Globalization, Terrorism, and Democracy: 9/11 and its Aftermath

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Globalization has been one of the most hotly contested phenomena of the past two decades. It has been a primary attractor of books, articles, and heated debate, just as postmodernism was the most fashionable and debated topic of the 1980s. A wide and diverse range of social theorists have argued that today's world is organized by accelerating globalization, which is strengthening the dominance of a world capitalist economic system, supplanting the primacy of the nation-state by transnational corporations and organizations, and eroding local cultures and traditions through a global culture. Contemporary theorists from a wide range of political and theoretical positions are converging on the position that globalization is a distinguishing trend of the present moment, but there are hot debates concerning its nature, effects, and future.

Moreover, advocates of a postmodern break in history argue that developments in transnational capitalism are producing a new global historical configuration of post-Fordism, or postmodernism as an emergent cultural logic of capitalism (Harvey 1989; Soja 1989; Jameson 1991; and Gottdiener 1995). Others define the emergent global economy and culture as a "network society" grounded in new communications and information technology (Castells 1996, 1997, and 1998). For its defenders, globalization marks the triumph of capitalism and its market economy (see apologists such as Fukuyama 1992 and Friedman 1999 who perceive this process as positive), while its critics portray globalization as negative (see, for example, Mander and Goldsmith 1996; Eisenstein 1998; and Robins and Webster 1999). Some theorists see the emergence of a new transnational ruling elite and the universalization of consumerism (Sklair 2001), while others stress global fragmentation of “the clash of civilizations” (Huntington 1996). Driving “post” discourses into novel realms of theory and politics, Hardt and Negri (2000) present the emergence of “Empire” as producing evolving forms of sovereignty, economy, culture, and political struggle that unleash an unforeseeable and unpredictable flow of novelties, surprises, and upheavals.

Discourses of globalization initially were polarized into pro or con celebrations or attacks. For critics, it provides a cover concept for global capitalism and imperialism, and is accordingly condemned as another form of the imposition of the logic of capital and the market on ever more regions of the world and spheres of life. For defenders, it is the continuation of modernization and a force of progress, increased wealth, freedom, democracy, and happiness. Its champions present globalization as beneficial, generating fresh economic opportunities, political democratization, cultural diversity, and the opening to an exciting new world. Its detractors see globalization as harmful, bringing about increased domination and control by the wealthier overdeveloped nations over the poor underdeveloped countries, thus increasing the hegemony of the “haves” over the “have nots.” In addition, supplementing the negative view, globalization critics assert that globalization produces an undermining of democracy, a cultural homogenization, and increased destruction of natural species and the environment. Some imagine the globalization project -- whether viewed positively or negatively -- as inevitable and beyond human control and intervention, whereas others view globalization as generating new
conflicts and new spaces for struggle, distinguishing between globalization from above and globalization from below (and Brecher, Costello, and Smith 2000).

I wish to sketch aspects of a critical theory of globalization that will discuss the fundamental transformations in the world economy, politics, and culture in a dialectical framework that distinguishes between progressive and emancipatory features and oppressive and negative attributes. This requires articulations of the contradictions and ambiguities of globalization and the ways that globalization is both imposed from above and yet can be contested and reconfigured from below in ways that promote democracy and social justice. I argue that the key to understanding globalization critically is theorizing it at once as a product of technological revolution and the global restructuring of capitalism in which economic, technological, political, and cultural features are intertwined. From this perspective, one should avoid both technological and economic determinism and all one-sided optics of globalization in favor of a view that theorizes globalization as a highly complex, contradictory, and thus ambiguous set of institutions and social relations, as well as involving flows of goods, services, ideas, technologies, cultural forms, and people (see Appadurai 1996).

To illustrate my approach, I argue that the September 11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq put on display contradictions and ambiguities embedded in globalization that demand critical and dialectic perspectives to clarify and illuminate these events and globalization itself. Showing the ways that globalization and a networked society were involved in the 9/11 events and subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, I argue that the terror attacks and ensuing Terror War show contradictions in the nature of globalization that requires dialectical analysis and critique. I conclude with some reflections on the implications of September 11 and the subsequent Terror War for critical social theory and democratic politics, envisaging a new global movement against terrorism and militarism and for democracy, peace, environmentalism, and social justice.

**Globalization, Technological Revolution, and the Restructuring of Capitalism**

For critical social theory, globalization involves both capitalist markets and sets of social relations and flows of commodities, capital, technology, ideas, forms of culture, and people across national boundaries via a globally networked society (see Castells 1996, 1997, and 1998 and Held, et al 1999). In a globalized network society, the transmutations of technology and capital work together to create an increasingly globalized and interconnected world. A technological revolution involving the creation of a computerized network of communication, transportation, and exchange is the presupposition of a globalized economy, along with the extension of a world capitalist market system that is absorbing ever more areas of the world and spheres of production, exchange, and consumption into its orbit.

The technological revolution presupposes global computerized networks and the movement of goods, information, and peoples across national boundaries. Hence, the Internet and global computer networks make possible globalization by producing a technological infrastructure for the global economy. Computerized networks, satellite-communication systems, and the software and hardware that link together and facilitate the global economy depend on breakthroughs in microphysics. Technoscience has generated transistors, increasingly powerful and sophisticated computer chips, integrated circuits, high-tech communication systems, and a technological revolution that provides an
infrastructure for the global economy and society (see Gilder 1989 and 2000; Kaku 1997; and Best and Kellner 2001).

From this perspective, globalization cannot be understood without comprehending the scientific and technological revolutions and global restructuring of capital that are the motor and matrix of globalization. Many theorists of globalization, however, either fail to observe the fundamental importance of scientific and technological revolution and the new technologies that help spawn globalization, or interpret the process in a technological determinist framework that occludes the economic dimensions of the imperatives and institutions of capitalism. Such one-sided optics fail to grasp the coevolution of science, technology, and capitalism, and the complex and highly ambiguous system of globalization that combines capitalism and democracy, technological mutations, and a turbulent mixture of costs and benefits, gains and losses.

In order to theorize the global network economy, one therefore needs to avoid the extremes of technological and economic determinism. Technological determinists frequently use the discourse of postindustrial, or postmodern, society to describe current developments. This discourse often produces an ideal-type distinction between a previous mode of industrial production characterized by heavy industry, mass production and consumption, bureaucratic organization, and social conformity, contrasted to the new postindustrial society characterized by "flexible production," or "postFordism," in which new technologies serve as the demiurge to a new postmodernity (Harvey 1987).

For postmodern theorists such as Baudrillard (1993), technologies of information and social reproduction (e.g. simulation) have permeated every aspect of society and created a novel social environment of media, consumption, computers, and socially constructed identities. In the movement toward postmodernity, Baudrillard claims that humanity has left reality and modern conceptions behind, as well as the world of modernity. This postmodern adventure is marked by an implosion of technology and the human, which is generating an emergent posthuman species and postmodern world (see Baudrillard 1993, the analyses in Kellner 1989b and 1994, and Best and Kellner 2001). For other less extravagant theorists of the technological revolution, the human species is evolving into a postindustrial technosociety, culture, and condition where technology, knowledge, and information are the axial or organizing principles (Bell 1976 and Lyotard 1984).

There are positive and negative models of technological determinism. A positive discourse envisages innovative technologies as producing a “new economy,” interpreted affirmatively as fabricating a renewed “wealth of nations.” On this affirmative view, globalization provides opportunities for small business and individual entrepreneurs, empowering excluded persons and social groups. Technophiles claim that new technologies also make possible increased democratization, communication, education, culture, entertainment, and other social benefits, thus generating a utopia of social progress.

Few legitimating theories of the information and technological revolution, however, contextualize the structuring, implementation, marketing, and use of new technologies in the context of the vicissitudes of contemporary capitalism. The ideologues of the information society act as if technology were an autonomous force and either neglect to theorize the complex interaction of capital and technology, or use the advancements of technology to legitimate market capitalism (i.e. Gilder 1989 and 1999; Gates 1995 and 1999; Friedman 1999). Theorists, like Kevin Kelly, for instance, the executive editor of Wired, think that humanity has entered a post-capitalist society that constitutes an original and innovative
stage of history and economy where previous categories do not apply (1994 and 1998; see the critique in Best and Kellner 1999). Or, like Bill Gates (1995 and 1999), defenders of the “new economy” imagine computer and information technologies producing a "friction-free capitalism," perceived as a highly creative form of capitalism that goes beyond its previous contradictions, forms, and limitations.

A negative version of technological determinism, by contrast, portrays the new world system as constituted by a monolithic or homogenizing technological system of domination. The German philosopher and Nazi supporter Martin Heidegger talked of the "complete Europeanisation of the earth and man" (1971: 15), claiming that Western science and technology were creating a new organization or framework, which he called Gestell (or "enframing"), and that was encompassing ever more realms of experience. French theorist Jacques Ellul (1967) depicted a totalitarian expansion of technology, or what he called la technique, imposing its logic on ever more domains of life and human practices. More recently, a large number of technophobic critics argue that new technologies and global cyberspace are a realm of alienation and reification where humans are alienated from their bodies, other people, nature, tradition, and lived communities (Borgmann 1994 and 1999; Slouka 1995; Stoll 1995; Shenk 1998; and Virilio 1998).

