IDEOLOGY AND THE COMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON GOULDNER'S THE DIALECTIC OF IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY

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The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology is, in my opinion, Gouldner's most important book. It provides the matrix for his final series of works containing formulations of key ideas in The New Class Project, The Two Marxisms and Revolutionary Intellectuals.)

Dialectic provides the most systematic historical and theoretical framework for Gouldner's 1970's project and shows the interconnections between some of his central themes and ideas. The book contains as well his most detailed account of academic sociology, Marxism and his own view of critical social theory. Like The Two Marxisms, Dialectic is a baroque work: rambling, sprawling and brawling. Unlike The Coming Crisis and The New Class Project, its arguments are not linear or straight-forward. In Dialectic Gouldner covers a vast range of material, providing critical sociological-historical analyses of the interactions between social theory, science, religion and ideologies in their post-Enlightenment historical context--much as Enter Plato provided analyses of the relationships between Greek thought and social development. Gouldner's "historical sociology with practical intent" shows connections between subject-matter usually separated and provides both a theoretical/the origins and development of the modern social order and brilliant analyses of contemporary society. Dialectic manages to be insightful and provocative in its fundamental theses and illuminating of particulars. In addition, it offers a theory of social change and demonstrations of the need for radical changes in contemporary society. It is vintage Gouldner at his best.

One Part of Dialectic develops Gouldner's theory of ideology and provides a historical account of the origins of both ideology and social theory in the print media. Gouldner's historical analyses are excellent and shed new light
on the origins, structure, social functions and future of ideology. Gouldner's theory of ideologies as relatively rational programs of social reconstruction corrects one-sided notions of ideology simply as lies or "false consciousness". By discussing the historical origins of modern political ideologies and by applying techniques of socio-linguistic analysis, historical sociology and Marxian "critique of ideology" to his subject-matter, Gouldner is able to provide new insights into the much-discussed phenomenon of ideology. Throughout the book he describes the changed status of ideology in today's society under the impact of electronic communications media, technocracy and consumerism. Consequently, he is able to illuminate the dialectic of ideology and technology by exposing ideology's origins in the print media and its later role in the intellectuals, "modern order" through its interaction with bureaucracy, technocracy, the mass media, the university, the state, consumerism and the development of capitalism and socialism. Gouldner also criticizes Marxist-Leninist theories of revolution and provides his own view of "the long revolution" required to increase significantly both freedom and equality.

Although Part One focuses on "Ideology and the Communication Revolution" and Part Two describes "Ideology and the Modern Order", in fact, there is no such thematic separation, nor is there a neat division between Gouldner's more historical analyses and his analyses of contemporary society. The book contains a rather unique mixture throughout of intellectual history, theory, analysis and critique of contemporary society and aspects of a political strategy appropriate for the present age. While Dialectic is bursting with perceptive ideas and insights into a variety of topics, I shall focus my remarks here on Gouldner's theory of the dialectic of ideology and technology, concentrating on his theory of ideology and the communications revolution. I shall present his central theses and then attempt to point out both what I consider most important and what I see as some of their shortcomings. My intention is to
appraise Gouldner's contributions to developing a theory of ideology, the communications revolution and modern society.

I

Gouldner begins by defining ideology as "a form of discourse; i.e. as a culture of critical speech; i.e. as an elaborated, sociolinguistic speech variant" (xi). This initial definition clues the reader to the essential contribution of Gouldner's theory: his elaboration of ideology as a form of critical speech—a view that elucidates the rational kernel of ideology more explicitly and convincingly than previous theorists. But Gouldner's overly concentrated focus on ideology as a "culture of critical speech" becomes the book's chief weakness: an excessively rationalistic and linguistic conception of ideology that mystifies its character as false consciousness, as hegemony and as a mode of the constitution and domination of everyday consciousness.

