiety in the disclosure
of insubstitivity and provides one of the transitional bridges from fallen,
insubstantial everydayness to authenticity. For just as a break in our in-
strumental relations (hammer) disclosed for the first time the nature,
structure, and possibilities of an instrumental complex that was unreflectively
utilized, so too does the experience of anxiety create a rupture in our everyday
relations to the social world and enables one to see with insight into
one’s alienation and lostness in a das Man existence. This parallel process
of disclosure indicates a recurrent pattern in Heidegger's thought that
starts with absorption in an activity or condition, encounters a breakdown,
that yields insight or disclosure. The whole process explicates what Heidegger
calls Durchsichtigkeit and is interconnected with his ‘theory of truth’. In
the case of anxiety and its disclosure, we begin with Dasein absorbed and
dispersed in its social relations, encounter a breakdown of its public
preoccupation, and become aware of hitherto covered over or inconspicuous
characteristics of our absorption in the world. Thus, anxiety for Heidegger
performs a kind of "existential epoche" that breaks through the constrictions

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1 Macomber in his book on Heidegger's "notion of truth" describes in
detail the process through which the sequence "activity, breakdown, and
awareness" arise in Dasein's relations to tools (ibid. p. 34-51). In the
context of Heidegger's theory of truth and disclosure within which Macomber
operates, my discussion of anxiety can be taken as a special case of a
Heideggerian description of "the process by which human awareness arises
out of human activity" (ibid. p. 49). This process, I might add, takes place
on all levels of experience and provides an account of how one gains awareness,
insight, and understanding of the many dimensions of experience. There is
a close similarity here to Dewey's notion of the "problematic situation" and
of the "natural attitude", thus enabling one to see through the distortions and concealments of das Man's understanding, and to see into Dasein's lostness in an inauthentic existence.\(^1\) In following sections we shall see that the experiences of death and conscience provide the same kind of disclosure and insight, enabling us to formulate a structure of experience which makes possible authenticity.

The obstacle to self-modification that must be broken through is everyday Dasein's tendency to "flee in the face of itself--of itself as an authentic potentiality-for-being-its-self" (SZ 184).\(^2\) In order to modify this situation, everyday Dasein must become aware that it is running away from itself. If Dasein is to halt its flight and discover its alienation

his "pragmatic" account of how one acquires new beliefs, rearranges and organizes one's knowledge, and changes one's life. The basic point is that awareness arises out of a breakdown of one's everyday relations. In the case we are presently studying, it is anxiety that causes the breakdown, thus rendering one's absorption in das Man a "problematic situation" which calls for decision and action.

1

The term "epoche" here signifies that in anxiety Dasein "puts into abeyance" its everyday attitudes, roles, and understanding. The qualification "existential" indicates that the breaking through of the natural attitude takes place in what Heidegger interprets as an "existential" constituent of human being. This case provides an example of how Heidegger thoroughly reinterprets Husserl's phenomenological epoché by substituting extreme experiences for theoretical cognition as key modes of disclosure.

2

The phenomenon under question here is: "Dieses Phänomen der Flucht des Daseins vor ihm selbst und seiner Eigentlichkeit". Heidegger's claim is that: "Das Aufgehen im Man und bei der besorgten 'Welt' offenbart so etwas wie eine Flucht des Daseins vor ihm selbst als eigentlichem Selbstsein-können" (SZ 184).
from its authentic possibilities, it must first become arrested from its
fall, then turn toward itself and see that it is fleeing from its authenti-
city and is falling ever deeper into inauthenticity. The problem is that
das Man provides Dasein with ways of fleeing and forgetting (SZ 44), thus
aggravating Dasein's fall away from itself such that "the authenticity of
being-one's-self has been closed off and thrust aside in falling" (SZ 184).
For within the context of one's everyday routine, one is unaware of sub-
mitting to das Man and existing inauthentically, thus concealing the
possibility of an authentic existence. In this complacent, self-satisfied
condition one believes that all is in order, that there is nothing amiss.
But, Heidegger claims, this tranquillized condition is an artificial one
for anxiety is always present, waiting to disturb and upset the delicate
balance with which everyday Dasein manages to keep in control.

In describing anxiety, Heidegger's first point is that the object of
anxiety, "that in the face of which one has anxiety (das Wovor der Angst)
is being-in-the-world as such" (SZ 186). Thus, the object of anxiety is
no particular entity in the world.

That in the face of which one is anxious is completely indefinite.
Not only does this indefiniteness leave factically undecided which
entity within-the-world is threatening us, but it also tells us
that entities within-the-world are not 'relevant' at all. Nothing
which is ready-to-hand or present-at-hand within the world functions
as that in the face of which anxiety is anxious (SZ 186).

Although the object of anxiety is nothing definite, for no one thing
threatens, nevertheless the experience causes a rupture in Dasein's usual
relatedness and involvement, and as with the case of the broken instrument
one "stumbles in a void" (stösst ins Leere) (SZ 75). The void that arises
in the experience of anxiety is a loss of meaning such that the world of
das Man no longer has any interest, importance or urgency.
The totality of involvements of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand discovered within-the-world, is, as such, without importance; it collapses into itself; the world has the character of complete meaninglessness.

The utter meaninglessness which makes itself known...does not signify that the world is absent, but tells us that entities within-the-world are of so little importance in themselves that on the basis of this meaninglessness of what is within-the-world, the world in its worldhood is all that still obtrudes itself... In anxiety what is environmentally ready-to-hand sinks away, and so, in general, do entities within-the-world. The 'world' can offer nothing more, and neither can the Dasein-with of others (SZ 186-7).

Thus, in anxiety, nothing definite threatens, there is no object of anxiety. Instead, one is anxious because the world has lost all meaning, urgency, and importance. The meaninglessness of the daily routine and public roles cause the instrumentalities and things in the world to intrude themselves on anxious Dasein whose absorption in das Man and public concern becomes oppressive and stifling. Neither the tasks of the work world nor my coexistence in the social world can offer any relief from the anxiety over a world in which commercial transactions and communal involvement are no longer of any consequence. I interpret this experience as a loss of meaning, an experience of meaninglessness that causes a rupture in Dasein's absorption in das Man.

It should be noted that in SZ the object and source of anxiety is not a metaphysical Nothingness (das Nichts). Though that which threatens in the state of anxiety can be said to be "nothing and nowhere" in that no definite object in a particular region is the source of the threat, Heidegger clearly says that which one is anxious about is "not totally nothing" (kein totales Nichts) (SZ 187).¹ Although after a seizure of anxiety when asked

¹ In Heidegger's later writings we find a quite different analysis. cf. Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik p. 228, and Was ist Metaphysik p. 16.
what is the matter, we may reply, "it was really nothing", this everyday disclosure which we usually due-to talk about familiar things in the world is unable to articulate the experience. For in anxiety everything in the familiar everyday world has become completely insignificant. There is nothing to be done, nothing to discuss, nothing to be said. But the "nothing" here is not a mysterious metaphysical Nothingness, but rather a world without meaning, a world stripped of its usual significance that has nothing to offer. Everyday existence has become empty, vacuous, hollow, void.

Heidegger argues from this experience of meaninglessness that anxiety is not only intentional (das Wovor), but also reflexive (das Worum); i.e. one is anxious about something. What one is anxious about "is not any definite kind of being for Dasein or a definite possibility...but rather... that which anxiety is anxious about is being-in-the-world itself" (SZ 187). This means that Dasein is anxious about its own being-in-the-world. For anxious Dasein is profoundly disturbed about the loss of meaning and the flat indifference of everything in its everyday world. The concomitant of anxiety is therefore that Dasein can no longer remain tranquil and self-assured in the protecting shelter of das Man.

Anxiety takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of the 'world' and the way things have been publicly interpreted. It throws Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about--its authentic potentiality-for-being-in-the-world (SZ 187).

The "negative function" of anxiety is to shatter the understanding-interpretation maintained by das Man (false consciousness). Therefore, anxious Dasein is deprived of the tranquilizations, justifications, and assurances with which everyday Dasein builds up its protecting shelter. For in a seizure of anxiety, the security and self-assured complacency of das
Man's system of conventions and distractions collapses. But this means that das Man's authority and dictatorship also collapses, resulting in the disintegration of the das Man self. Thus, the positive function of anxiety is the extrication of Dasein out of its dispersion-absorption in average everydayness, for as anxiety brings about the collapse and disintegration of the das Man self it "throws Dasein back upon its authentic potentiality-for-being-a-self."

The point I wish to stress is that what disintegrates and collapses is the das Man self. Dasein's fall into das Man's ways of being (marked by publicness, levelling down, averageness, covering over and closing off) was earlier shown to be a source of Dasein's alienation from its authentic possibilities. We recall that Dasein's understanding of itself in terms of the roles and possibilities of das Man, and its uncritical acceptance of public interpretations and ways of being was seen to be one of the ways through which das Man exerted its control over everyday Dasein. In this context, the destruction of the tyranny of das Man's domination over Dasein in anxiety extricates Dasein from its absorption in everydayness and frees it for authentic possibilities. I believe that it is Heidegger's purpose to free the individual from the bondage of das Man so that one can become free to appropriate and develop one's own possibilities of understanding, interpreting, and acting, and thus constitute one's potentiality-for-being-a-self. In this interpretation Heidegger emerges as a philosopher of the freedom of the individual: of freedom from the herd-existence of das Man, and freedom for a choice of one's authentic possibilities.

This analysis of the extricating function of anxiety should help explain why Heidegger chose anxiety as a unique disclosive-ontological
phenomenon for his hermeneutic of authenticity and not more cheerful moods
as happiness, love, or Rausch. For it is anxiety alone, on this account,
that is powerful enough to break through das Man's authority and thus
liberate Dasein from its submission to publicness. What is at stake here
is liberation from das Man. What is required is a collapse and disintegration
of das Man's power and authority. Heidegger's argument is that anxiety can
achieve this goal most effectively and penetratingly: such "positive"
moods as happiness, self-satisfaction, and equanimity can serve to reinforce
das Man's dominion, thus enchainning Dasein ever tighter in its tyrannical
grip ("The Happy Consciousness"). Anxiety breaks through this bondage,
collapses the coercive authority of publicness and disintegrates das Man's
inauthentic understanding, thus freeing Dasein from das Man's ways of being.
In anxiety there is nothing for idle talk to chatter about, nothing for
curiosity to distract itself with, and nothing for ambiguity to surmise
about. The turbulence of inauthenticity has come to a standstill, and one
is brought face to face with "the groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic
everydayness".

Moreover, in Heidegger's interpretation of anxiety, besides the extrica-
tive function of reducing to insignificance das Man's world and disintegrating
the das Man self, anxiety also plays the positive role of individualizing
Dasein for its own self-being. The process of the extrication of Dasein
from its fallenness in das Man and the individuating disclosure of the
possibility of an authentic existence is clearly portrayed in the following
passage:

Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost being-in-the-
world, which as something that understands, projects itself
essentially upon possibilities. Therefore, with that which
it is anxious about, anxiety discloses Dasein as being possible,
and indeed as that which it can be singly from itself as individualized in individuation.

Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its being toward its ownmost potentiality-for-being—that is, its being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its being-free-for (propensio in) the authenticity of its being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is (SZ 187-8).

The two "insights" which Heidegger claims are disclosed to Dasein through anxiety, properly understood, are its "being possible" and its "being free". The argument would seem to be that the disintegration of the constrictive authority of das Man enables Dasein to realize that it is possible for Dasein to act, understand, and interpret in its own ways, and that das Man's ways of being are merely possibilities that may be altered, rejected, or exchanged for other possibilities, thus robbing das Man of its authoritative force. For by individuating one to his "solus ipse", anxiety enables one to gain a sense of one's own possibilities and one's being-free to make his own choices and resolves. This sense of freedom and possibility is brought about by the collapse of the domination of das Man. With the death of das Man everything is possible. Dasein's being-free and being-possible is brought home to it in a forceful way when das Man's protecting shelter collapses and it realizes its is abandoned, on its own. This breakdown of das Man can enable Dasein to see that it is free to choose its own possibilities, since there is nothing to prevent it from making its own choices or constituting its own ways of being. Thus, anxiety frees Dasein to take over and choose its own possibilities and projects, and frees it from the coercion and

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Underlying this claim is, perhaps, Kierkegaard's doctrine of anxiety as the vertigo of freedom, in which the individualized self dizzily surveys the infinity of possibilities before it and experiences anxiety in the face of its freedom and possibility (cf. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread (Princeton: Princeton, N.J. 1967)).
domination of das Man. "Anxiety individuates and discloses Dasein as 'solus ipse'" (SZ 188). Before the extricative experience of anxiety we find that Dasein is lost, that is is not its own self, but rather that it is undifferentiated, unindividuated, inauthentic. With the collapse of das Man, individuated Dasein experiences itself as a unique individual, the "single one" who is differentiated from the mass, who has his own self, his own possibilities, his own authenticity. Paradoxically, then, the journey toward authenticity begins with a seizure of anxiety that reveals one's lostness in das Man and begins a process of self-transformation.

Heidegger claims that "unbiased evidence" for his description of anxiety is found in the everyday way of talking about anxiety that says, "in anxiety one is 'uncanny' (unheimlich)" (SZ 188). The term "uncanniness", Heidegger claims, elucidates the "peculiar indefiniteness" of anxiety, its being over "nothing and nowhere"; but more important for our purposes, uncanniness also signifies "not being at home" (SZ 188). Heidegger claims that everyday Dasein has been tranquillized and tempted into believing that it is "at home" in the familiar publicness of das Man. But anxiety shatters this at-homeness, disclosing that one is not-at-home (unheimlich) in the world of das Man. In an earlier chapter Heidegger remarked: "The obviousness and self-assurance of the average ways in which things have been interpreted, are such that while the particular Dasein drifts along toward an ever-increasing groundlessness as it floats, the uncanniness of this floating remains hidden from it under their protecting shelter" (SZ 170). In anxiety the protecting shelter and das Man's "at-homeness" collapse and the groundlessness and uncanniness of a das Man existence make themselves manifest. In this way anxiety and uncanniness halt the fall into das Man by disrupting the
trannquilizing complacency of everydayness.\(^1\)

Thus, we should now be aware that anxiety is both an extricative experience (onic) and a structural concept (ontological) which, I have suggested, signifies the disintegration of the das Man self. Anxiety is experienced as an oppressive meaninglessness and is accompanied by "uncanniness". Anxiety is interpreted and conceptualized as a disclosive mood that halts the flight from the self, and is a fundamental way in which one is extricated from absorption-dispersion in das Man, and is individuated as the "single one" with his own authenticity.

In anxiety there lies the possibility of a disclosure which is quite distinctive; for anxiety individualizes. This individuation brings Dasein back from its falling, and makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities of its being (SZ 190-1).

One might object to Heidegger's account of anxiety that although one has experienced or heard about the sort of thing that Heidegger describes as anxiety, one would hardly admit that the experience "means" what Heidegger claims. i.e. one might question Heidegger's conceptual analysis and interpretation of anxiety.\(^2\) For one might claim that it is perverse to maintain that anxiety can play the disclosive-liberating role that Heidegger maintains.

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1 "Die Angst dagegen holt das Dasein aus seinem verfallenden Aufgehen in der 'Welt' zurück. Die alltägliche Vertrautheit bricht in sich zusammen. Das Dasein ist vereinzelt, das jedoch als In-der-Welt-sein. Das In-sein kommt in den existenziellen 'Modus' des Un-zuhause. Nichts anderes meint die Rede von der 'Unheimlichkeit'" (SZ 189).

2 It is interesting to note that Heidegger apologizes for the "factual rarity of anxiety as a phenomenon": "Under the ascendancy of falling and publicness, 'real' anxiety is rare" (SZ 190). This is no longer the case. The exploding number of various journal articles and books about anxiety cutting across several disciplines, and the constant reference to anxiety in world literature, everyday life, and mass culture would indicate that acceptance of the fact of anxiety is more wide spread today than when SZ appeared in 1927. But while we readily accept the phenomenon of anxiety qua "fact", we may differ about its interpretation.
The everyday interpretation of anxiety holds that "being anxious" is a negative phenomenon that the "healthy person" should strive to overcome. Indeed, psychoanalysis and psychiatry claim to help one overcome or minimize anxiety that supposedly inhibits one from normal or "productive" behavior. Thus, "one" might want to say that far from being a liberating-disclosive experience as Heidegger maintains, anxiety is really a destructive menace that is a threat to the well-being of modern man and perhaps to society itself, and is thus something that should be expiated rather than praised.

Heidegger could counter this criticism by arguing that the understanding of anxiety as an extricating-individuating concept is suppressed and covered over by das Man's injunctions to the effect that anxiety is rather a sign of weakness, abnormality, or mental disorder. For if one takes anxiety to be an unhealthy, though merely passing thing that can be overcome or resolved by the proper technique or attitude, one "dims down" its disclosive function. Hence, Heidegger could stress that if anxiety is to have a liberating influence one must be aware of what anxiety signifies and portends for authenticity, and that failure to do so is an indication of the extent to which one is absorbed into das Man.

Heidegger's account of anxiety and its significance for authenticity no doubt creates difficulties for the "average understanding". I hope to have clarified its role in making possible authenticity, and to have indicated why anxiety, among all our manifold "moods", was chosen as the Befindlichkeit which can most powerfully and directly extricate and individuate Dasein from das Man. Let us then be clear about the liberating function anxiety plays in Heidegger's hermeneutic of authenticity and grasp how and why Heidegger maintains his unique interpretation of anxiety. Simply put, anxiety is a sign that something is wrong with one's existence. Anxious Dasein puts
into question his das Man existence. His way toward liberation has begun.

B. Death and Authenticity

In this section I wish to work out Heidegger's argument that authentic being toward death "reveals to Dasein its lostness in the das Man self, and brings it before the possibility of being itself (es selbst zu sein)" (SZ 266). My interpretive concern is to show how, for Heidegger, understanding one's own being toward death extricates one from absorption in das Man, and individuates one for the possibility of choosing and constituting an authentic self. Being toward death, then, like anxiety is a condition of the possibility of authenticity. Moreover, the disclosive understanding of one's own death is, on Heidegger's account, one of the fundamental ways in which one gains a sense of self-being. Thus, for Heidegger the experiences of being toward death and anxiety are not negative destructive phenomena that inhibit one's power to be, but are rather liberating-disclosive phenomena that help free one from bondage and lostness in das Man, and free one for the possibility of authenticity. Heidegger therefore implies that the taking over and incorporating death and anxiety into one's own understanding of personal self-being is a positive aid in constituting an authentic self and, stronger, is an indispensable condition of authenticity.

The grounds for this claim will be examined in detail in the following pages.

I shall begin by showing how the awareness of the possibility of one's own death creates a break or rupture in one's absorption-dispersion in das Man and enables Dasein to gain insight into its inauthenticity and lostness. We recall that at first and for the most part everyday life is preoccupied with the dealings and involvements of concern and solicitude. Although many events stand before busy everyday life, such as the arrival of a friend,
a trip, a storm, a vacation, success or failure (SZ 250), there is one thing, Heidegger claims, that stands before one (Bevorstand) in a distinctive way. This unique possibility is my own death. All other possibilities of everydayness are based on my being with others and are dependent on the instrumentalities and prescriptions of das Man. These possibilities concern things to do and ways of being in my environing world that are constituted and controlled by das Man and are thus givens of my environment that are external to me. Heidegger wants to make a distinction between these everyday possibilities and the distinctive possibility of death. What we must do is determine how death is a unique possibility different from the possibilities of das Man.

First, my death is, Heidegger argues, something that is distinctively mine: death is my ownmost possibility that is of vital personal concern to me and whose source is me alone. Death as my ownmost possibility is explicated in terms of its being a distinctive possibility in which no one can replace me, act as my substitute, or take away from me, and which therefore stands before me as something irreplaceably and inalienably mine. The interpretative key that should help us to reveal the relevance of this argument for authenticity is the concept "representability" (Vertretbarkeit). On SZ 239-40 Heidegger claims that "representability is constitutive for our

1 "Bevorstehen kann dem Dasein aber auch zum Beispiel eine Reise, eine Auseinandersetzung mit Anderen, ein Verzicht auf solches, was das Dasein selbst sein kann: eigene Seinsmöglichkeiten, die im Mitsein mit Anderen gründen" (SZ 250). I call attention to the last clause in this sentence that claims that Dasein's possibilities are founded on its being with others, i.e. are dependent on das Man. We shall see that the quest for authenticity is in part a search for possibilities that are not founded in or are dependent on das Man.

2 "Der Tod ist, sofern er 'ist' wesenmäßig je der meine. Und zwar bedeutet er eine eigentümliche Seinsmöglichkeit, darin es um das Sein des je eigenen Daseins schlechthin geht. Am Sterben zeigt sich, dass der Tod ontologisch durch Gemeinigkeit und Existenz konstituiert wird" (SZ 240).
being with one another". That is, in the everyday possibilities of das Man another person can always represent me, serve as a substitute for me, or replace me. Hence, from the standpoint of das Man I am but a cog in the social machine serving various functions, playing various parts that are interchangeable such that anyone can take over and serve in my place. Most of our everyday being with others is grounded in and constituted by this representability in Heidegger's view. His argument is that when one is absorbed in everyday concern, "one is what one does" (SZ 239). Moreover, since everyday Dasein identifies with what he does in his social relations he conceives of himself in terms of these representable possibilities, roles, and functions in such a way that he covers over and conceals his uniqueness, individuality, and irreplaceability. Heidegger's point here is appealing to my death as a paradigm of a kind of non-representable possibility that is uniquely mine seems to be that it is in becoming aware of my own death that I become aware that I am not merely a set of interconnected functions and social roles but am also a unique self possessing my own non-representable self-being. Heidegger's claim is that "this possibility of representing breaks down completely" when it comes to the question of my own death. Through this breakdown I become aware of my Gemeinigkeit, my mineness, my being a unique, non-representable self.

My death, then, gives me an experience of my self. The question now arises: how does one experience and take over authentically his own death, so that it gives him a sense of self and individuates and extricates his self from das Man? Heidegger claims that most people flee from, evade, and cover over their own death (cf. SZ #51 and #52). He implies that by fleeing from their own death, most people flee from their own self and thus forfeit
a potent way of modifying their inauthentic ways of being. What we must see is how an authentic being toward death stops the flight from the self and brings one before the possibility of authenticity.

The fundamental characteristic of death that an authentic being toward death should free, understand, and endure is the nature of death as a distinctive possibility.¹ The proper way of achieving this insight is not, Heidegger stresses, by brooding over death, calculating when and how it will arrive (and thus planning one's life in terms of this calculation), or expecting and waiting for death to happen. Heidegger argues that these behaviors weaken death's character as a possibility by conceiving of death as something ready - or present-at-hand that is to be evaded, calculated, or feared, thus covering over our own being toward this possibility (Sz 261-2). The only way to preserve the "pure possibility" character of death, so as to understandingly endure it as a possibility, is through what Heidegger calls "advancing in the possibility" (Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit) (Sz 262).² Vorlaufen signifies an advancing into the future, but the phrase "in die Möglichkeit" indicates that the "advancing" (projecting) is not toward death (nor does Vorlaufen in signify an "anticipation of" death)³ but rather signifies

¹"Im Sein zum Tode dagegen, wenn anders es die charakterisierte Möglichkeit als solche verstehend zu erschliessen hat, muss die Möglichkeit umgeschwächt als Möglichkeit verstanden, als Möglichkeit ausgebildet und im Verhalten zu ihr als Möglichkeit ausgehalten werden" (Sz 261).

² I am using "advancing" as a translation for Vorlaufen, following Richardson (op. cit.) for reasons which I hope to make quite clear.

³ I am suggesting that Macquarrie and Robinson's translation of "Vorlaufen in..." as "anticipation of..." is fundamentally misleading for not only is this a questionable rendering of the German, but it suggests exactly what Heidegger denies; i.e. "anticipation of" suggests that death is something that
a projecting into the future from my own being toward death.

To understand what Vorlaufen signifies we should clearly distinguish between Sein zum Tode and Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit. Being toward death is an existentiale, a constitutive structure of human being.¹ Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit is a "advancing" in the possibility "being toward death", or in other words, Vorlaufen signifies a projecting into the future out of Dasein's finitude. Rarely does Heidegger speak of a Vorlaufen zum Tode, an advancing toward death. Thus, since Vorlaufen discloses its being toward death as a present possibility and not as a future fact, it does not anticipate its own death as an event that will one day close out its being in the world. Rather, Vorlaufen is a projecting itself ahead in its finitude, but not in such a way that it anticipates its end, or posits its end death as a special goal, end, or "value". Grasping this notion of Vorlaufen in is of the utmost importance in understanding Heidegger's conception of an authentic being toward death and in avoiding a misconception of the relation between death and authenticity.

This interpretation stresses that Vorlaufen as authentic being toward death is not a dwelling upon the end or a brooding over it. Heidegger's Sein zum Tode is neither a pessimistic life-negation nor a romantic obsession with dying or finitude. His analysis of death as a distinctive possibility that I must understandingly endure rather than crippling one for life frees

is anticipated as a future event that is "still outstanding". For "anticipation" connotes an object of anticipation, something anticipated as if death were the intentional object of a privileged sort of act, and authentic being toward death was an intentional projecting of death as its end or object. Thus, the translation "anticipation of" suggests exactly what Heidegger denies and fails to account for Heidegger's important stress that authentic being toward death understandingly endures death as a distinctive possibility and not as an object in the indefinite future. We shall later see how this mistranslation can contribute to a fundamental misunderstanding of authenticity.

¹ SZ 245. T. S. Eliot poetizes this concept in his Four Quartets:
one from a morbid concern with such questions as "what will happen after I die", and with futile attempts to picture the afterlife, and helps free one from an inhibiting fear of death.

Death, as possibility, gives Dasein nothing to be 'actualized', nothing which Dasein as actual could itself be...in accordance with its essence, this possibility offers no support for becoming intent on something, 'picturing' to oneself the actuality which is possible, and so forgetting its possibility (SZ 262).

By making death Dasein's "pure possibility", Heidegger draws attention away from the event of dying and the question of the afterlife, and focuses on one's relation to one's own finite self-being and its significance for one's authenticity. Thus, it is a salient mark of Heidegger's concept of being toward death that far from intending to portray the senselessness of life in view of the impossibility of death, he stresses that authentic being toward death gives Dasein the power to be in the face of death, such that it makes possible individuation and authenticity. For Vorlaufen not only discloses the "measureless impossibility of existence" but reveals Dasein's potentiality-for-being-authentic. The following passage is crucial in exhibiting Heidegger's concept of authenticity in its relation to death.

Being toward death is advancing in a potentiality-for-being whose mode of being is itself advancing. In the advancing revealing of this potentiality-for-being, Dasein discloses itself as regards its uttermost possibility. But to project itself on its ownmost potentiality-for-being-means to be able to understand itself in the being of the entity so revealed--namely to exist. Advancing turns out to be the possibility of understanding one's ownmost and uttermost potentiality-for-being--that is to say, the possibility of an authentic existence (SZ 262-3).

Let us now indicate, briefly and concisely, the relation between death as a possibility, potentiality-for-being, and being toward death. In Heidegger's words "death is Dasein's ownmost possibility. Being toward this

"In my beginning is my end".
possibility discloses to Dasein its ownmost potentiality-for-being, in which its very being is at stake" (SZ 262). Further, "advancing turns out to be the possibility of understanding one's ownmost and uttermost potentiality-for-being—that is to say, the possibility of an authentic existence". This implies that Dasein's potentiality-for-being (Seinkonnen) is authenticity. Dasein can be (sein-konnen) authentic. Seinkonnen thus signifies that Dasein has the power, the ability (kennen) to be authentic. This analysis thus suggests that "advancing" brings one to the threshold of authenticity by disclosing the possibility of an authentic existence. But at this point Dasein merely understands that it can be authentic; it has not chosen authenticity as a project, resolved on its authentic possibilities, or constituted an authentic self. The point to be again stressed is that an authentic existence is not achieved, subsumed or completed by an authentic running ahead in death. Rather, an authentic being toward death discloses to Dasein its potentiality-for-being by individualizing Dasein, thus freeing one from immersion in the das Man self.

Let us now attempt to further clarify the relation between death, authenticity, Seinkonnen, and individuation. Heidegger claims that an authentic being toward death, first, conceives of death as its ownmost possibility. The effect of this disclosure is described on SZ 263:

Death is Dasein's ownmost possibility. Being toward this possibility discloses to Dasein its ownmost potentiality-for-being, in which its very being is at stake. Here it can become manifest to Dasein that in this distinctive possibility of its own self, it has been wrenched away from das Man. This means in advancing any Dasein can have wrenched itself away from das Man already. The understanding of this 'can' (Konnens) first reveals its factual lostness in the everydayness of the das Man self (SZ 263).

This sense of possessing and taking over one's ownmost possibility provides a paradigm for projecting one's own self-chosen possibilities. This
ability to project one's own existence ("can" signifies: can choose and project one's possibilities) reveals one's lostness in das Man, in which one has failed to project one's own possibilities, foregoing authenticity through going along with das Man, taking over its possibilities and following its ways of being. Advancing in one's ownmost possibility thus discloses that one is free, and is able to choose and project one's own possibilities.

Secondly, an authentic being toward death experiences its own death as a non-relational possibility which discloses that one is on his own, abandoned to himself:

Vorlaufen allows Dasein to understand that that potentiality-for-being in which its ownmost being is at stake, must be taken over by Dasein alone. Death does not just 'belong' to one's own Dasein in an undifferentiated way; death lays claim to it as an individual Dasein. The non-relational character of death, as understood in Vorlaufen individualizes Dasein down to itself (SZ 263).

In explicating the individualizing impact of the experience of one's own death, we again encounter the pattern absorption-breakdown-disclosure that was stressed in the analysis of anxiety. According to Heidegger, before my ownmost possibility of death I find all my relations to the environment and to the others are dissolved (SZ 250), therefore the tasks of the work world and the roles of the public world have no relevance to my confrontation with my own death; for in standing before death alone, I face my death "primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude". This experience reveals that my possibility of self-being is something I must experience and take over on my own: "Dasein can only be authentically itself if it makes this possible for itself on its own accord (von ihm selbst)" (SZ 263). Thus, authentic being toward death extricates me from das Man and individuates me, disclosing that I have my own potentiality-for-being that only I can take over.
Authentic being toward death, thirdly, discloses one's finitude, for is the possibility that is "not-to-be-out-stripped" (Unüberholbare). This makes death a particularly potent extricator, for when one understands his finitude he has no option but to surrender himself to his impending end, giving himself up to death's honesty. Heidegger argues that this "giving oneself up" (Selbstaufgabe) frees one to take over and choose his own authentic possibilities by freeing one from the inauthentic possibilities of das Man.¹ Authentic being toward death shakes one up sufficiently to break through one's complacent, self-assured immersion in das Man which kept one solidly entrenched in inauthenticity:

Vorlaufen discloses existence giving itself up as its uttermost possibility and thus it shatters that tenaciousness and rigidity (Versteifung) of whatever existence has been reached (SZ 264).

In this interpretation, the realization of finitude jolts one out of his complacency, shakes away some of his illusions, and makes him view his world with a penetrating, piercing eye that puts into question the familiar everyday world. Let us be clear on the import authentic being toward death has for our current life. An awareness that death is not to be outstripped "shatters one's tenacity", shaking Dasein out of its absorption in das Man. To use Sartre's metaphor, the disclosure of death brings one up against a wall. But in Heidegger's analysis one does not impotently and helplessly collapse in the face of this wall (as Sartre's condemned political prisoners

¹"Das vorlaufende Freiwerden für den eigenen Tod befreit von der Verlorenheit in die zufällig sich andrängenden Möglichkeiten, so zwar, dass es die faktischen Möglichkeiten, die der unüberholbaren vorgelagert sind, allererst eigentlich verstehen und wählen lässt" (SZ 264).
in his story "The Wall"), but rather one's das Man self shatters upon
crashing against finitude, and, to continue the metaphor, the individualized
self bounces back from the collision and comes back to its individualized Da,
from which an authentic being toward death projects itself into its own finite
future. Everyone has an awareness of his future death. An authentic being
toward death understandably endures this constituent of being human and
advances in the possibility choosing to constitute its authenticity from its
individualized self.

Thus, although the emphasis on self-surrender, giving oneself up, and
the shattering of "all tenaciousness to whatever existence one has reached"
seems like the type of ego-dissolution or dying to the world advocated by
various religions, this interpretation would, I believe, be incompatible
with the secular, worldly texture of Heidegger's thought in \(SZ\). For Heidegger
does not advocate either a solipsistic withdrawal into \(\text{la vie interieure}\) or
a negation of worldly concern. His claim is that the possibilities offered
by das Man are a threat to authenticity in that they divert one from one's
own authentic possibilities into the alienating ways of being of das Man. For
whereas das Man in his curiosity and ambiguity projects himself on a set of
possibilities that are average, conventional and dictated by the interests
of "publicness", authentic Dasein projects himself into possibilities that
he chooses as his own possibilities that are decisive for creating an authentic
way of being-in-the-world.

Hence, Heidegger suggests that authentic being toward the possibility
that is not-to-be-outstripped combines freedom and surrender. By surrendering
myself to the uttermost possibility of existence, I free myself for choosing
among factual possibilities which I decide are the ones I will take over and
appropriate in order to create my unique and irreplaceable life. But one must
constantly guard against falling behind one's free choice of one's own project and thus fall back into das Man. For only by continually projecting oneself onto one's ownmost potentiality-for-being does one "never become too old for one's victories" (Nietzsche, quoted on SZ 264), for one remains steadfast and constant in one's choice of authenticity. Hence, Heidegger's intention in calling for "self-surrender" (Selbstaufgabe means "giving oneself up" and "self-task") reveals itself as a means to choosing a life project that is authentic (one's own), and not as a means of extricating oneself from worldly being, thus distinguishing his concept of "Selbstaufgabe" from certain religious notions. The important point I wish to stress here is that Heidegger is explicitly arguing that authentic being toward death frees me not only in order to take over the possibility of death but also frees me to choose those factual possibilities with which I create my authentic existence. One can say, I believe, that authentic being toward death is a means to authenticity and individuation and not an end in itself. This point is important to understand in order to avoid the type of interpretation which conceives of authenticity as a constant confrontation with death, and takes Vorlaufen as a death oriented activity that is constantly projecting or running toward death as if death were its own (and only) inalienable authenticity. I again stress that Heidegger nowhere claims that death is my sole authentic possibility. One must, I believe, distinguish between death as my "pure" or "distinctive" possibility, and those "authentic" possibilities which I choose to give content to my authentic resolve (the nature of which will concern us in the next division).

Grasping death as the possibility that is not-to-be-outstipped induces one to recognize that his possibilities of existence are inalterable finite.¹

¹"Frei für die eigensten, vom Ende her bestimmten, das heisst als
Heidegger does not develop the existentiell consequences of this disclosure, but it could be argued that only through an awareness that one's possibilities are finite do one's involvements become urgent and pressing.¹ Thus a thoroughgoing awareness of finitude could impart a new seriousness on one's existence and could quicken one's sense of life, inducing one to carry through his projects with a new impetus to decisively act and create. While the disclosure of finitude could endow one's own projects with a new importance, it could also devaluate das Man's possibilities by revealing them as merely finite, provisional, non-absolute. In this way, one could gain a new perspective on life viewing social possibilities as non-essential, passing, finite, and one's own choices and projects as essential in constituting one's own unique determinate life.

Fourthly, authentic being toward death makes one aware of death's certainty. The certainty disclosed in authentic being toward death is not inductively derived from observing a numerous sample of cases of death, nor

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¹ For example, Hermann Hesse in his novel Narcissus and Goldmund writes that the fear of death is the source of art (and thought), and that the artists project is to create something solid, stable, enduring in a transitory world of passing in and out of existence: "He (Goldmund) thought that fear of death was perhaps the root of all art, perhaps also of all things of the mind. We fear death, we shudder at life's instability, we grieve to see the flowers wilt again and again, and the leaves fall, and in our hearts we know that we, too, are transitory and will soon disappear. When artists create pictures and thinkers search for laws and formulate thoughts, it is in order to salvage something from the great dance of death, to make something that lasts longer than we do" (Narcissus and Goldmund New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1968. p. 157). Generalizing this point in connection with Heidegger's claim that authentic being toward death discloses the finitude of one's possibilities, one could suggest, though Heidegger does not, that an awareness of death is the source of one's resolve to act, to achieve, to create, to do anything more than procure minimal conditions of existence.
does it enjoy the theoretical certainty of analytic statements. Through
the certainty of death, one sees that being-in-the-world is finite, and
one can live one’s life in the truth of this certainty.\textsuperscript{1} This being-certain
as a way of being meets Kierkegaard’s criterion of subjective existential
truth that is appropriated and lived, and not merely cogitated.\textsuperscript{2}

Finally, authentic being toward death is aware of the indefiniteness
of death’s certainty. In understanding the certainty of death Dasein
must hold itself open to a constant threat of dying at any moment. This
threat cannot be toned down and must be steadily faced if Dasein is to
maintain an authentic being toward death.\textsuperscript{3} The threat is best revealed in
the mood of anxiety.

the mood which can hold open the utter and constant threat to
itself arising from Dasein’s ownmost individualized being, is
anxiety. In this mood, Dasein finds itself face-to-face with
the nothing of the possible impossibility of its existence.
Anxiety is anxious about the potentiality-for-being of the
entity so determined and in this way it discloses the uttermost
possibility (\textit{SZ} 265-6).