In addition to technologically determinist and reductive postindustrial accounts of globalization, there are economic determinist discourses that view it primarily as the continuation of capitalism rather than its restructuring through technological revolution. A large number of theorists conceive globalization simply as a process of the imposition of the logic of capital and neo-liberalism on various parts of the world rather than seeing the restructuring process and the enormous changes and transformations that scientific and technological revolution are producing in the networked economy and society. Capital logic theorists, for instance, portray globalization primarily as the imposition of the logic of capital on the world economy, polity, and culture, often engaging in economic determinism, rather than seeing the complex new configurations of economy, technology, polity, and culture, and attendant forces of domination and resistance. In the same vein, some critical theorists depict globalization as the triumph of a globalized hegemony of market capitalism, where capital creates a homogeneous world culture of commercialization, commodification, administration, surveillance, and domination (Robins and Webster 1999).

From these economistic perspectives, globalization is merely a continuation of previous social tendencies; i.e. the logic of capital and domination by corporate and commercial interests of the world economy and culture. Defenders of capitalism, by contrast, present globalization as the triumph of free markets, democracy, and individual freedom (Fukuyama 1998 and Friedman 1999). Hence, there are both positive and negative versions of economic and technological determinism. Most theories of globalization, therefore, are reductive, undialectical, and one-sided, either failing to see the interaction between technological features of globalization and the global restructuring of capitalism, or the complex relations between capitalism and democracy. Dominant discourses of globalization are thus one-sidedly for or against globalization, failing to articulate the contradictions and the conflicting costs and benefits, upsides and downsides, of the process. Hence, many current theories of globalization do not capture the novelty and ambiguity of the present moment that involves both innovative forms of technology and economy -- and emergent conflicts and problems generated by the contradictions of globalization.
In particular, an economic determinism and reductionism that merely depicts globalization as the continuation of market capitalism fails to comprehend the new forms and modes of capitalism itself that are based on novel developments in science, technology, culture, and everyday life. Likewise, technological determinism fails to note how the new technologies and new economy are part of a global restructuring of capitalism and are not autonomous forces that themselves are engendering a new society and economy which breaks with the previous mode of social organization. The postindustrial society is sometimes referred to as the "knowledge society," or "information society," in which knowledge and information are given roles more predominant than earlier days (see the survey and critique in Webster 1995). It is now obvious that the knowledge and information sectors are increasingly important domains of the contemporary moment and that therefore the theories of Daniel Bell and other postindustrial theorists are not as ideological and far off the mark as many of his critics on the left once argued. But in order to avoid the technological determinism and idealism of many forms of this theory, one should theorize the information or knowledge "revolution" as part and parcel of a new form of technocapitalism marked by a synthesis of capital and technology.

Some poststructuralist theories that stress the complexity of globalization exaggerate the disjunctions and autonomous flows of capital, technology, culture, people, and goods, thus a critical theory of globalization grounds globalization in a theory of capitalist restructuring and technological revolution. To paraphrase Max Horkheimer, whoever wants to talk about capitalism, must talk about globalization, and it is impossible to theorize globalization without talking about the restructuring of capitalism. The term "technocapitalism" is useful to describe the synthesis of capital and technology in the present organization of society (Kellner 1989a). Unlike theories of postmodernity (i.e. Baudrillard), or the knowledge and information society, which often argue that technology is the new organizing principle of society, the concept of technocapitalism points to both the increasingly important role of technology and the enduring primacy of capitalist relations of production. In an era of unrestrained capitalism, it would be difficult to deny that contemporary societies are still organized around production and capital accumulation, and that capitalist imperatives continue to dominate production, distribution, and consumption, as well as other cultural, social and political domains. Workers remain exploited by capitalists and capital persists as the hegemonic force -- more so than ever after the collapse of communism.

Moreover, with the turn toward neo-liberalism as a hegemonic ideology and practice, the market and its logic comes to triumph over public goods and the state is subservient to economic imperatives and logic. Yet the term technocapitalism points to a new configuration of capitalist society in which technical and scientific knowledge, computerization and automation of labor, and information technology and multimedia play a role in the process of production analogous to the function of human labor power, mechanization of the labor process, and machines in an earlier era of capitalism. This process is generating novel modes of societal organization, forms of culture and everyday life, conflicts, and modes of struggle.

The emergence of novel and original forms of technology, politics, culture, and economy marks a situation parallel to that confronted by the Frankfurt school in the 1930s. These German theorists who left Nazi Germany were forced to theorize the new configurations brought about by the transition from market to state monopoly capitalism
(Kellner 1989a and Bronner and Kellner 1989). In their now classical texts, the Frankfurt school analyzed the emergent forms of social and economic organization, technology, and culture; the rise of giant corporations and cartels and the capitalist state in "organized capitalism," in both its fascist or "democratic" state capitalist forms; and the culture industries and mass culture which served as powerful modes of social control, manipulative forms of ideology and domination, and novel configurations of culture and everyday life.

Today, critical theorists confront the challenge of theorizing the emergent forms of technocapitalism and novelties of the present era constructed by syntheses of technology and capital in the emergence of a new stage of global capitalism. The notion of technocapitalism attempts to avoid technological or economic determinism by guiding theorists to perceive the interaction of capital and technology in the present moment. Capital is generating innovative forms of technology just as its restructuring is producing novel configurations of a networked global economy, culture, and polity. In terms of political economy, the emergent postindustrial form of technocapitalism is characterized by a decline of the state and increased power of the market, accompanied by the growing power of globalized transnational corporations and governmental bodies and declining power of the nation-state and its institutions -- which remain, however, extremely important players in the global economy, as the responses to the terror attacks of September 11 document.

Globalization also is constituted by a complex interconnection between capitalism and democracy, which involves positive and negative features, that both empowers and disempowers individuals and groups, undermining and yet creating potential for revitalized types of democracy. Yet most theories of globalization are either primarily negative, presenting it as a disaster for the human species, or as positive, bringing a wealth of products, ideas, and economic opportunities to a global arena. Hence, I would advocate development of a critical theory of globalization that would dialectically appraise its positive and negative features. A critical theory is sharply critical of globalization’s oppressive effects, skeptical of legitimating ideological discourse, but also recognizes the centrality of the phenomenon in the present age. It affirms and promotes globalization’s progressive features, while criticizing negative ones and noting contradictions and ambiguities.

The Contradictory Matrix of Globalization

Globalization thus combines economic, technological, social and cultural factors in a unique matrix that includes homogeneity and heterogeneity, massification and hybridity, capitalism and democracy, and a contradictory matrix of complex factors and effects. Globalization also contains a sometimes-conflicting mixture of the global and the local. As part of the backlash against globalization over the past years, a wide range of theorists have argued that the proliferation of difference and the shift to more local discourses and practices define significant alternatives to corporate globalization. In this view, theory and politics should swing from the level of globalization and its accompanying often totalizing and macro dimensions in order to focus on the local, the specific, the particular, the heterogeneous, and the micro level of everyday experience. An array of discourses associated with poststructuralism, postmodernism, feminism, and multiculturalism focus on difference, otherness, marginality, hybridity, the personal, the particular, and the concrete over more general theory and politics that aim at more global or universal conditions. Likewise, a broad spectrum of social movements and subcultures of resistance have focused
their attention on the local level, organizing struggles around a seemingly endless variety of identity issues (see Best and Kellner 2001, and Kahn and Kellner 2003).

However, it can be argued that such dichotomies as those between the global and the local express contradictions and tensions between crucial constitutive forces of the present moment, and that it is therefore a mistake to reject a focus on one side in favor of an exclusive concern with the other (Cvetkovich and Kellner 1997, Castells 1999). Hence, an important challenge for the emerging critical theory of globalization is to think through the relationships between the global and the local by observing how global forces influence and even structure an increasing number of local situations. This requires analysis as well of how local forces mediate the global, inflecting global forces to diverse ends and conditions, and producing unique configurations of the local and the global as the matrix for thought and action in the contemporary world (see Luke and Luke 2000).

Globalization is thus necessarily complex and challenging to both critical theories and radical democratic politics. But many people these days operate with binary concepts of the global and the local, and promote one or the other side of the equation as the solution to the world’s problems. For globalists, globalization is the solution, and underdevelopment, backwardness and provincialism are the problem. For localists, the globalized eradication of traditions, cultures, and places is the problem and localization is the solution. But, politics is frequently contextual and pragmatic, and whether global or local solutions are most salient depends upon the conditions in the distinctive context that one is addressing and the particular solutions and policies being proposed.

Specific locations and practices of a plurality of subcultures constitute an important feature of oppositional subcultural activities at work within the context of globalization. Consequently, theorists of globalization have made distinctions between globalization from above, as produced by dominant corporations, nation states and global institutions, and globalization from below consisting of groups opposing corporate globalization (see Brecher, Costello and Smith 2000). Against capitalist globalization from above, there have been a significant eruption of forces and subcultures of resistance that have attempted to preserve specific forms of culture and society against globalization and homogenization, and to create alternative forces of society and culture, thus exhibiting resistance and globalization from below. Most dramatically, peasant and guerrilla movements in Latin America, labor unions, students, and environmentalists throughout the world, and a variety of other groups and movements have resisted capitalist globalization and attacks on previous rights and benefits. Several dozen people's organizations from around the world have protested World Trade Organization policies and a backlash against globalization is visible everywhere. Politicians who once championed trade agreements like GATT and NAFTA are now often quiet about these arrangements and at the 1996 annual Davos World Economic Forum its founder and managing director published a warning entitled: "Start Taking the Backlash Against Globalization Seriously." Reports surfaced that major representatives of the capitalist system expressed fear that capitalism was getting too mean and predatory, that it needs a kinder and gentler state to ensure order and harmony, and that the welfare state may make a comeback. One should take such reports with the proverbial grain of salt, but they express fissures and openings in the system for critical discourse and intervention.

Indeed, by 1999, the theme of the annual Davos conference was making globalization work for poor countries and minimizing the differences between have and
have-nots. The growing divisions between rich and poor were worrying some globalizers, as were the wave of crises in Asian, Latin American, and other developing countries. In James Flanigan's report in the Los Angeles Times (Feb. 19, 1999), the "main theme" is to "spread the wealth. In a world frightened by glaring imbalances and the weakness of economies from Indonesia to Russia, the talk is no longer of a new world economy getting stronger but of ways to 'keep the engine going.'" In particular, the globalizers were attempting to keep economies growing in the more developed countries and capital flowing to developing nations. U.S. Vice-President Al Gore called on all countries to spur economic growth, and he proposed a new U.S.-led initiative to eliminate the debt burdens of developing countries. South African President Nelson Mandela asked: "Is globalization only for the powerful? Does it offer nothing to the men, women and children who are ravaged by the violence of poverty?"

In the 2000s, there were ritual proclamations of the need to make globalization work for the developing nations at all major meetings of global institutions like the WTO or G-8 convenings. For instance, at the September 2003 WTO meeting at Cancun, organizers claimed that its goal was to fashion a new trade agreement that would reduce poverty and boost development in poorer nations. But critics pointed out that in the past years the richer nations of the U.S., Japan, and Europe continued to enforce trade tariffs and provide subsidies for national producers of goods such as agriculture, while forcing poorer nations to open their markets to "free trade," thus bankrupting agricultural sectors in these countries that could not compete. Moreover, major economists like Joseph Stiglitz (2002), as well as anti-corporate globalization protestors and critics, argued that the developing countries were not developing under current corporate globalization policies and that divisions between the rich and poor nations were growing. Under these conditions, critics of globalization were calling for radically new policies that would help the developing countries, regulate the rich, and provide more power to working people and local groups. 7

But not only the anti-corporate globalization movement emerged as a form of globalization from below, but also Al Qaeda and various global terror networks intensified their attacks and helped generate an era of Terror War (Kellner 2003a). This made it difficult simply to affirm globalization from below while denigrating globalization from above, as clearly terrorism was an emergent and dangerous form of globalization from below that was attacking hegemonic global forces and institutions. Moreover, in the face of Bush administration unilateralism and militarism, multilateral approaches to the problems of terrorism called for global responses to the problem, as I argue in this paper. Thus, in the next section I reflect upon the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 and subsequent Terror War as exemplifying the contradictions and ambiguities of globalization today and conclude with reflections on the proper global response to terrorism.

Terrorism and the Contradictions and Ambiguities of Globalization

The terrorist acts on the United States on September 11 and subsequent Terror War dramatically disclose the downsides of globalization, the ways that global flows of technology, goods, information, ideologies, and people can have destructive as well as productive effects. The disclosure of powerful anti-Western terrorist networks shows that globalization divides the world as it unifies, that it produces enemies as it incorporates participants. Globalization links people together and brings new commonalities into
experience just as it differentiates them and produces new inequalities. Likewise, while it connects and brings into global networks parts of the world that were isolated and cut-off, it ignores and bypasses other regions. The events disclose explosive contradictions and conflicts at the heart of globalization and that the technologies of information, communication, and transportation that facilitate globalization can also be used to undermine and attack it, and generate instruments of destruction as well as production.8

The experience of September 11 points to the objective ambiguity of globalization, that positive and negative sides are interconnected, that the institutions of the open society unlock the possibilities of destruction and violence, as well as democracy, free trade, and cultural and social exchange. Once again, the interconnection and interdependency of the networked world was dramatically demonstrated as terrorists from the Middle East brought local grievances from their region to attack key symbols of American power and the very infrastructure of New York. Some saw terrorism as an expression of “the dark side of globalization,” while I would conceive it as part of the ambiguity and contradictions of globalization that simultaneously creates friends and enemies, wealth and poverty, and growing divisions between the “haves” and “have nots.” Yet, the downturn of the global economy, intensification of local and global political conflicts, repression of human rights and civil liberties, and general increase in fear and anxiety have certainly undermined the naïve optimism of globophiles who perceived globalization as a purely positive instrument of progress and well-being.

The use of powerful technologies as weapons of destruction also discloses current asymmetries of power and emergent forms of terrorism and war, as the new millennium exploded into dangerous conflicts and interventions. As technologies of mass destruction become more available and dispersed, perilous instabilities have emerged that have elicited policing measures to stem the flow of movements of people and goods across borders and internally. In particular, the USA Patriot Act has led to repressive measures that are replacing the spaces of the open and free information society with new forms of surveillance, policing, and repression, thus significantly undermining U.S. democracy (see Kellner 2003b).

Ultimately, however, the abhorrent terror acts by the bin Laden network and the violent military response by the Bush administration may be an anomalous paroxysm whereby a highly regressive premodern Islamic fundamentalism has clashed with an old-fashioned patriarchal and unilateralist Wild West militarism. It could be that such forms of terrorism, militarism, and state repression would be superseded by more rational forms of politics that globally criminalize terrorism, and that do not sacrifice the benefits of the open society and economy in the name of security. Yet the events of September 11 may open a new era of Terror War that will lead to the kind of apocalyptic futurist world depicted by cyberpunk fiction.

In any case, the events of September 11 have promoted a fury of reflection, theoretical debates, and political conflicts and upheaval that put the complex dynamics of globalization at the center of contemporary theory and politics. To those skeptical of the centrality of globalization to contemporary experience, it is now clear that we are living in a global world that is highly interconnected and vulnerable to passions and crises that can cross borders and can effect anyone or any region at any time. The events of September 11 also provide a test case to evaluate various theories of globalization and the contemporary era. In addition, they highlight some of the contradictions of globalization and the need to
develop a highly complex and dialectical model to capture its conflicts, ambiguities, and contradictory effects.

Consequently, I want to argue that in order to properly theorize globalization one needs to conceptualize several sets of contradictions generated by globalization's combination of technological revolution and restructuring of capital, which in turn generate tensions between capitalism and democracy, and “haves” and “have nots.” Within the world economy, globalization involves the proliferation of the logic of capital, but also the spread of democracy in information, finance, investing, and the diffusion of technology (see Friedman 1999 and Hardt and Negri 2000). Globalization is thus a contradictory amalgam of capitalism and democracy, in which the logic of capital and the market system enter ever more arenas of global life, even as democracy spreads and more political regions and spaces of everyday life are being contested by democratic demands and forces. But the overall process is contradictory. Sometimes globalizing forces promote democracy and sometimes inhibit it, thus either equating capitalism and democracy, or simply opposing them, are problematical.

The processes of globalization are highly turbulent and have generated new conflicts throughout the world. Benjamin Barber (1998) describes the strife between McWorld and Jihad, contrasting the homogenizing, commercialized, Americanized tendencies of the global economy and culture with traditional cultures which are often resistant to globalization. Thomas Friedman (1999) makes a more benign distinction between what he calls the "Lexus" and the "Olive Tree." The former is a symbol of modernization, of affluence and luxury, and of Westernized consumption, contrasted with the Olive Tree that is a symbol of roots, tradition, place, and stable community. Barber (1997), however, is too negative toward McWorld and Jihad, failing to adequately describe the democratic and progressive forces within both. Although Barber recognizes a dialectic of McWorld and Jihad, he opposes both to democracy, failing to perceive how both generate their own democratic forces and tendencies, as well as opposing and undermining democratization. Within the Western democracies, for instance, there is not just top-down homogenization and corporate domination, but also globalization-from-below and oppositional social movements that desire alternatives to capitalist globalization. Thus, it is not only traditionalist, non-Western forces of Jihad that oppose McWorld. Likewise, Jihad has its democratizing forces as well as the reactionary Islamic fundamentalists who are now the most demonized elements of the contemporary era. Jihad, like McWorld, has its contradictions and its potential for democratization, as well as elements of domination and destruction (see Kellner 2003b).