\textsuperscript{1} Heidegger holds that the existential certainty of death is the
"highest certainty" because: (1) it is a truth of Dasein’s existence;
(2) it is rooted in an authentic understanding of being-in-the-world and
not merely in a propositional attitude; and (3) it makes possible the "full
authenticity of its existence" (\textit{SZ} 265). Heidegger seems to be deliberately
flouting Husserl’s ideal of apodicticity in this argument: "Daher muss die
Evidenz einer unmittelbaren Gegebenheit der Erlebnisse, des Ich und des
Bewusstseins notwendig hinter der Gewissheit zurückbleiben, die im Vorlaufen
beschlossen liegt. Und zwar nicht deshalb, weil die zugehörige Erfassungsart
nicht streng wäre, sondern weil sie grundsätzlich nicht das für wahr 'da-haben'
will: das Dasein, das ich selbst bin und als Seinkönnen eigentlich erst
vorlaufend sein kann" (\textit{SZ} 265).

\textsuperscript{2} "Zu beachten bleibt, dass Verstehen primär nicht besagt: begaffen eines
Sinnes, sondern sich verstehen in dem Seinkönnen, das sich im Entwurf
enthüllt" (\textit{SZ} 263).

\textsuperscript{3} "Das Sein zum Ende muss sich in ihr halten und kann sie so wenig
ablenden, dass es die Unbestimmtheit der Gewissheit vielmehr ausbilden
muss" (\textit{SZ} 265).
We observe here the interconnection between death and anxiety as extricating-individuating phenomena. In fact Heidegger writes, "being toward death is essentially anxiety" (SZ 266). I take this to imply that being toward death and anxiety most radically and concretely individualize Dasein, and that anxiety is both the constitutive mood of authentic being toward death, and the experience which most forcefully discloses one's finitude and individualized self-being. The important point to grasp is the disclosive-liberating function of anxiety and death. Heidegger is sometimes sociologically trivialized as expressing German anxiety over death and defeat in World War I, or is criticized as engaging in morbid sensationalism or pessimistic nihilism.¹ These remarks fail to elucidate the function death and anxiety play in Heidegger's philosophy and his distinctive and original analysis of these concepts. I have been attempting to show how death and anxiety provide a break or rupture in one's absorption-dispersion in das Man and disclose, negatively, one's lostness, not-at-homeness, alienation from one's own self, and abandonment to one's self, and, positively, one's being free for authenticity which is experienced as a potentiality (Seinkönnen) which one owns and can be.

But, one might ask, can death and anxiety really be taken in the positive, beneficial way Heidegger is recommending? Are they really ontological modes of disclosure? Extricating-individuating phenomena? Or are they not nasty natural facts that are a hinderance to "productive living" which should be struggled against and mastered? To answer these questions Heidegger might retort that it is no evidence against his account that anxiety and death,

¹The strongest and most detailed criticism of this sort is made by Lukacs in Die Zerstörung der Vernunft (Luchterhand: Berlin, 1962) and by Adorno in Jargon der Eigentlichkeit (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt, 1964).
and the subsequent individuation and extrication, are not commonly experienced and interpreted in the manner just explicated. For he claims that das Man evades death by prescribing an untroubled indifference as the appropriate attitude toward death, and interprets anxiety over death as cowardly fear over passing away (SZ 254). But Heidegger claims that this evasion and repression of anxiety and being toward death alienates one from one's authentic individualized potentiality-for-being (SZ 254), and thus serves to imprison Dasein in the bonds of das Man.¹ He also stresses that authentic Dasein will not be crippled for life by authentic being toward death, but will accept death as a component of finite being-in-the-world. For Heidegger claims that through authentic being toward death one receives courage for anxiety and freedom toward death that releases one from the illusions of das Man and enables Dasein to project itself onto its ownmost potentiality-for-being, thus making possible its authenticity.

We may now summarize our characterization of authentic being toward death as we have projected it existentially: Advancing (Vorlaufen) reveals to Dasein its lostness in the das Man self, and brings it back face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned freedom toward death—a freedom which has been released from the illusions of das Man, and which is factual, certain of itself, and anxious (SZ 266).

At this point in the interpretation I wish to make some clarifying remarks in order to avoid any misleading impression that might lead one to over emphasize or exaggerate the role of death and anxiety in the constitution

¹An example from literature of the breakdown of one who has evaded and repressed his being toward death is Tolstoy's Ivan Ilych. This superb story (cited by Heidegger in SZ) provides a striking illustration of das Man's evasion of death and the effect of such a repression on one's life. There is a growing literature on the psychological damage that evading and covering over death can inflict on both the aged and the mature adult (cf. Flegel's The Meaning of Death (McGrav-Hill: New York, 1959) that confirms Heidegger's intuition of the negative effects of the evasion of death.
of an authentic existence. To avoid this tendency, I propose that authentic being toward death takes one to the threshold of authenticity, but does not of itself constitute authenticity. That is, authenticity is not equivalent to or subsumed in being toward death. This thesis, plainly stated, may not appear too startling, but the fact is that most commentators on and critics of SZ have concluded that an authentic being toward death is the constitutor and fundamental structure of authenticity, thus implying, although not everyone draws out the consequences of this interpretation, that death is what is "authentic", (i.e. what is uniquely and inalienably mine) and that authenticity and being toward death are equivalent.¹ It is my intention to correct this view which I believe badly distorts Heidegger's subtle and liberating account of authenticity. I shall carefully analyze the passages that suggest the interpretation of authenticity, solely as a way of being toward death, shall draw distinctions and elicit passages that put such an interpretation in question, and shall offer an alternative interpretation which I believe more adequately and persuasively presents Heidegger's concept of authenticity. This issue reaches its sharpest focus in the

¹ This interpretation is crudely put by Adorno: "Die Unvertretbarkeit des Todes wird für die Ontologie von Sein und Zeit zum Wesenscharakter von Subjektivität selbst; sie determiniert alle anderen Bestimmungen bis zum Übergang in jene Lehre von der Eigentlichkeit, die am Tod nicht nur ihr Mass sondern ihr Ideal hat. Tod wird zum Wesenhaften des Daseins........... So wird der Tod in die Position des Eigentlichen manövriert................. Tod wird zum Wesen des Sterblichen, wider das Nächste, dass es da sei, und dadurch artifiziell zu einem jenseits des Seinden, vorm Man gerettert und dessen erhabenes Gegenbild, das Eigentliche; Eigentlichkeit ist der Tod". Jargon der Eigentlichkeit (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1964). p. 114, 115, 125. A more sophisticated formulation which builds on and synthesizes previous interpretations of the relation between death and authenticity is found in Demski's Sein, Mensch und Tod (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1963) which we shall later examine.
section on vorlaufende Entschlossenheit which we shall examine in the
next division, but I wish to introduce the problem of the interpretation
of the relation between death and authenticity here in the hope that an
early clarification will help us avoid the interpretive pitfalls which have,
I believe, plagued most interpretations of authenticity. I therefore pro-
pose that authentic being toward death merely begins the journey toward
authenticity, or takes one to the threshold of authenticity. Thus, I wish
to argue that death and anxiety extricate Dasein from its lostness in das
Man and enables one to gain a sense of self that is the beginning of in-
dividuation toward authenticity, but that these experiences of extrication
and individuation help make possible but do not complete the constitution
of authenticity.

Excursus: The contrast between authentic and inauthentic ways of being

In his chapter on "Being toward Death" Heidegger contrasts authentic
and inauthentic ways of comporting one's self toward death. He concludes
his portrayal of an inauthentic way of being toward death:

Our everyday falling evasion in the face of death is an inauthentic
being toward death. But inauthenticity is based on the possibility
of authenticity. Inauthenticity characterizes a kind of being into
which Dasein can divert itself and has for the most part always
dverted itself; but Dasein does not necessarily and constantly have
to divert itself into this kind of being. Because Dasein exists,
it determines its own character as the kind of entity it is, and
it does so in every case in terms of a possibility which it itself
is and which it understands (SZ 259).

The possibility of extrication and modification is made clear in the
statement that one "does not necessarily and constantly have to divert one-
self into this kind of being" for one can always, in Heidegger's interpretation,
determine one "in terms of a possibility which one is and understands"
(authenticity). Heidegger's contrast of inauthentic and authentic ways of
being toward death seems to lend credence to Sartre's criticism that "the
expressions 'authentic' and 'inauthentic' which Heidegger employs are
dubious and insincere because of their implicit moral content'. One
of my interpretive projects is to examine Heidegger's concept of authenticity
so as to ascertain if and in what sense his analyses do contain "implicit
moral content" or an evaluative dimension. I have already noted that
authenticity is a problematic concept for philosophers who maintain a
distinction between "descriptive" and "evaluative", for authenticity seems
to contain both; i.e. one can analyze both descriptive and evaluative pro-
positions out of Heidegger's contrast between authentic and inauthentic
ways of being. To clarify how Heidegger interconnects what is generally
separated into evaluative and descriptive components I wish now to examine
Heidegger's claim that Vorlaufen is an authentic way of being toward death.
This analysis should show how Heidegger attempts to ground what are
generally taken to be evaluative judgments in a descriptive ontological
analysis, and should thus illustrate how Heidegger roots his concept of
authenticity in his existential ontology.

But again we must penetrate beneath Heidegger's disclaimer, this time
that he is not proposing "norms or rules for comporting oneself toward
death" in the interests of "edification" (SZ 248), i.e. again Heidegger
seems to deny that his analysis has any evaluative function or import.
What we must do is to determine in what sense his analysis does (or does
not) propose "norms or rules for comporting oneself toward death". I
believe that if we take Heidegger's disclaimer restrictively we cannot
adequately explicate the contrast between das Man's inauthentic, evasive

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covering over of death and Heidegger's claim that Vorlaufen provides us with an authentic way of being toward death that does "not evade its ownmost, non-relational possibility, or cover up this possibility by fleeing from it, or give a new explanation for it to accord with the common sense of das Man" (SZ 260). For Heidegger seems to imply that authentic being toward death does not fall prey to the deficiencies and failures of das Man's inauthentic being toward death, which is characterized in language which rather unambiguously criticizes the everyday way of being toward the end (cf. SZ 254–60). That is, his language of an evasive flight that inauthentically understands and conceals death strongly suggests a negative evaluation of inauthentic being toward death, so that once again Heidegger's language suggests a critique of das Man's ways of being. Moreover, Heidegger's delineation of a way of authentic being toward death would seem to indicate that he is proposing an authentic way of comporting oneself which is projected as the appropriate or preferable way of being. But we must take care to provide the proper explication of an authentic being toward death to show that it is not intended to be merely evaluative (subjective, emotive, arbitrary) but is rather firmly grounded in an ontological analysis. Clearly, Heidegger wishes his analysis to have an ontological status in the sense that it is not "something devised accidentally and at random", nor is it "arbitrary" or willfully proposed. But this is what Heidegger must make convincing, and a careful study of his analysis indicates that he does attempt to show that authentic being toward death is grounded in and corresponds to the phenomenon of death (cf. SZ #53). Heidegger's existential analysis of death concluded:

Death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein's ownmost, non-relational, certain and as such indefinite possibility, that is not to be outstripped. Death is, as the end of Dasein, in the being of this entity toward its end (SZ 258–9).
What Heidegger attempts to show in _SZ 53_ is that authentic being toward death, unlike inauthentic flight and evasion, understands and endures death in its existential reality, and is thus the authentic way of being toward death that is appropriate to the subject matter, and that is grounded in the phenomenon itself and in an authentic understanding of human existence. Authentic on this analysis would then describe an appropriate way of being, grounded in the things themselves, and would in no way indicate subjective preference or a personal act of advocation. Thus, by showing how Vorlaufen is a way of authentic being toward death, Heidegger would hope to convince one that this way of being is not an arbitrary construction, but is rather a way of being in accordance with the phenomenon of human death.

Thus it would be a mistake, I believe, to take eigentlich as a "merely" descriptive term, for the way Heidegger uses eigentlich in certain contexts, it functions as a guide to human action and, stronger, can serve to induce the individual to modify his behavior. For if one accepts Heidegger's "descriptive" analysis he sees and conceives of certain ways of behavior as "inauthentic", and sees them as contrasted with an authentic way of being. The implicit impetus to self-modification rests in the situation that if one understands the phenomenon of human being and Heidegger's description of how most people act (das Man and inauthenticity), they will want to modify their inauthentic behavior so as to become more authentic human beings. In the case of being toward death just examined, Heidegger's argument would be that if one wants to behave in accordance with the way things are he should choose to act in a certain way and avoid acting in other inauthentic ways—implying inauthenticity is evasive, wrong, false. In this analysis, inauthentic behavior is a way of being to be modified and authenticity and
Heidegger's analysis of authentic ways of being functions as a guide to modification and that projects the appropriate, authentic way of human being. Thus Heidegger's concept of authenticity functions as a guide to human action which projects authentic ways of being and in this sense one can argue that authenticity has an evaluative use and dimension.

I have just suggested that Heidegger's concept of authenticity is connected with human action, possibilities, choice, and commitment and has an evaluative function. For his contrast between authentic and inauthentic ways of being indicates a negative evaluation of certain ways of being and a positive evaluation of opposed ways of being, thus indicating that the concept of authenticity, like traditional evaluative language, functions to guide and regulate human behavior by criticizing and proposing opposed ways of acting. Thus I am suggesting that Heidegger's hermeneutic of authenticity offers a new evaluative language that takes over the function of traditional evaluative language which Heidegger believes to be inadequate and deficient. The philosophical innovation of the concept of authenticity would be that it undercuts the distinction between descriptive and evaluative language could thus answer charges of emotivism by claiming its concepts are grounded in an ontology of human being (or "philosophical anthropology") which in turn has been secured and grounded in phenomenological description and conceptual analysis. Thus I conclude that although Heidegger's analysis of being toward death is not "edificatory" in that he does not use language of appeal or exhortation, it does, I believe, propose an "ideal" way of comporting oneself, but an ideal that can claim to be grounded in the

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1 I discuss the relevance of Heidegger's concept of authenticity for the problems of ethics in the conclusion.
phenomenon at stake and thus can claim not to be arbitrary, subjective, or emotive. In this sense I would argue that Heidegger's hermeneutic of authenticity is at once ontological and evaluative.

But upon concluding his analysis of authentic being toward death Heidegger is not completely satisfied that he has indeed adequately grounded and secured his analysis. For although authentic being toward death "corresponds" with his ontological analysis of death, there is still the question of whether one can perform an authentic being toward death and carry through the extrication and individuation that has been delineated as an ontological possibility. The questions thus arise: Can Dasein extricate itself from das Man and individuate itself as an authentic self, and if so how can we describe this condition? Moreover, how can we be sure that Dasein can be authentic? How do we know that authenticity is not an impossible or fantastical exaction? Can we show that Dasein discloses its authenticity in a manner in which authenticity will show itself to be an actual way of existing and not merely a fabricated ideal? Can we empirically confirm the possibility of authenticity by showing that Dasein itself gives testimony "from its ownmost potentiality-for-being as to a possible authenticity of existence" (SZ 267). And can we more clearly indicate the relation between authenticity and being toward death? Heidegger raises these questions on SZ 266-7 and then indicates:

Before answering these questions, we must investigate whether to any extent and in any way Dasein gives testimony, from its ownmost potentiality-for-being, as to a possible authenticity of its existence, so that it not only makes known that in an existentiell manner such authenticity is possible, but demands this of itself. (SZ 267).
C. Conscience, Guilt, and the Call to Authenticity

Heidegger's goal in his analysis of conscience is to find an existential phenomenon (im Sein des Daseins ihre Wurzel haben) which will provide the evidence required to confirm the possibility of authenticity, and which further shows that Dasein demands authenticity from itself. His task is to demonstrate that this confirmation is not a merely accidental experience that just happens to occur, but that it has its source in Dasein's state-of-being (Seinsverfassung). The aim of the analysis is to show that Dasein has an authentic potentiality-for-being-a-self. We have examined Heidegger's claim that the self is to be defined as a way of existing, and that for the most part I am not myself, but das Man self.\(^1\) It has also been emphasized that authenticity takes the form of an existentiell, individual modification of the das Man self. What we must now determine is the nature of the modification and the conditions of its possibility.

The starting point for the analysis is Dasein's not-being-itself, its lostness in das Man. Dasein has first and foremost forfeited the possibility of possessing its ownmost Seinkönnen (authenticity) by falling into das Man's possibilities, thus losing itself in everyday ways of being, obeying das Man's dictates and prescriptions, carrying out its tasks, engaging in its activities, conforming to its standards and ways of being. Further, by delimiting and prescribing the possibilities of being that are currently accessible and approved, das Man takes away Dasein's responsibility for

\(^1\)"Die Selbstheit des Daseins wurde formal bestimmt als eine Weise zu existieren, das heisst nicht als ein vorhandenes Seiendes. Das Wer des Daseins bin zumeist nicht ich selbst, sondern das Manselbst. Das eigentliche Selbstsein bestimmt sich als eine existenzielle Modifikation des Man, die existenzial zu umgrenzen ist" (SZ 267).
choice, thus ensnaring one in the web on inauthenticity.

Das Man even hides the manner in which it has tacitly (stillschweigende) relieved Dasein of the burden of the explicit choice of these possibilities. It remains indefinite who 'really' chooses. This choiceless getting carried along by the nobody, through which Dasein ensnares itself in inauthenticity can be reversed only if Dasein on its own specifically brings itself back to itself from its lostness in das Man (SZ 268).

On this analysis, inauthentic Dasein in following das Man forfeits its possibility of choice and thus loses its authentic possibilities of self-being. The modification of this choiceless, other-directed das Man existence must, Heidegger claims, "make up for not choosing" (Nachholen einer Wahl). That is, in order to extricate oneself from inauthenticity one must choose to modify one's inauthentic ways of being. This choice to choose must make up for the neglect of one's authenticity in fallen everydayness. What is required is a choosing to bring oneself back (Sichzurückholen) from lostness in das Man so as to choose to make one's own choices and thus to modify one's inauthentic being-in-the-world. "In choosing to make this choice, Dasein makes possible first and foremost its authentic potentiality-for-being" (SZ 268). Hence, "choosing to choose" is not an empty formal choice for the sake of choice, but is rather the choice of oneself, of authentic ways of being, for the sake of authenticity.

But in order to find and choose its authentic self Dasein "must be 'shown' to itself in its possible authenticity" (SZ 267). It needs to be confronted with this possibility of becoming oneself (i.e. authentic) and must have this possibility concretely confirmed if it is not to be a merely fantastical ideal. The possibility of authenticity is attested, according to Heidegger, in what we commonly know as the "voice of conscience". But can we rely on the disclosure of conscience to supply us with experiential
attestation of the possibility of authenticity? Is conscience a reliable source of evidence? For is not conscience "veiled with obscurities"?

Heidegger answers:

That the very 'fact' of conscience has been disputed, that its function as a higher court for Dasein's existence has been variously assessed, and that 'what conscience says' has been interpreted in manifold ways—all this might only mislead us into dismissing this phenomenon if the very 'doubtfulness' of this fact—or of the way in which it has been interpreted—did not prove that here a primordial phenomenon of Dasein lies before us (SZ 268).

Heidegger thus assumes conscience is a "fact" and proceeds to give his interpretation of the phenomenon. He stresses that conscience, like death, is not to be interpreted as an event that occurs within experience, but is rather to be conceptualized as part of Dasein's ontological structure. If it is the case, as Heidegger claims, that conscience "gives us something to understand", then it is to be interpreted as a mode of disclosure. Conscience is thus interpreted by Heidegger as part of Dasein's "disclosedness", i.e. one of the ways in which Dasein discloses itself to itself. Disclosedness includes discourse in its structure, and since Heidegger characterizes conscience as a call (Ruf) it is conceived as a mode of discourse. The call is interpreted as an appeal (Anruf) to everyday Dasein lost in the ways of being of das Man to return to itself, and as a summons (Aufruf) to authenticty. Moreover, all modes of discourse have a "possible way of hearing" which in the analysis of conscience "unveils itself as wanting-to-have-a-conscience" (SZ 270). The call of conscience and the "wanting-to-have-a-conscience" that hears the call provides the basis for the choosing to be oneself that Heidegger call resoluteness (Entschlossenheit).

1 "Zunächst soll das Gewissen in seine existenzialen Fundamente und Strukturen zurückverfolgt und als Phänomen des Daseins unter Festhaltung der bisher gewonnenen Seinsverfassung dieses Seinden sichtbar gemacht werden." (SZ 268-9).
The above sketch provides an outline of the existential concept of conscience which Heidegger works out in SZ 267-301. I shall (1) elucidate Heidegger's phenomenology of conscience by exhibiting Heidegger's interpretation of conscience as the call to authenticity. Then, I shall (2) examine the understanding of the call and the "guilt" which Heidegger claims the call discloses. The analysis of conscience and guilt should show that the individual who has undergone extricating-individuating experiences of anxiety and death is summoned from his individuated solitude (solus ipse) to his potentiality-for-being-a-self. What is needed is attestation that one is lost in das Man and that one has the possibility of authenticity as a way out of an inauthentic existence.

1. The Call to Authenticity

The starting point for our analysis of the call of conscience is its function as a mode of disclosure. Conscience gives us something to understand. Most of the time, everyday Dasein understands itself in terms of the world into which it has become absorbed and dispersed. Dasein is worldly: it listens to the voice of das Man to discover where it stands and what it must do (roles, my station and its duties, conventions). But by "losing itself in the publicness and idle talk of das Man, it fails to hear (überhört) its own self in listening to the das Man self" (SZ 271).

A dialectic of hearing and failing to hear is thus crucial in the process of extrication which conscience elicits. Inauthentic Dasein listens to (hören auf) das Man, and fails to listen to itself (überhören). If Dasein, on this account, is to escape from its self-abandonment to das Man it must bring itself back from its failure to listen to itself and recognize that it fails to hear itself because it listens away (Hinhören) to das Man.
It must resolve to *break away* from the tyranny of das Man's commands, exhortations, and prohibitions, and must choose to listen to itself and choose to become its own master. In order to accomplish this feat of *extrication* and self-determination, the possibility of another kind of hearing must be given to Dasein which dispenses with the mediation of das Man.

Dasein's failure to hear itself and its listening away to das Man can be broken off, Heidegger claims, by a *call* that "arouses another kind of hearing, which in relationship to the hearing that is lost has a character in every way opposite" (SZ 271). Our analysis of das Man's ways of being disclosed that the discourse of das Man is an ambiguous idle chatter in which one greedily appropriates the latest gossip, avidly passing the word along to another fascinated, curious listener. Hence, the call that arouses an opposite kind of hearing must dispense "with the 'hubbub' of the manifold ambiguity which idle talk possesses in its everyday 'newness'" (SZ 271).

Heidegger claims it is *conscience* which calls us from listening to das Man's chatter and gives us something to understand unambiguously and without idle talk. We must now attempt to ascertain the nature of the call and its *communication*.

Heidegger's analysis of talking and listening (SZ #34, 160ff., and SZ 271) stresses that vocal utterance is not essential for discourse, therefore the "voice" of conscience need not actually utter audible words that carry a linguistically articulated message. And Heidegger claims that the call does not in fact tell us anything, it does not condemn or reprove us for doing or not doing this or that, nor does it provide any specific commands or prohibitions. Rather, the call is described as a "giving to
understand" such that:

in the tendency to disclosure which belongs to the call lies
the momentum of a push—of an abrupt arousal. The call is from
afar unto afar. It reaches him who wants to be brought back
(SZ 271).

The call does not communicate a particular discourse or message but
is rather an "abrupt arousal" that has the "momentum of a push". That is,
the call arouses me to awareness, it is an experience of being shaken up,
of being summoned and appealed to. The experience seems to be one of
disenchantment, in which one's fascination for everydayness dissolves, and
one is no longer seduced into everyday ways of being. Thus the rather
mysterious claim that the call comes "from afar unto afar" should be taken
as an indication that the call is "out of the ordinary", and in fact the
call is precisely a summons for me to get out of the ordinary (das Man).
Hence, the experience should not be interpreted as an ordinary call that
has something to say, but rather as a distinctive mode of disclosure whose
nature must be more clearly delineated.¹

One might ask, who is called? And what is talked about in the call?
Heidegger answers that both the subject matter of the call and the "who"
that is called is Dasein.² Since Dasein always has some understanding of
itself, the call reaches its current understanding. Everyday Dasein under-
stands itself in terms of the average understanding and common sense of

¹ Above all, Heidegger wishes to avoid a psychological construing of
conscience, as if the call were a mental event occurring in a stream of
psychological experience: "Die Betrachtung vermeidet von Anfang an den Weg,
der sich zunächst für eine Interpretation des Gewissens anbietet: man führt
das _ewissen auf eines der Seelenvermögen, Verstand, Wille oder Gefühl, zurück
oder erklärt es als ein Mischprodukt aus diesen" (SZ 271).

² "Was ist im Ruf des Gewissens das Beredete, das heisst Angerufene?
Offenbar das Dasein selbst. Diese Antwort ist ebenso unbestreitbar wie
unbestimmt" (SZ 272).
das Man and the call addresses this "das Man self of concernful Mitsein with others" (SZ 272). And to what does the call summon Dasein? Heidegger answers that the call reaches the everyday self and summons Dasein to its own self (das eigene Selbst). The call appeals solely to one's potentiality-for-being-a-self passing over all of Dasein's everyday public concerns.¹ Heidegger claims that because only one's ownmost self is called, the power of das Man over Dasein collapses, for in being called to listen to one's own self one is called away from das Man. Das Man is disclosed as a tranquillizing temptation that diverts and alienates one from one's ownmost possibilities. In passing over public concerns they are pushed into insignificance. By not recognizing das Man's authority it is diminished and displaced by the call that summons one away from listening to das Man so that one may better hear the voice of one's own self.² In this way Dasein is called out of the protecting shelter of das Man into its own solitude.

The call, like anxiety and uncanniness, is thus an extricating-individuating experience that causes a break or rupture in my everyday routine. Supposedly, in the stillness of solitude, I am aroused from my sleeping immersion in everyday concern; the insignificance of what is said by them (das Man) to be important is impressed upon me, and I am made aware of the

¹"Das Dasein, als welches es weltlich verstanden für die Anderen und sich selbst ist, wird in diesem Anruf übergangen" (SZ 273).

²"Weil nur das Selbst des Man-selbst angerufen und zum Horen gebracht wird, sinkt das Man in sich zusammen. Dass der Ruf das Man und die öffentliche Ausgelegtheit des Daseins übergeht, bedeutet keineswegs, dass er es nicht mittrifft. Gerade im Übergehen stösst er das auf Öffentliches Ansehen empfiehlt Man in die Bedeutungslosigkeit. Das Selbst aber wird, dieser Unterkunft und dieses versteckts im Anruf beraubt, durch den Ruf zu ihm selbst gebracht" (SZ 273).
groundlessness and nullity of das Man's ways of being. For the call is a negation of idle chatter, curiosity, and ambiguity in which the whole hectic, scattered, dispersed ways of being of das Man's publicness are pushed into insignificance. In this experience I withdraw from listening to das Man and am drawn away from das Man's possibilities toward an as yet indistinct authentic potentiality-for-being.

Although the call seems to be an invitation to introspection, Heidegger makes it clear that the call does not induce one to cultivate a refined "inner life" (SZ 273). The call does not command me to withdraw from the world into a region of subjective isolation. Rather, the call summons one to change his way of life so that by abandoning one's allegiance to das Man, one chooses to become authentic. Since Heidegger disdains inner-outer, subject-object distinctions, the movement from listening to the herd to listening to the self should be interpreted as a modification of one's way of being-in-the-world—a change from an other-directed orientation to a self-directed existence that asserts its own independence and autonomy, and rejects the authority of the public to dominate and direct its life. Thus, although one is tempted to interpret the call as a summons "inside", a call for withdrawal from the outer world into subjective introspection, this interpretation would subvert Heidegger's stress that what is at stake is one's way of being-in-the-world. Instead it should be emphasized that the accent is on the self-world relation, and the call summons one to a change of that relation, and does not signify a "going out of" or "transcendence" of the world or a going into one's subjectivity.

Although the call communicates in the mode of "keeping silent" and tells me "taken strictly, nothing", Heidegger claims that "while the content of the call is seemingly indefinite, the direction it takes is a sure one and
is not to be overlooked" (SZ 274). What is clear in the call, Heidegger argues, is that the appeal is made to the self lost in das Man. The call summons Dasein to its potentiality-for-being-a-self, and thus to the choice of its own possibilities. Thus, the direction of the call is away from das Man toward one's authenticity. This analysis implies that the sense of the call is that one must change his life. For Heidegger claims that what is disclosed in the call is unequivocal, "even though it may undergo a different interpretation in the individual Dasein in accordance with its own possibilities of understanding" (SZ 274). We are "given to understand" that the inauthenticity of everydayness is to be modified and one's way of being-in-the-world is to be changed. In Heidegger's interpretation, conscience calls us to authenticity.

The question now arises, "who is calling", who is summoning me to authenticity? When confronted with the problem of making clear who it is calling Dasein to authenticity, we face a formidable obstacle. For it is the very nature of the call to resist familiar categorizing. The call is unlike any experience which everyday Dasein undergoes. To the everyday understanding the call seems "unworldly" and perplexing. But this peculiar indefiniteness of the caller and the difficulty in determining who is calling are not merely vagaries which can be clarified away but belong to the distinctive character of the call. The caller is in one sense, Heidegger claims, Dasein itself, but the self that is calling is as yet indefinite and undetermined. Moreover, "what Dasein understands itself as first and foremost in its concernful interpretation is passed over by the call" (SZ 271).

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1"Festzuhalten gilt es: der Ruf, als welchen wir das Gewissen kennzeichnen, ist Anruf des Man-selbst in seinem Selbst; als dieser Anruf der Aufruf des Selbst zu seinem Selbstseinkönnen und damit ein Vorrufen des Daseins auf seine Möglichkeiten" (SZ 274).
And the authentic self is a still indefinite project rather than a definite being. But if the call does not emanate from an "authentic self" how does the call arise? Do I will the call? Heidegger's answer is that the "phenomenal findings" disclose that,

The call is precisely something which we ourselves have neither planned nor prepared for nor voluntarily performed, nor have we ever done so. 'It' calls, against our expectations and even against our will. On the other hand, the call undoubtedly does not come from someone else who is with me in the world. The call comes from me and yet from beyond me (SZ 275).

The call, it appears, is becoming increasingly oracular. Not only is the call wordless and indefinite, but it calls "from me and yet from beyond me". This interpretation seemingly suggests that the call is an "alien power by which Dasein is dominated"—an interpretation that could lead one to posit God or a psychological being (Superego, Archetype, "buried self") as the power that calls. But such interpretations, Heidegger claims, presuppose that whatever is (such as the caller) must be something present-at-hand. Such interpretations and ontological presuppositions are rejected by Heidegger who claims that the "phenomenal findings" can be made intelligible only from the standpoint of the existential analytic which interprets the call as a mode of disclosure, and thus as part of Dasein's disclosedness.

Therefore, since conscience is to be seen as a phenomenon of Dasein we must

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1The call of conscience in SZ seems to be a precursor of the call of Being in Heidegger's later writings which summons Dasein to become the Guardian or Shepherd of Being, and/or Protector of Truth. In both cases the call comes to Dasein seemingly of its own accord. Although with the call of conscience Heidegger explicitly stipulates that it comes from Dasein itself and not from Being, one still feels that the call is ultimately a mystery despite Heidegger attempt at "existential analysis", thus suggesting a connection between the Call and the Mystery of Being in the later Heidegger.
look to its existential constitution for clues to the interpretation of
the "it" that does the calling.

Heidegger's strategy in elucidating the "who" that is calling is to
show the relationship between the call-caller and the ontological structure
of Dasein that has been set forth in **SZ** Part I. The first interpretive
clue is the structure of **facticity (thrownness).** In Heidegger's coinage,
Dasein has been "thrown" into the world. Most of the time Dasein evades
its thrownness and diverts itself from its being delivered over to facticity
by fleeing into the shelter of das Man, with its supposed tranquillity and
self-assurance. But such an escape is to no avail for everyday Dasein is
plagued with **anxiety** and **uncanniness.** Hence Dasein becomes "anxious with
anxiety about its ownmost potentiality-for-being" and finds itself in the
"depths of uncanniness" (**SZ** 276).

In uncanniness Dasein exists in a state of naked individuation stripped
of all social roles and masks. The world of das Man has become strange.
Dasein feels itself not-at-home and nothing "they" say or do matters. But
is not this state of indeterminateness and strangeness similar to the state
of the caller? For is not the caller definable by nothing at all? If
this is so, could it be that the caller is Dasein in its uncanniness?
Heidegger claims that, "Nothing speaks against this; but all those phenomena
which we have hitherto set forth in characterizing the caller and its
calling speak for it" (**SZ** 276).

Thus, Heidegger is arguing that the caller is Dasein in its uncanniness.
The call reaches anxious Dasein that has failed to individualize itself and
calls one back from the idle talk and scattered dispersion of das Man "into
the reticence of his existant potentiality-for-being (**SZ** 277). Individualized
Dasein alone in its uncanniness summoned to itself by the call of conscience
cannot be mistaken about, evade, or cover over its condition. For,

What is Dasein to report from the uncanniness of its thrown being? What else remains for it than its own potentiality-for-being as revealed in anxiety? How else is 'it' to call than by summoning Dasein toward this potentiality-for-being which alone is the issue? (SZ 277).

The call does not serve to drive Dasein into the depths of a demonic uncanniness, but rather summons Dasein to retrieve its forsaken potentiality-for-being. Thus uncanniness, like death and anxiety, serves a positive function in Heidegger's hermeneutic, in pursuing lost inauthentic Dasein, powerfully disclosing its not-at-homeness in das Man, and with the aid of the call to authenticity, summons Dasein to authentic self-being. Hence, uncanniness, far from being a destructive or neurotic condition, helps to free inauthentic Dasein from das Man's tyranny by perpetually haunting everydayness.\(^1\) Thus,

The call whose mood has been attuned by anxiety is what makes it possible first and foremost for Dasein to project itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-being. The call of conscience, existentially understood, makes known for the first time what we have hitherto merely contended: that uncanniness pursues Dasein and is a threat to the lostness in which it has forgotten itself (SZ 277).

We can now sum up the results of the inquiry into the ways that Dasein can be both caller and called, and the relationship between them. We have seen that the existential analysis of facticity and uncanniness have provided clues to the being of the "it" who calls, and that falling, lostness, forfeiture, and inauthenticity characterize the Dasein who is summoned to authenticity. Thus, the ontological structure previously analyzed enabled

\(^1\)"Unheimlichkeit ist die obzwar alltäglich verdeckte Grundart des In-der-Welt-seins" (SZ 277).
Heidegger to clarify the call, the caller, and the Dasein called. Heidegger concludes:

Conscience manifests itself as the call of care: the caller is Dasein, which in its thrownness (in its being-already-in), is anxious about its potentiality-for-being. The one to whom the appeal is made is this very same Dasein, summoned to its ownmost potentiality-for-being (ahead of itself...). Dasein is falling into das Man (in being-already-alongside the world of its concern) and it is summoned out of this falling by the appeal (SZ 277-8).

Thus the call of conscience is not from an "alien power" or a "mysterious voice" but from Dasein itself, for Dasein is a being that cares about and for its being. Conscience is in each case mine. It summons me out of das Man toward my potentiality-for-being-a-self and comes from that entity which I myself am. Although this interpretation seemingly "subjectivizes" conscience, Heidegger claims that "only in this way do the inexorability and unequivocable character of the call become free" (SZ 278). He argues that only by seeing conscience as mine is the "objectivity" of conscience protected from any concept of a "public" or "universal" conscience which, besides being ontologically indefinite, becomes a tool of das Man utilized to seduce or coerce Dasein into conformity with its ways-of-being (This is clear in Freud's concept of the Superego in which "conscience" functions as the internalized voice of social authority, thus serving to perpetuate the dominion of das Man). Thus, the call of conscience in Heidegger's interpretation penetrates through "the thin wall by which das Man is separated, as it were, from the uncanniness of its being" (SZ 278), and calls Dasein to take over that being and choose authenticity.

Heidegger wishes to use conscience to attest to Dasein's potentiality-for-being-a-self, claiming that conscience gives testimony to the possibility of authenticity by showing that authenticity is Dasein's potentiality-for-
being that is demanded by myself. But he stresses that the attestation is incomplete until the response to the call is further clarified. For even if we grant that the call summons us away from our fallenness in das Man, we have not clarified the potentiality-for-being which the call summons us toward. Thus:

What the conscience attests becomes completely definite only when we have delimited plainly enough the character of the hearing which genuinely corresponds to the calling. The authentic understanding which 'follows' the call is not a mere addition which attaches itself to the phenomenon of conscience by a process which may or may not be forthcoming. Only from an understanding of the appeal together with such an understanding does the full experience of conscience let itself be grasped (SZ 279).

To complete the analysis of conscience we must next analyze the character of Dasein's understanding the appeal. We shall inquire more specifically into what the call "gives me to understand". Heidegger claims that the call "speaks somehow of guilt" (SZ 280). It is the phenomenon of understanding the appeal and guilt that we shall now discuss.

2. Understanding the Appeal and Guilt: Dasein's Being-guilty

In this section we shall see how the phenomenon of guilt is related to the call to authenticity. This task can be carried out on the foundation of the previous analysis of the call of conscience; therefore to grasp "what one hears in understanding the appeal", we shall return to the appeal (Anruf) as our point of departure.

Heidegger's remarks on the "appeal" help clarify the concept of Seinkönnen. On SZ 280 Heidegger tells us that "the appeal to the das Man self signifies summoning one's ownmost self to its potentiality-for-being (Seinkönnen) and to be sure as Dasein—that is, as concernful being-in-the-world and being with others" (SZ 280). This passage emphasizes that Seinkönnen is not to be
construed narrowly as referring just to certain phenomena of self-being such as death, anxiety, and guilt, but rather encompasses the totality of Dasein's concernful, solicitous involvement in the work-world and public world. This is an important point to note as a warning against equating *Seinkönnen* solely with Dasein's "being-guilty" (or its being toward death) as Heidegger seems to suggest in some passages. To counter this restrictive and, I believe, distorted interpretation of *Seinkönnen*, I have stressed the interconnection of *Seinkönnen* with authenticity which I suggest explicates the potentiality (*können*) for a way of being that is descriptive of Dasein's relatedness and involvement throughout the *Umwelt* and *Mitwelt*, and thus is not merely explicative of Dasein's relation to such structures of its own ontological constitution such as death, anxiety, conscience, and guilt. Thus, I stress that *Seinkönnen*, Dasein's being-able-to-be-authentic comprehends all of Dasein's ways to be and explicates Dasein's being-able to choose authentic possibilities.