Friedman, by contrast, is too uncritical of globalization, caught up in his own Lexus high-consumption life-style, failing to perceive the depth of the oppressive features of globalization and breadth and extent of resistance and opposition to it. In particular, he fails to articulate contradictions between capitalism and democracy and the ways that globalization and its economic logic undermines democracy as well as circulates it. Likewise, he does not grasp the virulence of the premodern and Jihadist tendencies that he blithely identifies with the Olive tree and the reasons why globalization and the West are so strongly resisted in many parts of the world.

Hence, it is important to present globalization as a strange amalgam of both homogenizing forces of sameness and uniformity, and heterogeneity, difference, and hybridity, as well as a contradictory mixture of democratizing and anti-democratizing
tendencies. On one hand, globalization unfolds a process of standardization in which a
globalized mass culture circulates the globe creating sameness and homogeneity
everywhere. But globalized culture makes possible unique appropriations and developments
all over the world, thus proliferating hybridity, difference, and heterogeneity.9 Every local
context involves its own appropriation and reworking of global products and signifiers, thus
that globalization embodies these contradictory tendencies at once, that it can be both a force
of homogenization and heterogeneity, is crucial to articulating the contradictions of
globalization and avoiding one-sided and reductive conceptions.

My intention is to present globalization as conflictual, contradictory and open to
resistance and democratic intervention and transformation and not just as a monolithic
juggernaut of progress or domination as in many discourses. This goal is advanced by
distinguishing between "globalization from below" and the "globalization from above" of
 corporate capitalism and the capitalist state, a distinction that should help us to get a better
sense of how globalization does or does not promote democratization. "Globalization from
below" refers to the ways in which marginalized individuals and social movements resist
globalization and/or use its institutions and instruments to further democratization and social
justice.

Yet, one needs to avoid binary normative articulations, since globalization from
below can have highly conservative and destructive effects, as well as positive ones, while
globalization from above can help produce global solutions to problems like terrorism or the
environment. Thus, in distinguishing between globalization from above and globalization
from below, one should not simply affirm that one is good and the other is bad in relation to
democracy. As Friedman shows (1999), capitalist corporations and global forces might very
well promote democratization in many arenas of the world, and globalization-from-below
might promote special interests or reactionary goals, as well as destructive projects like Al
Qaeda terrorism.

While on one level, globalization significantly increases the supremacy of big
corporations and big government, it can also give power to groups and individuals that were
previously left out of the democratic dialogue and terrain of political struggle. Such
potentially positive effects of globalization include increased access to education for
individuals excluded from entry to culture and knowledge and the possibility of oppositional
individuals and groups to participate in global culture and politics through gaining access to
global communication and media networks and to circulate local struggles and oppositional
ideas through these media. The role of new technologies in social movements, political
struggle, and everyday life forces social movements to reconsider their political strategies
and goals and democratic theory to appraise how new technologies do and do not promote
democratization (Kellner 1997 and 1999b).

In their book Empire, Hardt and Negri (2000) present contradictions within
globalization in terms of an imperializing logic of “Empire” and an assortment of struggles
by the multitude, creating a contradictory and tension-full situation. As in my conception,
Hardt and Negri present globalization as a complex process that involves a
multidimensional mixture of expansions of the global economy and capitalist market
system, new technologies and media, expanded judicial and legal modes of governance, and
emergent modes of power, sovereignty, and resistance.10 Combining poststructuralism with
“autonomous Marxism,” Hardt and Negri stress political openings and possibilities of
struggle within Empire in an optimistic and buoyant text that envisages progressive democratization and self-valorization in the turbulent process of the restructuring of capital.

Many theorists, by contrast, have argued that one of the trends of globalization is depoliticization of publics, the decline of the nation-state, and end of traditional politics (Boggs 2000). While I would agree that globalization is promoted by tremendously powerful economic forces and that it often undermines democratic movements and decision-making, I would also argue that there are openings and possibilities for a globalization from below, and that globalization can thus help promote as well as undermine democracy. As noted, however, globalization from below can implement and inflect globalization both for positive and progressive ends like democracy and social justice, as well as destructive ones like terrorism.

In general, globalization involves both a disorganization and reorganization of capitalism, a tremendous restructuring process, which creates openings for progressive social change and intervention. In a more fluid and open economic and political system, oppositional forces can gain concessions, win victories, and effect progressive changes. During the 1970s, new social movements, new non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and new forms of struggle and solidarity emerged that have been expanding to the present day (Hardt and Negri 2000; Burbach 2001; and Foran 2003). And, as noted, destructive forces are also unleashed like terrorism and the sorts of civil war apparent in Africa and other parts of the developing world.

The present conjuncture, I would suggest, is marked by a conflict between growing centralization and organization of power and wealth in the hands of the few contrasted with opposing processes exhibiting a fragmentation of power that is more plural, multiple, and open to contestation. As the following analysis will suggest, both tendencies are observable and it is up to individuals and groups to find openings for progressive political intervention and social transformation that pursue positive values such as democracy, human rights, ecological preservation and restoration, and social justice, while fighting poverty, terror, and injustice. Thus, rather than just denouncing globalization, or engaging in celebration and legitimation, a critical theory of globalization reproaches those aspects that are oppressive, while seizing upon opportunities to fight domination and exploitation and to promote democratization, justice, and a forward looking reconstruction of the polity, society, and culture.

Globalization, Terror War, and 9/11

Momentous historical events, like the September 11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent Terror War, test social theories and provide a challenge to give a convincing account of the event and its consequences. In the following analyses, I want first to suggest how certain dominant social theories were put in question during the momentous and world-shaking events of September 11, and offer an analysis of the historical background necessary to understand and contextualize the terror attacks.

I am using the term “Terror War” to describe the Bush administration’s “war against terrorism” and its use of unilateral military force and terror as the privileged vehicles of constructing a U.S. hegemony in the current world (dis)order (see Kellner 2003b). The Bush administration has expanded its combat against Islamic terrorism into a policy of Terror War where they have declared the right of the U.S. to strike any enemy
state or organization presumed to harbor or support terrorism, or to eliminate “weapons of mass destruction” that could be used against the U.S. The rightwing of the Bush administration seeks to promote Terror War as the defining struggle of the era, coded as an apocalyptic battle between good and evil and has already mounted major military campaigns against Afghanistan and Iraq, with highly ambiguous and unsettling results.

Social theories generalize from past experience and provide accounts of historical events or periods that attempt to map, illuminate, and perhaps criticize dominant social relations, institutions, forms, trends, and events of a given epoch. In turn, they can be judged by the extent to which they account for, interpret, and critically assess contemporary conditions, or predict future events or developments. One major theory of the past two decades, Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History (1992), was strongly put into question by the events of September 11 and their aftermath. For Fukuyama, the collapse of Soviet communism and triumph of Western capitalism and democracy in the early 1990s constituted “the end of history.” This signified for him “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” Although there may be conflicts in places like the Third World, overall for Fukuyama liberal democracy and market capitalism have prevailed and future politics will revolve around resolving routine economic and technical problems, and the future will accordingly be rather mundane and boring.

Samuel Huntington polemicizes against Fukuyama’s “one world: euphoria and harmony” model in his The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996). For Huntington, the future holds a series of clashes between “the West and the Rest.” Huntington rejects a number of models of contemporary history, including a “realist” model that nation-states are primary players on the world scene who will continue to form alliances and coalitions that will play themselves out in various conflicts. He also rejects a “chaos” model that detects no discernible order or structure. Instead, Huntington asserts that the contemporary world is articulated into competing civilizations that are based on irreconcilably different cultures and religions. For Huntington, culture provides unifying and integrating principles of order and cohesion, and from dominant cultural formations emerge civilizations that are likely to come into conflict with each other, including Islam, China, Russia, and the West. On Huntington’s model, religion is “perhaps the central force that motivates and mobilizes people” and is thus the core of civilization.

Although Huntington’s model seems to have some purchase in the currently emerging global encounter with terrorism, and is becoming a new dominant conservative ideology, it tends to overly homogenize both Islam and the West, as well as the other civilizations he depicts. As Tariq Ali argues (2002), Huntington exaggerates the role of religion, while downplaying the importance of economics and politics. Moreover, Huntington’s model lends itself to pernicious misuse, and has been deployed to call for and legitimate military retribution against implacable adversarial civilizations by conservative intellectuals like Jeane Kirkpatrick, Henry Kissinger, and members of the Bush administration, as well as, in effect, to give credence to Al Qaeda and Jihadist attacks against the “corrupt” and “infidel” West.

In sum, Huntington’s work provides too essentialist a model that covers over contradictions and conflicts both within the West and within Islam. Both worlds have been divided for centuries into dueling countries, ethnic groups, religious fractions, and
complex alliances that have fought fierce wars against each other and that continue to be divided geographically, politically, ideologically, and culturally (see Ali 2002). Moreover, Huntington’s ideal type that contrasts East and West, based on conflicting models of civilization, covers over the extent to which Arab and Muslim culture preserved the cultural traditions of the Greece and Rome during the Middle Ages and thus played a major role in constituting Western culture and modernity. Huntington downplays as well the extent to which Western science and technology were importantly anticipated and developed in the Middle and Far East.14

Furthermore, Islam itself is a contested terrain and in the current situation there are important attempts to mobilize more moderate forms of Islam and Islamic countries against Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda terror network and Islamic extremism (see Ahmed 2003). Hence, Huntington’s binary model of inexorable conflict between the West and Islam is not only analytically problematic, but covers over the crucial battle within Islam itself to define the role and nature of religion in the contemporary world. It also decenters the important challenge for the West to engage the Islamic world in a productive dialogue about religion and modernity and to bring about more peaceful, informed, and mutually beneficial relations between the West and the Islamic world. Positing inexorable conflicts between civilizations may well describe past history and present dangers, but it does not help produce a better future and is thus normatively and politically defective and dangerous.

Globalization includes a homogenizing neo-liberal market logic and commodification, cultural interaction, and hybridization, as well as conflict between corporations, nations, blocs, and cultures. Benjamin Barber’s book McWorld vs. Jihad (1996) captures both the sameness and conflictual elements of globalization. Barber divides the world into a modernizing, stanardizing, Westernizing, and secular forces of globalization, controlled by multinational corporations, opposed to premodern, fundamentalist, and tribalizing forces at war with the West and modernity. The provocative “Jihad” in the title seems to grasp precisely the animus against the West in Islamic extremism. But “Jihad” scholars argue that the term has a complex history in Islam and often privilege the more spiritual senses as a struggle for religion and spiritualization, or a struggle within oneself for spiritual mastery. From this view, bin Laden’s militarization of Jihad is itself a distortion of Islam that is contested by its mainstream.15

Leading dualistic theories that posit a fundamental bifurcation between the West and Islam are thus analytically suspicious in that they homogenize complex civilizations and cover over differences, hybridizations, contradictions, and conflicts within these cultures. Positing inexorable clashes between bifurcated blocs a la Huntington and Barber fails to illuminate specific discord within the opposing spheres and the complex relations between them. These analyses do not grasp the complexity in the current geopolitical situation, which involves highly multifaceted and intricate interests, coalitions, and conflicts that shift and evolve in response to changing situations within an overdetermined and constantly evolving historical context. As Tariq Ali points out (2002), dualistic models of clashes of civilization also occlude the historical forces that clashed in the September 11 attacks and the subsequent Terror War.

Consequently, the events of September 11 and their aftermath suggest that critical social theory needs models that account for complexity and the historical roots and
vicissitudes of contemporary problems like terrorism rather than bifurcated dualistic theories. Critical social theory also needs to articulate how events like September 11 produce novel historical configurations while articulating both changes and continuities in the present situation. It requires historical accounts of the contemporary origins of Islamic radicalism and its complicity with U.S. imperialism (see Kellner 2003b). The causes of the September 11 events and their aftermath are highly multifaceted and involve, for starters, the failure of U.S. intelligence and the destructive consequences of U.S. interventionist foreign policy since World War II and the failure to address the Israeli-Palestinian crisis; U.S. policies since the late 1970s that supported Islamic Jihadist forces against the Soviet Union in the last days of the Cold War; and the failure to take terrorist threats seriously and provide an adequate response. In other words, there is no one cause or faction responsible for the 9/11 terror attacks, but a wide range of responsibility to be ascribed and a complex historical background concerning relations between the U.S. and radical Islamic forces in the Cold War and then conflicts starting with the 1990-1991 “crisis in the Gulf” and subsequent Gulf War (see Kellner 1992 and 2003b. In the next section, I want to suggest how these events have been bound up with the trajectory of globalization.

Globalization and the Aftermath 9/11 Terror Attacks: What Has Changed?

In the aftermath of September 11, there was a wealth of commentary arguing that “everything has changed,” that the post-September 11 world is a different one, less innocent, more serious, and significantly altered, with momentous modifications in the economy, polity, culture and everyday life. There were some doubters such as historian Alan Brinkley who stated in a New York Times interview (Sept. 14, 2002): “I’m skeptical that this is a great rupture in the fabric of history.” Time alone will tell the depth of the magnitude of change, but there are enough significant shifts that have occurred already to see September 11 as a transformational event that has created some dramatic alterations in both the U.S. and global society, signaling reconfigurations and novelties in the current world.

In the context of U.S. politics, September 11 was so far-reaching and catastrophic that it flipped the political world upside down, put new issues on the agenda, and changed the political, cultural, and economic climate almost completely overnight. To begin, there was a dramatic reversal of the fortunes of George W. Bush and the Bush administration. Before September 11, Bush’s popularity was rapidly declining. After several months of the most breathtaking hardright turn perhaps ever seen in U.S. politics, Bush seemed to lose control of the agenda with the defection of Vermont Republican Senator Jim Jeffords to the Democratic Party in May 2001. Jeffords’ defection gave the Democrats a razor-thin control of Congress and the ability to block Bush’s programs and to advance their own (see Kellner 2001, Chapter Eleven). Bush seemed disengaged after this setback, spending more and more time at his Texas ranch. He was widely perceived as incompetent and unqualified, and his public support was seriously eroding.

With the terror attacks of September 11, however, the bitter partisanship of the previous months disappeared and Bush was the beneficiary of a extraordinary outburst of patriotism. Support for the Bush administration was strongly fuelled by the media that provided 24/7 coverage of the heroism of the fireman, police, and rescue workers at the
World Trade Center. The response of ordinary citizens to the tragedy showed American courage, skill, and dedication at its best, as rescue workers heroically struggled to save lives and deal with the immense problems of removing the Trade Center ruins. New York City and the country pulled together in a remarkable display of community, heroism, and resolve, focused on in the ongoing media coverage of the tragedy. There was an explosion of flags and patriotism and widespread desire for military retaliation, fanned by the media.

The U.S. media’s demonizing coverage of bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network of terrorists and constant demand for strong military retaliation precluded developing broader coalitions and more global and less militarist approaches to the problem of terrorism. The anthrax attacks, unsolved as I write in Fall 2003, fueled media hysteria and mass panic that terrorism could strike anyone at any time and any place. Bush articulated the escalating patriotism, vilification of the terrorists, and the demand for stern military retaliation, and a frightened nation supported his policies, often without seeing their broader implications and threat to democracy and world peace.

There was a brief and ironical ideological flip-flop of Bush administration policy, in which it temporarily put aside the unilateralism that had distinguished its first months in office in favor of a multilateral approach. As the Bush administration scrambled to assemble a global coalition against terrorism with partners such as Pakistan, China, and Russia, that it had previously ignored or in the case of China even provoked, illusions circulated that the U.S. would pursue a more multilateral global politics. Yet ultimately the U.S. largely chose to fight the Afghanistan war itself, eschewing NATO, UN, or other multilateral support. One could indeed argue that the failures of the Afghan intervention to capture bin Laden, Mullah Omar, and other top Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership was a result of the U.S. choosing a unilateral military policy rather than a more multilateral approach (see Kellner 2003b).

With the apparent collapse of the Taliban and the defacto conclusion of the intense military phase of the Afghanistan Terror War by December 2001, the Bush administration intensified its unilateral approach and only many months later invited in a more multilateral policing force although as of Fall 2003, the multilateral police forces are only operative in Kabul and the rest of the country remains in chaos. Moreover, the Bush doctrine articulated in his January 2002 State of the Union address projected an “axis of evil” threatened by U.S. military action, called for unprecedented military action and build-up, and evoked an image of an era of war via U.S. military intervention throughout the world for the foreseeable future. The threat of a new militarism as the defining feature of the Bush era was intensified as his administration came to formulate his doctrine of “preemptive strikes” during the summer of 2002 and put into practice via the Bush and Blair war against Iraq in April 2003.

Crucially, the September 11 events dramatized that globalization is a defining reality of our time and that the much-celebrated flow of people, ideas, technology, media, and goods could have a down side as well as an upside, and expensive costs as well as benefits. The 9/11 terror attacks also call attention to the complex and unpredictable nature of a globally-connected networked society and the paradoxes, surprises, and unintended consequences that flow from the multidimensional processes of globalization. Al Qaeda presented an example of a hidden and secretive decentered network dedicated to attacking the U.S. and their Afghanistan base represented what theorists called “wild
zones” or “zones of turmoil” that existed out of the boundaries of “safe zones” of globalized metropoles like Wall Street and Northern Virginia (see Mann 2001 and Urry 2002). Globalization thus generates its Other, its opponents, just as it destroys tradition and incorporates ever more parts of the world and forms of life into its modernizing and neo-liberal market.