Moreover, Heidegger makes it clear that the authentic *Seinkönnen* cannot be explicated in terms of any specific existentiell possibilities for, "in interpreting existentially that toward which the call summons us, we cannot seek to delimit any concrete single possibility of existence as long as we understand the methodological possibilities and tasks which such an interpretation implies" (SZ 280). It is clear therefore that Heidegger does not intend to legislate any specific prescriptive oughs or to project concrete existentiell possibilities of existence. His project, as he describes it, is to set forth and analyze "what belongs to the existential condition for the possibility of the existentiell factual potentiality-for-being" (SZ 280). In other words, he is setting forth the existential conditions of the possibility of authenticity by analyzing what makes authenticity possible.
Thus, an authentic understanding of the call does not give one a universal command that one must fulfill as a moral imperative, but rather appeals to "that which has been currently individualized and which belongs to that particular Dasein" (SZ 280); i.e. to my particular situation constituted by my possibilities of understanding and disclosure. For while the call points forward (Vorruf) to my potentiality-for-being (authenticity), it also calls me back (Rückruf) to my situation as a thrown being delivered over to and abandoned to my own there. Hence, I am called back to my own thrown individuation out of which I shall choose my authentic possibilities. The call, then, has a double movement calling us back (to our current situation) as it calls us forth to authenticity. This double movement preserves my particularity and individuality while at the same time calling me to the universally human (self-being, authenticity—an ideal yet to be explicaded). Authenticity, unlike most previous ethical theories, can be said to preserve my individuality while simultaneously calling me to be fully human. In this way the tension between the particular and universal is overcome without forcing one to sacrifice either dimension of human being.

What exactly does the call give me to understand? Heidegger claims that the call "speaks somehow of guilt". In ascertaining the nature of the guilt which the call gives me to understand we are confronted with many senses of guilt in everyday usage which Heidegger claims results in a misleading and distorted understanding of guilt that covers over the nature of the

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1. "Das Woher des Rufens im Vorrufen auf... ist das WoHin des Zurückrufens. Der Ruf gibt kein ideales, allgemeines Seinkonnen zu verstehen; er erschliesst es als das jeweils vereinzelte des jeweiligen Daseins. Der Erschliessungscharakter des Rufes wird erst voll bestimmt, wenn wir ihn als vorrumpfenden Rückruf verstehen" (SZ 280).
guilt which the call "gives me to understand". These varied senses of being-guilty refer to ways in which Dasein behaves, and describe ways of being with others in which the basis of our relation is constituted by a lack: owing something (Schulden haben), causing something to happen for which I am responsible (schuld sein an), breaking some law (sich schuldig machen), causing damage to someone (Schuldigwerden an Anderen). Furthermore, the lack is calculated by a process of computing and judging that some act is deficient in one way or another, according to some ideal norm or standard. But Heidegger argues that explicating the guilt disclosed in the call in terms of the domain of calculative concern covers over and distorts the phenomenon of guilt in question. Hence:

the ideal of 'guilty' must be sufficiently formalized so that those ordinary phenomena of guilt which are related to our concernful being with others, will drop out. The idea of guilt must not only be raised above the domain of that concern in which we reckon things up, but it must also be detached from relationship to any law or 'ought' such that by failing to comply with it one loads himself with guilt (SZ 283).

What Heidegger wants to do is to explicate an unambiguous sense of "I am guilty" disclosed by the call. In summary, he claims that his analysis of the several senses of guilt has disclosed that: (1) in the idea of guilt there lies the character of negativity (i.e. lack, deficiency, not meeting the mark); and (2) the idea of being-a-basis-for (das Grundsein fur) belongs to the nature of guilt (i.e. through incurring, taking over, being

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1 This is the case in German where forms of the root Schuld signify such varied things as "having debts", "being responsible for", lawbreaking, causing something to happen to another person (c.f. SZ 281-2 for Heidegger's analysis of these four senses of guilt found in everyday German usage).
responsible for). Thus, he concludes that "we can define the formally existential idea of the 'guilty' as: being-the-basis for a being which has been defined by a not—that is to say, as being-the-basis of a nullity" (SZ 283).

We must endeavor to make sense of this odd conception of guilt. We first face the task of clarifying the not (das Nicht) that lies at the basis of the phenomenon of guilt. Heidegger claims that the "not" belongs to the being of Dasein and that therefore Dasein is the basis of a nullity (Grundsein einer Nichtigkeit). The point Heidegger is trying to make is that guilt must not be conceived as a privatum or something lacking in the sense of something not present-at-hand, but rather guilt belongs to the being of Dasein (i.e. like death it is part of Dasein's ontological structure and not something that only sometimes occurs, or that one experiences upon occasion). This means that personal guilt is not acquired from failing to meet the mark in the domain of Mitsein but rather arises from Dasein's being-guilty.

being-guilty does not first result from an indebtedness (Verschuldung), but, on the contrary, indebtedness becomes possible only 'on the basis' of a primordial being-guilty (SZ 284).

In explicating "being-guilty" Heidegger proposes to show that there is a constitutive nullity in the structure of thrownness and projection, indicating a nullity in Dasein's ontological structure. Heidegger's argument for Dasein's being-guilty is that all the senses of guilt in everyday usage indicate a "lack" and Dasein's being the basis of this lack, implying that Dasein is the null basis of a nullity. Thus if he can demonstrate that
Dasein is permeated with nullity this will indicate its being guilty.¹

Heidegger does not use this type of argumentation to argue for a nihilism or an ontological negativity, worthlessness, or failure in the heart of human reality, but stresses that nullity also "belongs to Dasein's being-free for its existentiell possibilities."² Thus Dasein's nullity

¹ The following arguments serve to indicate various nullities permeating human existence that provide the basis for a derivation of Dasein's nullity from its existential constitution. First, the argument from the structure of thrownness is designed to indicate a manifold of nullities in human being: As a being thrown into the world, Dasein has been delivered over to its "there" but not of its own accord. Everyday Dasein has devoted itself to a potentiality-for-being, but not as itself (i.e. everyday Dasein is not itself, but das Man, the nobody). Further, Dasein is not causa sui, it has not laid the basis which it must take over, and it can never completely be master of its existence: "Being-a-basis means never to have power over one's ownmost being from the ground up. This 'not' belongs to the existential meaning of 'thrownness'. It itself, being a basis, is a nullity of itself" (SZ 284).

² Secondly, Dasein's nullity does not merely signify what Dasein is not, or lacks, or fails to actualize, but rather refers to what Dasein is: thrown being that must take over that being which it has not created, chosen, or founded, and must therefore become the being of a basis that it can never take over completely. The manner in which Dasein takes over its thrown basis is by projecting itself on possibilities. But as Spinoza saw omnis determinato est negatio. To choose one possibility or set of possibilities always means not choosing and thus excluding other possibilities. Thus, in this sense, projection, as well as thrownness, "is essentially null" (SZ 285).

The above argument attempts to show the relation between guilt and nullity in terms of the nature of projection and action. Since in choosing x, I must sacrifice a, b, and c, every action incurs guilt, therefore one is inevitably guilty. This phenomenon becomes clear when it is a question of important conflicting demands that call me to a real sacrifice, thus incurring burdensome guilt, but even our average everydayness is saturated with exclusions, foregoings, passings by and over, so that as the years pass our being becomes permeated with the nullity of what might have been, and my present thus becomes laden with past exclusions that fill me with regret and perhaps emptiness.

² "Die gemeinte Nichtigkeit gehört zum Freisein des Daseins für seine existenziellen Möglichkeiten. Die Freiheit aber ist nur in der Wahl der einen, has heisst im Tragen des Nichtgewählthabens und Nichttauchwahlkonkëns der anderen" (SZ 285). Is this passage the source of Sartre's equation of freedom and nothingness?
is not a deficiency which it should strive to eradicate, but is rather part of its existential constitution which not only provides an explanation of Dasein's finitude, but which is also the source of its freedom. Moreover, this nullity provides both the basis for its fall into das Man and its freedom to become authentic. Fallen, inauthentic Dasein is not itself but is das Man, the nobody. But there is nothing to prevent Dasein from choosing its authenticity. Hence nullity belongs to Dasein's ownmost potentiality-for-being, for Dasein's fall into das Man, its thrownness into the world, and its projection of itself onto chosen possibilities are constituted by its nullity, leading Heidegger to conclude that Dasein is the null basis of a nullity. And from this "null basis" Heidegger derives Dasein's primordial guilt. He concludes:

Care itself, in its very essence, is permeated with nullity through and through. Thus care—Dasein's being—means, as thrown projection, being-the-basis of a nullity (and this being-the-basis is itself null). This means that Dasein as such is guilty, if our formally existential definition of guilt as being the basis of a nullity is indeed correct (SZ 285).

For our purposes of disclosing the significance of being-guilty for the response to the call to authenticity, we can interpret Dasein's guilt disclosed by the call as an indication that Dasein is guilty of not being itself, of forfeiting its possibility of an authentic existence by falling into authenticity. The call to authenticity would then be a summons accusing Dasein of forfeiting and neglecting its authentic potentiality-for-being-a-self. Through the call Dasein would summon itself to become a self, by

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1 "In der Struktur der Geworfenheit sowohl wie in der des Entwurfs liegt wesenhaft eine Nicktigkeit. Und sie ist der Grund für die Möglichkeit der Nicktigkeit des unneigentlichen Daseins im Verfallen" (SZ 285).

2 Heidegger suggests this interpretation in his reference on SZ 285 to the "Nichtigkeit des unneigentlichen Daseins im Verfallen". cf. also SZ 287 cited on this page.
becoming aware of itself as an individual existing self with its own decisions to make, projects to carry out, and responsibilities to assume. In this interpretation, Dasein would experience guilt disruptive to its complacent absorption in das Man, disclosing that it is guilty of living inauthentically and therefore must change its life.

This calling-back in which conscience calls forth, gives Dasein to understand that Dasein itself... is to bring itself back to itself from its lostness in das Man; and this means that it is guilty (SZ 287).

Hence we see that Heidegger connects the call of conscience with guilt, and claims that the call gives me to understand that I am guilty. But hearing the call correctly does not merely consist in taking cognizance of the fact that one is guilty; i.e. it does not mean that I merely take up a certain propositional attitude toward guilt. And it certainly does not call upon me to commit evil actions so that I will clearly experience my guilt! Instead it demands that I take over my guilt—that I project myself upon my own potentiality—for-being-guilty and thus appropriate my guilt in the project of becoming a self.

Hearing the appeal correctly is thus equivalent to having an understanding of oneself in one's ownmost potentiality-for-being—that is, to projecting oneself upon one's ownmost authentic potentiality for becoming guilty. When Dasein understandingly lets itself be called forth to this possibility, this includes becoming free for the call—its readiness for the potentiality of getting appealed to. In understanding the call, Dasein is in thrall to (hörig) its ownmost possibility of existence. It has chosen itself (SZ 287).

Let us conclude with a few remarks concerning the notion of "choosing oneself" which will be developed in the next division. When the call reaches the inauthentic self, one chooses to become free for one's extrication and individuation from das Man so that one can carry through the modification of the das Man self, which Heidegger claims requires "being free for one's
ownmost being-guilty" (SZ 288). He stresses that "wanting to have a conscience" does not mean willing conscience into existence, but signifies becoming ready for the transformation to authenticity. Understanding the call means that Dasein lets its ownmost self take action in terms of its potentiality-for-being which it chooses to take over and constitute. Only now is it responsible for its action.¹ The responsibility here is responsibility to oneself. Heidegger notes that "any taking action is necessarily 'conscienceless'" (SZ 288), which indicates that wanting to have a conscience is wanting to develop one's own conscience,² wanting to be authentic. This way of being is "conscienceless" from the standpoint of das Man for the self "in thrall to its ownmost possibility of existence" that is "taking action in itself" is removed from the restrictions of das Man's conscience (Freud's Superego) which tells one what he should not do. Heidegger's call of conscience, however, is not restrictive but positive:

> when the call is rightly understood, it gives us that which in the existential sense is the 'most positive' of all—namely, the ownmost possibility which Dasein can present to itself, as a calling-back which calls it forth into its factual potentiality-for-being-itself at the time. To hear the call authentically, signifies bringing oneself into a factual taking action (SZ 295).

Understanding the call of conscience indicates that one is ready and wants to choose authenticity. Letting oneself be summoned to authenticity

---¹"Rufverstehend lässt das Dasein das eigenste Selbst aus seinem gewählten Seinkönnen in sich handeln. Nur so kann es verantwortlich sein" (SZ 288).

²Note Heidegger's revealing citation from Count Yorck on SZ 403: "To dissolve elemental public opinion, and, as far as possible, to make possible the moulding of individuality in seeing and looking, would be a task for the state. Then, instead of a so-called public conscience—instead of this radical externalization—individual consciences—that is to say, consciences—would again be powerful".
means becoming free for authenticity. This signifies that the individual has now extricated his self from das Man and is individuated as a potentiality-for-being-a-self. The individual is now ready for the choice of authenticity which Heidegger calls resoluteness. He is on the way toward authenticity.
Division Three

ON THE WAY TOWARD AUTHENTICITY

I have examined the application of authenticity as a concept in the works of Heidegger, Eliade, and Marshall, among others. The concept of authenticity in the works of Heidegger has been particularly influential in exploring the relationship between human existence and the natural world. In his work, "Sein und Zeit," Heidegger emphasizes the importance of understanding the world through the lens of authenticity. This concept is further developed in his later works, such as "Sein und Zeit" and "Phenomenological Analysis of the Historical Concept of Time." The idea of authenticity as a way towards understanding the world is also evident in the writings of Eliade, who explores the concept of authenticity in the context of traditional and religious cultures. Marshall, on the other hand, has contributed to the understanding of authenticity in the context of modernity and the individual's relationship with the world.

For example, in his work "Sein und Zeit," Heidegger develops the concept of authenticity as a way of being in the world. He argues that authenticity is not a static state, but a process of becoming that is characterized by a constant renewal. This process is guided by the principles of existence, which Heidegger defines as "Dasein." In his later works, such as "Phenomenological Analysis of the Historical Concept of Time," Heidegger explores the implications of authenticity for understanding the world.

In his work, "Sein und Zeit," Heidegger develops a concept of authenticity that is closely related to the idea of being. He argues that authenticity is not a static state, but a process of becoming that is guided by the principles of existence. This process is characterized by a constant renewal and is essential for understanding the world. In his later works, such as "Sein und Zeit," Heidegger explores the implications of authenticity for understanding the world.
We have examined Heidegger's concept of inauthenticity and have analyzed the process of extrication and individuation from an inauthentic existence. Our task is to provide an interpretation of Heidegger's concept of authenticity. This task confronts a serious obstacle for almost all of the major interpreters of Heidegger's SZ have concluded that authenticity is a way of being toward death. This interpretation was set forth by some of the first Heidegger scholars in Germany in the late 1920's and 1930's, and became widespread with the popularity of the so-called Existenzphilosophie. During the 1930's the publication of Was ist Metaphysik, with its emphasis on anxiety, death and nothingness, gave impetus to the notion that authenticity was a nihilistic confrontation with death. This interpretation passed over

1For early examples of the explication of authenticity as a way of being toward death cf. Beck, M. "Referat und Kritik von Martin Heidegger: 'Sein und Zeit'"; Philosophische Hefte 1, (Berlin, 1928), especially pp. 31-44; Marck, S. Die Dialektik in der Philosophie der Gegenwart (Tübingen: Mohr, 1929), pp. 153-6; and Karl Löwith who put forth this interpretation in two articles in the 1930's which he has not abandoned up to the present day: "Grundzüge der Entwicklung der Phänomenologie zur Philosophie und ihr Verhältnis zur protestantischen Theologie", Theologische Rundschau 2, (Tübingen, 1930), Heft 1, p. 26ff, and Heft 5, p. 33ff; "Phänomenologische Ontologie und protestantische Theologie", Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 11 (Tübingen, 1930), and reprinted in Pöggeler's Heidegger anthology, cf. pp. 58-62; Heidegger: Denker in dürftiger Zeit (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1953); and Die Frage Martin Heidegger (Heidelberg: Martin, 1969). Löwith's interpretation will be cited and criticized throughout this division.

to France through the works of de Waelhens and Sartre in the 1940's, and has dominated literature on authenticity up until the present day. De Waelhen's influential interpretation was no doubt a prime vehicle for transmitting the notion that authenticity was a way of being toward death. All of the French literature on authenticity that I have read agrees in its essentials with the following remarks in de Waelhen's La Philosophie de Martin Heidegger:

Authentic being regards death as an index affecting each of its actions and each modality of its being. It lives in the incessant anticipation of death (p. 148)....The anticipated acceptance of death and the silent and anguished comprehension of the most extreme possibilities (these being the avowal of one's fundamental guilt): the two expressions are perfectly equivalent (p. 175)....The acceptance and the being-for-death defines the authenticity and ultimate possibility of Dasein (p. 178)....¹ (translation mine).

The following quotes make clear the primacy of being toward death in Sartre's interpretation of Heidegger's concept of authenticity in Being and Nothingness:

Authenticity and individuality have to be earned: I shall be my own authenticity only if under the influence of the call of conscience (Ruf des Gewissens) I launch out toward death with a resolute decision (Entschlossenheit) as toward my own most peculiar possibility. At this moment I reveal myself to myself in authenticity, and I raise others along with myself toward the authentic (p. 246)....it is by projecting itself freely towards its final possibility that the Dasein will attain authentic existence and wrench itself away from everyday banality in order to attain the irreducible uniqueness of the person (p. 534)....Death has become the peculiar

possibility of the Dasein, the being of the human reality is defined as \textit{Sein zum Tode}. Inasmuch as the Dasein determines its project toward death, it realizes freedom-to-die and constitutes itself as a totality by the free choice of its finitude (p. 533). ... we can not stop at those classifications of 'authentic project' and 'inauthentic project of the self' which Heidegger wants to establish. In addition to the fact that such a classification, in spite of its author's intent, is tainted with an ethical concern shown by its very terminology, it is based on the attitude of the subject toward his own death (p. 564).

In the 1950's a notion became popular that Heidegger's thought had undergone a \textit{Kehre} (turning) which was, for example, interpreted by Walter Schulz as a turn away from the "subjectivist-voluntarist-nihilism" of \textit{SZ}, which was supposedly "overcome" in the later philosophy of Being.\(^2\) Recent books in Germany that have reinforced and propagated the interpretation of authenticity as a way of being toward death are Demskes's \textit{Sein, Mensch, und Tod} and Pöggeler's \textit{Der Denkweg Martin Heidegger's}.\(^3\) One of the more accessible books in English which maintains this interpretation is Spiegelberg's \textit{The Phenomenological Movement},\(^4\) where he claims that Heidegger

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{Sartre, Jean-Paul.} \textit{Being and Nothingness} (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956).
  \item Schulz, W. "Über den philosophiegeschichtlichen Ort Martin Heideggers" (Philosophische Rundschau I, 1953-4), pp. 65-93 and 211-232; reprinted in Pöggeler's Heidegger anthology.
\end{itemize}
"identifies and characterizes death as the most authentic possibility of human existence" (p. 334), and that death is thus "man's only authentic possibility" (p. 338). He concludes that:

Much about Heidegger's interpretation of man's attitude toward death as the ultimate possibility which ends all possibility and about his attempts to escape it is impressive. Nevertheless, one wonders why facing this possibility in stern resoluteness should be his one and only authentic possibility (p. 334).\(^1\)

The interpretation of authenticity that I shall criticize dominates both the specialized literature on Heidegger, \textit{SZ}, and authenticity, and the interpretations of such major philosophers as Buber, Binswanger, Sartre, Ricoeur, Marcuse, and Adorno.\(^2\) This interpretation generally holds that authenticity is equivalent to being toward death, in which Heidegger's notion of \textit{vorlaufende Entschołossenheit} is explicated solely as a way of being toward death that constitutes and is identical with authenticity. For example Demske writes:

'Outside of 'authentic being toward death, there is for Dasein no other authenticity. Authentic being toward death and Dasein's authenticity in general are thus one and the same: advancing resoluteness.'\(^3\) (translation mine).

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\(^3\) Demske, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 50.
Developing this explication of authenticity as authentic being toward death, it is claimed that the culmination of \textit{SZ} (or its "summit") is reached in the doctrine of \textit{vorlaufende Entschlossenheit} and that death is the "highest court of authority" for the existing individual. This interpretation implies that authenticity is solely constituted by being toward death, thus death becomes one's single authentic possibility. On this basis Marcuse claims that Heidegger has a "death ethic", de Waehlens argues that authenticity takes death as its sole value and is a "nihilism unconditionally defeatist", Adorno claims Heidegger has a "theodicy of death", which Körner claims is "Heidegger's Private Religion". These notions have contributed to creating a generally distorted interpretation of authenticity as a form of "heroic nihilism", or of Heidegger's authentic individual as a "solipsistic egotist". I shall critically confront and shall challenge these interpretive claims in the course of this division.

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3 Marcuse, \textit{op. cit.} p. 96.

4 De Waehlens, \textit{op. cit.} p. 78.


7 Delp, \textit{op. cit.}; Brecht, \textit{op. cit.}; de Waehlens, \textit{op. cit.}; Demske, \textit{op. cit.}; and Schulz, \textit{op. cit.}, who characterized Heidegger's \textit{SZ} as a "subjectivist-voluntarist-heroic nihilism".

8 The solipsistic egotist label was most prominently applied by Buber and will be criticized in the next chapter.
In this division I shall argue that this interpretation that equates authenticity with being toward death covers over and distorts Heidegger's concept of authenticity. The authenticity problematic in _SZ_, I believe, has been misread and misinterpreted by a generation of Heidegger interpreters who have overlooked the importance of the historicity analysis for the concept of authenticity. I wish to show how Heidegger's interpreters have mistaken certain passages in the text of _SZ_ which they have bound together into a doctrine of authenticity as a way of being toward death. I shall show how this misinterpretation is suggested by the text, but shall argue that it is based on a misreading that fails to take into consideration the whole of the authenticity problematic in _SZ_, that overlooks the key structures of authenticity in the historicity sections, that fails to see the movement of authenticity from the extricated solitude of the individuated self (solus ipse) to the resolute involvement and struggle for authenticity in the historical world. Thus I stress the dubiousness of the interpretation of authenticity as expounded by the most influential Heidegger interpreters in Europe and America. I believe that the interpretation in question covers over the liberating concept of authenticity in Heidegger's text, reduces a complicated doctrine to an impoverished over-simplification, and greatly distorts the hermeneutic of authenticity that is a central theme of _SZ_. I hope to show that a "fallacy of selected emphasis" that has plagued Heidegger interpretation in general has particularly distorted the interpretation of authenticity in _SZ_.

To counter this misinterpretation, I wish to develop the full
structure of authenticity that receives its most detailed explication in the important chapter on "Temporality and Historicity" (SZ 372-403).

In this division I shall begin with an analysis of (A) "Resoluteness: The Choice of Authenticity", in which I shall develop an interpretation of resoluteness and the self-other relation which I believe avoids the interpretive pitfalls into which many interpreters of authenticity have entangled themselves. Next, (B) I shall attack the common interpretation of authenticity which explicates authenticity as a way of being toward death (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit). To break through what I consider to be a constrictive perspective on and misinterpretation of authenticity, I shall (C) develop an alternative interpretation ("The Authenticity of Self-transformation") which provides an explication of what I take to be the fully articulated structure of Heidegger's concept of authenticity. I believe that if one grasps the importance of the structures of authentic historicity in the constitution of an authentic existence, then the partial, simplistic, distorting nature of the standard interpretation will make itself manifest.

A. Resoluteness: The Choice of Authenticity

In this section I shall argue that in the phenomenon of resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) we have found the key to authenticity. Heidegger's term Entschlossenheit suggests that resoluteness "unlocks" the possibility of authenticity, and that it is the opening to an authentic existence. The German roots of Entschlossenheit suggest the "key" image as well as the metaphor of "unlocking". The similarity between Entschlossenheit and Erschlossenheit suggests the interconnection between resoluteness and disclosedness that will prove to be suggestive in our explication of resoluteness. Much of Heidegger's suggestiveness is lost in an English translation.
In the process of interpreting Heidegger's concept of resoluteness, I shall criticize widespread misinterpretations of authenticity that would either claim authenticity is a form of subjectivism, or an irrationalistic voluntarism, or a solipsistic egotism. I hope to show that an understanding of resoluteness and the notion of authentic caring-for-others undermines superficial attempts to apply derogatory labels to Heidegger's concept of authenticity. I shall (1) argue that resoluteness is a way of self-determination and being-a-self which contains the equiprimordial characteristics of understanding and action, and that discerning the interconnection between these characteristics dispels attempts to take authenticity as a form of subjectivism or voluntarism. Then (2) I shall argue against the widespread belief that all that concerns authentic Dasein is its own self-determination and that other people and authentic relations are only of negative import. I shall suggest that a careful consideration of the notion of authentic solicitude (Fursorge) corrects this view.

1. Resoluteness, Self-Determination, and Being-a-Self

Let us begin by seeing how resoluteness completes the extrication of Dasein from inauthentic everydayness, and enables one to modify and transform one's inauthentic ways of existing. Thrown into its world, every individual submits to a process of social conditioning and takes over those possibilities that are handed down to it and imposed upon it through publicness (socialization). In this way one loses one's self in the ways of being of das Man and the routines and conventions of the everyday world. Heidegger argues that: "To this lostness one's own Dasein can appeal and the appeal can be understood in the way of resoluteness" (SZ 297). The experiences of anxiety, one's own impending death, conscience,
and guilt shake the individual awake, undermine the authority and domination of das Man, and puts into question everyday (inauthentic) ways of being. "This reticent self-projection upon one's own lost being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety, we call resoluteness". (SZ 296-7). Responding to the disclosure of inauthenticity resolutely means that one's relations with the world, the other, and one's self are authentically disclosed and that this disclosure leads to a modification of one's relations to and involvement with tasks of the work world, roles and functions of the public world, and one's own self-understanding.

This authentic disclosedness modifies with equiprimordiality both the way in which the 'world' is discovered, and the way in which the co-existence of others is disclosed. The 'world' which is ready-to-hand does not become another one 'in its content', nor does the circle of others get exchanged for a new one; but both one's being toward the ready-to-hand understandably and concernfully, and one's solicitous being with others are now determined in terms of their own most potentiality-for-being-their-selves (SZ 297-8).

It should be stressed that resoluteness and authenticity do not merely refer to an attitude the self takes toward the self, and toward such subjective phenomena as death, guilt, and anxiety, but rather refers to the totality of being-in-the-world, and to a way of being-in-the-world.¹ Authenticity resides not merely in the "subject", but in Dasein's disclosed-disclosing involvement in its world. Heidegger clearly does not subjectivize authenticity as the self's relation to the self: "Resoluteness as authentic being-one's-self does not detach

¹ "Die Erschlossenheit des Da erschliesst gleichursprünglich das je ganze in-der-Welt-sein, das In-Sein and das Selbst, das als 'inch bin' dieses Seiendes ist" (SZ 297).
Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating 'I': (SZ 298). Resoluteness is authentic being-in-the-world.1 Resoluteness brings Dasein out of its lostness in das Man and out of the solitude into which it withdrew during its process of extrication-individuation by bringing it back into its threefold relatedness to the work world, social world, and selfhood, so that its relations to its world are modified.2 As the passage previously cited (SZ 297-8) indicates, authenticity is a matter of relatedness ("being toward") and involvement ("being with") in which one's concerns are determined not by das Man, but "in terms of Daseins's own most potentiality-for-being" (SZ 298). Extrinsicating itself from das Man "in the light of the projected field (Worumwillen) of one's self-chosen potentiality-for-being, resolute Dasein frees itself for its world" (SZ 298.) Aware that it can take over and project its own most potentiality-for-being and become its own master, resolute Dasein projects itself on its own self-chosen possibilities. Freed from the tyranny of das Man, resolute Dasein has chosen to become a self.

1 "Die Entschlossenheit löst als eigenliches Selbstsein das Dasein nicht von seiner Welt ab, isoliert es nicht auf ein frei-schwebendes Ich. Wie sollte sie das auch—wo sie doch als eigen-
tliche Erschlossenheit nicht anderes als das In-der-Welt-sein
eigentlich ist" (SZ 298).

2 "Die Entschlossenheit bringt das Selbst gerade in das jeweilige besorgende Sein bei Zuhandenem und stösst es in das fürsorgende Mitsein mit den Anderen.
Aus dem Worumwillen des selbstgewählten Seinkönnens gibt sich das entschlossene Dasein frei für seine Welt" (SZ 298).
Heidegger is reinterpreting here, I suggest, the themes of autonomy and self-determination. But he rejects the Kantian model of "pure reason" forever struggling to control and defeat "empirical" passion, and utilizes a model of the individual struggling against society (das Man). The issue here concerns the determination of one's choices and the constitution of one's life. Inauthentic Dasein does not determine itself, for it either blindly follows das Man, evades decisive choice by losing itself in distraction (Neugier) or ineffectually surmising what it should do (ambiguity). Heidegger calls this submission to das Man and forfeiture of self-determination and being-a-self irresoluteness. Irresolute Dasein surrenders to the way things have been publicly interpreted and falls into the ways of being that are prescribed and recommended by das Man, thus both its thought and action are controlled by its submission to publicness. Benumbed by das Man it loses itself in publicness and its social roles and masks by playing a prescribed role in the banal drama of everyday existence.

Heidegger argues that inauthentic Dasein's failure to resolve and choose its own possibilities and self-determination is an allowing oneself to become ensnared in the routines and roles of public existence. The argument that failing to choose is a choice to remain inauthentic is suggested here. Heidegger's point is that everyday Dasein in surrendering itself to das Man has forfeited its freedom to make its own choices and

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1 The theme of autonomy will be further developed in the discussion of the authentic self.

2 "The term 'irresoluteness' merely expresses that phenomenon which we have interpreted as a being surrendered to the dominating way of interpretation of das Man. Dasein, as a das Man self, gets 'lived' by the common-sense ambiguity of publicness in which nobody resolves upon anything but which has always made its decision" (SZ 299).
decisions, and thus loses its individuality. The section we are
analyzing elucidates the importance of choosing to choose, and makes
sense of Heidegger's notion of "making up for not choosing". For we
now see that resoluteness is a choosing to choose: a decision to
extricate oneself from an irresolute mode of existence, "in which
nobody resolves upon anything but which has always made its decision"
(i.e. to conform to and follow das Man).

For das Man the situation is closed off for irresolute everydayness
knows only the "general scene" (allgemeine Lage), losing itself in those
"opportunities" that are thrust upon it (i.e. joining the army,
becoming a well-paid and self-satisfied employee, settling down to a
life of tranquilized desperation in the suburbs). Immersed in the
general scene, inauthentic Dasein adjusts itself to whatever is
happening, and bears as "accidents" whatever catastrophes happen to
inflict themselves on its tranquilized everydayness (i.e. wars,
political disasters, economic crisis, social repression, and violence).¹

But what everydayness considers accidents occurring in the "general scene",
resolute Dasein sees as events falling-into (zu-fallen) its situation—
events which are to be accepted, combatted, adjusted to, negated according
to one's own resolute project. Hence, whereas everyday Dasein's existence
and the general situation are constituted by the opportunities thrust up-
on it by the public and the accidents which daily occur, resolute Dasein
constitutes its situation by choosing or rejecting those possibilities and

¹"Dem Man dagegen ist die Situation wesenhaft verschlossen. Es
kennnt nur die 'allgemeine Lage', verliert sich an die nächsten
'Gelegenheiten' und bestreitet das Dasein aus der Verrechnung der
'Zufälle', die es, sie verkennend, für die eigene Leistung hält
und ausgibt" (SZ 300).
events which its involvement in the world provide as the currently available material for creating its own existence. Resolute Dasein in its struggle for authenticity thus creates its own situation by making its own choices and by combatting the tendencies and events in the general situation which are inimical to its resolves, refusing to surrender its self-determination to das Man.

Resoluteness, then is an act of freed, individuated Dasein who resolves upon the project of self-determination. But resoluteness is not just a determination of consciousness for, "resoluteness 'exists' only as an understanding self-projecting resolve" (SZ 298)—that is, to be resolute one must choose and carry through specific resolves. But what must I resolve upon? What should I choose and act upon? Heidegger answers:

But upon what does Dasein disclose itself in resoluteness? On what is it to resolve? Only the resolution itself can give the answer. One would completely misunderstand the phenomenon of resoluteness if one should want to suppose that this consists simply in taking up possibilities which have been proposed and recommended, and seizing hold of them. The resolution is precisely the disclosive projection and determination of what is factically possible at the time. To resoluteness, the indefiniteness characteristic of every potentiality-for-being into which Dasein has been factically thrown, is something that necessarily belongs. Only in a resolution is resoluteness sure of itself. (SZ 298).

Resoluteness is process of self-determination carried out by a particular individual, in a particular place, in a particular time, in particular possibilities. Since indefiniteness belongs to my own potentiality-for-being, since I am a unique individual with my own capabilities, possibilities, limitations, and personal choices to make, therefore I must make my own choices without
reliance on external guidelines, social conventions, or moral principles. This conception puts the burden of responsibility and guilt squarely upon the resolving individual's shoulders, for "only in a resolution is resoluteness sure of itself" (SZ 298). That is, only the act of resolving and the carrying through the resolve will disclose whether my choice was in deed true for me. The notion of the "self taking action in itself" and the freedom from external restraints and constrictions indicates that resoluteness takes one outside of the sphere of conventional justifications, rationalizations, and assurances for one's actions. The notion of the indefiniteness of the resolve is the final consequence of Heidegger's starting point and presupposition that the being of Dasein "is in every case mine" and that "the essence of Dasein lies in its existence" (SZ 42). Because existence is so profoundly mine, I must make my choices on the basis of the project of my own self-constitution, which means that I stand by my self alone, abandoned to my own resources and devices, without recourse and without excuse.

This notion is no doubt upsetting to those who want concrete ethical directives or absolute moral principles and seems to raise the perhaps frightening spectre of "moral anarchism". For if resoluteness has no determinate content is it not an empty and indefinite command to take action and resolve to be whatever one arbitrarily and perhaps unwisely decides to become? Is resoluteness merely for the sake of taking any action whatsoever? Is Heidegger advocating total ethical permissiveness? Does resoluteness have any definiteness or is it purely empty and formal, an encouragement to arbitrarily be and do whatever one resolves upon?
Heidegger's answer is that although there is an existentiell indefiniteness that adheres to the content of the resolution, there is an existential definiteness that defines its structure (SZ 298). We have provisionally indicated this structure by contrasting resoluteness with irresoluteness. Perhaps, a further explication of the structure of resoluteness would mitigate some of the most obvious objections to Heidegger's analysis. Indeed, I believe that one of the crucial tasks in working out Heidegger's concept of authenticity is a clarification I shall suggest that resoluteness is an unitary phenomenon that can be analyzed into two constituent characteristics: understanding and action. Let us begin by examining how Heidegger introduces resoluteness, so as to provide a starting point for the desired elucidation. In the introduction to the chapter on conscience Heidegger writes:

To the call of conscience there corresponds a possible hearing. Our understanding of the appeal unveils itself as our wanting to have a conscience. But in this phenomenon lies that existentiell choosing which we seek—the choosing to choose a kind of being-one's-self which, in accordance with its existential structure, we call resoluteness (SZ 270).

Resoluteness is thus introduced as a special kind of choosing— namely, a decision to be a self. We have also seen that "resoluteness 'exists' only as a resolution which understandingly projects itself" (SZ 298), and that "as resolute Dasein is already taking action" (SZ 300)—which makes clear the action characteristic of resoluteness. To supplement this point, we note that on SZ 297 resoluteness is described as a mode of disclosure—indeed, a "primordial disclosure" of the "truth of existence". But this disclosure is not merely a detached cognitive act for we next discover that, "this authentic disclosure
modifies with equal primordiality both the way in which the 'world' is discovered and the way in which one's co-existence with others is disclosed" (SZ 297). This analysis allows us to analyze resoluteness into two equiprimordial and interconnected characteristics of understanding and action.

First, as a mode of understanding, resoluteness refers to seeing through (durchsichtig) das Man's concealments and distortions, and one's situation transparent, and one can thus see into one's relation to the das Man self and see the way out to authenticity; i.e. one can see authentic possibilities, alternatives. Thus resoluteness is a clarification of one's understanding, a seeing through das Man and a seeing into possibilities for modification. But, secondly, resoluteness includes the act of carrying out the modification of fallen inauthenticity, the choice of specific resolves, and thus refers to taking action in the situation. On SZ 300 Heidegger writes:

As resolute, Dasein is already taking action. The term 'action' (Handeln) is one which we are purposely avoiding. For in the first place this term must be taken so broadly, that 'activity' will also embrace the passivity of resistance (SZ 300).

I have not been avoiding the term "action": in my interpretation for I believe that acting, projecting possibilities, and self-determination are essential features of the activity of self-modification through which one passes from inauthenticity to authenticity. The point to stress is that resoluteness requires a radical act: a wrenching oneself away from inauthenticity and an activity of self-transformation that radically modifies one's ways of being-in-the-world. A failure to see
authenticity as a way of action reduces it to a psychological phenomenon, a special form of self-consciousness, a purely contemplative way of seeing.¹ But I stress also the characteristic of disclosure and understanding in resoluteness to show that authenticity does not advocate an irrational voluntarism nor does it urge blind, unrestrained action. Heidegger stresses that "even resolutions remain dependent upon das Man and its world. The understanding of this is one of the things that a resolution discloses, inasmuch as resoluteness is what first gives authentic transparency to Dasein" (SZ 299). This "authentic transparency" sees "what is factically possible for it as its ownmost potentiality-for-being in das Man", and acts with a deep understanding of its condition, possibilities, and limitations. This includes, we shall see in the next section, an understanding of the other people with whom we share the world. One's resolve is made therefore not as a blind, gratuitous act but rather with a clear understanding and disclosure of one's being-in-the-world. Thus I stress the interconnection between understanding and action in resoluteness and want to make it clear that authenticity is neither merely a form of understanding nor a pure voluntarism.

Finally, Heidegger's remarks that he opposes a sharp dichotomy between practical and theoretical ways of behavior (SZ 300-1) indicates

¹An interpretation of authenticity as a form of understanding has been recently maintained by Erickson in Language and Being (New Haven: Yale, 1970), who interprets authenticity as a "reflective turn" that "opens one toward Being" (p. 87). Erickson implies that one can only obtain authenticity through raising the question of being (p. 129-30) and defines resoluteness as "authenticated reflexivity" (p. 131). In addition to using psychological concepts which Heidegger purposely avoids (i.e. "reflexivity"), I would argue that this type of consciousness only explicates part of the phenomenon of resoluteness, and that it is a restriction and distortion of Heidegger's hermeneutic to cover over the dimension of action and self-transformation.
that resoluteness refers to a unitary phenomenon and provides support for my proposal that we should interpret resoluteness as a phenomenon that includes understanding and action as inseparable and interconnected characteristics of a process of becoming authentic (SZ 300-1). Hence in analytically separating the two main features of resoluteness, I do not wish to evoke a dualism or a contrast between the practical and theoretical. Hence I shall interpret resoluteness as a unitary phenomenon which contains choice, decision, projection, disclosure and other phenomena related to understanding and action. I wish to argue that the two-dimensional reference of resoluteness is central to Heidegger's analysis and should also be connected with his concept of Seinkbünden which would thus signify not only can understand, but also can do. If this is the case, then authenticity describes a process of insight and integration, of seeing and doing, and thus describes an understanding activity of self-transformation. This activity will receive its fullest explication in the sections authentic historicity.

Resoluteness, then, is the choice of authentic being-in-the-world: It is the choice of authenticity. Through the resolution to choose authentic self-being, I choose the project of self-determination and project myself upon those factual possibilities with which I constitute the situation. Since the situation is structured by my own projection and self-determination, by taking action in the situation I carry out the necessary modification of the inauthentic self's lostness in the general scene. Thus it is through resoluteness that I break away from das Man and choose authenticity.

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1 This activity will receive its fullest explication in the sections on authentic historicity.
2. The Self and the Other

Heidegger's analysis of resoluteness and being-a-self has often been criticized as an egotistical, solipsistic withdrawal from all forms of social being (autarchy), in which the self-sufficient individual, solely relying on himself, utterly disregards the other, social relations, and communal participation in relentlessly projecting his own authenticity. In fact, almost all of Heidegger's critics and commentators stress or deplore a deficiency in Heidegger's analysis of social being.\(^1\) While there are certainly grounds for criticism and even distress, some of the criticisms are either misdirected or only partially just. In the following pages I wish to correct what I consider a prevalent misinterpretation of the question of authentic Dasein's relations to others, and the corresponding distortion of authenticity which characterizes authentic Dasein as a lonely, isolated, egotistical, death-haunted creature totally divorced from communal life. Such a picture, I shall argue, is patently untrue to the concept of authenticity I find in *SZ*, and it is to be hoped that my study will disclose the perversely constrictive perspective on authenticity that the interpretation of authenticity as a form of autarchy yields.

\(^1\)For a sampling of the negative evaluation of Heidegger's doctrine of human relationships see the books by Barrett, Buber, Binswanger, Grene, Heinemann, Langen, Löwith, Macomber, Sartre and Versenai cited in the Bibliography. In my interpretation of the self-other relation I shall briefly cite Buber's criticism found in *Between Man and Man* as an exemplary case of what I consider a misinterpretation of the relation between Mitsein and authenticity. Buber's criticism is probably the most influential attack on Heidegger's supposedly solipsistic, authentic Dasein—I shall argue that it is one-sided and is a dubious interpretation based on a mis-reading of *SZ*. 
In this section I wish to argue that Heidegger is not advocating a radical egotism in which one's self-determination is all that is of interest and importance. Although Heidegger states that only through freeing oneself can one properly relate to others, he does not neglect the problem of authentic being-with-others, but rather indicates that only resolute Dasein can be authentically with others. This is made clear in a striking and important passage:

Dasein's resoluteness toward itself is what first makes it possible to let the others who are with it 'be' in their ownmost potentiality-for-being, and to co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and liberates (vorspringend-befreien den). When Dasein is resolute, it can become the 'conscience' of others. Only by authentically being-their-selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another—not by ambiguous and jealous stipulations and talkative fraternizing in das Man and in what 'they' want to undertake (SZ 298).

This passage indicates that authentic being-with-others is not a dominating and prescribing, but is rather a "leaping forth and liberating" which frees the other for his ownmost potentiality-for-being by disclosing authentic possibilities. Only by first becoming resolute oneself can one serve as an example, become the conscience of others, and help the other to liberate himself.

Far from advocating a solipsistic withdrawal, authentic Dasein is clearly concerned with relating to other people authentically.

In this section I shall argue that the contrast between vorspringend-befreien den solicitude just noted, and the notion of einspringend-beherrschen den solicitude cited in SZ #26 refers to a contrast between authentic and inauthentic ways of being with others and is a key to interpreting Heidegger's attitude toward ethics.

This analysis of authentic being with others should show that Heidegger
does not completely ignore the problem of authentic human relations and that it is unfounded to characterize authenticity as a radical egotism or autarchical solipsism. I shall argue that it is unfair to attack Heidegger's imputed non-concern for, or condemnation of, interpersonal relationships until one has carefully examined his notion of sollicitude (Fürsorge) on S2 121-5 in order to see if Heidegger does or does not allow for the possibility of authentic human relations. Taking the reference quoted above citing the resoluteness that co-discloses the possibility of authenticity "in the sollicitude which leaps forth and liberates" as an interpretive clue, I propose to examine Heidegger's concept of sollicitude in relation to the question of the involvement of authentic Dasein with others. I shall argue that this analysis indicates that Heidegger does not condemn resolute Dasein to a solipsistic alienation, does not exile Dasein from communal participation, nor is his authentic Dasein a model of selfishness, egotism, or non-involvement.

In S2 #26 Heidegger discusses Dasein's ways of relating to others, and contrasts positive and deficient modes of caring-for-others (Fürsorge). We are concerned here to contrast Heidegger's analysis of the two extreme positive possibilities of caring-for-others. The first would "take away care from the other" and take over caring-for him (S2 122). In Heidegger's dynamic terminology, this mode of sollicitude is designated leaping-in for the other (einspringen). Leaping in and taking over leads to domination and dependency and is determinative for a large part of our human relations. An example would be possessive parents who "leap-in" and make major decisions for their
children, structuring their lives into socially acceptable roles and modes of behavior. A paradigm of this way of relating to others is Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor. Often the domination alluded to in leaping-in is hidden and implicit, sometimes disguising itself in various forms of altruism, as in the case of the Grand Inquisitor. The common denominator of the solicitude that "leaps-in" is that it treats the other as an object that one is "concerned with", or as something ready-to-hand that must be guided, manipulated or acted upon ("Sie betrifft zumeist das Besorgen des Zuhandenea", SZ 122). In this way the other is dehumanized, treated as a thing, and is denied his autonomy to choose and make his own evaluations and commitments. Hence Heidegger concludes that such a solicitude that takes over one's care, in fact takes one's care away, and is thus described as "die 'Sorge' abnehmende Fürsorge" (SZ 122).

Letting someone "leap-in" and "take over" is descriptive of any surrender of one's own freedom and responsibility to another person, to a collective institution such as the church, state, or organization, or to a set of unquestioned moral principles or beliefs. This taking over of a set of moral, political, or philosophical beliefs and principles as "finished and at one's disposal" and as something that can be mechanically applied to concrete situations is the way everyday Dasein, on the whole, relates to das Man. One who takes over the moral values, imperatives, customs, and attitudes that are transmitted to one through one's socialization, and who acts as if these human creations had an unquestionable validity and authority, and were therefore to be taken over, followed, and actualized exemplifies this way of being.
It is this surrender of autonomy, discrimination, and evaluation that Heidegger is criticizing in his characterization of Dasein's fall into das Man. His claim is that by disburdening oneself of the need to choose, evaluate, and resolve for oneself, one becomes an indistinguishable one-among-many, and loses one's ownmost potentiality-for-being in herd being. Thus, a mode of being-with-others that intensifies this tendency to absolve oneself from the burden and grandeur of choice, such as "leaping-in", does not seem to be a promising candidate for authentic being-with-others. This mode of leaping-in for someone and taking over his care is perhaps similar to a prescriptive ethics which enjoins what one should and should not do by setting down moral imperatives and an absolute set of values. It is, I suggest, this notion of ethics as prescriptive which Heidegger opposes, and propose that his concept of authenticity avoids the domination and dependency of an ethic that leaps in and takes over through prescribing a set of imperatives or laying down the "moral law".

In contrast with this mode of caring-for that leaps in and dominates, there is positive way of caring-for that leaps ahead of the other (ihm vorausspringt) and discloses possibilities that enables him to take over his own care and proceed to authenticity. This disclosure of authentic possibilities enables one "to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it" (SZ 122). Whereas the mode of leaping in for someone sees him as something ready-at-hand which must be guided and manipulated, the way of leaping ahead and revealing possibilities respects his integrity as a person with his own potentialities and autonomy. Thus Heidegger does not seem to share the Grand Inquisitor's viewpoint that man's basic in-capacity for freedom
and autonomy requires that one leap-in and take over his care. For, in contrast, *vorausspringen* indicates a "leaping forth and liberating" that I believe characterizes what can be interpreted as an authentic way of being-with-others which Heidegger recommends.

This attitude of leaping-forth and liberating, I believe, characterizes Heidegger's own attitude toward "ethics". I suggest that Heidegger's concept of authenticity is a set of recommendations (or proposals) which discloses a possibility of being free and human, and which projects a freeing oneself from das Man (liberation), and a freeing oneself for authentic self-determination. Heidegger never "appeals", in Jasper's sense, for an authentic existence and avoids the language of prescriptivity (Heidegger's objections to traditional prescriptive concepts will be indicated in the conclusion). Like the Socratic gadfly, Heidegger's description of das Man and everydayness awakens one to an awareness of the danger and folly of following the prescribed path of the social order and serves to liberate one from the bondage and domination of public opinion, traditional prejudice, and social convention. This way of leaping forth and liberating, I suggest, not only indicates what Heidegger himself is doing in *SZ* in regard to his projection of authenticity as an alternative to inauthentic everydayness, but also indicates the way authentic Dasein relates to other people. What is at stake is the liberation of the other from the bonds of das Man. Most people, most of the time, on Heidegger's analysis, live in a state of bondage, trapped in the inauthenticity of das Man. An authentic being with others thus helps free the other with whom one shares the world from his bondage and thus attests to authentic care for the other's authenticity. This interpretation is supported by Heidegger's
analysis of authentic solicitude on SZ 122.

First, Heidegger describes the way of caring—for that leaps ahead (vorausspringen) as a liberating way of being—with-others that gives one back his care "authentically as such for the first time" (SZ 122)—an indication that authentic being with others is concerned with liberating the other and enabling him to engage in the project of authenticity.

We next read that "this kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care—that is, to the existence of the others, not to a 'what' with which one is concerned" (SZ 122).¹ This suggests that authentic care treats the other as human being and not as a thing, thus it is but a short distance to Kant's maxim, "treat the other as an end, never as a means". Thus, two guidelines in Heidegger's analysis of authentic solicitude are that an authentic being with others is a way of liberation that treats the other as a human being, and never as a thing, an object, a "what".

Heidegger next stresses that these various ways of caring—for-others have importance for one's own "authentic being toward oneself" (SZ 122).² This statement implies that the way in which one relates to others is fundamental in determining how one seizes upon his own possibilities for being. Hence it is clear that an

¹"Diese Fürsorge, die wesentlich die eigentliche Sorge—das beisst die Existenz des Anderen betrifft und nicht ein Was, das er besorgt, verhilft dem Anderen dazu, in seiner Sorge sich durchsichtig und für sie frei zu werden" (SZ 122).

²"Die Fürsorge erweist sich als eine Seinsverfassung des Daseins, die nach ihren verschiedenen Möglichkeiten mit dessen Sein zur besorgten Welt ebenso wie mit dem eigentlichen Sein zu ihm selbst verklammert " (SZ 122).
account of authenticity cannot override being with others. Indeed even in the chapter on authentic being toward death in which Dasein undergoes his most radical individuation Heidegger stresses that authentic being toward death "enables Dasein, as Mitsein, to have some understanding of the potentiality-for-being of others" (SZ 264). Thus, Heidegger suggests that individuation helps one to understand and to authentically relate to the other. Further, although he claims that much everyday being together indicates deficient modes of caring-for (i.e. distance, reserve, impersonality, mistrust, hostility, etc), Heidegger does not limit the possibilities of Mitsein to negative modes. In fact, he even speaks of being authentically bound together in devotion to a common cause which each individual Dasein has chosen as an authentic possibility (SZ 122). Such examples as engaging in scholarship or science, in revolutionary activity or defense of one's country could be instances of an authentic being bound together. But it is important to stress that an authentic being bound together requires individual awareness, choice, and commitment. Irrational submission to the group or the collective is not, I believe, suggested by any aspect of Heidegger's analysis of authenticity. He argues that for a group to have authentic togetherness it is necessary that each individual be aware of his personal commitment and ownmost potentiality-for-being so that the "right kind of objectivity" is operative "which frees the other in his freedom for himself". (SZ 122). Only in this

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1 "Diese eigentliche Verbundenheit ermöglicht erst die rechte Sachlichkeit, die den anderen in seiner Freiheit für ihn selbst freigibt" (SZ 122). Throughout SZ I find Heidegger's philosophy inconsistent with submission to a collective group. In a later chapter on historicity I shall directly confront this question and shall criticize Löwith's claim that Heidegger's political mistake in the 1930's is a consequence of his philosophical principles.
way can an individual preserve his own freedom as he works to secure freedom for others.

A widespread misconception of Heidegger's philosophy which I hope the preceding analyses have helped clear away is that there is no emphasis on authentic relatedness in SX and that authentic being with others is excluded from the project of authenticity. One source of this confusion is Martin Buber who in an influential essay in *Between Man and Man* claims that Heidegger's Dasein is essentially non-relational and that there is no room in Heidegger's thought for a real togetherness of I and Thou. Buber writes: "Heidegger's Dasein is monological... Heidegger's self is a closed system". Though there is truth in Buber's assertion that for Heidegger one's self-projection is of fundamental importance in the quest for authenticity, it is also the case, which Buber has failed to discern, that one's relations with the other and the world are also a fundamental part of authenticity so that a solipsistic or "monological" interpretation of resoluteness is clearly false. Moreover, Buber fails to grasp that Heidegger's analysis of being with others purports to work out the structures of human existence and is not concerned with prescribing or delineating an ideal of concrete relations such as Buber's I-Thou relation. Perhaps

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2 I might note that Buber's famous I-Thou concept was taken over from Feuerbach: "Not 'I' but 'I and Thou' is the true principle of thought. The most real relationship between I and Thou is love"
Heidegger's failure to offer an account of love and friendship or a more fully developed concept of authentic relatedness is a deficiency of his philosophy, but to claim that Dasein is a "closed system" in which relations to other humans have no significance is simply false in view of his emphasis on Mitsein and his notion of authentic solicitude. For we have seen indications that authentic being with others is an integral part of authenticity, and that this is a recurring theme that is adumbrated in the chapter on death, stressed in the sections on resoluteness and historicity, and is grounded in the context of Heidegger's analysis of solicitude which we have just examined. These passages indicate that Heidegger's resolute Dasein is not a solipsist, nor is there textual evidence that he is an egotist who completely disregards or selfishly manipulates the other.

In this chapter we have developed Heidegger's analysis of resoluteness as a doctrine of self-determination, and authentic being with others as a leaping forth and liberating. Throughout my interpretation I have combatted widespread and simplistic tendencies to label authenticity as a form of subjectivism, voluntarism, or solipsistic egotism. In the next chapter we shall examine the doctrine (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit) that is perhaps in large part the origin of these mis-takings of authenticity, and shall attempt to analyze and exhibit what issues it raises for the interpretation of authenticity.

Feuerbach, quoted in Löwith's From Hegel to Nietzsche (New York: Anchor, 1968), p. 78. As Buber is known to have studied Feuerbach, there is little doubt as to the source of the I-Thou ideal.
B. Advancing Resoluteness and the Interpretation of Authenticity

A major task of productively developing Heidegger's concept of authenticity is to put into question and criticize the simplistic equation of authenticity with authentic being toward death. In SZ #62 Heidegger brings together the results of his analysis of authentic being toward death and resoluteness which he combines in the doctrine of vorlaufende Entschlossenheit, advancing resoluteness.

This doctrine is often taken as the "summit" of SZ, as the culmination of Heidegger's hermeneutic of authenticity. Further, as noted in the introduction to this division, advancing resoluteness is often interpreted solely as a way of being toward death which is said to constitute authenticity. Demske, for example, writes:

'Outside of' authentic being toward death, there is for Dasein no other authenticity. Authentic being toward death and Dasein's authenticity in general are thus one and the same: advancing resoluteness.¹

(translated mine).

---¹"Ausserhalb' des eigentlichen Seins zum Tode gibt es für Dasein keine andere Eigentlichkeit. Diese eigentliche Sein zum Tode und die Eigentlichkeit des Daseins überhaupt sind also ein und dasselbe: die vorlaufende Entschlossenheit" (Sein, Mensch, und Tod, op. cit., p. 50); cf. also p. 115: "In 'Sein und Zeit' das eigentliche Sein des Daseins die Übernahme der eigenen Struktur des schuldhaften Seins zum Tode war....In Sein und Zeit ist die eigentliche Existenz das Vorlaufen des vereinzelten Daseins in den Tod (p. 183)....So steht Dasein völlig allein seine einzige Aufgabe und seine einzige eigentliche Existenzmögklichkeit ist die leere reflexive Übernahme seiner selbst. Allein und selbstbehauptend, nur um seiner eigenen Struktur willen existierend, ist Dasein eine heroisch-tragische Gestalt (p. 188)....Eigentlichkeit des Daseins, d.i. der Existenz in der Fülle dessen, was Dasein sein kann. Konkret gesprochen besteht die Eigentlichkeit des Daseins in der Übernahme seines eigenen Seins zum Tode; denn die eigentliche Existenz und das eigentliche Sein zum Tode sind dasselbe (p. 190)"; cf. also p. 192.

I should note that although the citations quoted indicate a clear identity between authentic being toward death, advancing resoluteness, and authenticity, on page 65 Demske indicates seemingly--in total contradiction to the passages quoted above!—that death is not to be over-valued nor taken as the exclusive constituent structure of authentic self-being:
Building on the assumed/identity between authentic being toward death and authenticity other interpreters have argued that death is "the highest court of authority" for an authentic existence, and that my own death is my constitutive authentic possibility. On this basis it is claimed that Heidegger has a "death ethic" (Marcuse), a "theodicy of death" (Adorno), which is said to be a "nihilism unconditionally defeatist" (de Waehlens), that is "Heidegger's private religion" (Körner). To put into question this interpretation of authenticity one must show that these claims are dubious and unfounded and should offer an alternative interpretation. In this chapter I shall attempt to show that the interpretation that equates authenticity with being toward death cannot be maintained as the explication of Heidegger's concept of authenticity without doing extreme violence to the text of SZ. I shall argue that this common interpretation is unfounded, misleading, and is put into radical question by a careful study of Heidegger's doctrine of authentic historicity which we shall examine in the next chapter.

weder ist der Tod das einzige Moment der Struktur des Daseins, welche immer dreigliedrig ist, noch ist das Verstehen des Seins zum Tode das einzige Mobent des eigentlichen Selbststeins, welches sowohl die Entschlossenheit zur eigenen Schuld und den Entschluss in die Situation wie auch das Vorlaufen in den Tod einbegreift. Kurz gesagt: Der ontologische Sinn des Daseins, d.h. seine letzte und tiefste Struktureinheit ist nicht der Tod, sondern die drei-dimensionale Zeitlichkeit (ibid, p. 65). But this passage citing a three-fold structure of authenticity strongly contrasts with Demske's interpretation on pages 49-51 and the summary of his argument on pages 183-192 where he indicates an identity between authentic being toward death, advancing resoluteness, and Demske's interpretation and shall attempt to provide a corrective showing exactly how I differ from the explication Demske gives in the passage just cited of the triadic structure of authenticity, and shall challenge his, I believe, erroneous identification of authenticity with vorlaufende Entschlossenheit.
I shall argue that in the section on historicity we find a continuation and development of the concept of authenticity we have been working out throughout this study, and claim that this concept of authenticity, constituted by resoluteness, receives its most subtle and important formulation in the much neglected sections on historicity. This procedure suggests that most interpreters of authenticity did not go far enough into SZ before reaching their conclusions as to what constitutes Heidegger's concept of authenticity. I hope to correct this omission in the next sections. Here, I shall work out the interpretation of authenticity that is the most widely held view expounded by some of the most influential Heidegger interpreters in Europe and America. I shall attempt to show that this interpretation cannot be clearly and unambiguously extracted from the text of SZ, and yields a quite unacceptable doctrine of authenticity.

I shall first (1) examine (SZ #62) where Heidegger brings together the analyses of resoluteness and authentic being toward death, which combine to produce vorlaufende Entschlossenheit, advancing resoluteness. I shall argue that it is a mistake to interpret this procedure as maintaining that advancing resoluteness is solely a way of being toward death which constitutes and is the criterion of authenticity, for this would imply a reinterpretation of resoluteness which would be radically different from the interpretation worked out in SZ #60. Further, I hope to show that reinterpreting resoluteness so as to make it a mode of being toward death contradicts other important doctrines in SZ, and is based on a dubious reading of SZ #62. I shall finally suggest that advancing resoluteness itself is not to be taken exclusively as a way of being toward death, but is rather a structure of authenticity that
includes but is not subsumed or exhausted by being toward death. Next, (2) I shall briefly contrast my interpretation of vorlaufende Entschlossenheit and authenticity with the standard interpretation that takes advancing resoluteness exclusively as a way of being toward death that is the sole constituent of authenticity, and shall finally (3) show the consequences of holding an equivalence between authenticity and authentic being toward death for the interpretation of authenticity and Heidegger's philosophy in SZ.

1. Death and Resoluteness: vorlaufende Entschlossenheit

In SZ #62 Heidegger asks, "to what extent does resoluteness 'thought through to the end' in a way corresponding to its ownmost tendency of being lead to authentic being toward death?" (SZ 305).

This problem raises a series of questions:

- How are these two phenomena of advancing and resoluteness to be brought together? Has not our ontological projection of the authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole led us into a dimension of Dasein which lies far from the phenomenon of resoluteness? What can death and the 'concrete Situation' of taking action have in common? (SZ 302)

Heidegger does, it is clear, wish to bind these phenomena together and in so doing raises some further quite surprising and puzzling questions:

- What if resoluteness, in accordance with its own meaning, should bring itself into its authenticity only when it projects itself not upon any random possibilities which just lies ahead of every factical potentiality-for-being of Dasein, and, as such, enters more or less undisguisedly into every potentiality-for-being of which Dasein factically takes hold? What if it is only in the advancing toward death that resoluteness, as Dasein's authentic truth, has reached the authentic certainty which belongs to it? What if it is only in the advancing in death that all the factical provisionalness of resolving would be authentically understood—in other words, that it would be caught up with in an existentiell way? (SZ 302).
Heidegger suggests that this interconnection between resoluteness and being toward death can be worked out by taking resoluteness as the point of departure and asking: "Does resoluteness, in its ownmost existentiell tendency of being, point forward to advancing resoluteness as its ownmost authentic possibility" (SZ 302). He argues that all existential phenomena should be "thought through to the end", and that this procedure will present us with the phenomenon of vorlaufende Entschlossenheit (SZ 303). Finally, this interpretation will, he claims "liberate Dasein for its uttermost possibility of existence" (SZ 303), death!

This procedure is perplexing for it would seem to move the locus of authenticity from the resoluteness of taking action in the situation (self-modification and self-determination) to a resolute projection upon one's uttermost possibility (death). This would move the focus of resoluteness from life to death, and would suggest that, indeed, the "authenticity of resoluteness" is not found in the projection "upon any random possibilities that lie closest", but rather lies in the projection upon "that uttermost possibility" (SZ 302). This interpretation would seem, then, to answer the question, "what do I resolve upon", with a definite answer: "my own death". In this case, death becomes my authentic resolve, and the source, constituent, and criterion of an authentic existence would be one's resolute being toward death. If this were the case, then Heidegger would maintain a type of "death ethic" as Marcuse has charged. Can we accept this interpretation?

First, this interpretation is highly dubious for it implies a reinterpretation of resoluteness that directly contradicts the
elucidation of resoluteness found in Sz #60, which we have set forth in the last chapter as a fundamental structure of authenticity. This contradiction can be easily shown by examining Sz 298-9 where one encounters clear indications that resoluteness refers to taking action in the present situation, in which one does choose from those "possibilities that lie closest". The following excerpts should forcefully confirm this point:

Resoluteness, as authentic being-one's-self does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating 'I'. And how should it, when resoluteness as authentic disclosedness, is authentically nothing else than being-in-the-world? Resoluteness brings the self right into its current concerned being—alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous being with others. In the light of the projected field (Worumwillen) of one's self-chosen potentiality-for-being, resolute Dasein frees itself for its world. Dasein's resoluteness toward itself is what first makes it possible to let the others who are with it 'be' in their ownmost potentiality-for-being (. . .) Resoluteness by its ontological essence, is always the resoluteness of some factual Dasein as a particular time...The resolution is precisely the disclosive projection and determination of what is factically possible at the time (. . .) What one resolves upon in resoluteness has been prescribed ontologically in the existentiality of Dasein in general as a potentiality-for-being in the manner of concerned solicitude (. . .) Even resolutions remain dependent upon das Man and its world...

In resoluteness the issue for Dasein is its ownmost potentiality-for-being, which, as something thrown, can project itself only upon definite factual possibilities. Resolution does not withdraw itself from 'actuality', but discovers first what is factically possible; and it does so by seizing upon it in whatever way is possible for it as its ownmost potentiality-for-being in das Man (Sz 298-9).

I have quoted from Sz #60 at length to demonstrate that resoluteness has been worked out in detail as a projection upon factual possibilities in which one chooses authentic resolves from one's "world" to constitute one's situation. I now wish to show that it is impossibly contradictory to radically reinterpret resoluteness so
as to make it a mode of authentic being toward death for not only
does it contradict the previous analysis of resoluteness, but it
also contradicts other important doctrines of SZ. To show that this
is the case I shall run through the interpretation where resoluteness
is shown to tend toward being toward death, and shall show how
interpreting the passages on SZ 307–9 as a reinterpretation of resoluteness
as, exclusively, a way of being toward death leads to one contradiction
after another. Then I shall suggest that the actual (and harmless)
consequence of bringing together the analysis of being toward death
and resoluteness is that advancing toward death is shown to be a mode
of resoluteness, one of the ways of being resolute. This interpretation
does not force upon us a radical reinterpretation of resoluteness that
would reduce resoluteness to a way of being toward death.

Heidegger’s procedure in bringing together being toward death and
resoluteness is to run through *seriatim* those "moments of modalization"
in the existential concept of death (i.e. *ownmost*, non-relational, not
to be outstripped, etc.), and to show that resoluteness also "tends"
toward these same features through disclosing Dasein’s potentiality-
for-being in the same terms - Thus supposedly indicating a correspondence
and interconnectedness between being toward death and resoluteness. I
shall now follow Heidegger’s interpretation on SZ 307–9 to disclose the
dubiousness of taking this procedure as maintaining a reinterpretation
of resoluteness which would make authenticity equivalent to authentic
being toward death taken as *vorlaufende* Entschlossenheit. On the top of
SZ 307 Heidegger writes:

> Understanding the call of conscience reveals the lost-
> ness in das Man. Resoluteness brings Dasein back to its
ownmost potentiality-for-being-its-self. One's ownmost transparent in an understanding being toward death as one's ownmost possibility (SZ 307).

In this paragraph and throughout #62 Heidegger is reaffirming the importance of death in the constitution of authenticity. His claim is that through being toward death Dasein is most radically individualized, implying that resoluteness should "tend toward" authentic being toward death so as to make Dasein’s individuality, its "ownness", "wholly and authentically transparent". But from this claim the partisan of vorlaufende Entschlossenheit as the doctrine of authenticity leaps to the conclusion that resoluteness is only authentic as resolute being toward death (cf. Demske quote), thus greatly restricting the scope and function of resoluteness. What is questionable here is that resoluteness in its authenticity passes over "factual possibilities" and confines its authentic resolve to the choice of death. If the argument is that resoluteness must choose and take over one's finitude and project all factual possibilities upon the horizon of one's inevitable dying, then the point is plausible. But if one takes one's resolute choice of death as one's ownmost possibility that constitutes an authentic existence, this implies that death is the sole authentic object of resoluteness. I hope to show that the latter is a misinterpretation that is an unwarranted restriction and distortion of authenticity and resoluteness that is denied in the sections on historicity in SZ. The source of this misleading impression is the section of SZ that we are now examining and some statements of Heidegger's that we shall later examine.

SZ 307, paragraph two:

The call of conscience passes over in its appeal all
Dasein's 'worldly' prestige and potentialities. Relentlessly it individualizes Dasein down to its potentiality-for-being-guilty, and exacts of it that it should be this potentiality authentically. The unwavering precision with which Dasein is thus essentially individualized down to its ownmost potentiality-for-being, discloses the advancing toward death as the possibility which is non-relational. Advancing resoluteness lets the potentiality-for-being-guilty, as one's ownmost, non-relational possibility, be struck wholly into the conscience (SZ 307).

If one takes this passage as stating that resoluteness is non-relational, then he contradicts the analysis of resoluteness in SZ 60 which portrayed resoluteness as a way of relating to the world and one's concernful solicitude. There, resoluteness, far from breaking off one's relations, brings Dasein back into authentic relatedness and involvement in the situation. We see here the questionable results of assimilating resoluteness to the analysis of being toward death, for on Heidegger's account it is anxiety, conscience, and being toward death which breaks off Dasein's relations to das Man, and resoluteness which brings it back into authentic relatedness and involvement in the situation, which includes concern and solicitude, i.e. relations! Thus although it is the case that authentic being toward death is non-relational and individualizes Dasein down to itself, so that a resolute choice of being toward death would relentlessly individualize one, is it not also the case that resoluteness still requires that Dasein choose factual possibilities with which it will create its unique being-in-the-world? Although Dasein's non-relational solitude and withdrawal is necessary as a pre-condition for taking action in the situation for Heidegger, I do not see how it is sufficient to constitute authenticity, for it is clear in 60 (and in important
later passages) that Dasein must return to everydayness and must choose possibilities that are currently and factically available in order to achieve an authentic existence. Hence, despite a formal similarity in the individualization of death and resoluteness, there is the fundamental difference that whereas authentic being toward death makes one aware of his individualized self-being (solus ipse), resoluteness brings Dasein back into the situation so as to resolutely take action in the spheres of concern and solicitude, and is thus not non-relational.

On SZ 307, paragraph three, Heidegger refers to his earlier analysis of primordial guilt and then claims:

This prior being-guilty, which is constantly with us, does not show itself unconcealedly in its character as prior until this very priority has been enlisted in (hineingestellt) that possibility which is simply not to be outstripped (unüberholbar). When, in running ahead, resoluteness has caught up (eingeholt) the possibility of death into its potentiality-for-being, Dasein's authentic existence can no longer be outstripped by anything.

In this case again it is clearly death only and not resoluteness which refers to the possibility of not getting outstripped. For in the next paragraph and in many other passages, Heidegger makes it clear that the choice of authenticity must be constantly renewed, and repeated such that Dasein must continually re-choose the project of authenticity. Thus the passage above should not be taken as implying that one resoluteness projects itself on death its authenticity would be secure, constant, and immune to irresoluteness—for this position would contradict the stress on consciously avoiding backsliding into irresoluteness through "repetition". What Heidegger wants to say is that death and guilt
cannot be outstripped, but if one assimilates resoluteness to the analysis of being toward death, he again forces a reinterpretation of resoluteness which is inconsistent with some of Heidegger’s fundamental doctrines, and which seems to imply a doctrine of authenticity ("which can no longer be out-stripped by anything") that is at variance with countless assertions which we have and shall examine.\(^1\) For we shall see that authenticity is not a purified state of perfect being, immune from backsliding and irresoluteness, but rather even authentic Dasein finds himself struggling against the irresoluteness, inauthenticity, and untruth that are part of its being-in-the-world.

On SZ 307, paragraph four, Heidegger claims that "the primordial truth of existence demands an equiprimordial being-certain, in which one maintains oneself in what resoluteness discloses". Heidegger then asks:

What, then, does the certainty which belongs to such resoluteness signify? Such certainty must maintain itself in what is disclosed by the resolution. But this means that it simply cannot become rigid (versteifen) as regards the situation, but must understand that the resolution, in accordance with its own meaning as a disclosure, must be held open and free for the current factual possibility. The certainty of the resolution signifies that one holds oneself free for the possibility of taking it back (Zurücknahme)—a possibility which is factically necessary (....) The holding-for-true which belongs to resoluteness, tends, in accordance with its meaning, to hold itself free constantly—that is, to hold itself free for Dasein's whole potentiality-for-being. This constant certainty is guaranteed to resoluteness only so that it will relate itself to that possibility of

\(^1\)Moreover, this doctrine could be empirically falsified due to the possibility of making the resolve of authentic being toward death, and then later changing and lapsing back into evasion, fear, cowardice or any of the other attitudes one can assume toward death. Jaspers has convincingly argued that it is impossible to adopt one fixed attitude toward death in his Philosophie, Vol. II. (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1932), p. 491.
which it can be utterly certain. In its death, Dasein must simply 'take back' everything. Since resoluteness is constantly certain of death—that is, since it is advancing resoluteness thus attains a certainty which is authentic and whole (SZ 308).

This passage seems to suggest that holding death for certain keeps Dasein from becoming too rigidly involved in any of its factual possibilities, presumably on the grounds that the constant awareness of finitude discloses that death is its only certain possibility, whereas other possibilities are uncertain, insecure, and thus one must be ready to withdraw or take back his resolution on these factual possibilities. But this should not be taken as implying that since death is my only certain possibility, authentic resoluteness must resolve on death alone as its authentic because certain possibility. For would not this constant fixation on death itself become rigid versteifen closing off Dasein in the confines of its own finite subjectivity? In order to preserve the consistent and important emphasis on avoiding rigidity in the resolve through holding oneself free and open for modification (Zurücknahme) and on the importance of Wiederholung, we must avoid any conclusion that might lead us to take authentic being toward death as providing the only certain possibility with which we constitute an authentic existence. If one takes the passage cited as holding that on the basis of death as a certain possibility (finitude) I choose authentic possibilities, then the point is plausible. But if one takes advancing resoluteness as a constant projection upon death as one's sole authentic and certain possibility, then he not only contradicts Heidegger's earlier analysis of resoluteness, as we have seen, but he also contradicts Heidegger's
analysis of authentic being toward death where Heidegger stressed that he was not advocating a "brooding over death" or a "thinking about death", and that vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit was an advancing in Dasein's finitude, such that one endured death as a possibility, but was not fixated upon death as an event and actuality (SZ 260-2). Thus taking vorlaufende Entschlossenheit as a way of authentic being toward death that constitutes authentic existence through a projection upon death would reverse the focus of being toward death from relating to a pure possibility (as Heidegger recommends) to fixating on death as an ever present actuality, and would thus result in a mode of being that was rejected by Heidegger as an inappropriate way of relating to death.¹

Let us now examine the paragraph in the middle of SZ 308:

_When resoluteness is transparent to itself, it understands that the indefiniteness of one's potentiality-for-being is made definite only in a resolution as regards the current situation. It knows about the indefiniteness by which an entity that exists is dominated through and through. But if this knowing is to correspond to authentic resoluteness, it must itself arise from an authentic disclosure. The indefiniteness of one's own potentiality-for-being, even when this potentiality has become certain in a resolution, is first made wholly manifest in being toward death. Vorlaufen brings Dasein face to face with a possibility which is constantly certain but which at any moment remains indefinite as to when that possibility will become an impossibility (SZ 308)._

Reinterpreting resoluteness on the basis of this passage would rest on an equivocation of different senses of unbestimmt.

_Death is unbestimmt in the sense that it is "indefinite in its_
certainty", i.e. it is possible at any moment; this seems to be the unambiguous connotation Heidegger has in mind. But unbestimmt also means "indeterminate, vague, undefined, undecided", and surely it is this sense of unbestimmt that refers primarily to the "indfiniteness of one's potentiality-for-being" that is made definite in a resolution. Moreover, this sense of unbestimmt cannot unambiguously refer to death which is clearly for Heidegger Dasein's most determinate possibility which defines its being as finite, individual, guilty, etc. Hence an equation of the unbestimmt character of death and the potentiality-for-being that is resolved on in resoluteness would deceptively and slyly utilize two senses of unbestimmt (indefinite and indeterminate), which renders equivocal the claim that it is the advancing in the unbestimmt (indeterminate) nature of one's potentiality-for-being. For it is clear that in the context of Heidegger's analysis, unbestimmt refers to two distinct phenomena that have no visible interconnection beyond a coincidental ambiguity in language. Moreover, the following passage makes clear the more convincing interconnection between death and resoluteness:

The indefiniteness of death is primordially disclosed in anxiety. But this primordial anxiety strives to exact resoluteness of itself. It moves out of the way everything which conceals the fact that Dasein has been abandoned to itself (SZ 308).