For the first time, the American people were obliged to perceive that it had serious enemies throughout the globe and that global problems had to be addressed. No longer could the U.S. enjoy the luxury of isolationism, but was forced to actively define its role within a dangerous and complex global environment. Moreover, the terror attacks of 9/11 put in question much conventional wisdom and forced U.S. citizens and others to reflect upon the continued viability of key values, practices, and institutions of a democratic society. In particular, the events of September 11 force the rethinking of globalization, technology, democracy, and national and global security. 9/11 and its aftermath demonstrate the significance of globalization and the ways that global, national, and local scenes and events intersect in the contemporary world. The terror spectacle also pointed to the fundamental contradictions and ambiguities of globalization, undermining one-sided pro or anti-globalization positions.

9/11 was obviously a global event that dramatized an interconnected and conflicted networked society where there is a constant worldwide flow of people, products, technologies, ideas and the like. September 11 could only be a mega-event in a global media world, a society of the spectacle (Debord 1970), where the whole world is watching and participates in what Marshall McLuhan (1964) called a global village. The 9/11 terror spectacle was obviously constructed as a media event to circulate terror and to demonstrate to the world the vulnerability of the epicenter of global capitalism and American power.

Thus, September 11 dramatized the interconnected networked globe and the important role of the media in which individuals everywhere can simultaneously watch events of global significance unfold and participate in the dramas of globalization. Already, Bill Clinton had said before September 11 that terrorism is the downside, the dark side, of globalization, and after 9/11 Colin Powell interpreted the terrorist attacks in similar fashion. Worldwide terrorism is threatening in part because globalization relentlessly divides the world into have and have-nots, promotes conflicts and competition, and fuels long simmering hatreds and grievances — as well as bringing people together, creating new relations and interactions, and new hybridities. This is the objective ambiguity of globalization that both brings people together and brings them into conflict, that creates social interaction and inclusion, as well as hostilities and exclusions, and that potentially tears regions and the world apart while attempting to pull things together. Moreover, as different groups gain access to technologies of destruction and devise plans to make conventional technologies, like the airplane, instruments of destruction then dangers of unexpected terror events, any place and any time proliferate and become part of the frightening mediascape of the contemporary moment.

Globalization is thus messier and more dangerous than previous theories had indicated. Moreover, global terrorism and megaspectacle terror events are possible because of the lethality and power of new technology, and its availability to groups and individuals that previously had restricted access. In a perverted distortion of Andrew Feenberg’s theory of the reconstruction and democratization of technology (1995, 1999),
terrorist groups seek technologies of mass destruction in the past monopolized by the state and take instruments of mass transportation and communication run by corporations and the state, like airlines and mail delivery, and reconvert these instruments into weapons of mass destruction, or at least of mass terror. I might parenthetically note here the etymology of the term terrorism, which, according to most scholars, derives from the Latin verb terrere, “to cause to tremble or quiver.” It began to be used during the French Revolution, and especially after the fall of Robespierre and the “reign of terror,” or simply, “the Terror” in which enemies of the revolution were subjected to imprisonment, torture and beheading, the first of many modern examples of state terrorism.

Hence, 9/11 exhibited a technological terror that converts benign instruments like airlines and buildings into instruments of mass destruction. Within a short time after the 9/11 terror attacks, in early October, 2001, the mail system was polluted by anthrax. Since infected letters were sent to politicians and corporate media, there was maximum public attention on the dangers on a lethal anthrax attack, making postal work, mail delivery, and the opening of mail a traumatic event, infused with fear. This is exactly the goal of terrorism and media hysteria over anthrax attacks went far in promoting war fever and hysterical fear that led the public to unquestionably support whatever military retaliation, or domestic politics, the Bush administration choose to exert. Curiously, while the Bush administration seemed at first to blame the Al Qaeda network and then Iraq for the anthrax attacks, it appears that the military high grade of anthrax has the genetic footprint of U.S. laboratories in Fort Detrick Maryland. But eventually the FBI and academic experts believe the source of the attacks was an individual working for the U.S. defense and biological weapons establishment (see Kellner 2003b).

It is clear from September 11 that the new technologies disperse power, empowering angry disempowered people, leveling the playing field and distributing the use and application of information technology and some technologies of mass destruction. Many military technologies can be obtained by individuals and groups to use against the superpowers and the access to such technology produces a situation of asymmetrical war where weaker individuals and groups can go after superpowers. The possibility of new forms of cyberwar, and terrorist threats from chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, creates new vulnerabilities in the national defense of the overdeveloped countries and provides opportunities for weaker nations or groups to attack stronger ones. Journalist William Greider, for instance, author of Fortress America: The American Military and the Consequences of Peace, claims that: "A deadly irony is embedded in the potential of these new technologies. Smaller, poorer nations may be able to defend themselves on the cheap against the intrusion of America's overwhelming military strength" (abcsnew.com, 11/01/99) -- or exercise deadly terrorism against civilian populations.

Hence, the U.S. discovered that it is vulnerable domestically to terrorist attack. Likewise, it is becoming clear that the more technologically advanced a society is, the more vulnerable it is to cyberwar. There are now, of course, serious worries about the Internet and cyberterrorism disrupting the global economy and networked society. It is somewhat strange that terrorist groups have not, in fact, gone after the Internet, and attempted to shut it down since they were obviously attempting to disrupt global business by attacking the World Trade Center and airlines industry. Already Paul Virilio evoked the frightening possibility of the collapse of the Internet through a major technological “event” that
would cause its shutdown — disruptions previewed by hacker attacks, worms, and viruses over the past years.¹⁹

Rather, the Al Qaeda terror network used the Internet, as it used globalization, to move its communication, money, people, propaganda, and terror. Curiously, then, 9/11 dramatizes that all of the most positive aspects of globalization and new technology can be turned against the U.S., or, in general, positive aspects of globalization can turn into their opposite. This situation illustrates Adorno and Horkheimer’s “dialectic of Enlightenment,” in which reason, science, technology, and other instruments of Enlightenment turned into their opposites in the hands of German fascism and other oppressive social groups (1972). Airplanes, for example, can be instruments of terror as well as transportation. Indeed, globalization makes possible global terror networks as well as networks of commerce and communication. The circulation of commodities, technologies, ideas, money and people can facilitate networks of terror, as well as trade and travel. The Internet makes possible the spreading of hate and terror, as well as knowledge and culture. Computers can be an integral part of a terror network just as they are part of businesses everywhere and many of our own everyday lives. And biotechnology, which promises such extravagant medical advances and miracles, can provide weapons of mass destruction, as well as medicines and positive forces.

Thus, September 11 and its aftermath exhibits the contradictions and ambiguities of globalization, the Internet, biotechnology, and technology in general in the contemporary age. Globalization has upsides and downsides, costs and benefits, which are often interconnected, and is consequently intrinsically ambiguous. New technologies can be used positively or negatively and in fact are at once potentially empowering and productive and disempowering and destructive, and are thus fraught with contradictions. Often, the positives and negatives of globalization and new technology are intertwined, as when the free and open society enabled the open movement of terrorists; the open architecture of the Internet enabled terrorists to communicate, circulate money, and organize their terror attacks; and the networked society of globalization, with its dark sides, enabled terrorists to attack the very symbols of American global wealth and power.

Certainly bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network represents bad globalization, most would agree, and the perverted use of technology. But in a sense the Al Qaeda Jihad is the reverse image of McWorld, which imposes its Jihad on tradition and local culture, wanting to create the world in its image. Just as Al Qaeda dreams of imposing a radical premodern Islam on the world, taking over and destroying Western infidel culture and imposing a homogenized Islamic fundamentalism, so too does McDonald’s want to destroy local and traditional eating habits and cuisine and replace them with a globalized and universalized menu.