Does it not follow from this passage that anxiety over death induces the advancing in death to become resolute, so that I resolutely choose my death as one of my possibilities? Indeed, in confirmation of the proposal that the bringing together of authentic being toward death and resoluteness serves to make advancing a mode of resoluteness, we find Heidegger stating that advancing has been modalized by resoluteness and attested:
In our interpretation of the 'connection' between resoluteness and advancing, we have first reached a full existential understanding of advancing itself. Hitherto this could amount to no more than an ontological projection. We have now shown that advancing is not just a fictitious possibility which we have forced upon Dasein; it is a mode of an existential potentiality-for-being that is attested in Dasein—a mode which Dasein exactsoof itself, if indeed it authentically understands itself as resolute (SZ 309).

I wholly concur in this conclusion and have been proposing throughout this section that advancing is a mode of resoluteness, and that when in resoluteness Dasein chooses authenticity, one of the ways in which Dasein resolves upon authentic self-being is in resolutely advancing forward in its death as a distinctive possibility. In fact, Heidegger himself suggests this interpretation in stating that "advancing 'is' not some kind of free-floating behavior", but is "a possibility hidden in resoluteness and thus attested therewith" (SZ 308). But we should not conclude that advancing resoluteness is the only authentic mode of resoluteness, or that death is the sole authentic resolve, or that authenticity is constituted by and equivalent to authentic being toward death, for this would make being toward death the fundamental constitutive of authenticity—an interpretation, I am trying to show, that cannot be extracted from the text of SZ without difficulty and distortion.

I hope to have shown the source of the prevalent identification of authenticity with vorlaufende Entschlossenheit, interpreted as a way of being toward death, and to have shown the problems and contradictions this interpretation forces upon us. An understanding of the roles of advancing and resoluteness in the constitution of authenticity would perhaps help us to avoid equating authenticity with being toward death.
Vorlaufen is a structure of all authentic choice, for resoluteness is a projection into the future (advancing) of self-chosen possibilities. On S2 262 Heidegger notes that "advancing is Dasein's mode of being", both in the sense that human being is always future oriented (sich vorweg) and is always moving forward forward its eventual death. Thus an authentic way of comporting oneself toward the future would be aware of one's advancing toward death and would resolutely take over being toward death as an authentic possibility. Moreover, since all authentic choice takes place under the eyes of death and resolves upon finite possibilities, Vorlaufen is a structure of all authentically resolute choice. Resoluteness, on the other hand, is a resolving on the situation, a constituting one's self-being through engaging in an understanding activity of self-transformation. This includes a taking over one's thrownness and past (this activity will be analyzed in the next chapter) and a constitution of one's present situation through one's future projections. Thus vorlaufende Entschlossenheit contains the structures of advancing and resoluteness, and far from being a merely future oriented advancing toward death contains the three temporal dimensions of human being and interconnects the structures of advancing toward death and projecting one's self-chosen resolve into the future, the constitution of the situation, and the taking over of one's facticity (thrownness, guilt, past).\footnote{Demske after seeming to equate vorlaufende Entschlossenheit solely with a way of being toward death that constitutes authenticity (cf. HCA p. 168), surprisingly, makes much the same point that advancing resoluteness has a "triadic strucute": Dementsprechend heist die eigentlich Existenz nicht bloss 'Vorlaufen in den Tod', sondern 'vorlaufende Entschlossenheit', wobei der Name all drei Elemente ausdrücken will. Die eigentliche Existenz besteht eben}
and resoluteness into "advancing resoluteness" is an interconnection of constituent structures of authenticity, but is not a transformation of resoluteness into a way of being toward death, nor does resoluteness find its sole authentic possibility in death.

2. **A Contrast between Two Interpretations of Advancing Resoluteness**

I now wish to briefly contrast my interpretation of advancing resoluteness (as so far developed) with the widespread interpretation that takes advancing resoluteness as a way of being toward death that constitutes authenticity. I shall quote the striking passage where Heidegger defends his concept of advancing resoluteness "against the grossest perversions" (SZ 310). I shall comment on this passage in detail to show further difficulties in interpreting advancing resoluteness solely as a way of being toward death, and to show that doing so commits one to restrictive and dubious positions that are put into question by other sections of SZ, and the interpretation I shall offer. Heidegger writes:

darin, dass Dasein durch das Vorlaufen in den Tod auf seine eigene Schuld zurückgeworfen wird, um dann in seiner Situation eigentlich existieren zu können. Alle drei Momente dieser Bewegung sind unentbehrlich; das Vorlaufen beseitigt weder die Schuld noch das Sein-bei anderem Seienden, sondern schafft erst die notwendige Vorbedingung dieser Momente und daher der ganzen Struktur (ibid, p. 65).

But in opposition to Demske I argue that advancing resoluteness is not equivalent to authenticity for although it is a fundamental constituent it does not subsume or exhaust the concept of authenticity. Demske's mistake, which every interpreter of authenticity I have studied has made, is that he fails to see the necessary and fundamental role of authentic historicity in the constitution of authenticity. Thus Demske and the "standard" interpretation stop with the structure of advancing resoluteness, believing they have found Heidegger's concept of authenticity. On this basis they draw the conclusion that authenticity is a death ethic or that death is my sole authentic possibility. The way out of imprisoning authenticity in an empty cul-de-sac of being toward death is to show the role of authentic historicity in the constitution of authenticity and the relation between the structures of vorlaufende Entschlossenheit and authentic historicity in the constitution of authenticity. This task will be performed in the next chapter.
Advancing resoluteness is not a way of escape, fabricated for the 'overcoming' of death; it is rather that understanding which follows the call of conscience and which gives death the possibility of assuming power over Dasein's existence, and of basically dispersing all fugitive self-concealments. Nor does wanting-to-have a conscience determined as being toward death signify a kind of seclusion in which one flees the world; rather, it brings one without illusions into the resoluteness of 'taking action'. Neither does advancing resoluteness stem from 'idealistic' exactions soaring above existence and its possibilities; it springs from a sober understanding of what are factically the basic possibilities for Dasein. Along with the sober anxiety which brings us before our individualized potentiality-for-being, there goes an unshakeable joy in this possibility. In it Dasein becomes free from the entertaining 'incidentals' with which busy curiosity keeps providing itself (SZ 310).

The "this-worldliness" of Heidegger's doctrine is stressed in his claim that "Advancing resoluteness is not a way of escape, fabricated for the 'overcoming' of death". Rather, advancing resoluteness "gives death the possibility of assuming power over Dasein's existence, and of basically dispersing all fugitive self-concealments". An ambiguity and two conflicting possibilities of interpretation arise from this phrase. For one could argue that advancing resoluteness gives death and death alone power over existence so that advancing resoluteness is seen as a teleologically death-centered condition such that an authentic modification of das Man would solely consist in one's relation to death. In this case "dispersing fugitive self-concealments" would signify breaking through one's evasion of death and resolutely confronting it—and in this way individuating one's self from das Man. But on the other hand, one could argue that advancing resoluteness rather gives one the power to be in the face of death. If this power to be is for the sake of one's authentic existence then one receives a boon that increases one's power of being. Then the phrase that advancing resoluteness "disperses all fugitive self-concealments" could indicate that being
toward death helps effect a transparency of one's disclosedness, a
breaking through and making transparent the concealments, illusions, and
evasions (false consciousness) with which das Man tempts Dasein to
tranquilize itself in its protecting shelter, and thus alienates
one from their ownmost potentiality-for-being-a-self. In this case
being toward death would be one of the means of obtaining authenticity,
or one of the conditions of the possibility of authenticity. The
ambiguity in the phrase being discussed can perhaps be clarified by
a comparison between notions advocated by Plato and Spinoza.

In Plato’s Phaedo philosophy is defined as the practise of dying,
and the philosopher is described as being engaged in a project of
learning how to die.¹ The goal is to become free for death so that
one achieves courage to die. Is there not a suggestion of the ethic
of the Phaedo in SZ? Does not Heidegger’s "freedom for death" and "courage
for anxiety in the face of death" remind us of Socrates’ last great
speech? Do we not leave SZ with the impression that one of the great
tasks of life is to obtain courage to face death?

But Heidegger’s notion of obtaining power over existence reminds us
of Spinoza’s dictum that one must strive to increase his "power and
activity of being". Of course for Spinoza knowledge was the way in which
one increases his control and power. Moreover, Spinoza shunned the
thought of death believing that, "A free man thinks of death least of all
things; and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of Life" (Ethics,
Part IV, Prop. LXVII). Heidegger would probably claim that Spinoza is merely
evading an important part of one’s self-knowledge, in that knowledge of

¹I realize that there are deep problems of interpretation here,
but I am merely taking Socrates’ statement literally in order to clarify
Heidegger’s problematic in SZ.
death is one of the essential conditions of self-understanding and of freeing oneself from the illusions of the herd. In this sense, then, one's freedom for death becomes an increase in one's power of life. Thus perhaps Heidegger wishes to convey the implication that authenticity provides both courage for death and power over life.

The following statement stresses that the "power over one's existence "obtained in resoluteness leads to "taking action in the situation":

Nor does wanting to have a conscience, which has been made determinate as being toward death, signify a kind of seclusion in which one flees the world; rather it brings one without illusions into the resoluteness of taking action.

Here I wish to argue that even if one of the ways "wanting to have a conscience" (resoluteness) resolves on authenticity is advancing toward death, this does not mean they are equivalent. Rather there is a reciprocal determination or interconnectedness between the various constituents of vorlaufende Entschlossenheit. Indeed, if one takes the phenomena of resoluteness and being toward death as equivalent how can we make sense out of the statement that advancing resoluteness is not a "kind of seclusion in which one flees the world; rather it brings one without illusions into the resoluteness of taking action". Do we not find a clear elucidation of the resoluteness of taking action in SZ #60 which stress choosing factual possibilities and projects in the situation? Perhaps Heidegger is implying that the authentic resolve toward death brings one resolutely back into the situation so that one can take action without illusions. But in this case advancing resoluteness is but a means to authenticity, one of the conditions of its possibility, and is not itself along identical with an authentic existence. I shall argue that Heidegger takes this position in his analysis in the crucial section on authentic
historicity.

Next, what does Heidegger mean by taking action "without illusion"? Does this mean in view of one's finitude? We read in the following sentence:

Neither does advancing resoluteness stem from 'idealistic' exactions soaring above existence and its possibilities; it springs from a sober understanding of what are factically the basic possibilities for Dasein (SZ 310).

The crucial question here concerns the construal of the "basic possibilities" of Dasein. Are they solely restricted to the choice of finitude? Or do they include a broader sphere of the choice of possibilities for doing and being? Two things seem to be implied. First, authenticity is not a visionary ideal demanding adherence to illusory exactions which demand that Dasein transcend its finite humanity. Secondly, it is clear that authentic Dasein is free from illusions in the sense that it does not cling to the myth of immortality, nor does it evade its constitutive finitude. But it is also the case that in Heidegger's account of authenticity, resolved Dasein does not strive for "perfection" or "fulfillment", nor does it believe in the tranquilizing reassurances of das Man that "one must live as one does", or do what "people" say. Rather it has a "sober understanding" of its situation: its finitude, thrownness, fallenness, guilt, alienation, and evasiveness. But Heidegger also emphasizes that understanding that average everydayness is fallen, irresolute, inauthentic leads one to resolve to modify his inauthentic ways of being. Authentic Dasein thus understands that its "basic possibilities" are inauthenticity and authenticity, and that its life tasks is to resolutely extricate itself from its fascinated absorption in das Man. The term "sober understanding" would then seem to designate
a tough-minded this-worldliness, resolutely committed to squarely facing the negative, yet choosing to engage oneself in the world so as to create one's unique self-being in the face of overbearing pressures from the social world, and in spite of the anxiety and uncanniness that are part of one's being-in-the-world. To interpret this passage so as to unambiguously extract a death projecting authenticity, one would have to limit what are factically the basic possibilities of Dasein to death, thus making my death my only "basic possibility." But Heidegger does not explicitly take this restrictive position, and in the next chapter I hope to show that an interpretation holding that death is my only basic or "authentic" possibility is denied in Heidegger's sections on historicity. Hence, for now, the question of Dasein's basic possibilities is an open one which cannot be restricted to death for lack of textual evidence that this was Heidegger's intention.

Finally, we read that:

Along with the sober anxiety which brings us before our individualized potentiality-for-being, there goes an unshakeable joy in this possibility. In it Dasein becomes free from the entertaining 'incidents' with which busy curiosity keeps providing itself (SZ 310)

An interesting passage. But how does "sober anxiety" in the face of individuation bring one "unshakeable joy"? Do we feel unshakeable joy in resolute being toward death? Or in the achievement of liberating oneself from das Man? If one equates our "individualized potentiality-for-being" with the self individuated in being toward death, then the unshakeable joy results from one's confrontation with one's own death. Is Heidegger here translating as "joy" the New Testament concept which signifies the accompanying mood of the celebration of salvation in the Christian triumph over death? In Bultmann's words, "in 'joy', care
and anxiety are indeed 'overcome' (aufgehoben), i.e. annulled and preserved. But Heidegger has clearly stated above that advancing resoluteness is "not a way of overcoming death", therefore it is unlikely that the unshakeable joy refers to the Christian joy in the hope and promise of salvation (overcoming death) and eternal bliss. This would suggest that the unshakeable joy would be ecstasy over one's individuation, over one's liberation from das Man, and one's choice of authenticity. This joy, then, would be the kind of elevation or peak experience that one enjoys when embarking upon a new project, or when one has liberated himself from a constrictive bond; whether it be something so simple as setting off on a journey, beginning a new love affair, being accepted in graduate school or a new position; or something as profound as having undergone a conversion to, say, Catholicism or revolutionary socialism, or to standing on the threshold of a new way of life. Joy over one's individualized potentiality-for-being would thus not seem to be joy over advancing in death, but rather joy over liberation and the possibility of authenticity.

To conclude, we shall inquire into how individuation "frees us from the entertaining 'incidental' with which busy curiosity provides itself". This could be interpreted as holding that advancing resoluteness induces Dasein to withdraw from the concerns of everydayness. But this interpretation would be questionable for we saw earlier in several contexts that authentic Dasein did not "die to the world", but rather modified its involvements in the world. Furthermore, there would be a possible

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empirical falsehood in this claim, for does not the confrontation with
death often cause one to plunge into a whirl of worldly activity and
immersion in distracting "incidentalss"...to flee and forget. This
situation was vividly portrayed in Kurosawa's brilliant story Ikiru
(To Live) in which a Japanese bureaucrat suddenly found out he was to
soon die and responded with a frantic leap into the "entertaining
incidentalss" of life that he had long shunned. This plunge into hedonism
soon proved to be unsatisfactory, and after undergoing anxiety, uncanniness,
and a withdrawal into reticent solitude, our hero returned to everydayness
(his office) and engaged in a resolute project (building a park for slum
dwellers) that brought him into constant conflict with das Man's
conventions and ways of being (the bureaucracy with its rigid
prescriptions, failure to decisively act, irresponsible ambiguity, and
idle chatter). But resolutely repeating his authentic choice he
carried through his project despite unending opposition and obstruction
from das Man, and thus achieved authenticity. The final scene showing
the breakdown of das Man (the other bureaucrats at the hero's funeral)
devastatingly portrays the "nullity and groundlessness of inauthentic
everydayness". 1

Kurosawa's story portrays no doubt an extreme situation (i.e. finding
out your days are numbered), but still we must ask how one's authentic
being toward death can free one from the daily transactions and entertaining
distractions of everydayness? And what is intrinsically wrong with
involvement in everydayness? If it is a matter of priorities, perhaps one
could argue that modern life has reversed authentic priorities, forgotten
ultimate concerns, and has immersed modern man in tasks and events of the

public world. But even if this reversal is both necessary and beneficial why should one scorn worldly involvement? Moreover, the many passages we have cited stressing a deep involvement in one's world indicate that Heidegger is not advocating a withdrawal from everydayness. Thus the "incidentals" from which one is freed are not worldly being as such, as if one's own death were all that matters to authentic Dasein, but rather the trivialities of everydayness, the burdensome banalities that often keep one imprisoned in the lowest levels of everyday life, and the multifarious distractions through which one avoids the choice of authentic possibilities.

Our interpretation of Heidegger's concluding remarks on vorlaufende Entschlossenheit show again that one can not extract an equivalence between authentic being toward death and authenticity from SZ without doing violence both to SZ and to Heidegger's concept of authenticity which I am engaged in interpreting. I next wish to draw out further untenable consequences which I believe the standard interpretation of authenticity as a way of being toward death contains and implies.

3. Existence Viewed from Under the Lordship of Death

In this section I shall first make some general remarks indicating how interpreting being toward death as a doctrine of authentic existence implies an inversion of concern and a "transvaluation of values" that is not only bizarre and untenable, but which also forces upon us a radical reinterpretation of Heidegger's existential ontology in SZ. I suggest that anyone who takes authenticity to be equivalent to being toward death is committed to this perverse interpretation of SZ, which I shall attempt
to show represents a thoroughgoing nihilism. I hope that this analysis gives pause for reflection to the many commentators who blithely identify authenticity with advancing resoluteness, by showing possible consequences and implications of this doctrine, and by raising some of the issues at stake.

Although it seems prima facie fantastic and perverse to take authenticity as a way of being toward death, nonetheless it is possible that one could build an imposing "authenticity of death" on the basis of Heidegger's analyses of death, guilt, anxiety, uncanniness, care, conscience, nullity, finite temporality, and advancing resoluteness in conjunction with the themes of extrication and individuation, in which death is interpreted as one's ownmost possibility and the supreme individuator. I shall suggest how the interpretation of authenticity as authentic being toward death in this context could be taken as implying a reversal of what we (das Man and everyman) take to be of paramount importance, interest, and concern, in that under the lordship of death all worldly concern is negated, null, and void. This turning concern upside down and shifting our involvement and commitment from daily life to a resolute, heroic bearing of death also, I shall suggest, implies a reinterpretation of Heidegger's existential ontology, in which death casts its shadow and pales the entire pathway cleared and marked out in SZ.

I shall first attempt to show that if one makes authentic being toward death the equivalent and summit of authenticity, the landscape along the pathway of the Dasein analytic is significantly altered. Not only does death replace life as the source, focus, and goal of authenticity, but we encounter an inversion of concern in which that which counts as
significant and important for everydayness, means nothing to one who has chosen death as his authentic resolve. To show that this is the case, I shall now briefly show how in an interpretation of authenticity that takes being toward death as its exclusive constituent, all existential phenomena and modes of disclosure undergo a radical reinterpretation that results in a paradoxically inverted universe.

The standard interpretation of authenticity implies that through advancing resoluteness death becomes my lord and master, the possibility that provides me with and constitutes my authenticity. For it is my being toward death that makes transparent and discloses the being of the being I am: null, thrown, finite, abandoned, alienated, powerless against my facticity. I take over this nullity as my guilt: a being-guilty that I can never overcome or diminish, for this guilt is the condition of a being condemned to finitude—I am guilty because I am saturated with nullity, I must die. I experience this nullity, guilt, and dereliction in anxiety, which I must exact as the authentic mood that makes me aware of the nothingness of the world of das Man, the nothingness from which I came and to which I shall return, and the nullity coiled within the heart of my being. This existence is thoroughly uncanny: withdrawing into the reticence of solitude, I extricate myself from das Man and all his concern and involvements, and individuate myself as a stranger and alien in their familiar everyday world. In the lonely stillness of uncanniness, conscience calls me to reject worldly being and pass over all worldly concern, summoning me to take over my guilty, anxious potentiality-for-being, which I can only assume by continually resolving upon my death and guilt as my only authentic possibility that makes fully transparent my finite, death-bound condition which I seize upon as my
authentic being. Taking over this being, understanding projects and discloses my finite possibilities as those through which I create an authentic self, steadfast in its advancing resoluteness, certain of its authentic resolve, standing forth in the totality of its being, taking over its naked aloneness in the nothingness of the world, offering it nothing essential to relate to except its own death, which it faces in the silence of uncanny isolation, alone.

If this is the picture of authenticity and the Dasein analytic that emerges from the authenticity of running ahead resoluteness—frequently taken as the summit of \(\text{SZ}\) —why, one might ask, should one strive for authenticity? Is death really to replace das Man as my lord and master? Did Heidegger seriously consider this identification of authenticity with being toward death, or is this interpretation but a fanciful construction of a series of Heidegger interpreters which somehow caught on and degenerated into a dogma? The point I have been trying to make in this section is that if one does take authenticity as equivalent to a way of being toward death, then there are grounds for the charges made by some critics of Heidegger that he maintains a death ethic and nihilism. In fact, several commentators have accused Heidegger of nihilism (among them, the influential French interpreter Alphonse de Waehlens\(^2\)).

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1 Cf. Karl Löwith’s article in Pöggeler’s Heidegger anthology where he makes this claim (p. 60). In the next chapter I shall criticize Löwith’s interpretation of Heidegger.

2 De Waehlens claims that Heidegger “refuses all value to everything that does not lead to the nihilistic acceptance of death” (La Philosophie de Martin Heidegger, op. cit., p. 78; translation mine). He further characterizes Heidegger as the “herald of a major nihilism” (p. 356) and portrays SZ as a “nihilism unconditionally defeatist” (p. 353). We shall examine passages that might suggest these conclusions and will propose that had de Waehlens not misunderstood Heidegger’s concept of authenticity, he would not make such vague and questionable statements.
so perhaps we should attempt to discern what features of Heidegger's analysis, if any, could be taken as implying a nihilistic doctrine, and we should evaluate to what extent passages in SZ can be said to support a nihilism.

There are some remarks in SZ #68 (esp. 343-4) which if taken as explicating the choice of death as my sole authentic resolve could indicate nihilistic consequences of interpreting authenticity, as a way of being toward death. For the sake of simplicity, I shall limit my discussion to two features of "nihilism" which seem as if they might be plausibly extracted from an equation of authenticity with being toward death: **nullity** (or **emptiness**) and **negativity** (or **negation**).¹

Nihilism stems etymologically from **nihil**, signifying "nothing", or "a thing of no value." The question arises as to whether Heidegger's critique of das Man and his doctrine of advancing resoluteness leaves anything of value, significance, and potential authenticity in our everyday-historical world. Does resolving upon one's death as one's authenticity imply or result in the "valuelessness" (insignificance) of all objects of concern for one who has resolved upon authentic self-being? We encounter on SZ 343 a passage that could be taken as suggesting the nullity of concern:

> Anxiety discloses the meaninglessness (Unbedeutsamkeit) of the world; and this meaninglessness reveals the nullity of that with which one can concern oneself—or, in other words, the impossibility of projecting oneself upon a potentiality-for-being of existence which is founded primarily upon one's objects of concern. The revealing of this impossibility, however, signifies that one is letting the possibility of an authentic potentiality-for-being be lit up (SZ 343).

¹ c.f. Arthur Danto's *Nietzsche as Philosopher* (New York: Macmillan, 1968) o. 28ff. for a discussion of the nihilism of emptiness
To interpret this passage as explicating a nihilism of nullity and negativity we would have to interpret the authentic potentiality-for-being indicated here as death, the negation of concern. In order to make this passage enunciate a nihilism in which Dasein's "basic possibilities" are reduced to a repetitive projection of death and taking over one's nullity (being-guilty), one would argue that in anxiety one loses his fascination (benommen) with the world and the variety of concern and becomes fascinated solely with its "naked uncanniness". This experience furthermore would allow us to see the "power through which the mood of anxiety is distinguished" (SZ 344). For "this fascination not only takes Dasein back from its 'worldly' possibilities, but at the same time gives it the possibility of an authentic potentiality-for-being" (SZ 344). Seinkönnen in this interpretation would seem to refer to little beyond being toward death, and all worldly concern would be impugned as null, worthless, nichts. "Anxiety liberates him from possibilities which 'count for nothing' (nichtigen) and lets him become free for those which are authentic" (SZ 344). In this interpretation we would have a strange negation of concern in which the objects of our involvement, fascination, and interest are devalued, emptied, negated by the Dasein that resolves on the authenticity of death. Liberation, then, would be described as extrication from "worldly possibilities" (all worldly possibilities?) which "count for nothing''. Does this imply that Heidegger is maintaining a thorough-going nihilism of negativity and nullity? If so, in this interpretation European nihilism described and diagnosed by Nietzsche in The Will to Power appears to have reached its summit in an
authenticity of death which rejects all worldly (and other worldly) values, so as to solely focus on one's individuated finite self-being in the face of death. But is this interpretation actually supported by SZ? Is Heidegger's concept of authenticity merely a resolute projection of death. But is this interpretation actually supported by SZ?

Against this interpretation I would first suggest a careful re-reading of SZ 343-4 so as not to take the quoted passages out of context, and would then suggest that we return to the earlier interpretation of anxiety, which stresses that anxiety does not negate or nullify all worldly concern, but rather disintegrates the power of das Man over Dasein by disclosing the meaninglessness of the world of das Man, thus preparing one for authenticity.1 In anxiety one loses his fascination with das Man which "gives it the possibilities which "count for nothing" from which anxiety liberates one are the inauthentic possibilities of das Man. Thus to take these passages as founding a nihilism of nullity and negativity would utilize a concept of anxiety different from the one we have found in SZ #40, and would imply a negation of concern which presupposes that death is my only authentic possibility and all other possibilities "count for nothing"—an interpretation which we shall see is denied in the sections on historicity. But, I stress that if one does take authenticity as equivalent to authentic being toward death, then he is committed to something like this nihilistic doctrine and a nihilistic interpretation of the whole of SZ. However, since this supposed nihilism that de Waehlens claims to find in SZ rests on what I consider a misinterpretation of authenticity, it is therefore in my view questionable and unfounded.

1 "Anxiety merely brings one into the mood for a possible resolution" (SZ 344).
In this chapter I have argued that it would be a mistake to equate advancing resoluteness taken as a way of being toward death with authenticity on the grounds that:

1) If one interprets advancing resoluteness as a modalization of resoluteness, which restricts it to the choice of death as its authentic possibility and the constituents of authenticity, one contradicts both the concept of resoluteness worked out in *SZ* #60, and the concept of authentic being toward death found in *SZ* #53. A careful study of the passage in *SZ* #63 where Heidegger bring together his analysis of resoluteness and being toward death clearly shows the contradictions which arise if one does modalize resoluteness solely as authentic being toward death, and suggests that actually "advancing" is a mode of resoluteness—a result that Heidegger himself confirms on *SZ* 309. This implies that:

2) The standard interpretation of authenticity (Löwith, de Waehlens, Demske, Sartre, etc.) cannot be extracted from *SZ* without doing extreme violence to Heidegger's philosophy, for it both advocates a dubious concept of authenticity and covers over what I take to be a liberating authenticity of self-transformation. Further, I argued that:

3) If one does subscribe to an equivalence of authenticity with an authentic being toward death, one is committed to an interpretation that implies a death ethic, a trans-valuation of values, an inversion of concern, and a philosophical nihilism which casts its dark shadow over the whole of *SZ*. Finally, in the next chapter I shall argue:

4) Heidegger himself clearly does not urge this interpretation as his concept of authenticity but rather offers an alternative doctrine in which
authentic being toward death is merely a preliminary to the choice of authenticity and the constitution of the authentic self. Thus I believe that the standard interpretation is incomplete, one-sided, and misleading as an interpretation of authenticity and is put into radical question by Heidegger's analysis of authentic historicity. This last proposal will be developed in the next chapter.
C. The Authenticity of Self-Transformation

In this chapter I wish to argue that Heidegger's analysis of authentic historicity\(^1\) yields an authenticity of self-transformation, and hope to show conclusively that Heidegger does not identify authenticity with authentic being toward death. I shall suggest that the movement toward authenticity progresses from the withdrawal of the extricated-individuated person from das Man and inauthenticity to resolute struggle for authenticity in the historical world. I shall contend that the phenomenon of authentic historicity explicates the whole, complex structure of authenticity and comprehends the interconnection of all its fundamental determinants. I shall argue that the historicity analysis in \(SZ\) shows that it is a mistake to interpret authenticity exclusively as a way of being toward death, and hope to show that the basis for Heidegger's final and most penetrating account of authenticity is in the chapter "Temporality and Historicity". In this context, I hope to supplement and correct previous interpretations of authenticity by explicating the importance of the constituents of authentic historicity for the analysis of authenticity.

I shall first (1) note the centrality and importance of the analysis of historicity for Heidegger's existential ontology and hermeneutic of authenticity. We shall examine the important constituents of Dasein's authentic historicity including (a) authentic historizing and the heritage;

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\(^1\) To avoid confusion on the part of those familiar with the English translation of \(SZ\), I might note that I am translating Geschichtlichkeit as historicity, rather than adopt Macquarrie and Robinson's neologism "historicality", which strikes me as clumsy and unnecessary since Geschichtlichkeit is not a special coining of Heidegger's, but is rather an important philosophical term (used by Hegel, Dilthey, Marcuse, etc.) for which Heidegger provides his own analysis.
(b) fate and destiny; and (c) repetition, the moment of vision, and the struggle for loyalty. I shall conclude this analysis of authentic historicity with a proposal delineating the structure of an authentic existence and summarizing the interpretation of authenticity worked out in this study. Then (2) I shall examine Heidegger's concept of the authentic self, suggesting that Selbständigkeit and individuality are criteria of authentic selfhood. We shall see (a) how his analysis of "Historicity and Selfhood" accounts for traditional features of selfhood, and provides the explication of the structure of the authentic self. We shall also provide (b) an interpretation of the autonomy, self-determination, self-knowledge, and self-reliance of the authentic self. Finally, (3) I shall conclude with a discussion of "Authenticity and Possibility". I shall raise the question of what possibilities might be considered authentic for Heidegger, shall provide an explication of the concept "authentic", and shall make some final remarks on Heidegger's concept of authenticity.

1. Historicity and Authenticity

On S2 313 Heidegger asks: "Has being-in-the-world a higher court of authority for its potentiality-for-being than its own death?". Previous interpreters seemed to have concluded unambiguously that death is the "highest court of authority" for authenticity, and that authenticity is equivalent to an advancing resoluteness toward death. Löwith expresses this point of view revealingly. He quotes the above stated question, and answers:

In dieser rhetorischen Frage, die aber in 'Sein und Zeit' eine faktisch fraglose Beantwortung erfährt, gipfelt offensichtlich und ausdrücklich das entscheidende 'Vorurteil' der ontologischen Interpretation das menschlichen Daseins... In dieser ausdrücklichen Fixierung des Todes als der obersten Instanz des Daseins enthüllt sich nur die letzte Konsequenz
Against this interpretation I shall argue that the analysis of
authentic historicity, the authentic resolve, and the authentic self give
us an understanding of authenticity that goes far beyond a way of being
toward death, and shall attempt to show conclusively that death is not
the "highest court of authority" for Dasein. I shall further argue that
SZ and the analysis of authenticity does not reach its "summit" until
the chapter on "Temporality and Historicity". In this crucial chapter
Heidegger provides the most primordial foundation of his Dasein analysis,
for he argues that we mean by the term 'everydayness' nothing else than
temporality" (SZ 372), while the "temporalization structure of temporality
reveals itself as the historicity of Dasein" (SZ 332). After showing the
interconnection between temporality and everydayness in Division Two,
Chapter IV, Heidegger confesses that this "bewildering phenomenon"
reveals the "inadequacy" of the foregoing Dasein analysis (SZ 371). For
the analysis has been "static", focusing on Dasein "immobilized in certain
situations" (i.e. being toward death!), and has overlooked its "stretching
through life" (SZ 371). The primordiality of the previous analysis is
put into question on SZ 371-2 in Heidegger's demand for an analysis of
historicity in which "this entity has been interpreted in a way which is
sufficiently primordial". The last three paragraphs of SZ #71 contain
indications that the Dasein analysis is inadequate as it stands and requires

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"In this rhetorical question that receives in 'Sein und Zeit' an
unquestionably positive answer, the decisive 'presupposition' of the
ontological interpretation (of human Dasein) reaches explicitly and openly
its summit...This explicit establishing of death as the highest court of
authority of Dasein reveals itself as the final consequences of the initial
starting point of the interpretation of Dasein as 'in every case mine'".
Löwith, ibid, p. 60. (Translation mine).
An analysis of historicity to provide an "adequate" and "sufficiently primordial" interpretation of human being. The importance of the historicity chapter for the interpretation of SZ can hardly be exaggerated, and in fact seems to have been greatly under-emphasized. For in this chapter, Heidegger gives his final and "most primordial" conceptualization of human being, authenticity, the authentic self and Dasein's totality.¹

In the following sections, I hope to show that the structure of authentic historizing provides the most comprehensive interconnection of the constituents of an authentic existence.

¹ In regard to the analysis of Dasein's totality, Heidegger asks:

Although up to now we have seen no possibility of a more radical approach to the existential analytic, yet, if we have regard for the preceding discussion of the ontological meaning of everydayness, a difficult consideration comes to light. Have we in fact brought the totality of Dasein, as regards its authentically being-a totality, into the fore-having of our existential analysis? It may be that a formulation of the question as related to Dasein's totality, possesses a genuinely unequivocal character ontologically. It may be that as regards being-toward-the-end the question itself may even have found its answer (SZ 372-3).

His answer indicates that the previous analysis of totality is inadequate and incomplete:

Death is only the 'end' of Dasein; and, taken formally, it is just one of the ends by which Dasein's totality is closed around. The other 'end', however, is the 'beginning', the 'birth'. Only that entity which is 'between' birth and death presents the whole which we have been seeking. Accordingly the orientation of our analytic has so far remained 'one-sided', in spite of all its tendencies toward a consideration of existent being-a-whole and in spite of (the genuineness) with which authentic and inauthentic being toward death have been explicated (SZ 373).

I shall argue that the previous analysis of authenticity is likewise inadequate, incomplete, and one-sided, and that authenticity receives its completion, adequacy, and fully articulated structure in the chapter on historicity.
a. **Authentic Historizing and the Heritage**

Heidegger begins *SZ* #74 with the search for "a kind of historizing" that "determines existence as historical" (*SZ* 382). Historicity is a "concrete working out of temporality", and temporality was "first revealed with regard to that way of authentic existing which we characterized as advancing resoluteness" (*SZ* 383). He then asks:

"To what extent does an authentic historizing of Dasein lie in advancing resoluteness?" (*SZ* 382). If advancing resoluteness is Dasein's "authentic historizing", and if advancing resoluteness is taken as a way of being toward death, then authenticity and authentic historizing are constituted as a way of being toward death.

Resoluteness gains its authenticity as advancing resoluteness. In this, Dasein understands itself with regard to its potentiality-for-being, and it does so in such a manner that it will go right under the eyes of death in order thus to take over its thrownness that being which it itself is, and to take it over wholly. The resolute taking over of one's factual 'there', signifies, at the same time, that the situation is one which has been resolved upon (*SZ* 382-3).

But is my own death my authentic resolve? Is authentic being toward death my authentic possibility that constitutes authenticity? Heidegger's answer, overlooked by a generation of interpreters, is set forth on *SZ* 383-4. Although the existential analytic is not to prescribe a specific content for the authentic resolve nor project specific factical possibilities, "nevertheless, we must ask whence, in general, Dasein can draw those possibilities upon which it factically projects itself" (*SZ* 383). That is, what is the source of one's authentic possibilities? Is it one's finite subjectivity? Am I myself
in my individuated finitude the sole source of my authentic possibilities?

Is death all that is truly and authentically mine, my only authentic possibility? If this is the case, then Dasein's authentic resolve does have a specific content, and thence the resolute choice of death would constitute an authentic existence. If this is the case, we are then forced to accept death as the source, locus, and content of Dasein's authenticity. But—and this passage is crucial—Heidegger's answer is that death is not the source of my authentic possibilities, and thus does not provide the content for my authentic resolve:

Those possibilities of existence which have been factically disclosed are not to be gathered from death. And this is still less the case when one's advancing in this possibility does not signify that one is speculating about it, but signifies precisely that one is coming back to one's factical 'there' (SZ 383).

Heidegger makes it clear here that authentic being toward death is not to be speculation about death or an explicit focus on it, but rather a coming back to one's "factual 'there'" (Mitsein, historicity, world) out of which one must choose authentic possibilities. The question then is, where does one discover his authentic possibilities? In das Man? We recall that Dasein is thrown into a world and at first and for the most part surrenders itself to das Man and becomes lost in average everydayness. Understanding itself in terms of das Man's understanding, one is cut off from his own possibilities of understanding interpreting, and talking: "The existential understanding cannot withdraw itself from the way of interpreting that comes down to it", but "it is out of this interpretation, against it, and yet again for it, that the chosen possibility is seized upon in resoluteness" (SZ 383). But where do authentic possibilities come from if das Man is the locus
of inauthenticity? From where does one appropriate authentic possibilities of understanding, interpreting, doing and being?

Heidegger answers:

The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself discloses current factical possibilities of authentic existing and discloses them out of the heritage which that resoluteness as thrown takes over (SZ 383).

Heidegger's claim is that one's historical heritage is the locus of possibilities which provides the authentic possibilities that are to be resolved upon, and is therefore the source of authenticity. Thus it is clearly not the case that Dasein's finite subjectivity alone provides one with his authenticity. History, not ontology, is the source of authentic possibilities. One's authentic possibilities are historical, not ontological. One must go beyond the subjectivity of one's ontological structure out into the openness of the historical situation to win authenticity. One must go beyond advancing resoluteness toward death and project authenticity by taking action in one's historical situation. Dasein has been thrown not only into death, but also into everydayness and history. For one is thrown into a heritage—a socio-cultural-historical tradition—which is the locus of possibilities to be chosen and resolved upon. Choosing an authentic resolve, taking over and resolving on one's situation requires a "handling down to oneself (sich überliefern) of the possibilities that have come down to one" (SZ 383). This "handing down to oneself" possibilities from the heritage is a critical act of questioning, evaluating, and appropriating. For everyday Dasein uncritically accepts the norms, values, and prescriptions of the social order as valid without question,
and thus goes along with the crowd, failing to perform its own evaluative discrimination. Hence everyday Dasein doesn't really choose or determine its own possibilities for it takes over whatever possibilities and ways of being are current, and floats from possibility to possibility according to whatever is now demanded or accessible. Authentic Dasein, on the other hand, sees all the current possibilities as arising out of the heritage, and sees that the specific ways of being and conventions are rooted in a particular historical context. Thus authentically appropriating possibilities requires that one must "hand down to oneself" (sich Überliefern) those possibilities that one critically takes over from the heritage as his own authentic possibilities. This process, we shall see, is not a simple unquestioning acceptance of the tradition but is rather a critical dialogue with the heritage in which one puts his heritage into question and then chooses which of those possibilities he conceives of as constitutive for his own existence.

On the basis of this doctrine, one could argue that today we have been thrown into a heritage of cultural pluralism in which there exists a multitude of conflicting possibilities for authentic existing. The task in appropriating one's own possibilities requires an activity of putting one's tradition into question, discerning which possibilities are appropriate to one's capabilities and potentialities, which possibilities will free one from domination by das Man, which possibilities will enable one to constitute an authentic self. This requires an activity of discrimination and evaluation in which one criticizes and rejects the possibilities of today which ensnare one in
inauthenticity and alienate one from authentic self-being. In a context of cultural pluralism there are many competing possibilities, some of which are outworn, constricting, alienating, and life-negating. These inauthentic, surpassed historical possibilities are in a state of tension, contradiction, conflict with liberating authentic possibilities, which are also found in one's current heritage, and which the resolute choice of authenticity then takes up and repeats as authentic possibilities. For instance, one might conclude that the current economic crisis in the capitalist world with its chronic unemployment, inflation, discrepancy between rich and poor, power elite, production-distribution anarchy, etc. requires a revolutionary change in the economic system and thus one might choose Marx and Lenin as his authentic possibilities and engage in the struggle for revolutionary socialism. Or one could be abhorred by the destructive imperialism and wars of the twentieth century and choose Ghandi and pacifism as an authentic possibility. Or one could be so disgusted with the totality of industrial civilization life that they could choose possibilities that represent a total negation of bourgeois life such as primitive Christianity, anarchism, or Eastern religion. Thrown into history, das Man, and existence one must come to terms with the conditions of one's being, and resolve to choose and make one's own those historical possibilities which have come down to us as live options for existentiell commitment.

What is at stake is being open to one's temporal dimensions, so that one is able to choose authentic possibilities from one's heritage so that one can project his own future. The fundamental importance of the heritage and the resolute choice of possibilities for authentic
existing out of the heritage is stressed in the following passage:

If everything 'good' is a heritage and the character of 'goodness' lies in making authentic existence possible, then the handing down of a heritage constitutes itself in resoluteness (SZ 383).

If, as this passage implies, authentic existing is constituted by the choice of possibilities from the heritage handed down in resoluteness, what is the role of death and being open to one's finite future? Heidegger answers:

The more authentically Dasein resolves—and this means that in advancing in death it understands itself unambiguously in terms of its ownmost distinctive possibility—the more unequivocally does it choose and find the possibility of its existence, and the less does it do so by accident. Only the advancing in death drives away every accidental and 'provisional' possibility. Only being-free for death, gives Dasein its goal outright and pushes existence into its finitude. Grasping the finitude of one's existence tears one out of the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one—those of comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly—and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its fate (SZ 384).

This passage provides an opportunity to expliccate the relationship between authentic being toward death (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit) and the resolute choice of authentic possibilities from the heritage. Resoluteness not only chooses authentic possibilities, from the heritage but projects them into the future in the way of vorlaufend, advancing. Dasein is always ahead of itself (sich vorweg), throwing itself into possibilities which are determined by the structure of being toward death as finite (SZ 264). Thus all authentic possibilities are "chosen under the eyes of death", so that one unambiguously choose finite possibilities. Heidegger argues that "Grasping the finitude of one's existence tears one out of the endless multiplicity of possibilities
which offer themselves as closest to one—those of comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly". That is, awareness of the finitude of one's existence, the limited time at one's disposal, the possibility that death may come at any moment, imparts a new seriousness and urgency to one's choices. The point of this analysis is that Vorlaufen is a structure of all authentic choice and projecting, and that being toward death thus enters into (but does not subsume or exhaust) and determines as finite all of one's resolves. Thus Vorlaufen is the authentic way of comporting oneself toward the future in which the individual actively and creatively chooses and projects his authentic possibilities. The way of being is contrasted with an inauthentic putting oneself at the disposal of das Man and waiting for the outcome of what is currently happening.

This interpretation suggests that by "accidental and 'provisional'" possibilities, Heidegger means those possibilities of today, the present age. The German vorlautig connotes "provisional", tentative and temporary which conveys the meaning that Heidegger suggests: today's possibilities are merely provisional, will soon pass away, and then will be replaced by another set of provisional possibilities. One could perhaps make a distinction between the provisional possibilities of today and the authentic possibilities of the heritage. If "everything good is a heritage" then my authentic possibilities are to be resolutely appropriated from the heritage so as to free me from dependence on and domination by the possibilities of today (i.e. working for AT&T, writing for a Madison Avenue Advertising agency, doing research for Time magazine, being a journalist for the Daily News, selling life insurance, becoming a computer
operator, living on welfare, begging on the streets, going to Viet Nam or to jail for draft resistance). By opening myself to the heritage I broaden my horizon of choice and am able to choose authentic possibilities and to escape from the compulsion and domination of today. The point I wish to stress in conclusion is that after the extrication and individuation from das Man, one still faces the task of choosing an authentic resolve in order to begin the movement from the possibility of authenticity to the projection of authenticity. I have particularly emphasized Heidegger's statement that the "handing down of a heritage"—the taking over and choosing authentic possibilities—"constitutes itself in resoluteness". This implies that the resolute choice of authentic possibilities from one's heritage constitutes an authentic existence. Thus I wish to stress the importance of Heidegger's concept of taking over, handing down, and appropriating possibilities from the heritage which has been previously overlooked. The heritage, and not death, is the source of one's authentic possibilities, and the resolute choice of possibilities from one's heritage constitutes one's authentic historizing.

This is how we designate Dasein's primordial historizing, which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen (SZ 384).

Dasein's authentic historizing is therefore not "advancing resoluteness" taken as a way of authentic being toward death, but is rather the resolute choice of possibilities from the heritage. Thus I suggest that Heidegger's concept of authentic historizing and the heritage brings the locus of authenticity out of the ontological structure of finite-individuated Dasein into the current historical situation, which is seen
to be the locus of resolute choice and the sphere of authenticity.

Although the heritage is the source of Dasein's authentic possibilities and its alternative to the coercion of today, it also imposes a limitation on Dasein's freedom. Thrown into its world, Dasein is delivered over to das Man and abandoned to history. Existence is historical being-in-the-world constituted by a socio-historical heritage. Since Dasein is Mitsein, it is a member of its generation, and its possibilities for existing are always limited by how the world (and country) into which it is thrown has developed. Let us now examine Heidegger's claim that authentic Dasein exists in the "simplicity of its fate", and explicate the interconnection between fate, destiny, and authentic historizing.

b. Fate and Destiny

Heidegger initially defines Dasein's "fate" as that "primordial historizing which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen" (SZ 384). Fate is thus connected with resoluteness, historizing, death, and choosing possibilities from the heritage. Hence it is interconnected with the fundamental constituents of authenticity—a connection made explicit in Heidegger's description of extricated, individuated resolved Dasein as existing in the "simplicity of its fate". But does the concept of "fate" add anything significant to the concept of an authentic existence? Or does it not rather introduce notions of irrational fatalism into Heidegger's soberly phenomenological view of human existence? To elucidate these questions we must
clarify Heidegger's special conception of fate.

The expression "simplicity of fate" did not accidentally slip into Heidegger's account for he develops a distinction between Dasein's "existing fatefully" and the "blows of fate", as well as distinguishing between "fate" and "destiny". In this section I shall develop Heidegger's concept of fate, and destiny and shall indicate their relation to authenticity. Then I shall show how a misinterpretation of these rather notorious concepts could lead one to a radical misinterpretation of Heidegger's philosophy. As an example I shall cite Löwith's attempt to show that Heidegger's shadowy association with Nazism can be partially explained by remarks in this section of SZ and general "tendencies" of his philosophy. Against Löwith, I shall argue that neither allegiance or submission to Nazism or any other totalitarianism (nor to any historical destiny) can be supported or justified by the analysis of authenticity in SZ, and that to do so distorts and covers over the radical individualism in SZ that is utterly opposed to submission in a social collectivism or to conformity with today. I tackle this emotional and controversial problem in order to clarify the issues which have resulted in harsh and often unjustified criticisms (or dismissal) of Heidegger's philosophy, and to further elucidate the concept of an authentic existence which is dialectically defined as an existence opposed to the social order, and in radical opposition to social submission or immersion.

Heidegger first argues that "Dasein can be reached by the 'blows of fate' only because in the depths of its being Dasein is fate in the sense we have described" (SZ 384). But it is important to note that only
resolute Dasein can have a fate; irresolute Dasein swept along by
the happenstance of circumstance has no "primordial historicity" and
thus no fate, for it is a worshipper and slave of today, and thus is
closed off from the authentic possibilities of the heritage and the
distinctive possibility of death. This doctrine implies, first, that
Dasein and not any mysterious force outside of human being is the
source of fate, for fate is constituted by the self-chosen resolve.
That is, my fate is constituted by my choice of authentic possibilities
with which I create my own unique existence. The resolute individual
is aware of the limitations to his resolves constituted by his death
and thrownness in a historical context which may be inimical or
supportive of his projects.

If Dasein in advancing lets death become powerful in
itself, then, as free for death, Dasein understands
itself in its own superior power, the power of its
finite freedom, so that in this freedom, which 'is'
only in its having chosen to make such a choice, it can
take over the powerlessness of abandonment to its having
done so, and thus can have a clear vision for the accidents
of the situation that have been disclosed (SZ 384).

"Fate" signifies the dialectic in human being between power and
powerlessness, freedom and facticity. Choosing "under the eyes of
death" indicates an awareness of the limitation to one's choices
inherent in the constitution of being human. Moreover one's free
choices are made in a historical context which one has not created thus
the resolute individual is open and ready to encounter any good fortune
or cruel misfortune that may confront his resolve.¹ Thus fate in
Heidegger's analysis does not arise from a "clashing together of events

¹Schicksalhaft in der sich Überliefernden Entschlossenheit existierend, ist das Dasein als in-der-Welt-sein für das 'Entgegenkommen' der glücklichen' Umstände und die Grausamkeit der Zufälle erschlossen" (SZ 384).
and circumstances", but rather arises out of that "primordial historizing" of resolute Dasein who is open to the past and future, and who has made the choice of authenticity. The concept of fate thus indicates both the freedom of the choice of authentic possibilities (one's "superior power"), and the limitations which one's condition impose on one's choices. This interaction between freedom and facticity in the constitution of one's self-chosen resolves is elucidated in Heidegger's distinction between fate and destiny.

Whereas "fate" is a characteristic of the resolute individual, "destiny" is a characteristic of Mitsein. The individual's abandonment to its situation includes not only its being submitted to the force of circumstances, but also its having to be with others, its Mitsein. Thus its fateful historizing is a co-historizing which Heidegger describes as destiny (Geschick)—"the historizing of the community, of a people" (SZ 384). Heidegger's distinction between Schicksal (fate) which refers to the historizing of an individual, and Geschick (destiny) which refers to the historizing of the group plays on the striking similarity Schicksal and Geschick have to the German word for history. And just as Mitsein is not an empirical concept generalizing about a contingent togetherness of human being, likewise destiny does not loosely generalize about the coming together of a class of individual fates, but is rather an existentiale structure of existence—an a priori structure made possible

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The term "destiny" (Geschick) as a designation for the co-historizing of the group is dropped in Heidegger's later philosophy where he talks of the "destiny of Being", a superpersonal concept that elapses the importance of the self-chosen fate described in SZ. This transformation of a structure of Mitsein (Geschick) into a characteristic of Being is one of the most striking and far-reaching departures from the Dasein analysis of SZ in Heidegger's later philosophy.
by Dasein's being-in and sharing the same world with others, and
resolving on possibilities that are social and involve others. Thus
Dasein's fate as an individual is bound up with its destiny as the
member of a group.

In communication and in struggle the power of destiny
first becomes free. Dasein's fateful destiny in and
with its 'generation' goes to make up the full authentic
historizing of Dasein (SZ 384-5).

This passage citing the "power of destiny" unfolded through
"communication and struggle", and the notion of "fateful destiny" take
on rather menacing overtones in the wake of twentieth century historical
catastrophes, and point to a possible deficiency in Heidegger's account
of authenticity. The question we shall here focus on is, how does the
"power of destiny" influence the choice of authenticity? That is, to
what extent does the authentic resolve depend upon and is influenced
by the current historical situation? If the current historical situation
provides the authentic resolve, and if the power of destiny coerces Dasein
into making certain choices demanded by the "destiny of the people",
then Dasein's resolve is contingent upon both the group and the current
historical situation. But these consequences would, I believe, be
inconsistent with the radical individualism and concept of Dasein as a
free project, and with Heidegger's emphasis on the primacy of the future
and past against "today". Further, there are several strong reasons why
it would be incompatible with Heidegger's conception to argue that
authenticity justifies or recommends a surrender to "destiny", history, or
the group. Hence, I shall argue that the notion of destiny in no way
provides content for the authentic resolve nor does it induce one to
surrender their potentiality-for-being (authenticity) to an external agency.
First, let us note that fate and the self-chosen resolve are
prior to (more "primordial" than) the not-chosen destiny of the group,
for Heidegger explicitly states that "fate" is the ground of destiny"
(SZ 386). Secondly, Heidegger distinguishes between the "moment of
vision" (authentic temporality) and the "making present today"
inauthentic temporality). The characteristic feature of the moment
of vision is that it is not immersed in or numbed with fascination
by what is current, and has chosen its authentic resolve from the
heritage. Heidegger sets up a dialogue between today, yesterday, and
tomorrow in which he constantly criticizes a surrender and submission
to what "today" demands or requires. These aspects of SZ strongly
militate against a "fatalistic" interpretation of the fate-destiny
notions, and indicate that the content of the authentic resolve is
not drawn from the "destiny of the people" which is derivative and
secondary to the choice of authentic possibilities from the heritage.

Heidegger writes:

Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our
being with one another in the same world, and in our
resoluteness for definite possibilities (SZ 384).

This statement indicates, I believe, that though Mitsein and the
shared heritage "guide" our choice of authentic possibilities by
delimiting what has already been (and therefore is possible), and what
is currently available, Mitsein or destiny does not prescribe the content
of the authentic resolve. For the choice of authenticity is the project
of individuated Dasein who must choose his own fate from his self-
constituted situation. Thus it seems that fate and destiny stand in
the same dialectical relation that we have seen throughout \SZ\: individual
v. group, yesterday v. today, self-chosen resolve (fate) v. not chosen
destiny. Again we find Dasein involved in a struggle for authenticity:
against today, against the power of destiny, against das Man. And
again, it seems that the authentic resolve is the free choice of
individuated Dasein, and not a submission to das Man, destiny, or
history.

Karl Löwith claims there is a confusion (Verwirrung) in Heidegger's
thought between authentic historizing (self-chosen fate, moment of vision,
authentic resolve), and the actual process of history (not chosen
destiny, today, the force of circumstances).\(^1\) He further insinuates
that Heidegger's assumption of the Rektorship in 1933 discloses the
baleful consequences of this confusion.\(^2\) This is an ad hominem
argument of a vulgar sort, and I believe that my clarification of the
distinction between fate and destiny makes it clear that surrender to the
power of destiny or what is demanded by "today" is inconsistent with
the doctrine we have been analyzing, and although Heidegger as a young
man may have been personally tempted to believe in a historical fate\(^3\),
and in his later philosophy talks of the "destiny of being"\(^4\), there is
nothing in \SZ\ that indicates a fatalism and no indication that one's
authentic resolve could possibly consist in surrender to the group, destiny,
or history. What is at stake here is the interpretation of Heidegger's

\(^1\) Löwith, Karl. Heidegger: Denker in dürftiger Zeit (Göttingen:

\(^2\) Ibid, p. 50.

\(^3\) Löwith claims this is an article on Heidegger published in Les Temps
Modernes, Nov. 1946, "Les implications politiques de la philosophie de l'
chez Heidegger", based on a letter Heidegger sent him in the early 1920's!

concept of fate. I have tried to make clear that fate for Heidegger is not a superpersonal power that sweeps down on the individual carrying it along with a coercive force, or tempting it to disaster, but rather refers to the act of individuated Dasein choosing its authentic resolve and thus committing itself to its "fate".

Hence, I would argue that surrender to totalitarianism or collectivism in no way follows from the analyses of historicity in *SZ*. We have consistently seen that Heidegger's radical individualism rules out submission to das Man in any of its historical manifestations, for das Man is the threat to authenticity that the authentic resolve must constantly struggle against. And now that we have clarified the relation between the authentic resolve and Dasein's self-chosen fate, we again see that Dasein's authentic resolve is not found in the power of destiny but in the authentic possibilities of the heritage. Given the dialectic between das Man and authenticity in which Heidegger consistently opts for the self (authentic man) against the system (inauthentic society), it seems to be a gross perversion of his dialectic to claim that the notion of a group destiny implies submission and surrender to the social order or history. Such a notion is operative in certain totalitarian systems, but it is not in Heidegger's *SZ* in which the radical individualism of authenticity excludes such submission on principle.

Thus I believe that if one clarifies the distinction between fate and destiny in relation to Heidegger's concept of authenticity, much of the baleful overtones of "fatalism" and submission to destiny disappear. Moreover, Heidegger's concept of fate as primordial historizing broadens his concept of authentic existence from a choice of ontological and
historical possibilities to a struggle with the present in which the force of circumstances and pressures of the public (destiny) require that resolute Dasein constantly reaffirm its choices and decisions in the face of the uncertain contingencies of the present situation. We shall develop this theme in the next section dealing with "the struggle for loyalty". Hence let us conclude by remarking that Heidegger's introduction of "fate" into his account of authenticity makes it clear that Dasein does not dwell in a universe where the rational is the real, and in which my projects constitute "reality", but instead, the projects of authentic Dasein are subject to the viscissitudes of history which are accepted and taken over as the conditions of existence. Far from assigning Dasein to a rationalistic world of the pure a priori or to an idealist dream-world, Heidegger situates Dasein out in the openness of history where authentic Dasein faces the reality of struggle and conflict. Since Dasein is rooted in the stream of history, we can say that Dasein is "historical in the very roots of its existence" (SZ 385), and can thus with Heidegger describe Dasein's authentic historicity as its fate, its struggle to be a self in the face of das Man and history.

Authentic historicity (and fate) is grounded in Dasein's temporality so to fully grasp the conditions of Dasein's authentic historizing, we must turn to analyze Dasein's authentic temporal structure. We shall see that it is Dasein's three-dimensional temporality that provides the conditions of its historicity, and that makes possible the phenomenon of authentic historizing, that is to say, authenticity. In the next section we shall investigate the historical-temporal phenomenon of the moment of vision that projects the repetition of authentic possibilities from the heritage, and constitutes the authentic self in a struggle for loyalty.
c. Repetition, the Moment of Vision, and the Struggle for Loyalty

In this section I shall lay bare the conditions of the possibility of authentic historizing and shall stress that authentic temporality in its three-dimensional "ecstatic unity" makes possible authenticity. This analysis suggests that authentic being toward death is but one of the three temporal conditions of authenticity. After analyzing the other important constitutive structures of authenticity, I shall summarize the results of the previous interpretation and shall bring together the fundamental structures of what I call the authenticity of self-transformation, a portrayal of Heidegger's analyses which I believe presents a cogent and complete concept of authenticity.

Our analysis of authentic historicity returns us to the resolute choice of possibilities from the heritage. In the past two sections we examined the taking over of the heritage and the resolute handing down to oneself authentic possibilities, such that one resolved upon the situation in the mode of "fateful destiny". We shall now examine how one chooses and takes over past possibilities (Wiederholung), and the way this choice is constituted in one's present projection toward the future. In this way we shall prepare for a formulation of the structure of an authentic existence and shall provide the context within which we can work out Heidegger's concept of the authentic self.

This activity of authentic historizing presupposes a condition of authentic temporalizing in which one is open to the three temporal dimensions and holds together these dimensions in the unity of the structure of authentic temporality. For, according to Heidegger, only
a being who is open to his future in such a way that he takes over his individualized finitude can come back to his situation and take over his thrownness. And only a being who is open to his past can take over its heritage and choose authentic possibilities in order to resolve upon its present situation. Thus, only a being that is open to its future and past can "by handing down to itself the possibilities it has inherited take over its thrownness, and be in the moment of vision for 'its time'" (SZ 385).

I wish to work out the importance of being open to the past, and the authentic way of taking over one's past to stress the importance of all three temporal dimensions in the constitution of authenticity. I put particular emphasis upon this point for it seems as if many of Heidegger's interpretations have placed exclusive emphasis on one's relation to the future in the mode of authentic being toward death (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit), and thus de-emphasize and dim down the importance of one's relation to the past. To correct this one-sided temporal emphasis, I hope to show the fundamental function of one's way of authentic being toward the past in constituting authentic historizing. Therefore, I shall argue that the three temporal dimensions are equiprimordial in the constitution of an authentic existence and shall propose that we hold on to this equiprimordiality, and do not sacrifice it for an exclusive emphasis on one's being toward death. In this way I hope to illuminate a dimension of authenticity that I believe has been covered over by previous Heidegger interpreters, and thus to make clear the full temporal-historical structure of authenticity.
Authentic temporalizing in the past is called Wiederholung by Heidegger (SZ 339). Wiederholung is an important and complicated term that is of methodological importance for SZ, as well as substantive import for authenticity, but we shall restrict ourselves to an inquiry into how Wiederholung describes the appropriating of past possibilities so as to constitute authentic historizing. I suggest that Wiederholung in the context of the choice of authentic possibilities from the heritage is the key to the authentic resolve and connotes both retrieve and repetition. This suggests that one must first retrieve possibilities from the heritage by making a resolute choice of authentic existence possibilities from the "Dasein that has been there". Then after choosing, retrieving, and taking over the possibility that has been handed down, one must repeat one’s choice by remaining loyal to one’s resolve in one’s struggle with das Man. This process of retrieve-repetition is enunciated in the following passage:

The resoluteness which comes back to itself and hands itself down, then becomes the retrieve-repetition (Wiederholung) of an existence possibility that has come down to us. Repetition is the explicitity handing-down, that is, the going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has been there. The authentic repetition of a past existence possibility—that Dasein itself chooses its hero—is grounded in advancing resoluteness; for in it one first chooses the choice that makes one free for the struggle of loyalty and the struggling succession of the repeatable (SZ 385).

In this passage one "chooses one's hero" from the past by a resolute repetition of authentic possibilities and repeats its choice in a "struggle for loyalty" in the "succession of the repeatable". The "repeatable" are authentic possibilities (the nature of which will be further clarified in the next section), and the "struggle for loyalty"
refers to the repetition of one's choice in the present situation such that one is true to one's resolve by standing by and remaining steadfast in one's projection of authenticity. "Choosing one's hero" from the heritage can be explicated as the choice of one's vocation, or the choice of models to guide one in one's projects. This choice of one's hero has some similarity to Sartre's concept of the fundamental project, but with the requirement that one consciously and resolutely makes one's choices out of the heritage of possibilities. For example, after a careful consideration of one's own potentialities and possibilities ("what one is capable of" and "what is open to one"), one can choose, say, philosophy as his authentic possibility, and can choose past philosophers as, for example, Aristotle, or Marx, or Nietzsche, as his models. Or one could choose Christianity or revolutionary socialism, taking Jesus or Lenin as their "hero". Hence in making an authentic resolve, one takes over one's heritage and retrieves possibilities for authentic existing.

The choice of one's authentic possibilities leads to a "struggle for loyalty", referring to the repetition of one's choices in the present situation such that one is true to one's resolve in standing by and remaining steadfast to one's projection of authenticity. The criterion for loyalty is, I suggest, Selbständigkeits which we shall see is one of the fundamental constitutives of the authentic self. Selbständigkeits refers to Dasein's standing by itself and connotates autonomy, self-determination, and self-constancy. This criterion applies only to the authenticity of resolute Dasein for only the individual that has chosen his authentic possibilities and constantly repeats his choice
has achieved the "steadiness" and "steadfastness" of self-constancy by taking its stand for its authenticity. Seizing on a definite possibility and loyally standing by it refers to an activity of commitment, or what has been popularized by Sartre as engagement. This loyal repetition of one's possibilities can be contrasted with the irresoluteness of das Man, which hops from possibility to possibility without ever committing itself to anything (Neugier), and which covers over its irresoluteness with ambiguous idle talk. Thus, Heidegger's suggested way of transforming a dispersed, alienated inauthentic existence is the resolute repetition of authentic possibilities, followed by a struggle for loyalty in which one remains true to one's choice against the pressures and prescriptions of das Man and publicness.

Heidegger's remarks suggest that commitment takes place in the struggle for loyalty, implying the resolute repetition and the struggle for loyalty are conditions of the possibility of commitment. This struggle for loyalty is the struggle against "today" and against falling back into irresoluteness—a struggle against das Man's tranquilizations, temptations, ways of alienation, and against "backsliding" into inauthenticity. Thus, the project of authenticity requires a commitment to one's authentic possibilities to overcome the irresoluteness of non-committed everydayness.

This description of "choosing one's hero" and the "struggle for loyalty" in authentic choice and commitment takes us even further beyond being toward death by bringing us into the historical situation, which we now see is the locus of authenticity. And I suggest that the centrality of Wiederholung for authenticity makes it clear that the
source of the authentic resolve is history, the heritage (and not
death). However, Heidegger stresses that Dasein's repetition of past
possibilities, its choosing its hero from the heritage is not an
antiquarian backtracking that seeks to merely imitate past personages
(mental institutions are after all full of Caesers, Christis, and
Hitlers). The following passage makes it clear that resolute Dasein
does not choose possibilities of the heritage merely for the sake of
a romantic yearning for what has been or to resurrect past heroes:

Arising, as it does, from a resolute projection of oneself,
repetition does not let itself be persuaded of something by
what is 'past', just in order that this, as something
which was formerly actual, may recur. Rather, the repet-
tion retorts (erwidert) to the possibility of that exis-
tence which has—been—there. But when such a retort (Er-
widung) is made to this possibility in a resolution, it
is made in a moment of vision; and as such it is at the
same time a disavowal (Widerruf) of that which in the
'today', is working itself out as the 'past'. Repetition
does not abandon itself to that which is past, nor does
it aim at progress. In the moment of vision authentic
existence is indifferent to both these alternatives (SZ 386).

This passage makes it clear that the appropriation and making one's
own of the tradition takes place for the sake of authentic existence,
and not merely to revitalize or revive what has once been a living
reality. That is, Heidegger is interested in the "use of history for
existence" and not in history as an antiquarian study. Nor is authentic
Dasein explicitly interested in adding to the heritage or contributing
its own creations to the tradition. What is at stake is not progress,
cultivation of the tradition for its own sake, or an aesthetic appreciation
of one's heritage, but rather the issue is one's self-transformation,
one's movement toward authenticity. Thus, there is no deification of
the heritage as such, nor can one simply label Heidegger a romantic escapist
who seeks to evade the brutality and ugliness of modern life through an immersion in the past.

The key concepts that suggest the active dialogue with the past which "repetition" for Heidegger implies are Erwiderung and Widerruf. An Erwiderung is a reply, answer, retort, or rejoinder that suggests a process of intensive questioning of the past, rather than a simple imitation of past possibilities. Widerruf in conjunction with Wiederholung-Erwiderung expresses the twofold nature of the resolute repetition of past possibilities; it is also a disavowal of how they have been traditionally interpreted. That is, authentic repetition is both a taking over and rejecting of the past, for it refers to a creative process of appropriating, evaluating, and criticizing. Thus, one's relation to the heritage is not a simple, unproblematic "taking over" but one must also struggle with the heritage to wrest from it authentic possibilities. This is adumbrated early in SZ on pages 20-1 where Heidegger stresses that Dasein not only falls into the world, but also falls into its historical tradition, which can "take away from one his own leadership, questioning, and choosing" (SZ 21). This suggests that the tradition and heritage are not just uncritically taken over as a substitute for das Man. For:

When tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it 'transmits' is made so inaccessible, at first and for the most part, that it rather becomes concealed... Dasein has had its historicity so thoroughly uprooted by tradition that it..., despite all its historiographical interests and all its zeal for an interpretation which is philologically 'objective', no longer understands the most elementary conditions which would alone enable it to go back to the past in a positive manner and make it productively its own (SZ 21).

I suggest that the "elementary conditions" that "alone make it possible to go back to the past in a positive manner and make it productively
its own" are found in the analysis of taking over one's heritage and in the resolute repetition of authentic possibilities. This discussion should help elucidate Heidegger's own twofold relation to the tradition which he wishes to at the same time "destroy" and "preserve". The same relationship, I believe, is indicated in the Wiederholung that is at once a retrieve and a repetition, and an Erwiderung and Widerruf. Thus Heidegger can with justification claim that his "destruction of the history of ontology" is "positive in its aim" and that "its critique aims" at today" (SZ 22).

The "authentic present" within which one retrieves and appropriates authentic possibilities is called by Heidegger the "moment of vision" (Augenblick). Since the "moment of vision temporalizes itself in a resolution" (SZ 344) it depends on an openness to the past in which one sees authentic possibilities in the heritage that free it from dependence on the conventions of today and ways of being of das Man. The term Augenblick suggests a flash of insight, a sudden understanding, a disclosure that illuminates the situation, such that one can choose authentically. But although the moment of vision takes one out of their immersion in present concern and provides a break or rupture in which a radical disclosure takes place, one must always return to the everyday: "Existence can in the moment of vision master the everyday although of course often only 'for a moment', but it can never extinguish it" (SZ 371). Thus after the moment of vision, the authentic present gives way to the "struggle for loyalty" and repetition of one's resolve.

I now wish to stress the unitary interconnectedness of the structures that make possible authentic historizing and the equiprimordiality of the temporal ecstasies and structures of historicity in the constitution
of authenticity. I stress this point because I believe that we must grasp the importance not only of authentic being toward death, but also of the resolute repetition of authentic possibilities and of one's authentic being toward the past, in order to work out the full structural complexity of Heidegger's concept of authenticity. The analysis of the structure of authentic temporality in _SZ_ #65 and #68 indicates that the three temporal ecstases all play a constitutive role in making possible the unity of authentic temporality. Moreover, since authentic temporality finds its concretion in authentic historicity (_SZ_ 33, 373f.), the structures of authentic temporality and historicity come together and play an equiprimordial role in the constitution of an authentic existence. Failure to see this can result in a collapsing of authenticity into authentic being toward death, and an overlooking the importance of the constitutives of authentic historicity for the constitution of authenticity. Such is the case, for example, in Demske's *Sein, Mensch, und Tod* (op. cit.) where he ignores the importance of the determinants of authentic temporality and historicity in the constitution of authenticity. Demske in common with past interpreters of authenticity fails to note the radicality of Heidegger's questions on _SZ_ 371-3 which put into question the primordiality of the previous analyses of everydayness, temporality, totality, the self, and authenticity, and fails to see that the section on authentic historicity provides the final and I believe most authoritative formulation of Heidegger's concept of authenticity, as well as the most primordial foundation of the Dasein analytic. Hence Demske greatly overemphasizes the role of being toward death and even where he stresses the triadic structure of an authentic
existence (which he articulates as being toward death, taking over guilt, resolve in the situation)\(^1\), he fails to see the importance of the structure of temporality and historicity in the constitution of authenticity, and thus provides a partial, incomplete, and highly misleading account of authenticity that merely lays bare some of the ontological structures of authenticity which find their explication and concretion in the structures of authentic temporality and historicity.

To make clear the difference in my interpretation from previous interpretations of Heidegger's concept of authenticity, I now wish to elucidate the relationship between advancing resoluteness (vorlaufende Entschlossenheit) and authentic historicity in the constitution of authenticity. Previous interpretations have identified authenticity with advancing resoluteness, and have either claimed that authenticity is equivalent to being toward death (a manifestly false claim), or have merely explicated authenticity as a structure in which the constituents of authentic historicity are overlooked. To correct these deficiencies in the interpretation of Heidegger's concept of authenticity, I suggest that advancing resoluteness and authentic historicity are equiprimordial in constituting authenticity, which is, I shall argue, a complex inter-connection of equiprimordial constituents. Hence, in opposition to the common interpretation, I am arguing that advancing resoluteness is a necessary constituent of authenticity, but that it alone is not sufficient

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\(^1\)Demske, Sein, Mensch und Tod, p. 65. To Demske's credit, he sees that authenticity is a triadically articulated complex structure (and is not simply a way of being toward death), but, as I am arguing, he fails to see the essential constitutive importance of the structures of authentic historicity for Heidegger's concept of authenticity.
to provide Heidegger's concept of authenticity. In fact, I believe that neither authentic being toward death alone, nor the resolute repetition of historical possibilities alone provide a full account of authentic existence. My argument is that advancing resoluteness toward death and the resolute repetition of historical possibilities from the heritage are interconnected in one unitary structure and stand in a relation of reciprocal, equiprimordial, constitutive determination. Thus I stress the interconnection of equiprimordial constituent structures of authenticity and the fundamental dynamic tension between advancing toward death and the resolve in the historical situation in the constitution of authenticity.

A brief look at Heidegger's existential ontology and methodology might provide an analogy that will clarify what is meant by claiming that authenticity is a unitary structure composed of equiprimordial, interconnected constituents. Heidegger's ontology aims at disclosing and developing "unitary primordial structures" composed of equiprimordial constituents (cf. SZ 81, 53ff., 130ff., et passim). He stresses that it is important in ontology to conceptualize the constitution of complex phenomena in terms of equiprimordial structures, and not to reduce the phenomena under question to a "primal ground" from which one deduces the more complex, supposedly derivative structures (cf. SZ 131-2). For example, Heidegger begins his existential analytic with an analysis of the unitary structure of Being-in-the-world, and then analyzes its constitutive equiprimordial structures: Being-in, World, and the Self who is the world. Then Heidegger takes the unitary structure of Being-in (SZ 131) and analyzes it in terms of its equiprimordial constitutives (Befindlichkeit, Verstehen, Rede). He then brings together his previous
analyses in an interpretation of "Care as the being of Dasein" (SZ #41), which provides an analysis of a primordial unitary structure of experience within which the constitutive structures already analyzed find their interconnectedness. Care is "not simple in its structure", Heidegger notes, but is "structurally articulated" (SZ 196). The second part of Sein und Zeit is a search for more primordial unitary structures which are the primary constitutives of existence that in Heidegger's language constitute the "being of care". The more primordial structures are disclosed in the analysis of temporality and historicity (cf. SZ 305ff.). A perhaps illuminating analogy for the interpretation of authenticity can be developed from this characterization of Heidegger's methodology and ontology in SZ. For authenticity, like Being-in-the-world, is, I am arguing, also an unitary, primordial structure composed of equiprimordial constituents. We have analyzed the constituent character of anxiety, death, conscience, and resoluteness in the constitution of authenticity, and have shown how Heidegger brings together his previous analyses in the structure of advancing resoluteness which, like care, is not a simple structure, but is structurally articulated. Against previous interpreters I am arguing that authenticity is not identical with advancing resoluteness, but that Heidegger, as in his ontological analysis of care, goes beyond his preliminary formulation and seeks structures that more concretely and adequately characterize the phenomena in question (such a search is announced, I have argued, on SZ 371-3). To equate authenticity with advancing resoluteness is, I believe, equivalent to simply equating the being of Dasein with care, to stop one's investigation halfway through Heidegger's project, and to omit the temporal and/or historical dimensions
from one's analysis. Previous interpreters of authenticity, I believe, have made this mistake, stopping with the analysis of advancing resoluteness and failing to advance and disclose the role of authentic temporality and/or historicity in the constitution of authenticity. To correct this deficiency, one must interpret authenticity as one unitary primordial structure composed of equiprimordial structures, and include the structures of authentic historicity in one's interpretation.

In emphasizing the importance of the constituents of authentic historicity in the constitution of Heidegger's concept of authenticity that have been ignored in previous interpretations, I do not want to overreact and unduly and falsely play down or de-emphasize the importance of being toward death in Heidegger's concept of authenticity. As we have noted in the key section where he argues that one's authentic possibilities are chosen from the heritage, it is clear that one's authentic choice is made "under the eyes of death" and that authentic being toward death is a constitutive moment in the choice of authentic possibilities (SZ 383-4). Similarly, on SZ 385 he argues that: "The authentic repetition of a possibility of existence that has been—the possibility that Dasein may choose its hero—is grounded existentially in advancing resoluteness"—indicating again that authentic being toward death is a constitutive moment of the authentic repetition of the self-chosen authentic possibilities (project). Thus I am not arguing that being toward death loses its importance or disappears in the structure of authentic historicity, but rather that an authentic existence contains both authentic possibilities from the heritage as equiprimordial, constitutive structures of a unitary structure of an authentic existence, and that one can best grasp their relationship in terms of a reciprocal, equiprimordial interconnectedness.
In trying to state more clearly the relationship between the structures of advancing resoluteness and authentic historicity, one encounters a complex and confusing interpretive situation. From the standpoint of (1) the constitution of authenticity, I have argued that advancing resoluteness toward death and authentic historicity are equiprimordial in the constitution of authenticity; that both are necessary conditions of the possibility of authenticity, but that neither alone are sufficient to constitute an authentic existence. Thus in regard to the question of the constitution of authenticity, they stand, I believe, in a relation of reciprocal determination, are of equal importance, have their own autonomy, and are both essential constituents of Heidegger's concept of authenticity.