Hence, whereas theories of globalization, the Internet, and cyberculture tended to be on the whole one-sided, either pro or con, 9/11 and its aftermath showed the objective ambiguity and contradictions of these phenomena and need for a more dialectical and contextualizing optic. On one hand, the events showed the fundamental interdependence of the world, dramatizing how activities in one part of the world effected others and the need for more global consciousness and politics. The September 11 events exposed the dangers and weaknesses inherent in constructions of Fortress America, and the untenability of isolationism and unilateralist policies. They made evident that we are in a local/global world with local/global problems, which require local/global solutions.
As the Bush administration pursued increasingly unilateralist policies after seeming to make gestures toward a multilateralist response, the aftermath of 9/11 shows the limited possibilities for a single nation to impose its will on the world and to dominate the complex environment of the world economy and politics, as the turmoil evident by fall 2003 in both Afghanistan and Iraq reveal. The 9/11 terror attacks also disclosed the failures of the laissez-faire conservative economics, which claimed that there was a market solution to every problem. Just as Grand Theft 2000 revealed the failure of voting technology, the voting registration process, the very system of voting, as well as the failure of the media and judicial system in the United States (see Kellner 2001), so too did September 11 reveal the massive failure of U.S. intelligence agencies, the National Security State, and the U.S. government to protect the people in the country, as well as cities and monuments, against terrorist attack. The privatization undergone by the airlines industry left travelers vulnerable to the hijacking of airplanes; the confused and ineffectual response by the federal government to the anthrax attacks uncovered the necessity of a better public health system, as well as more protection and security against terrorist attacks. Going after the terror networks disclosed the need for tighter financial regulation, better legal and police coordination, and an improved intelligence and national security apparatus. Rebuilding New York City and the lives of those affected by the terror attacks showed the need for a beneficent welfare state that would provide for its citizens in their time of need.

Thus, the 9/11 events end the fantasies of Reagan-Bush conservative economics that the market alone can solve all social problems and provide the best mechanism for every industry and sector of life. The Bush-Enron scandals also reveal the utter failures of neoliberalism and the need for a stronger and more effective polity for the U.S. to compete and survive in a highly complex world economy and polity (see Kellner 2003b, Chapter 9).

On the whole, September 11 and its aftermath have made the world a much more dangerous place. Regional conflicts from the Israel-Palestine hostilities in the Middle East to India-Pakistan conflict to discord in Africa, the Philippines, Columbia, and elsewhere have used Bush administration discourse against terrorism to suppress human rights, to legitimate government oppression, and to kill political opponents throughout the world. Bush administration unilateralism in pursuing the war against terror throughout the world, including against an imagined “axis of evil” not directly related to the Al Qaeda terror network, has weakened multilateral agreements and forces from NATO to the UN and has increased collective insecurity immensely. The Bush administration polarizing policy of “you are with us or against us” has divided alliances, is ever more isolating the U.S. and is producing a more polarized and conflicted world. The alarming build-up of U.S. military power is escalating a new militarism and producing proliferating enemies and resentment against the U.S., now being increasingly seen as a rogue superpower. Finally, aggressive U.S. military action throughout the world, failed propaganda in the Arab world, and what is perceived as growing U.S. arrogance and belligerence is producing more enemies in the Arab world and elsewhere that will no doubt create dangerous blowback effects in the future.

Not only has Bush administration unilateralist foreign policy endangered the U.S. to new attacks and enemies, but Bush administration domestic policy has also weakened democracy, civil liberties, and the very concept of a free and open society. Draconian anti-terror laws embodied in the so-called “USA Patriot Act” have immeasurably increased government powers of surveillance, arrest, and detention. The erection of military prison
camps for suspected terrorists, the abrogation of basic civil liberties, and the call for military trials undermines decades of progress in developing a democratic policy, producing among the most regressive U.S. domestic policies in history.

Bush administration economic policy has also done little to strengthen the “new economy,” largely giving favors to its major contributors in the oil, energy, and military industries. Bush administration censorship of Web-sites, e-mail and wireless communication, refusal to release government documents, and curtailment of the information freedom act signals the decline of the information society and perhaps of a free and open democratic society. Traditional Bush family secrecy explains part of the extreme assaults on open flow of information and freedom, but there are also signs that key members of the Bush administration are contemptuous of democracy itself and threaten to drastically cut back democratic rights and freedoms.

Consequently, Bush administration policy has arguably exploited the tragedy of September 11 for promoting its own political agenda and interests and threatens to undermine the U.S. and world economy and American democracy in the process. 9/11 thus represents a clear and present danger to the U.S. economy and democracy as well as the threat of terror attacks. Of course, many people lost loved ones in the 9/11 terror attacks and their lives will never be the same. Other individuals have returned to the routines and patterns of their pre-September 11 life, and there are thus continuities in culture and everyday life as well as differences and changes. It is not clear if there will be a significant and lasting resurgence of civic re-engagement, but more people now realize that global politics are highly significant and that there should be more focus and debates on this terrain than previously.

Still, many corporate and political interests and individual citizens pursue business as usual at the same time that significant differences unfold in the economy and politics. There are, however, intelligent and destructive ways to fight global terrorism and such a virulent global problem requires a global and multilateral solution, demanding alliances of a complex array of countries on the legal, police, economic, and military front. In this global context, there are serious dangers that the Bush administration will make the problem of terrorism worse and will immeasurably weaken the U.S. and the global economy and policy in the process. In the name of containing terrorism, the Bush administration is both championing curtailment of civil liberties and the public sphere domestically and promoting military solutions to terrorism globally. These policies legitimate repressive regimes to suppress human rights and democracy and to themselves use military and police methods to deal with their respective regime’s opponents and critics — as was evident in the India-Pakistan dispute, the intensification of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and numerous other actions around the world following the Bush administration Afghanistan intervention. And the U.S.-U.K. Iraq intervention also arguably destabilized the Middle East and created more enemies for the West and new waves of terrorist violence. In this situation, it is now becoming increasingly important to seek local/global solutions to local/global problems, to defend democracy and social justice, and to criticize both militarism and terrorism.

For Democracy and Against Terrorism and Militarism
In conclusion, I want to argue that in the light of the Bush administration attacks on democracy and the public sphere in the United States and elsewhere in the name of a war against terrorism, there should be a strong reaffirmation of the basic values and institutions of democracy and a call for local/global solutions to problems that involve both dimensions. Progressive social movements should thus struggle against terrorism, militarism, and social injustice and for democracy, peace, environmentalism, human rights, and social justice. Rather than curtailing democracy in the naming of fighting terrorism we need to strengthen democracy in the name of its survival and indeed the survival of the planet against the forces of violence and destruction. Rather than absolve Bush administration domestic and foreign policy from criticism in the name of patriotism and national unity, as the administration’s supporters demand, we need more than ever a critical dialogue on how to defeat terrorism and how to strengthen democracy throughout the world.

Democracy is in part a dialogue that requires dissent and debate as well as consensus. Those who believe in democracy should oppose all attempts to curtail democratic rights and liberties and a free and open public sphere. Democracy also involves the cultivation of oppositional public spheres and as in the 1960s on a global scale there should be a resurrection of the local, national, and global movements for social transformation that emerged as a reaction to war and injustice in the earlier era. This is not to call for a return to the 1960s, but for the rebirth of local/global movements for peace and justice that build on the lessons of the past as they engage the realities of the present.

In addition to re-affirming democracy, we should be against terrorism and militarism. This is not to argue for an utopic pacifism, but to argue against militarism in the sense that the military is offered as the privileged solution to the problem of terrorism and in which the military is significantly expanded, as in the Bush administration massive military build-up, and promotion of unilateral military action. Thus, while I would argue that military action against terrorism is legitimate, I would oppose U.S. unilateralist militarism outside of the bounds of recognized military conventions and law, and would favor more multilateral action in the context of global law and coalitions.

Yet just as globalization from above and from below can both have positive and destructive dimensions and effects, likewise unilateralism is not per se bad and multilateralism is not itself good. Sometimes it is necessary for nation-states to undertake unilateral action, and often multilateral agreements and coalitions are deployed to exert power of the haves over the have nots, or for stronger states to suppress weaker ones. Yet in the context of current debates over terrorism and global problems like the environment and arms control, certain multilateral and global solutions have become necessary while Bush administration unilateralism has clear shown its flaws and failures.

There is little doubt that the Bin Laden and Al Qaeda terrorists are highly fanatical and religious in their ideology and actions, of a sort hard to comprehend by Western categories. In their drive for an apocalyptic Jihad, they believe that their goals will be furthered by creating chaos, especially war between radical Islam and the West. Obviously, dialogue is not possible with such groups, but equally as certain an overreactive military response that causes a large number of innocent civilian deaths in a Muslim country could trigger precisely such an apocalyptic explosion of violence as was dreamed of by the fanatic terrorists. It would seem that such a retaliatory response was
desired by the Bin Laden group which carried out the terrorist attacks on the U.S. Thus, to continue to attack Arab and Islamic countries could be to fall into the Bin Laden gang’s trap and play their game — with highly dangerous consequences.

Further, we need to reflect on the global economic, social, environmental and other consequences of promoting militarism and an era of warfare against terrorism. Evoking and fighting an “axis of evil” called for by the Bush administration is highly dangerous, irrational, and potentially apocalyptic. It is not clear that the global economy can survive constant disruption of warfare. Nor can the environment stand constant bombardment and warfare, when ecological survival is already threatened by unrestrained capitalist development (see Kovel 2002 and Foster 2003). To carry out continued military intervention, whether against an “axis of evil” or any country that is said to support terrorism by the Bush administration, risks apocalypse of the most frightening kind. Continued large-scale bombing of Iraq, Iran, Syria or any Arab countries, especially after growing anger following the U.S./U.K. war against Iraq in 2003, could trigger an upheaval in Pakistan, with conceivable turmoil in Saudi Arabia and other Moslem countries. It could also help produce a dangerous escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, already at a state of white-hot intensity, whose expansion could engulf the Middle East in flames.