From the standpoint of (2) analyzing the structure of authenticity it is clear to me that authentic historicity is the most comprehensive all-inclusive structure that encompasses all of the essential constituent structures of authenticity. Authentic historicity includes all the constituents of advancing resoluteness and the structures of the resolute repetition of authentic possibilities from the heritage, the self-chosen fate, the struggle for loyalty, and the other structures of authentic historicity, whereas advancing resoluteness does not contain the structure of authentic historicity, thus it is less inclusive and comprehensive. I have been trying to call attention to the fact that authenticity for Heidegger is a complex, articulated structure that contains the elements of authentic historicity as essential constituent parts throughout this chapter in an effort to correct previous interpretations that have overlooked either the complexity of Heidegger's concept of authenticity or the fundamental role of the structures of authentic historicity.
But it is also clear that there is a certain priority and privileged position of death both in Heidegger's ontology and concept of authenticity that could lead one to conclude that authentic being toward death does after all have a position of ontological priority. Hence from the standpoint of (3) ontological primordiality one could argue that authentic being toward death is the ground of authenticity and its primordial foundation. On Sz 386, after developing the fundamental importance of authentic historicity in the constitution of authenticity, Heidegger notes that (1) "If fate constitutes the primordial historicity of Dasein, then history has its essential importance neither in what is past nor in the 'today' and its 'connection' with what is past, but in that authentic historicizing of existence which arises from Dasein's future"; (2) "As a way of being for Dasein, history has its roots so essentially in the future that death, as that possibility of Dasein which we have already characterized, throws advancing existence back upon its factual thrownness, and so for the first time imparts to having-been its peculiarly privileged position in the historical"; (3) "Authentic being-toward-death—that is to say, the finitude of temporality—is the hidden ground of Dasein's historicity"; (4) "That which we have hitherto been characterizing as 'historicity' to conform with the kind of historicizing which lies in advancing resoluteness, we now designate as Dasein's 'authentic historicity'"; (5) "the phenomena of handing down and repeating, which are rooted in the future...." These claims seem to indicate a priority of the future and of being toward death in that authentic historicity, according to Heidegger, has its roots essentially in the future, so that authentic being toward death is the hidden ground of Dasein's historicity, implying further that authentic historicity and
resolve repetition lie in advancing resoluteness, which would seem to
dow authentic being toward death with an ontological primordiality.
The question of "ontological primordiality", however, contains a series
of ontological puzzles and confusions which Heidegger never resolves.
For example, what does it mean to say that "authentic being toward death
is the hidden ground (der verborgene Grund) of Dasein's historicity"?
What does Heidegger mean by "hidden ground"? What does he mean by "ground"?
I doubt that the book he published after Sein und Zeit called On the Essence
of Ground (Von Wesen des Grundes) provides a clear cut answer, and
certainly in Sein und Zeit it remains an ontological puzzle what Heidegger
probably does not intend a "primal ground" from which derivative structures
can be deduced (he criticizes this ontological practice on SZ 131-2) and
since it is not clear what he does intend, I believe that it is best to
bracket the question of "ontological primordiality". Following Heidegger's
own recommendations on SZ 131-2 on the use of equiprimordial structures, I
believe that it is in the interests of formulating a relatively clear
interpretation of authenticity to approach the problems of authenticity from
the standpoint of its constitution and the analysis of the full structure of
authenticity, in regard to which I have proposed that authenticity is a
unitary structure consisting of equiprimordial constituents. The following
diagram summarizes the interconnectedness of the complex and full
constituents of Heidegger's concept of authenticity:

1 The "answer" to the question of ontological primordiality lies,
I believe, somewhere in an obscure series of ontological puzzles which
Heidegger never clearly resolves and in fact abandons after his so-called
Kehre. A discussion of the ontological issues involved here and of the role
death in Heidegger's ontological problematic in SZ and his later writings
goes far beyond the framework of this study and probably beyond the framework
of Western philosophy! Demske makes an effort to confront the problem of
the role of death in Heidegger's philosophy in his Sein, Mensch, und
Tod (op. cit.).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(A) Ontological Care-Structure</th>
<th>(B) Temporal Structure</th>
<th>(C) Authentic way of being</th>
<th>(D) Ontological-temporal Structure of Authenticity</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>(2)</strong> Seins-bei being-alongside (the world) Befindlichkeit - Mood</td>
<td>Present: Begemlassen</td>
<td>Augenblick Moment of Vision</td>
<td>Constitution of Situation</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>(3)</strong> Schon-Sein-in being-already-in (the world) Thrownness - Falling</td>
<td>Past: Auf-sich-zurückkommen</td>
<td>Wiederholung Repetition</td>
<td>Taking over Thrownness, Nullity and Guilt</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>(E)</strong> Historicity Dimension of Structure of Authenticity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Projecting Authentic possibilities chosen from the heritage</td>
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<tr>
<td>Struggle for loyalty: Selbständigkeit Fate-Destiny</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taking over heritage retrieve-repetition of authentic possibilities</td>
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This diagram illustrates, first, the ontological care-structure (A) and temporal structure (B) of Dasein. These structures are on Heidegger's account the human being-in-time that is constitutive for human being. At point C one confronts a choice in regard to A and B. In regard, for example, to (1) one's future being ahead of oneself, one can advance (vorlaufen) in this possibility consciously and creatively, aware of one's being toward death and taking account of and constituting one's own finite future, or one can await (Gewärtigen) one's future, putting oneself at the disposal of das Man, waiting to see what happens, without actively intervening. (SZ 336-7). Regarding one's present being-alongside the world (2), one can merely "make present" (Gegenwärtigen) one's being-in, passively going along with whatever is imposed upon one, without critically or creatively scrutinizing one's environment and possibilities. Or one can in a moment of vision see authentic possibilities and resolve to overcome one's passive, inauthentic ways of being (SZ 337-8). Thirdly, one can forget one's past, failing to reflect on where one has been, what one has done, what has made one the person he is; or one can repeat authentic possibilities, disavowing what one discerns as inauthentic (SZ 338-9). Authenticity further involves, as we see in structure D on the diagram, (1) a resolute advancing toward death so that one's authentic choices and advancing into the future are made with clear insight into one's finitude; (2) the resolute choice of finite possibilities enables one to constitute his situation, an activity that also requires (3) taking over one's thrownness into one's unique existential situation and the guilt which Heidegger claims is an inevitable consequence of human finitude. But Heidegger's concept of authenticity is not fully
described without an analysis of structure E on the diagram which shows that (1) one's authentic possibilities are chosen from the heritage; (2) that one's authentic self, fate, and destiny are constituted in a struggle for loyalty in one's historical situation involving a standing by one's choice of authenticity and one's authentic project, which is (3) a retrieve-repetition of authentic possibilities from the heritage. These authentic ways of being toward one's past, present, and future constitute the structures of authenticity which have been the subject matter of this chapter. All the structures of authenticity indicated are articulations of one unitary structure which Heidegger progressively develops in the course of his analysis, shading in and filling out the concept of authenticity, encircling the phenomenon with ever more determinations—as he likewise develops and articulates the structure of being-in-the-world and all the other phenomena which are the subject matter of his analytic of human existence.

In this chapter I have argued that an examination of the full, complex structure of authenticity indicates that past interpretations are deficient in that they overlook the importance of authentic historicity, and failed to see that the final and most penetrating formulation of authenticity takes place in the sections on historicity. Thus against the standard interpretation I wish to argue that not authentic being toward death above, but the interconnected structures of advancing resoluteness and authentic historicity are the fundamental constituents of authenticity; that the summit and culmination of §7 and the concept of authenticity is not section §62 on advancing resoluteness, but rather the analysis of authentic historicity; and shall argue in a later section that not death but historical possibilities are the "highest
court of authority" for authentic existence. Therefore I maintain that Heidegger does not have a death ethic, a theodicy of death, or a nihilism.

In this section we have seen that the project of authenticity requires an authentic resolve chosen from the heritage such that the individual can take action in the situation and can thus carry out the modification of the das Man self that I call the authenticity of self-transformation. Let us now see how the constituents of authentic historicity explicated in this section describes the project of constituting an authentic self.

2. The Authentic Self

The first criterion of authentic selfhood for Heidegger, already noted in the discussion of the struggle for loyalty, is Selbständigkei. In terms of the authenticity of care the constancy of the self (Selbständigkei), as the supposed persistence of the subjectum, gets clarified. But the phenomenon of this authentic potentiality-for-being also opens ours eyes for the constancy of the self in the sense of its having achieved some sort of position. The constancy of the self, in the double sense of steadiness and steadfastness, is the authentic counter-possibility to the non-self-constancy which is characteristic of irresolute falling (SZ 322)¹

The second criterion that Heidegger uses to explicate authentic selfhood is individuation (individuality). He writes:

Dasein is authentically itself in the primordial individuation of the reticent resoluteness which exacts anxiety of itself. As something that keeps silent authentic being-one's-self is just the sort of

¹Heidegger's German reveals the connection between the many occurrences of the root stand and authentic selfhood: "...Aus ihr erhält die Ständigkeit des Selbst als vermeintliche Beharrlichkeit des Subjectum seine Aufklärung. Das Phänomen des eigentlichen
thing that does not keep on saying 'I! I!' but in its reticence it 'is' that thrown entity as which it can authentically be. The self which the reticence of resolute existence unveils is the primordial phenomenal basis for the question of the being of the 'I' (SZ 323).

The problem we face in this section is to discern what constitutes Dasein's Selbständigkeits and individuality. Those interpreters who explicate authenticity as a way of being toward death would argue that one's individuality is constituted by choosing one's death as one's own, inalienable, individualizing possibility, and that Selbständigkeit is a constant repetition of the choice of being toward death. Against this interpretation I shall argue that individuality and Selbständigkeit are achieved through the repetition of the authentic resolve and not merely through being toward death, and that the section on the historicity of the authentic self, which we shall next examine, offers a concept of the authentic selfhood which can account for the unity and totality of the self in terms of authentic historicity. Thus, I suggest that Heidegger does not intend to interpret Selbständigkeit and individuation solely as a function of being toward death, and to make this convincing I shall indicate an alternative interpretation that interconnects the authentic self with the authenticity of self-transformation.

Seinkönens Öffnet aber auch den Blick für die Ständigkeit des Selbst in dem Sinn des Standgewonnenhaben. Die Ständigkeit des Selbst im Doppelsinne der beständigen Standfestigkeit ist die eigentliche Gegenmöglichkeit zur Unselbst-ständigkeit des unentschlossenen Verfallens" (SZ 322). The term Selbständigkeits thus builds on the base of the word stand with its root meaning of standing and suggests a standing by one's authentic resolve. Heidegger uses the root stand with its root meaning of standing and suggests a standing by one's authentic resolve. Heidegger uses the root stand in various combinations to stress the self-constancy of authentic selfhood that takes its stand in das Man and remains steadfast and loyal to its resolve for authenticity.

1The most explicit development of this argument is found in Adorno's Jargon der Eigentlichkeit (op. cit.).
a. Historicity and the Authentic Self

On SZ 332 Heidegger writes:

The ontological structure of the entity, that in each case I myself am, centers in the self-constancy (Selbständigheit) of existence. Because the self can be conceived neither as a substance nor as a subject, but is grounded in existence, the analysis of the inauthentic self, das Man, has remained wholly in the context of the preparatory interpretation of Dasein. But now, after selfhood has been explicitly taken back into the structure of care and temporality, the temporal interpretation of Selbst-ständigkei and Unselbst-ständigkei takes on its own importance. It requires a separate, thematic carrying through. This interpretation, however, not only first gives the right kind of insurance against the paralogisms and the ontologically inappropriate questions about the being of the I in general, but it provides at the same time in accordance with its central function a primordial insight into the temporalizing structure of temporality. This reveals itself as the historicity of Dasein.

This passage indicates that the temporal interpretation of the authentic self requires a working out of its temporalization structure, which "reveals itself as the historicity of Dasein". Again we see (and stress!) the importance of the historicity analysis for Heidegger's hermeneutic. I suggest that in his discussion of the interconnection of historicity, selfhood, and authenticity we encounter Heidegger's final (in SZ) and most penetrating account of authentic selfhood.

In this section we shall examine Heidegger's claim that authentic and inauthentic selfhood are based upon possible ways of historizing. We shall see that time and history are fundamental keys to the being of the self which is not to be conceived of as a subject that is in time and history, but is instead for Heidegger a way of being-in-the-world that is temporal and historical. For time and history are not in
Heidegger's interpretation a container or framework in which entities are there-inside, nor are they forces that impinge upon the self from outside, but are rather constituents of Dasein's being-in-the-world, ways in which Dasein exists, dimensions of its projections and disclosure. This intimate relationship between human being, time, and history is one of the striking features of Heidegger's thought, and one of the keys to interpreting his concept of the authentic self.

The problem of the self arises in connection with the question of the "connectedness of life" (SZ 373). What is at stake is the kind of "stretching along, movement, and persistance which are specific for Dasein" (SZ 374). This movement in which "Dasein stretches itself along and is stretched along" (erstreckten Sicherstreckens) is Dasein's historizing (Geschehen, SZ 375), which, as we have seen, provided the concretion of everydayness, and the locus of Dasein's totality and authenticity. We shall now ask how it is that Dasein maintains itself as one and the same Dasein in the course of its moving through life. Although this seems to be but a restatement of Hume's problem of how one's discrete experiences are to be unified in a person who maintains a constant and self-same identity, we shall see that far from being an epistemological dilemma, the problem of the self becomes for Heidegger an existential problem of identity that is central to the conception of an authentic existence.

Heidegger first criticizes approaches to the problem of the "connectedness of the self" that presuppose a "stream of experience" in which one experience supposedly succeeds the other in a temporal sequence. He argues that this approach is founded upon an inadequate concept of
experience that renders the question of the connectedness of the "moments" of experience an unsolvable epistemological dilemma. For this problematic must explain how a discrete sequence of experience can be organized into the unity of one self-same entity. But how is this "self-sameness" to be defined and what is its relationship to the changing experiences? If we take experience to be a bundle of nows that must be tied together, are we not basing our efforts on an ontology of the present-at-hand that reifies Dasein's being into a thinglike subject, thus covering over and distorting the phenomenon of the human self? But if we reject the notion that Dasein's being consists of a sequence of experiences how are we to formulate the problem of its "connectedness"?

To avoid these difficulties, Heidegger rejects traditional approaches to the problem of the identity and connectedness of the self, and instead uses the phenomenon of Selbst-ständigkeit in the context of authentic historicity to account for these traditional features of selfhood. His strategy fits ingeniously into his concept of authenticity so that an authentic self can be defined as one that maintains its identity, connectedness, and individuality, throughout the course of its experience, whereas an inauthentic self lacks these characteristics and loses its potentiality-to-be-a-self by dispersing itself in inauthentic ways of being. The task of formulating and working out a concept of authentic selfhood in the context of authentic historizing should provide a final contrast between authenticity and inauthenticity. Once again I shall begin with inauthenticity and shall show how most people "historize" themselves so as to forfeit the possibility of having an authentic self.
I shall exhibit the conditions (and criteria) of the possibility of having an authentic self, and shall show how inauthentic Dasein does not in this analysis qualify for authentic selfhood, for its ways of being lack the essential characteristics of selfhood. Then I shall show how having an authentic self is bound up with the resolute repetition of authentic possibilities and the struggle for loyalty described in the last section.

Inauthentic Dasein absorbed in the dealing of concern and dispersed in the ways to be of das Man is "driven about by its affairs" (SZ 390). The fall into das Man was the starting point of our search for authenticity, and we later saw that irresolute Dasein falls into the "general situation" and fails to choose and constitute its own situation (SZ 299-300). And now we discover that everyday Dasein also falls into world-history and dissolves its own historizing in the "state of affairs of the world". In this way everyday Dasein loses the possibility of creating its own identity and individuality by becoming dispersed in the affairs and events of the everyday world, much as it has lost its possibility of authenticity through its absorption-dispersion into the ways to be of das Man.

Thus irresolute Dasein falls into world-history as it falls into das Man, and therefore doubly falls away from authenticity. If Dasein wishes to retrieve itself from its fall into inauthenticity and if it wishes to attain authentic self-being, it must extricate itself from its dispersed absorption in worldly affairs and choose authenticity as its way of being. As Heidegger puts it, "If it wants to come to itself, it must first pull itself together from the dispersion and disconnectedness
of the very things that have 'come to pass'' (SZ 390). The source of
everyday Dasein's disconnected, dispersed, fragmented absorption in
multifarious happenings is, Heidegger claims, irresoluteness. This
irresoluteness manifests itself as a non-constancy of the self (Un-
selbständigkeit des Selbst), a failure to stand by oneself, a tendency
to lose oneself in distractions and diversions, novelties and fads, games
people play and social masks (personae). Irresolute Dasein has no
real identity because it is always hopping from happening to happening
(Neugier), veiling its concern in a cloak of ambiguity, and concealing
its possibility of authenticity by a constant engagement in gossip,
dissimilarity, and frantic escape and evasion. This lack of
stable identity makes possible what we currently speak of as an
"identity crisis".

This state of inauthentic historizing is also, Heidegger claims,
the source of the misconceived pseudo-problem of the "connectedness
of the self". Heidegger claims that this question can only arise because
everyday Dasein is disconnected and dispersed in das Man. In regard
to the problem of identity, the more revealing question is not, Heidegger
calls, --"how can the discrete experiences of the self be connected
within the unity of one self-same, identical self"--but rather: "in
which of its own kinds of being can Dasein lose itself in such a manner
that it must, as it were, only subsequently pull itself back together
is embraced" (SZ 390). The answer is, Heidegger suggests, that Dasein
can be dispersed and fragmented only if it has fallen into das Man and
world affairs and then faces the problem of seeking and finding unity
and identity out of its dispersion. And the solution to one's "identity
"crisis" is not pulling together one's dispersion into a unity held together by willing or thinking oneself into an identity that one has subjectively fabricated. Rather, "the self's resoluteness against the inconstancy of distraction is in itself a steadiness which has been stretched along (erstrekte Stabilität)" (SZ 390). It is resoluteness and the constant loyalty to one's authentic resolve that constitutes one's authentic self, thus providing one with a unique identity and self-constancy.

Thus we see that Dasein's authentic selfhood is a function of the choice and resolute repetition of the project of authenticity. One who is engaged in the process of self-transformation strives to extricate himself from the dispersed irresoluteness of everydayness and chooses those authentic possibilities with which it can create its authentic self. By handing down to itself those possibilities it has inherited from its tradition the resolute individual repeats the monumental possibilities of human existence, thus constituting its authentic historicity as a steadiness that resolutely stretches itself along by being constantly loyal to its choice. In the fateful repetition of authentic historicity, resolute Dasein projects its death and takes over itsthrownness. Thus, by projecting itself into its future and retrieving its past, Dasein's birth and death, past and future, are caught up into its existence so that "Dasein is indeed in a moment of vision for what is world historical in its current situation" (SZ 391). Therefore, Heidegger concludes that the whole of existence is "caught up" and "stretched along" in authentic historicity "in a way which is primordial and not lost and which has no need of connectedness" (SZ 390). Thus, it is authentic historizing that constitutes the authentic self and
therewith its identity, self-constancy, totality and unity. In this analysis, since only the authentic self has the features of selfhood traditionally attributed to self-being, thus only authentic Dasein can be said to possess a self. Therefore, only the authentic self can provide us with the "primordial phenomenon of selfhood". This seems to be Heidegger's argument.

We can now see why Heidegger claims that only authentic Dasein can have an identity, for Heidegger interprets identity in terms of the authentic resolve and one's resolute repetition of authentic possibilities. We should also be clear that "identity" in this analysis is quite different from the epistemological identity sought by Hume's fragmented atomism, and the self-identical sameness sought by the Idealists in a Transcendental I. The unity of the self is conceived in terms of the structure of authentic temporality, which holds together the past, future, and present in the ecstatical unity of the "moment of vision". This structure contains the totality of Dasein's being, for authentic historicity in its resolutely stretching itself along holds together the past, present.

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1"Die Entschlossenheit des Selbst gegen die Unständigkeit der Zerstreuung ist in sich selbst die erstreckte Stätigkeit, in der das Daseins als Schicksal Geburt und Tod und ihr 'Zwischen' in seine Existenz 'einbezogen' hält, so zwar, dass es in solcher Ständigkeit augenblicklich ist für das Welt-Geschichtliche seiner jeweiligen Situation. In der schicksalhaften Wiederholung gewesener Möglichkeiten bringt sich das Dasein zu dem vor ihm schon Gewesenen 'unmittelbar', das heisst zeitlich ekstatisch zurück. Mit diesem Sichüberliefern des Erbes aber ist dann die 'Geburt' im Zurückkommen aus der unüberholbaren Möglichkeit des Todes in die Existenz eingeholt, damit diese freilich nur die Geworfenheit des eigenen Da illusionsfreier hinnehme" (SZ 390-1).

I wish to note that in this exposition I intend to merely present Heidegger's interpretation of these features of selfhood without raising theoretical difficulties or criticizing insufficiencies. One might want to evoke Sartre's general remark about Heidegger's "barbaric" practice of "cutting through Gordian Knot's rather than trying to unite them" (Being and Nothingness, op. cit. p. 300).
future, and the heritage, project, and situation. Inauthentic historicity, on the other hand, has forgotten its past, evades its future, and solely concentrates on the making present of today. Thus the temporality of inauthentic historicity is flat, fragmented, one-dimensional. Inauthentic historizing (and thus inauthenticity) is then founded in an inauthentic mode of temporalizing. Lost in the making present of today, inauthentic Dasein ignores the future and views the past as a dead storehouse of "old" relics. Dispersed in its current concern, one-dimensional Dasein cannot resolve on any definite possibility for it is always hopping from one affair to another.

In awaiting the next new thing, it has already forgotten the old one. Das Man evades choice. Blind for possibilities it cannot repeat what has been, but only retains and receives the 'actual' that is left over, the world-historical that has been, the leavings, and the information about them that is present-at-hand (SZ 391).

By seeking the modern, evading choice and commitment, fleeing from death and authentic possibilities, forgetting about its heritage and the possibilities that have been, and by falling away from itself and its authenticity—iresolute, inauthentic Dasein loses itself in the concern of the moment, and is closed off from its past and future, from its authentic historicity as the projective, repetitive moment of vision deprives the 'today' of its character as present (Entgegenwürdigung des Heute) and means one away from the conventionalities of das Man" (SZ 391). Thus it is the extrication from das Man and the choice-project of authenticity that makes possible authentic selfhood. Let us now more closely examine several characteristics of authentic selfhood.
b. **Self-being: Autonomy, Self-knowledge, and Self-determination**

In the course of this chapter we should have become increas-
singly aware of the intimate connection between selfhood and auth-
enticity, and should be clearer about how Heidegger can maintain
that only authentic Dasein can be said to have a self. His argument
would be something like this: Identity, unity, individuality,
substantiality, and personality have traditionally been taken as
criteria of selfhood. These accounts, although based upon in-
adequate and dubious ontological presuppositions and despite an
unclarified ontological horizon, have a certain validity that must
be secured and elucidated. An examination of everyday Dasein discloses
that most people cannot be said to possess identity, unity,
individuality, and the other characteristics of selfhood, for they are
dispersed into many disconnected roles and absorbed in fragmented
activities, thus exhibiting no continuity, constancy, or steadfastness.
However, an examination of the characteristics of an authentic existence
discloses that a resolute individual possesses the features traditionally
accepted as criteria of selfhood, hence we can say that the term "self"
describes a way of being in the world achieved by the project authenticity
and does not "stand for" any ghostlike unobservable entity or psychological
construction.

In this concluding section I wish to extract notions of the
authentic self's autonomy, self-knowledge, and self-determination from
Heidegger's analyses, and shall give a final interpretation to Heidegger's
notion of the authentic self and its interconnectedness with the
authenticity of self-transformation.
We have noted that Selbständigkeit can be taken as the criterion of authentic selfhood. This term suggests an autonomy of the authentic self which I wish to elucidate. Macquarrie and Robinson write in a footnote on page 369 of Being and Time: "In the following sentence the noun Selbständigkeit which ordinarily stands for autonomy, independence or self-subsistence, is similarly expanded to 'Selbst-ständigkeit' ---'Self-constancy'". Again we note the richness of Heidegger's language whose coinages build both on ordinary usage and add new senses and contextual associations. And the addition of the concept of autonomy to Heidegger's conception of the authentic self is an important contribution that provides a new analysis of an extremely important presupposition of many traditional and current ethical theories. I shall now proceed to briefly work out a concept of autonomy from Heidegger's analysis of the authentic self.

Autonomy generally signifies a capacity to make one's own choice, to be one's own legislator. Hence it has an interesting linguistic connection with eigentlich which suggests the ownness of choice, the selfhood (auto) of decision, and a first person singular evaluative act of resolution. For Heidegger, "autonomy" presupposes the individual's freedom of choice and evaluation: freedom from the coercion and domination of das Man, and freedom to create my own way of being-in-the-world. 1

1 Actually Heidegger does not work out a conception of freedom and seems to presuppose "causal indeterminacy" for he limits his focus to the autonomous freedom to extricate oneself from das Man, and to choose possibilities and projects that constitute one's authentic self-being. In Von Wesen des Grundes, pp. 101-2, Heidegger makes the startling claim that autonomy (here described as the "freedom of transcendence") is the ground of all freedom, implying that causal indeterminacy, "spontaneity", "libertas indifferentiae", and so on are founded in a "primordial freedom", thus reversing the generally accepted account that would take causal indeterminacy as a presupposition for autonomy (cf. Olafson's Persons and Principles)
Autonomy in this context signifies the recognition that I am my own legislator, the awareness that all choices are my own, and that my projects and resolves originate in my own choices and decisions—which further suggests (although Heidegger does not spell this out) that I assume responsibility for my acts and commitments. Throughout SZ there is a contrast between authentic Dasein as the initiator of choice, and inauthentic Dasein who blindly follows das Man or irresolutely hops from one concern to another without "really" having decided on or chosen anything (cf. SZ 127, 288). For Heidegger "responsibility" is not an answerability to others, or an accountability for one's actions to others, nor does it refer to taking over responsibility in certain situations (as a father, employee, and good citizen does by virtue of their roles, contractual relations, or situational functions). Rather, responsibility is a structure of authenticity delineating a way of being, a being-responsible. This notion has to do with responsibility for who you are, rather than what "one" does in certain situations, and thus indicates a self-responsibility: an answerability to one's ownmost self for one's way of being. The presuppositions for this analysis are self-choice, a choosing to be a self, which we now see includes a taking over responsibility for one's self-being. This includes further a choice of self-determination, a taking over responsibility for being one's own legislator—

op. cit. p. 145–62 for a clear statement of this analysis of freedom that Heidegger reverses). We may also note that in Heidegger's later writings freedom becomes a concept of increasing importance which Heidegger ties together with transcendence, Seinlassen, truth, language, originateive thinking and poetic creation. For an often stimulating account of Heidegger's concept of freedom cf. Reuben Guilead's Etre et Liberte (op. cit.).

In fact, there is no mention or indication of a responsibility to others in Heidegger's account. Whether there is absolutely no basis for such a notion in Heidegger's ontology, and whether the lack of a concept of social responsibility, answerability to others, is a grave deficiency in Heidegger's "authenticity" remains an open question.
thus the connection with the autonomy of the authentic self. Further, this being-responsible requires resolute repetition, for if one does not repeat the choice of authenticity, one will backslide into irresponsibility.

Finally, autonomy refers to an act (or feat) of having resolved upon self-determination. For since we are elucidating autonomy in terms of Selbständigkeit, clearly "autonomy" does not refer only to a disposition or capacity, but also to an achievement of resolved Dasein, an actual way of acting, or mode of being. But this interpretive use of self-determination should not be construed on a Kantian model of pure reason struggling to control and determine empirical inclination. In Heidegger the struggle is between the individual and society, and what is at stake is choosing one's own possibilities and "determining" one's own ways of being. Secondly, for Kant self-determination refers to pure reason as a moral legislator that creates its own laws which are aimed at determining the whole of human life. In the formulation of these laws, pure reason must "abstract" from all personal desire, inclination and self-interest and act as a rational being as such (i.e. in a purely objective, impersonal, universalizable manner). But self-determination in the sense I am using it to explicate the autonomy of Selbständigkeit, refers to a unique individualizing act of the authentic self that helps determine the individual qua individual. Reversing Kant, an autonomous act of self-determination on the Heideggerian analysis "abstracts" from the das Man self and is thus a personal individuating act of the authentic self. Thus whereas Kant seems to explicate responsibility in terms of rationality, Heidegger makes responsibility a function of the individualizing activity of the authentic self.
For Heidegger man is a maker of himself. Heidegger's analysis here can be contrasted with Sartre's doctrine that "man is what he makes himself to be". For whereas Sartre argues that man's continuous making of himself is a resultant of spontaneous self-creation, Heidegger claims that man's creation of an authentic self is a state that is only attained by a project of self-being, implying that most men do not make themselves but are "made" by das Man (i.e. their social-historical environment). The notion that authenticity consists in a project of self-transformation explicates a characteristic of Heidegger's concept of project (Entwurf). The primary function of understanding is, in Heidegger's account, to project possibilities. But Entwurf does not merely signify throwing oneself into something (as Sartre's project), but rather signifies designing, sketching, and planning, for the German Entwurf literally means "design, plan, project, scheme, blueprint". These connotations suggest that the primary function of human understanding is to sketch and project possibilities, to choose projects which weighs alternatives, conceives what is possible, decides how one can best carry out one's resolves and so forth. Thus the clear connection with autonomy which presupposes an ability to conceive and choose between alternative possibilities and the capacity for creative choice. What is made by virtue of the authenticity of self-transformation which projects authenticity is the authentic self. The self is the creation of resolute Dasein who chooses extrication and individuation, and who resolutely projects authenticity. The self is an achievement that stands by its resolves and remains loyal to its choices. The self is not an entity, a thing, a psychological construct, but a way of being-in-the-world characterized by resoluteness, identity, constancy
and steadfastness (Selbständigkeit), loyalty and commitment, responsibility, and autonomy. All these characteristics of selfhood are structures of authenticity and refer to a way of being-in-the-world attained by the resoluteness of self-transformation.

The concluding point I wish to stress is the intricate, detailed, and complicated nature of the fully-articulated structure of the authentic self. In this concluding summary I wish to single out three "dimensions" or characteristics of the authentic self which should make clear the rich and varied nature of Heidegger's analysis of the self, which I believe resists the facile and often simplistic conceptualizations which have been imposed upon it by many Heidegger interpreters. My proposal is that, like authenticity, the authentic self should be interpreted as a complex, articulated structure which encompasses many of the fundamental structures of being human.

First, I stress the characteristic of self-transparency or disclosedness alluded to in the section on resoluteness. This emphasis militates against a purely voluntaristic concept of selfhood as a will to power that resolves arbitrarily or irrationally on whatever it pleases. For the emphasis on self-transparency indicates that insight and understanding precedes action; before the self can act authentically its being-in-the-world must be disclosed and transparent; i.e. it must understand its situation and be open to the full range of its possibles if it is to choose in a "moment of vision" that is fully open and aware of what is possible and appropriate. This structure also throws light on Heidegger's brief reference to the problem of self-knowledge. On SZ 146 in a discussion of various kinds of "sight", Heidegger writes:
The sight which is related primarily and on the whole to existence we call 'transparency' (Durchsichtigkeit). We choose this term to designate 'knowledge of the self' in a sense which is well understood, so as to indicate that here it is not a matter of perceptually tracking down and inspecting a point called the 'self', but rather one of seizing upon the full disclosedness of being-in-the-world throughout all the constitutive items which are essential to it, and doing so with understanding (SZ 146).

This passage suggests that "self-knowledge" is a process of making transparent "the full disclosedness of being-in-the-world" throughout all its essential constitutive moments—or, in other words, making transparent the structure of care, temporality, and one's threefold relatedness to the self, other, and world. The key term is Durchsichtigkeit which indicates a seeing through, thus connotating an activity of insight. Thus self-knowledge on Heidegger's account seems to indicate a gaining insight into one's being-in-the-world. Seeing through distortions, illusions, concealments and evasions and gaining insight are thus a prerequisite for achieving authenticity and constituting an authentic self.

Secondly, the authentic self is self-determined. It is defined on SZ 129 as a "self that has been taken hold of in its own way (eigens ergriffen)". Heidegger uses the term "ergeifen" (to seize upon, take hold of) to describe a process of taking over and grasping hold of one's possibilities (SZ 20, 38, 86, 144, 153); one's own Dasein (SZ 122, 188); the disclosedness of being-in-the-world (SZ 146); being with others (SZ 162); everydayness (SZ 179), being-guilty (SZ 291), finitude (SZ 384); the problem of existence (SZ 235); and one's Worumwillen (SZ 193). This list serves to indicate that the term ergriffen indicates a process of self-determination that extends throughout the totality of being-in-the-world. Thus, the authentic self should not be taken in a purely
intellectualistic idealist way as a "pure disclosure", for *ergreifen* indicates acting, a process of seizing hold of one's existence in the act of self-transformation.

Thirdly, the authentic self is characterized by a self-constancy and steadfastness. Such concepts as repetition and loyalty indicates that the self stands by its choices, defining itself in terms of self-chosen possibilities, which it takes over as its own. Identity and individuality on Heidegger's account are not merely matters of acting in eccentric or peculiar ways, for one constitutes his self by "choosing one's hero" from the monumental possibilities of the heritage. In this way the authentic self has self-respect and is self-reliant.
3. Concluding Remarks: Authenticity and Possibility

Authentic possibilities are what is at stake in Heidegger's concept of authenticity. They exist in the historical heritage and are to be taken over and made one's own by an act of resolute repetition which aims at self-transformation. We shall now inquire into what kind of possibilities might be considered authentic for Heidegger and will provide an explication of the concept "authentic" as we make some final remarks and raise some final questions about Heidegger's concept of authenticity.

The possibilities to be resolved upon in the project of authenticity are the historical possibilities of one's heritage that are to be retrieved and repeated. In this notion of the use of history for life, Heidegger is in agreement with Nietzsche, whose essay "On the use and abuse of history for life" is cited with approval.¹

Assimilating Nietzsche's analysis to his own, he claims that Nietzsche's

¹ Heidegger's analysis of the concept of history in SZ #76 is only comprehensible in terms of his analysis of authenticity, and would appear rather strange outside of the context of his disclosure of authenticity. He claims that the act of historical research discloses "the Dasein that has-been-there (dagegenesen) as a repetition of an authentic possibility which has been" (SZ 394). This implies that not "facts" but possibilities are the authentic object of historical research! Indeed, Heidegger claims that "factuality" is constituted by the projection of possibilities upon a chosen potentiality-for-being, hence "that which authentically has-been-there 'factually' is the existentiell possibility in which fate, destiny, and world-history have been factically determined" (SZ 394). Thus, for Heidegger, the task of historiology is not to record dead facts but to disclose the "quiet force of the possible" (SZ 394). Writing history is thus for Heidegger disclosing possibilities that have been, and since history is the locus of authentic possibilities that can be retrieved and repeated. The historian makes manifest the possibilities inherent in one's heritage, and if he wishes to meet Heidegger's standards of authentic historiology, he must conceive his task as the disclosure of concrete possibilities for existing, embodied in the past of the Dasein "that has been there": "Only by historicity which is factual and authentic can the history of what has-been-there, as a resolute fate, be disclosed in such a manner that in repetition the 'force' of the possible gets struck home into one's factual existence" (SZ 395).
three kinds of historiology are rooted in the unity of the three-fold structure of temporality, which is the foundation for authentic historicity. Bringing Nietzsche's division of history into the monumental, the antiquarian, and the critical into Heidegger's analysis helps elucidate the relation between authenticity and history.

As historical, Dasein is possible only on the ground of its temporality. Temporality temporalizes itself in the ecstatico-horizontal unity of its raptures. Dasein exists authentically as futural in resolutely disclosing a chosen possibility. Coming back resolutely to itself, it is, by repetition, open for the 'monumental' possibilities of human existence. The historiology which arises from such historicity is 'monumental'. Dasein is as having-been delivered over to its thrownness. In the repetitive appropriation of possibilities there is adumbrated at the same time the possibility of reverently preserving the existence that has been there, in which the possibility seized upon has become manifest. Thus authentic historiology, as monumental, is 'antiquarian' too. Dasein temporalizes itself in the way the future and having been are united in the present. The present discloses the 'today' authentically, and of course as the moment of vision. But in so far as this 'today' has been interpreted in terms of future repetitive understanding of a possibility of existence which has been seized upon, authentic historiology becomes a way in which the 'today' gets deprived of its character as present; in other words, it becomes a way of painfully detaching oneself from the falling publicness of the 'today'. As authentic, the historiology which is both monumental and antiquarian is necessarily a critique of the 'present'. Authentic historicity is the foundation for the possible unity of these three ways of historiology. But the ground on which authentic historiology is founded is temporality as the existential meaning of the being of care (SZ 396-7).

The resolute choice of the monumental possibilities of human existence, the reverent preserving of the possibilities of the heritage, the struggle for loyalty, the painful detaching oneself from das Man, and the critique of the present have shown themselves to be main constituents of the resolute repetition that we have seen to be decisive in the project of authenticity. An authentic existence is founded upon authentic historicity (fateful repetition) which in turn is made
possible by the three-fold unity of temporality exemplified in advancing, repetition, and the moment of vision. It is thus authentic temporality and historicity in its unity that constitutes authenticity, and not merely the projection of death. Furthermore, it is the resoluteness that extricates one's self from das Man, resolves on the project of authenticity, and chooses authentic possibilities from the heritage that is the center and core of an authentic existence. The crucial point I have been trying to establish is that the locus of Dasein's authentic possibilities is history, and not its ontological structure. This insight takes us beyond authentic being toward death as the fundamental structure of authenticity, and provides us with a "higher court of authority" than our own death. This point is made clear by Heidegger in a passage overlooked by the adherents of the standard interpretation:

Resoluteness constitutes the loyalty of existence to its own self. As resoluteness which is ready for anxiety, this loyalty is at the same time a possible way of revering the sole authority which a free existing can have—of revering the repeatable possibilities of existence (SZ 391).