Thus, while it is reasonable to deem international terrorism a deadly threat on a global scale and to take resolute action against terrorism, what is required is an intelligent multifaceted and multilateral response. This would require a diplomatic consensus that a global campaign against terrorism is necessary which requires the arrest of members of terrorist networks, the regulation of financial institutions that allow funds to flow to terrorists, the implementation of national security measures to protect citizens against terrorism, and the world-wide criminalization of terrorist networks that sets international, national, and local institutions against the terrorist threat. Some of these measures have already begun and the conditions are present to develop an effective and resolute global campaign against terrorism.

There is a danger, however, that excessive unilateral American military action would split a potential coalition, creating uncontrollable chaos that could destroy the global economy and create an era of apocalyptic war and misery such as Orwell evoked in 1984. We are living in a very dangerous period and must be extremely careful and responsible in appraising responses to the events of September 11 and other terrorist attacks bound to happen. This will require the mobilization of publics on a local, national, and global level to oppose both terrorism and militarism and to seek productive solutions to the social problems that generate terrorism, as well as to terrorism itself.

Consequently, while I would support a global campaign against terrorism, I believe that we cannot depend on war or large-scale military action to solve the problem of global terrorism. Terrorists should be criminalized and international and national institutions should go after terrorist networks and those who support them with the appropriate legal, financial, judicial, and political instruments. Before and during Bush administration military intervention in Afghanistan, an intelligent campaign was underway that had arrested many participants and supporters of the bin Laden and other terror networks, that had alerted publics throughout the world to the dangers of terrorism, and that had created the conditions of possibility for a global campaign against terror. But we need global movements and institutions to oppose purely militarist attacks on
terrorism and that legitimate the suppression of democracy in the name of the war against terrorism.

Another lesson of September 11 is that it is now totally appropriate to be completely against terrorism, to use the term in the arsenal of critical social theory, and to declare it unacceptable and indefensible in the modern world. There was a time when it was argued that one person’s “terrorism” was another person’s “national liberation movement,” or “freedom fighter,” and that the term was thus an ideological concept not to be used by politically and theoretically correct discourse — a position that Reuters purportedly continues to follow.

In terms of modern/postmodern epistemological debates, I would argue against absolutism and universalism and for providing a contextual and historical account of terms like terrorism. There were times in history when “terrorism” was an arguably defensible tactic used by those engaged in struggles against fascism, such as in World War II, or in national liberation struggles, such as in the movements against oppressive European and later U.S. empire and colonialism. In the current situation, however, when terrorism is a clear and present danger to innocent civilians throughout the world, it seems unacceptable to advocate, carry out, or defend terrorism against civilian populations because of the lethality of modern weapons, the immorality of indiscriminate crime, and the explosiveness of the present situation when terror on one side could unleash genocidal, even species-cidal, terror as a retaliatory response.

Yet it is extremely important to be critical of state terrorism when one discusses the complex and sensitive topic of terrorism. For decades, the U.S. and Israel have been accused of state terrorism (see Chomsky and Herman 1979 and Herman 1982), just as many European superpowers had been previously. In much of the world, the 2003 Bush-Blair war against Iraq is seen as an example of state terrorism and Israeli policies continue to warrant this label.

It is therefore neither the time for terrorism nor reckless unilateral military intervention, but for a global campaign against terrorism that deploys all legal, political, and morally defensible means to destroy the network of terrorists responsible for the September 11 events, but that is also against state terrorism and for democracy and peace. Such a global response would put terrorist groups on warning that their activity will be strongly opposed, and that “terrorism” will be construed as a moral and political malevolence not to be accepted or defended. But a progressive global campaign should also not accept militarism, the erection of a police-military state, and the undermining of democracy in the name of fighting terrorism.

Thus, while I would support a global campaign against terrorism, especially the al Qaeda network, that could include military action under UN or other global auspices, I would not trust U.S. unilateral military action for reasons of U.S. failures in the region and its sustained history of supporting the most reactionary social forces (see Kellner 2003b). Indeed, one of the stakes of the current crisis, and of globalization itself, is whether the U.S. empire will come to dominate the world, or whether globalization will constitute a more democratic, cosmopolitan, pluralistic, and just world, without domination by hegemonic states or corporations. Now more than ever local/global institutions and movements are needed to deal with local/global problems and those who see positive potential in globalization should renounce all merely national and unilateral solutions to the problem of terrorism and seek global ones. Consequently, while
politicians like Bill Clinton and Colin Powell have deemed terrorism “the dark side of globalization,” it can also be seen as an unacceptable response to misguided and destructive imperial national policies which themselves must be transformed if a world without terror is possible.

Finally, this will require the anti-corporate globalization movement to rethink its nature, agenda, and goals. There may well be a “clash of civilizations” occurring today between the globalizing forces of transnational capital and resistance to global capitalism by heterogeneous configurations of individuals, groups, and social movements. But in its first stages the movement against capitalist globalization tended to be defined more by what it was against than what it was for, hence, the common term “anti-globalization movement.” New social movements in the contemporary era must, however, define themselves by what they are for as well as against. In the wake of September 11, I am suggesting that local, national, and global democratic movements should be for democracy, peace, environmentalism, and social justice and against war, militarism, and terrorism, as well as the multiplicity of injustices that various social movements are currently fighting. Now, more than ever, we are living in a global world and need new global movements and politics to address global problems and achieve global solutions.

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Notes

1 In this study, I draw upon previous studies of globalization in Cvetkovich and Kellner 1997 and Kellner 1998 and 2002, and my study of the 9/11 terror attacks and subsequent
Terror War in Kellner 2003b. For critical comments that helped with the revision of this article, I am thankful to Richard Kahn, David Sherman, and Ino Rossi.


3 What now appears at the first stage of academic and popular discourses of globalization in the 1990s tended to be dichotomized into celebratory globophilia and dismissive globophobia. There was also a tendency in some theorists to exaggerate the novelties of globalization and others to dismiss these claims by arguing that globalization has been going on for centuries and there is not that much that is new and different. For an excellent delineation and critique of academic discourses on globalization, see Steger 2002.

4 In his extreme postmodern stage, Baudrillard (1993) argued that “simulation” had replaced production as the organizing principle of contemporary societies, marking “the end of political economy.” See the critique in Kellner 1989b. In general, I am trying to mediate the economic determinism in some neo-Marxian and other theories of globalization and the technological determinism found in Baudrillard and others.

5. On resistance to globalization by labor, see Moody 1997; on resistance by environmentalists and other social movements, see the studies in Mander and Goldsmith 1996, Kellner 1999 and 2003c, and Best and Kellner, 2001.

6. See the article in New York Times, February 7, 1996: A15. Friedman (1999: 267f) notes that George Soros was the star of Davos in 1995, when the triumph of global capital was being celebrated, but that the next year Russian Communist Party leader Gennadi A. Zyuganov was a major media focus when unrestrained globalization was being questioned - - though Friedman does not point out that this was a result of a growing recognition that divisions between “haves” and “have nots” were becoming too scandalous and that predatory capitalism was becoming too brutal and ferocious....


8 I am not able in the framework of this paper to theorize the alarming expansion of war and militarism in the post-9/11 environment. For my theorizing of these topics, see Kellner 2002 and 2003b.

9. For example, as Ritzer argues (1993 and 1996), McDonald's imposes not only a similar cuisine all over the world, but circulates processes of what he calls "McDonaldization" that involve a production/consumption model of efficiency, technological rationality, calculability, predictability, and control. Yet as Watson et al 1997 argue, McDonald's has
Critical scholarship has revealed the important role of Islam in the very construction of modernity and globalization; see Rahman 1984; Ali 2001; and Simons 2003.
For an astute analysis of the different senses of Jihad and a sharp critique of the Islamic terrorists’ distortions of Islam, see Raschid 2002 and Ahmed 2003.

I provide my own historical and theoretical account of the background to the events of September 11 in Kellner 2003b.

Brinkley elaborated his position in a forum at Columbia University on October 5, 2001; see http://www.columbia.edu/cu/news/01/10/historical_reflection_9_11.html.


For Virilio (1998), every technology has its accident that accompanies it, so the airplane’s accident is the crash, the automobile a wreck, and a ship its sinking. For Virilio, the accident the Internet faces is “the accident of accidents,” as he calls it, the entire collapse of the global system of communication and information, and thus the global economy. On Virilio, see Kellner 1999.

Human Rights Watch has released a report that has documented how a wide spectrum of countries have used the war against terrorism to legitimate intensified repression of its domestic opponents and military action against foreign adversaries. See http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/02/usmil0215.htm