This passage indicates that the "sole authority a free existing can have" are the "repeatable possibilities of existence"—these are perhaps what Nietzsche calls the "monumental possibilities of human existence" found in the heritage from which one "chooses his hero". I take this passage as decisive testimony that authentic possibilities from the heritage and not death are the "highest court of authority" for human existence. Therefore, against Löwith and other interpreters, I believe that Heidegger answers affirmatively the rhetorical question posed on SZ 313: "Has Dasein a higher court of authority than its own death?".
A clue as to what might qualify for Heidegger as "monumental" and "repeatable" authentic possibilities is found in a passage on SZ 400 where Heidegger, quoting Count Yorck,¹ calls attention to "those great realities of Homer, Plato, and the New Testament which 'put to shame everything that is superficial' in the modern world". Is Heidegger suggesting here that philosophy, poetry, and religion offer one authentic possibilities? It is the case that those are the possibilities which Heidegger himself has chosen as his authentic possibilities. But Heidegger explicitly states that the delimitation and working out of specific authentic possibilities goes beyond the scope of his ontological inquiry, and is the task of a philosophical anthropology (SZ 301). Heidegger therefore leaves open the question of what possibilities the individual should resolve upon. This dictum is in line with his conception of ontological inquiry and his avoidance of "prescriptivism": "The existential interpretation will never seek to take over any authoritarian pronouncement as to those things which, from an existentiell point of view are possible and binding" (SZ 312; cf. also SZ 156, 280, 301, 383). Earlier I noted that authentic being with others was what Heidegger called "leaping forth and liberating", and suggested that this described what he was doing in SZ in regard to his disclosure of

¹ The remarkable section in SZ where Heidegger profusely quotes from an interchange of letters between Dilthey and Count Yorck (SZ 397–404) indicates a striking tribute to these thinkers, both in explicit approval of their ideas (SZ 377, 397), and in the fact that Heidegger included a sampling of quotations from these thinkers in his own master opus. I suggest that the passages quoting Count Yorck's ideas offer an important clue to Heidegger's own thinking on historicity and authenticity. I shall indicate a few passages which I believe provide some insight into Heidegger's unspoken thoughts on authenticity and propose a careful reading of the Dilthey–Yorck correspondence in SZ #77.
authenticity. Hence, it would be incompatible with this ideal of ontological inquiry and authentic being with others to lay down factual prescriptive possibilities.

What is at stake is liberation from the domination and coercion of das Man, so one can appropriate and develop one's own possibilities. Heidegger's aim is perhaps expressed in SZ through the medium of Count Yorck, quoted in some very revealing passages found on SZ 399-403.

Yorck writes:

"to dissolve elemental public opinion, and, as far as possible, to make possible the moulding of individuality in seeing and looking, would be a pedagogical task for the state. Then, instead of a so-called public conscience—instead of this radical externalization—individual consciences (that is to say, consciences) would again be powerful" (cited on SZ 403).

Authentic Dasein is concerned with the "moulding of individuality", "dissolving elemental public opinion", and developing its individuality in a dialogue with the tradition marked by Wiederholung, Erwiderung, and Widerruf. This struggle with das Man and dialogue with the tradition is solely for the development of the individual, and not for the betterment of society (changing the world), or adding to the cultural fund of knowledge. This radical individualism is responsible for the harsh criticism of Heidegger from Marxist-oriented thinkers as Lukacs and Adorno and is perhaps the most glaring deficiency of Heidegger's authenticity analysis. This tendency toward withdrawal and development of one's own self-being is expressed in another citation from Yorck:

While it is said that 'if you were quiet, you would be strong', the variant is also true that 'if you are quiet, you will perceive—that is understand!'...And then I enjoy the quietude of soliloquizing and communing with the spirit of history. This spirit is one who did not appear to Faust in his study, or to Master Goethe either. But they would have felt no alarm in making way for him, however grave and compelling such an
apparition might be. For he is brotherly, akin to us in another and deeper sense than are the denizens of bush and field. These exertions are like Jacob's wrestling—a sure gain for the wrestler himself. Indeed this is what matters first of all (cited on SZ 401).

"What matters first of all", then, is the individual's authenticity. The exertions of the project of authenticity "are like Jacob's wrestling—a sure gain for the wrestler himself". But the wrestling does not merely signify wrestling with oneself in the solitude and isolation of withdrawal, but also includes struggling for authenticity in the context of one's work world and social world. To be sure, there is a tension in Heidegger's concept of authenticity between involvement and withdrawal, but authenticity should in no way be taken as a project of extrication from worldly being. For Heidegger constantly stresses that one never escapes or overcomes either his being-in-the-world, his everydayness, or his historicity, and therefore authentic historizing (that is to say, authenticity), brings one into constant conflict with the untruth and dictatorship of das Man in one's historical world.¹ Further, the struggle and conflict never cease, for not only must the choice of authenticity be constantly repeated, but moreover repetition takes place through the "moment of vision" which is open to the situation, and is therefore constantly open to change, modify, or abandon its choice if the situation demands.

Resoluteness, as fate, is the freedom to give up some definite resolution, and to give it up in accordance with the demands of some possible situation or other (SZ 391).

¹This is perhaps a difference from the later Heidegger where the struggle for authenticity against das Man recedes as a thematic concern, and where Seinslassen replaces Seinkönnen.
Let us use this passage to stress that authenticity and authentic selfhood is no perfect, final, complete state of self-contained and self-identical self-being. Heidegger never speaks of fullfillment, completion, perfection, or even "self-realization", as if the self were something to be "realized". Authenticity is a way of being which includes struggle, movement, and change. This is clear in the above passage stressing the freedom to "give up" a definite resolution, and was stressed earlier in a passage citing that the resolve must remain "free and open" for a possible "withdrawing" or "taking back" one's resolve (SZ 307-8). The authentic resolve should not, he warns, stiffen, (versteifen). Moreover, it is a central doctrine of Heidegger's ontology that Dasein alternates between authenticity and inauthenticity, truth and untruth, resoluteness and irresoluteness, and never exists in a state of being in which inauthenticity, untruth, and irresoluteness are excluded. What is at stake then is choosing authenticity, truth, and resoluteness as ways of being, so that in so far as possible one transforms one's inauthentic ways of being. Although authenticity and inauthenticity can be interpreted as two "ideal" poles of being-one's-self and not-being-one's-self, one never, strictly speaking, reaches "pure authenticity".

For these reasons it is, I believe, misleading to explicate authenticity and the authentic self merely as "owned existence", an inalienable "self-possession", as if with the choice of authenticity one suddenly owned a self which would henceforth be one's everlasting "possession". Therefore I reject Schmitt's suggestion that authenticity be translated as "genuinely self-possessed."
The German terms 'eigentlich' and 'uneigentlich' are customarily translated as 'authentic' and 'inauthentic', presumably because 'eigentlich' ordinarily means 'genuine' or, adverbially, 'really'. But Heidegger uses these terms in a technical sense, playing on the meaning of eigen, which means 'own'. To be eigentlich is to be an individual in the fullest sense of that term; it is to be in possession of oneself. To be uneigentlich is to be 'fallen away' from oneself (Verfallen) or, in a familiar expression, to be alienated from oneself. To be in full possession of oneself is, of course, also to be most genuinely a human being. Hence to translate 'eigentlich' as authentic, although not wrong is a bit misleading; more clumsy, but more accurate, is 'genuinely self-possessed'.

Previous interpreters have generally interpreted eigentlich etymologically as signifying something that is one's own, in the sense of possession, such that it signified something that I uniquely own as inalienably mine. But this interpretation plays into the hands of the interpretation of authenticity as a way of being toward death, for explicating "authentic" in this way raises the question, "what is essentially one's own", which led to the conclusion, expressed by Adorno, that in this sense only death is one's own, for it is one's only non-representational possibility, the only thing that is inalienably mine. Thus I wish to argue that Schmitt's recommendation is not only "more clumsy", but is also misleading and inaccurate, for I believe it is wrong to conceive of authenticity as "self-possession" because "possession" suggests "having properties" in the sense in which when we speak of "possession" we refer to a possessor having or possessing something. This analysis assumes an ontology of the Vorhanden as the basis of selfhood, and leaves the nature of the "possessor", the "possession",

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2 Adorno, op. cit., p. 95ff.
and the relation between them ontologically indefinite. Moreover, this analysis suggests that the self possesses or has something, namely itself, in which case the possessor and possessed turn out to be indiscriminable. Finally, on this account the self is reified into a thing, or possession, which covers over Heidegger's notion of the self as a free, self-modifying project. Thus I believe "authentic" is a preferable translation of eigentlich which more faithfully conveys Heidegger's philosophical intentions.

Moreover, I suggest that "authentic" is explicated by the term Zueignung, "appropriating", or "making something one's own". The act of making authentic is explicated on SZ 162 as "taking hold of something and appropriating it" (ergriffenes und zugeeignetes). Thus authentic does not signify ownness in the sense of discovering what is uniquely mine, what is peculiar to my self, but rather refers to a process of appropriating possibilities which become my own through an activity of resolve and repetition. Heidegger emerges in this interpretation as a philosopher of liberation and possibility. His authentic existence is a way of freely choosing and making one's own authentic possibilities. This way of choice is called resoluteness and describes an appropriating, seizing hold of, and making one's own possibilities for existing chosen from the heritage.

Eigentlichkeit, authenticity, thus refers to a way of being resolved on as a fundamental project by an individual who seeks liberation from the domination of das Man. In general, authenticity in SZ is a global hermeneutic providing a basic orientation to being-in-the-world. What is at stake is a choice between two basic ways of being: authenticity and inauthenticity. Although Heidegger does not
work out any clear lines of demarcation between a large number of authentic as opposed to inauthentic ways of being, and does not explicate normative principles with which one can judge or calculate if act x is or is not authentic—I believe, nevertheless, that there are guidelines, indications, and suggestions in SZ as to what constitutes authentic v. inauthentic ways of being (understanding, interpreting, talking, relating, etc.), which it would be the task of a philosophical anthropology or more detailed existential analysis to work out and develop.¹ Moreover, I believe that some of these existential possibilities are elucidated, often with a change of terminology and orientation, in the later Heidegger. Authentic understanding then becomes the activity of thinking (Denken). Authentic talking is clarified in the discussion of poetry and originative thinking (Rede becomes Sprache). Authentic ways of being and relating such as Seinslassen, truth, waiting, obedience, and the other complicated Heideggerian themes, too difficult to here develop, abound in Heidegger's writings after SZ. Authenticity is in Heidegger's admission "circular". but the hermeneutic circle, if it is ontologically adequate, encompasses what is fundamental to being a human. Being human in Heidegger's analysis is a being possible. Possibility is the central ontological category in Heidegger's Dasein analysis, and I am suggesting that authenticity is a possibility of choosing and appropriating authentic possibilities of human existing. Since these possibilities constitute ways of being Dasein's retrieve-repetition of possibilities from the heritage is a making one's own of ways of talking,

¹On SZ 301 Heidegger writes: "To present the factual existentiell possibilities in their chief features and interconnections, and to interpret them according to their existential structure, falls among the tasks of a thematic existential anthropology" (SZ 301).
interpreting, understanding, and being that enables one to overcome
the "groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness". These
concrete possibilities, not worked out in SZ, come together to
form the structural interconnectedness of an authentic existence.
Conclusion
A. The Possibility and Problems of an Ethical Interpretation of SZ

The problem of whether Heidegger's analysis can produce or contribute to an ethical theory is remarkably ambiguous. As noted, Heidegger frequently disclaims any intention of engaging in evaluative-ethical analysis, stressing that his intentions are "purely ontological" (SZ 167). However, he treats phenomena that are traditionally connected with ethical theory (conscience, guilt, resoluteness, responsibility, loyalty, authenticity), and I have argued that his language of authenticity functions evaluatively. But although the phenomena analyzed, the language, and the impact on the reader seem to imply an ethical concern, Heidegger denies this intention and claims that his analysis takes place on an ontological plane, supposedly prior to ethical discriminations. Thus Heidegger's project has an at best indirect relation to ethical analysis, and is perhaps considerably at odds with traditional concepts of ethics. To help clarify the issue of the possibility of an ethical interpretation of SZ, I shall take some of Heidegger's statements (mostly found in his chapter on "conscience") that are relevant, and shall both cite and interpret passages that seem to indicate a possible contribution to ethical theory, and that criticize traditional ethical theory. This procedure should help us in ascertaining what kind of ethical theory Heidegger rejects, and in what sense (if any) Heidegger's concept of authenticity can be taken as an ethical doctrine.

Let us begin with a passage that indicates a positive relation of Heidegger's ontology to ethics. In indicating the relation on his ontological analysis of guilt to moral guilt Heidegger writes:
This essential being-guilty is equiprimordially the existential condition for the possibility of the 'morally' good and the 'morally' evil—that is, for morality in general and for the possible forms which this may take factically. The primordial 'being guilty' cannot be defined by morality, since morality already presupposes it for itself (SZ 286).

This passage suggests both a possible connection between Heidegger's ontology and ethics, and a general notion of the relationship between ethics and ontology. For Heidegger implies here that ontology is the foundation of ethics, and that it is illegitimate for ethics to define such concepts as guilt, "since morality already presupposes it for itself" (SZ 286). If it is the task of philosophy to "work out its presuppositions with more and more penetration", as Heidegger states on SZ 310, then it follows that the presuppositions of ethics must be analyzed, grounded, and delimited in an ontological analysis. This would imply that ethical theory must be aware of its presuppositions and be sure they are adequately grounded in an ontology of human being—indicating that ethics requires existential-ontological clarification and understanding. This notion is repeated in another context on SZ 293:

Even the theory of value, whether it is regarded formally or materially, has as its unexpressed ontological presupposition a 'metaphysic of morals'—that is, an ontology of Dasein and existence (SZ 293).

What is clear from the passage cited is that Heidegger claims (1) that ethics has "unexpressed ontological presuppositions" (SZ 293), and (2) cannot define its own presuppositions (SZ 286). These statements suggest a superordinate position in regard to ethics for ontology, and suggests that one of the task of ontology in relation to ethics is to work out the presuppositions of ethics, and thus to provide a grounding
of its basic concepts. Following this argument, it could be suggested that ontology functions as a court of jurisdiction that validates or criticizes ethical theories, according to whether they are in accord with the being that is in question, as disclosed by the analysis of a well-grounded ontology, such as Heidegger claims to provide in SZ. That is, the ought must be shown to be grounded in the is, in much the same way that Heidegger holds that the ontological must be grounded in the ontic. Those philosophers who advocate the "autonomy" of ethics, and hold that the "ought" is an ideal that is far removed from the "is" (which is human being and doing), must, I believe, answer the questions Heidegger raises and defend their enterprise by showing that their theory is based on an adequate foundation, that they have secured and clarified their presuppositions, and that they have a penetrating understanding of the subject matter of ethics—human being-in-the-world. Thus I believe that part of the ethical import of SZ rests upon the questions it raises for ethical theory and the challenge it presents to existing theories.

What is at stake is the question of the conditions of the possibility of ethics. Before, on this analysis, one can define such concepts as "good", "guilt", "responsible", and so on, one should be clear as to the conditions of the possibility of being-good, being-guilty, being-responsible. That is, what kind of a being can "be good" and what does this mean? What kind of a being can assume moral guilt? can be blamed? praised? held responsible? obligated? This type of questioning, if developed, would, I believe, lead to a powerful critique of existing ethical theory. Moreover, I believe that these considerations also illuminate
Heidegger's own position in regard to ethics. For his seeming rejection of ethical analysis as a separate, specialized mode of inquiry is an implicit critique of the fragmentation of philosophical analysis that considers questions of the good, right, or ought for man without having adequately secured a conceptual understanding of human being. By not securing an adequate foundation for its theories and imperatives, ethics, is condemned to be merely prescriptive or emotive, confessional. Thus if ethics is to be a philosophically respectable discipline it must become aware of its presuppositions, and build its theories on the firm foundation of an ontology of human being, or some general theory of man. Such are the guidelines that are suggested by Heidegger's remarks concerning the relations between ethics and ontology.

This concept of the relation between ethics and ontology was hinted at by Kant in his famous remark that the question "What is Man" must precede any such questions as "What ought I to do", "What can I hope for", "What can I know". Heidegger's contribution to this problem is a clarification of the structure of human being, a working out of some presuppositions of ethics, a critique of prevalent ethical theories of his day, which he claims rest on an inadequate ontology of Dasein and upon unfounded and dubious presuppositions—and of course his concept of authenticity. In this context, let us now examine two of his criticisms of traditional and current ethical theories.

Heidegger's first specific criticism of traditional ethical theories is that they presuppose an ontology of the present-at-hand (Vorhanden). That is, they characterize "good" or "value" as something present-at-hand,
interpreted as a property or predicate of a thing or state of affairs. This ontological presupposition that everything that is must be something present-at-hand (and thus an observable, describable entity) is, according to Heidegger, the source of much bad philosophical thinking. Speaking of the concept guilt, Heidegger writes:

Least of all can we come any closer to the existential phenomenon of guilt by taking our orientation from the idea of evil, the malum as privatio boni. Just as the bonum and its privatio have the same ontological origin in the ontology of the present-at-hand, this ontology also applies to the idea of 'value', which has been 'abstracted' from these (SZ 286).

The passage suggests the extent to which ethical thinking has been dominated by the ontological model of the Vorhanden. Philosophers have traditionally taken values as something present-at-hand, either in a Platonic world of Ideas, in an intelligible realm of consciousness, or in the "objective" structure of reality. On this model of the Vorhanden, "good" too must be something, a property, an entity, something intuitable. This ontological prejudice, then, is the source of the controversy over ethical naturalism (and the so-called naturalistic fallacy), over ethical intuitionism (which was honest enough to confess that they couldn't find "good" or any ethical property in the world, but which was so stubbornly dominated by the metaphysics of the present-at-hand that they were forced into mystification to defend their enterprise), and over the question of the being (or "logical status") of "value". The advocates of the linguistic "revolution" in philosophy will agree with Heidegger that much ethical thinking has been dominated by bad metaphysics without seeing that they too are dominated by this ontological presupposition in their belief that ethical concepts can be
reduced to (or explicated as) linguistic usage, speech acts, or social conventions: good solid factual data that one can set before him and analyze in a clear cut (if trivial) way. To these believers in ordinary usage, common sense, and social conventions, Heidegger could scornfully note that they are merely making explicit the publicness of das Man, and in submitting without criticism to these phenomena are no better than "slaves of Pharisaism".

Heidegger's argument against the type of ethics that takes ethical concepts to denote entities present-at-hand could be that this enterprise is inadequate to the phenomena in question and must be replaced by a new vocabulary that is rooted in an authentic understanding of existence and a new way of thinking that does not become trapped in traditional presuppositions and inadequate thinking. Such an ontology Heidegger could claim to offer in \textit{SZ}, and he claims that his existential ontology explicates the being of a being who is qualitatively other than the something present-at-hand explicated by the categories of traditional metaphysics (and ethics). One application of this thesis for ethics is its suggestion that ethicists should not waste their time searching for properties to which they can apply their ethical predicates, or sorting out different senses of the language of ethics, but should rather see into the ontological dubiousness of their procedure, and the need to ground their ethical analysis in an adequate ontology of human being.

Whereas Heidegger's first criticism noted a dubious ontological presupposition of traditional ethics, his second criticism concerns the ontological horizon of ethics. For Heidegger, any theory that interprets
Dasein as a being who is to be evaluated according to its capacity and performance in either "actualizing values" or "satisfying norms" (or moral principles) operates within the horizon of everyday calculative concern and thus falls prey to an ontologically dubious practice. From this standpoint, "'Life' is a business, whether or not it covers its costs" (SZ 289). That is, Dasein is pictured as a household or business which is run according to some conventionally established procedure, and is judged and evaluated in terms of how it measures up to that standard. Heidegger suggests that most ethical theories operate in the sphere of everyday concern and calculation in which they presuppose certain standards, morale principles, or norms, and then measure human being according to whether it meets the mark or satisfies the demand in question. For example, he suggests that Kant, with his representation of conscience as a "court of justice", has fallen prey to the horizon of concern and calculation, for his interpretation was guided by the idea of satisfying or transgressing the "moral law" (SZ 293).

What is objectionable here is not only a crude, mechanical way of thinking, but also the ontologically unclear and questionable nature of the moral principles, laws, imperatives, and so forth that are used as the norms controlling the act of judging. In particular, Heidegger puts into question the notion of a moral law and ought, and the demand or requirement (Forderung) made that is supposedly binding or obligatory (verbindlich). In reference to Dasein's guilt, Heidegger writes:

This kind of lacking is a failure to satisfy some requirement which applies to one's existent being with others. It remains undecided how such requirements arise and in what way their character as requirements and laws must be conceived on the basis of their having this source....
The idea of guilt must not only be raised above the
domain of that concern in which we reckon things up,
but it must also be detached from relationship to any
law or ought such that by failing to comply with it one
loads himself with guilt (SZ 282, 283).

These remarks implicitly raise many difficult questions. For
what is the source of obligation, moral law, ethical imperatives?
Why must I do xyz, and not do abc? The ontological dubiousness of
the concept of ought (moral law, prescriptives) thus throws into
question the whole moral practice of calculating, judging, and
condemning in relation to a fulfilling, failing to fulfill or
transgressing a moral law or ought. Heidegger's most critical
remarks throwing into question the "ought" or a binding, obligatory
imperative are found in a neglected passage, SZ 156. In speaking of
the phenomenon of validity (Geltung), he distinguishes three essential
predicates: ideality, objectivity, bindingness (Verbindlichkeit).
He argues that these "significations" are "not only opaque in
themselves but constantly get confused with one another. Methodological
fore-sight demands that we do not choose such unstable concepts as
clues to interpretation" (SZ 156). These criticisms are directed
against an analysis of the "theory of judgment", but I believe they
also apply to ethical judgments, for the characteristics in question
are generally taken to be essential constituents of ethical judgments.¹

¹The properties of a normative-ethical judgment are often taken to
be "ideality" (or in the Anglo-American philosophical world "non-naturalness"),
"objectivity" (or "universalizibility"), and "bindingness" (or "prescriptivity").
Thus Heidegger's critical remarks can apply to certain features of ethical
language, which he could claim are ontologically (or "conceptually")
unclarified, ungrounded, and confused.
This means that the concept of "bindingness" or "obligatoriness"
(Verbindlichkeit) is a dubious one for Heidegger, who would thus be
forced by his own philosophical reflections to abstain from recommending
authentic possibilities that would be obligatory or binding (at least
until the "ontological opaqueness" and confusion surrounding these "unstable"
concepts is dissolved).

These remarks suggest a criticism of ethical prescriptivism: the
claim of most ethical theories to lay down universally valid, binding,
obligatory laws that provide a strict regulation of human behavior. I
earlier suggested that Heidegger's analysis of the mode of Fürsorge
that "leaps in and dominates" (einspringend beherrschenden) corresponds
to a prescriptivism in ethics (HCA p. 160-3), and have now indicated
some reasons why Heidegger would want to avoid a prescriptive type of
ethics. I contrasted einspringen with Heidegger's analysis of the
authentic mode of Fürsorge, which "leaps ahead and liberates", and
suggested that this corresponds to Heidegger's own attitude toward ethics
and describes what he himself is doing in SZ (HCA p. 163-4). Thus although
Heidegger does not make fully clear the relevance of his concept of
authenticity for ethical theory, he not only criticizes the presuppositions
and some key concepts in traditional ethical theory, but he also works out
some presuppositions for an ethical theory in his analyses of guilt,
conscience, and resoluteness. Moreover, I have proposed that he also
delineates the presuppositions of such important ethical concepts as
responsibility, commitment, and autonomy in his analyses of authenticity.

1 "Existential interpretation will never seek to take over any
authoritarian pronouncement as to those things which, from an existentiell
point of view, are possible or binding" (SZ 312).
To be sure, Heidegger does not work out a fully articulated ethical theory, but neither does he close the door on the possibility of an ethical interpretation of SZ, or of an ethical development of his analysis. On the contrary, he states that:

To present the factual existentiell possibilities in their chief features and interconnections, and to interpret them according to their existential structure, falls among the tasks of a thematic existential anthropology (SZ 301).

This passage indicates that an existential anthropology has the task of working out "factual existentiell possibilities"—which could refer to ethical possibilities (the passage cited follows the analysis of conscience, guilt, and resoluteness). This passage in conjunction with the passage cited earlier on SZ 286 and 293 would indicate at least a possible connection between Heidegger's existential analysis and ethics, and would indicate tasks yet to be performed. As Heidegger himself does not return to this problem-field, and perhaps never intended to, I do not wish to over-emphasize the relevance to ethical theory of Heidegger's SZ, but I wish to point out that the possibility of an ethical interpretation of SZ is in no way ruled out by any substantial doctrines in Heidegger's text.

We shall next discuss the interconnection in Heidegger's hermeneutic between what has been traditionally separated into ethics and ontology, normative and descriptive disciplines and statements. This discussion should help further ascertain the relevance of Heidegger's concept of authenticity for ethical theory.
B. Heidegger’s Language of Authenticity and the Normative Descriptive Distinction

We have already noted that the status of Heidegger’s concept of authenticity is remarkably problematic for those philosophers who maintain a strict dichotomy between descriptive and normative statements. In an earlier section of this study I argued that, despite Heidegger’s claim that his intentions were "purely ontological" and that his account of das Man and its ways of being intended "no negative evaluation", his language of inauthenticity contained a negatively evaluative dimension in terms of the usual connotations of his language, the explications he provided of his concepts, the sources of some of his concepts, the function of his language, and the dialectical contrast between authenticity and inauthenticity. I suggested on HCA p. 26, 116-7 that the concept of authenticity serves as an ideal that projects alternative authentic ways of being, which stimulate and guide the modification of inauthentic ways of being. Heidegger confirms this proposal that authenticity projects an ideal of human existence in the following passage: "Is there not, however, a factual ideal of Dasein, underlying our ontological interpretation of Dasein's existence" (SZ 310). Heidegger's answer: "that is so indeed" (SZ 310). He then states that while there is an ideal of existence (and authenticity) underlying his analysis:

not only is this fact one which must not be denied and which we are forced to grant; it must also be conceived in its positive necessity, in terms of the object which we have taken as the theme of our investigation. Philosophy will never seek to deny its 'presuppositions', but neither may it simply admit them. It conceives them, and it unfolds with more and more penetration both the presuppositions themselves and that for which they are presuppositions (SZ 310).
In working out his concept of authenticity, Heidegger is operating on the principle that Dasein has an understanding of an authentic existence that can be made explicit and transparent by philosophical clarification, thus arguing that his presuppositions are part of Dasein's pre-ontological comprehension of its own being. Thus far from being an arbitrary ideal, the idea of existence guiding Heidegger's analysis is claimed to be grounded in Dasein's understanding of itself and its being-in-the-world, which it is the task of his existential ontology to "unfold with more and more penetration". Authenticity is thus an ideal of existence that is grounded in each individual's understanding of existence (SZ 313), and that is worked out and secured in a confirmed and attested ontological analysis.¹

The important point to note is that the ideal of authenticity is grounded in an ontological analysis of human being. This interconnection of what is usually analytically separated into normative and descriptive statements is a distinctive feature of Heidegger's concept of authenticity, which I interpreted as an undercutting of the normative-descriptive distinction. In fact, it could be that the upshot of this problem of interpreting the propositional status of authenticity forces us to reconsider our often rigidly maintained dichotomy between evaluative and descriptive statements, value and fact, normative and descriptive disciplines. I have proposed that Heidegger's concept of authenticity contains both a descriptive and an evaluative dimension, neither of which can be

¹Heidegger claims that the ideal of authenticity has "the character of an understanding projection, in such a manner that the interpretation by which such an understanding gets developed, will let that which is to be interpreted put itself into words for the very first time, so that it may decide of its own accord whether...it has that state of being for which it has been disclosed in the projection with regard to its formal aspects" (SZ 314-5)
can be eradicated without distorting and restricting the scope, depth, and import of Heidegger's work. Further, I propose that Heidegger's undercutting the descriptive-normative dichotomy corrects a dubious methodological procedure that results in a restricted or one-sided analysis which, intentionally or not, omits considerations that don't fall within the prescribed-delimited domain of inquiry (I am thinking of much American social science, pure phenomenology, linguistic analysis, and other disciplines that maintain a strict fact-value, descriptive-evaluative distinction, and that claim to exclude all value judgments, evaluative presuppositions, and ethical claims). We encounter here a Heideggerian procedure that puts into radical question established practices, methodological presuppositions, and theoretical commitments prevalent in the Anglo-American philosophical world. This problem in the area of hermeneutics (or methodology) has its analogue in the ethical problem of the relation between "is" and "ought" in which Heidegger again puts our current dogma into question. This challenge to our current philosophical conventions is one of the valuable contributions which SZ offers the English speaking philosophical world.

In regard to the normative-descriptive distinction, I suggest that a radical questioning of this distinction and a careful study of the language of authenticity in SZ can contribute to an elimination of what I believe to be a superficial foundational dogma of an outworn empiricism. The origin of this dichotomy in twentieth century positivism utilized the distinction for the most part as a corrosive tool; i.e. ethical statements or "value judgments" are on this model merely expressions of an attitude or "feelings", and thus have an inferior cognitive status, since
they cannot be verified by empirical observation statements. But this whole model rests on a questionable and largely discredited empiricist theory of verification, evidence, and a propositional cognitive hierarchy that divided our language into two exclusive classes of statements, in which evaluative statements are rated cognitively inferior, since they are not capable of objective or factual verification, and are therefore subjective, emotive, non-cognitive.¹ But both the simplistic dichotomy between normative and descriptive and an explication of normative-evaluative statements as cognitively inferior are highly questionable notions which demand serious criticism and re-thinking.² I believe that Heidegger's language of authenticity puts the distinction and its positivist explication into question by undercutting the dichotomy and by offering a vocabulary that has both a descriptive and evaluative dimension.

¹The inadequacies of this model are well known and several papers criticizing its application to ethical analysis can be found in Theories of Ethics, Philippa Foot, editor, (London: Oxford, 1967). cf. especially Foot's "Introduction", her essay on "moral beliefs", Searle's essay "How to derive 'ought' from 'is'", and John Austin's remark that, "the familiar contrast of 'normative-evaluative' as opposed to the factual is in need, like so many dichotomies, of elimination", op. cit. p. 13.

²Limitations of space and time make it impossible to further develop the problems involved in the normative-descriptive distinction within the bounds of this study. The problem has produced a vast but inconclusive literature in the world of analytic philosophy (some references cited in footnote 1 above), and is a central philosophical issue in Europe where "critical rationalists" (i.e. Popper and Hans Albert) defend the old positivist distinction against the attacks of "Neo-Marxists" and others (i.e. Adorno, Habermas, Marcuse). The question is also an important one for social scientists, since the day of Max Weber's distinction between fact and value, and his notion of a value-free science.
C. Philosophical Tasks of the Present Age

A study of Heidegger’s concept of authenticity, and the problems it raises, indicates some important philosophical tasks for philosophy in the present age, which I shall note in conclusion. The first task, indicated in the last two sections, concerns the status and grounding of ethical concepts. This task would involve providing a grounding of ethics in a philosophical anthropology. The anthropology would offer the sort of ontological analysis of human being (or "regional ontology", to use Husserl’s term) set forth by Heidegger himself in Sein und Zeit. By taking up the challenge of developing a "thematic existentiell anthropology" (SZ 301), this endeavor would set forth ethical directives on the basis of the results of the anthropology, which would be an "ontological purification" (SZ 51) of the most recent findings of the sciences of man, providing an analysis and conceptual interconnection of the latest results of the sciences of anthropology, sociology, psychology, cybernetics, and whatever other insights into human being have been brought to light and clarified in the present age. Within this framework, then, one could raise traditional ethical questions, and subject ethical concepts to a philosophical analysis. Distinctions such as Is–ought, descriptive–normative, and fact–value would have to be reinterpreted or rejected, for the interconnection of ethics and anthropology, and the grounding of the ethical concepts therein, would render an absolute dichotomy untenable. I have noted that Heidegger’s practice in SZ and his ideal of authenticity could contribute to such an endeavor, by showing how what is currently separated into evaluative and descriptive concepts and disciplines can be
productively interconnected.

The second important task to be performed is the further development of a critical theory of society. I submit that Heidegger's critique of das Man and inauthenticity can contribute to this endeavor, for it provides an ontological framework that contains a radical critique of das Man and publicness, a dissection of inauthentic ways of being, and a dialectical hermeneutic of authenticity which functions to "dissolve public opinion" (SZ 397), undermine public conventions (SZ 391), and to extricate the individual from the domination of "today" (SZ 391, 397), in order to provide a "critique of the present" (SZ 397). But this critique is an ambiguous one, not only in that Heidegger claims his work is non-evaluative, but also in terms of Heidegger's relation vis-a-vis the current social-historical situation. For not only does Heidegger focus on social being as such, and not concrete social problems, but he claims he has no interest in "progress" (SZ 176, 386), which implies he has no interest in bettering social conditions or changing the world, and thus foresees no social solution to the problem of existence—suggesting a social passivity as an adjunct to the critique of das Man. This position follows the radical individualism of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, which despairs of modifying the structures of inauthenticity, or changing the mass man. But we must ask: can an individual be authentic in an inauthentic society? Does not the individual's struggle for liberation and authenticity involve him in the struggle for the liberation of others. Does not the possibility of self-determination presuppose a liberated society in which it is possible to make one's own choices and carry through one's resolves? Would not an
individual who chose certain projects as his authentic possibilities in an unfree society be harassed, oppressed and perhaps persecuted? Since one is thrown into a specific social-historical world and is bound together with his generation (SZ 385), is one's "fateful destiny" not intricately interconnected with his historical world? Despite Heidegger's profound analysis of historicity, is not the historical dimension insufficiently developed in Heidegger's hermeneutic of authenticity? Does not Heidegger's ontological analysis require an ontic supplementation for its concretion and adequacy? For does not the domination and dictatorship of das Man take specific historical forms, and would not liberation from das Man take the form of a specific historical practice?

I would propose that Heidegger's analysis of the domination of the individual by das Man requires an ontic concretion, such as is found in Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man and An Essay on Liberation. Heidegger's analysis of publicness would then require an examination of the specific instruments and institutions (media, family, school, etc.) and socialization processes through which the individual receives (introjects) the opinions and understanding-interpretation of his society. Although Heidegger provides a general characterization of what every individual in every society must liberate himself from, this characterization requires an examination of the specific things that are keeping the individual in bondage in a particular society in a particular age.

Further, Heidegger's analysis of what the individual should liberate himself for (authenticity) seems to require supplementation. Here, I believe, Marx provides a needed corrective. Man in capitalist society,
Marx claims, is in bondage because of alienated labor and false consciousness, which are constituted by the social-economic system (private property, class division, wage-labor, money, consumer goods, reification, etc.). Therefore one must liberate himself from alienated labor and false consciousness, and for a mode of consciousness that has broken through the ideological conditioning of one's life-history, and for a mode of labor that is not alienated. Marx thought this was only possible through a revolutionary transformation of the entire social-economic system, and that overcoming alienation was therefore a social task. Heidegger, on the other hand, makes the project of authenticity a purely individual task. But we must ask: is not one's choice of labor a fundamental authentic possibility? Can one make authentic vocational-labor choices in a system, or within an institution, that is inauthentic and alienating (or repressive, to use a current term)? Do not one's authentic possibilities require overcoming alienated labor, and does this not involve social change? Does not Heidegger's concept of resoluteness require a theory of revolutionary praxis as its supplementation?

Heidegger seems therefore to exclude important dimensions of the problem of authenticity. His emphasis on the choice of authentic resolves lacks a theory of revolutionary praxis, which is perhaps necessary for the carrying through of one's resolves. An ontic theory of society would provide a supplementation by analyzing what particular das Man phenomena are keeping the individual in bondage in a given society, and would indicate what the individual could do in order to liberate himself, and what obstacles he would confront. Moreover, the critical theory would be guided by an ideal of authenticity that would be the goal of the individual's self-determination and self-transformation.
The individual striving for authenticity would be necessarily involved in social-political struggle for his own struggle for authenticity, if we take politics as a way in which the individual lives his life. Authenticity would then be an ethical ideal grounded in a philosophical anthropology, and the presupposition of a critical theory of society. Our conclusion here is the starting point of Herbert Marcuse in his first publication:

The fundamental question of all living philosophy is: What is authentic existence and how is authentic existence possible.¹

Acknowledgments

Personal acknowledgments are owed to Robert Browne who introduced me to the philosophical existence; to many friends who read and criticized parts of the manuscript at various stages; to Dieter Henrich and Helmut Fahrenbach who aided me the two years I was in Germany; and especially to Robert Cumming, in whose Heidegger Seminar the project was first conceived, and who has patiently read through and criticized all of the many re-writings and revisions over the past several years.

I am also indebted to Betsy Tenenbaum and Paige Mitchell for a careful and solicitous proof reading and improving of the manuscript.

The Woodrow Wilson Foundation and the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst have provided grants which made possible the leisure and supportive environment necessary to complete this study.
Selected Bibliography

I have divided the Bibliography into two categories. First, I list works dealing with Heidegger’s concept of authenticity which have provided stimulation for this study. The best Bibliography of literature on Heidegger is Dirk Pereboom’s subject-indexed Heidegger-Bibliographie, 1917-1966, Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie (Freiburg, Switzerland: 1970), pp. 100-161. Secondly, I list books referred to in this study or that deal generally with the themes and problems under consideration in the concept of authenticity, but which do not specifically treat Heidegger’s concept of authenticity.

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