Gouldner's strategy is to counter the dominant conceptions of ideology shared by Marxism and academic social theory, both of which see ideology as a distorted form of consciousness and a theoretical deficiency. For Marxism, Gouldner suggests, ideology is false consciousness and apologetic theory, ranging from pseudo-science to pathological cognition (3ff.). For mainstream sociology, ideology is non-rational, partisan, dogmatic, evaluative, emotive and extremist (4ff.). Discussants in both camps denounce or denigrate the views of their adversaries as mere ideology: think of a University administrator or academic sociologist dismissing with a sneer views opposed to their own as ideology, or of Adorno's relentless attack on his opponents under the umbrella of the critique of ideology. Both camps contrast "science" (or critical theory) to ideology and reject metaphysics as a negative paradigm muddled by ideological pollution. Thus both Marxism and
academic sociology legitimate themselves as anti-ideological: true theory that transcends distorting interests and values.

Consequently, both camps dismiss each other as patently ideological; ideology is a pejorative term for both. Marxists criticize the class-interests and mystifications of "bourgeois social science"--which in turn dismisses Marxism as politically partisan, value-laden and dogmatically biased. Gouldner undercuts the terms of this debate by arguing that the theories of both camps are "ideological"--and that ideology is a relatively rational form of cognitive discourse with its rules, logic and, to use the fashionable term, semiotics. Gouldner thus reformulates the debate over ideology in a fashion that calls upon academic sociology and Marxism to see those elements of its theory that are ideological and to reconstruct their concept of and attitudes towards ideology. In this way, Gouldner both elucidates neglected aspects of the complex phenomenon of ideology and delegitimates partisan defense-mechanisms in political and theoretic debates by refusing protagonists the move of simply dismissing their opponent's views as "ideological". To succeed in this strategy, Gouldner must provide a novel and convincing account of the origins and social role of ideology which forces the reader to reconceptualize ideology rather drastically. In my view, he partly succeeds.

To get us to look at ideology differently, Gouldner presents ideology as the form of a post-traditional, modern symbol system that subverts traditional views of the world like religion and mythology (23ff.). In his theory, ideology is a relatively rational form of discourse produced by the modern intelligentsia. As such, ideologies are specialized, technical languages with their own rules and logic: they are what Gouldner, following Basil Bernstein, calls an "elaborated linguistic code" (57ff.). Gouldner opposes ideology to "restricted linguistic codes" governed by fixed, limited stereotypes and bound by relatively unchanging tradition.
Ideologies are more abstract and context-independent, containing "articulated symbols" which are open to historical development and which encourage critical thought and political discussion. Moreover, ideology provides "access to alternative realities and hence has a relation to the status quo which is critical and transcendent" (60). Restricted linguistic codes by contrast contain closed and condensed symbols and metaphors which are "merely expressive of the status quo in a conservative way" (ibid.). Thus ideology, as opposed to everyday language, or restricted linguistic codes, is a "sociolect" of an "elaborated speech variant....the shared culture of critical speech" (ibid.)

For Gouldner, ideologies are programs of social reconstruction that are progressive, subversive of tradition, even revolutionary. Ideologies unify theory and practice while combining "reports" and "commands" (30ff.). They are both maps of "what is"---i.e. theories about society, human nature and history that bring to attention suppressed or neglected phenomena (reports)--and are projects of action that call for social reconstruction (commands). The power of ideology resides in its ability to mobilize the masses, to subvert tradition, to give birth to a new view of the world and to motivate its advocates to political action. Ideologies posit a faith in the power of ideas to change consciousness and activate individuals, as well as a faith in the powers of people to change the world. They have an idealistic and moral core and often create a sense of intellectual or moral superiority in their adherents. They can give birth to a new self, a more Promethean "subject-person" and can direct the newly released energies into political action which mobilizes masses around certain political actions (26ff. and 67ff.).
Gouldner links the rise of ideology to the technology of print media and the communications revolution, which was, in his words, "an invisible revolution...the medium through which the other revolutions were followed and seen" (195).\(^1\) The revolution in printing, he suggests, gave rise to and facilitated the spread of ideology (39ff.), for the communications revolution dramatically increased literacy and proliferated topical tracts and pamphlets that elicited political discussion and reinforced "a certain kind and measure of rationality" (41). Since the form of print requires that information be clearly and concisely formulated, there is an increase in the rationality of discourse. Writing and print bestow permanency on the word, endowing discourse with more seriousness; it makes possible as well sustained reflection on its meaning. The layout and form of print makes it possible to assess the validity of an argument or the cogency of a story more coolly and rigorously than in public debate. As the revolution in print technology democratized the culture of writing by spreading literacy and ideas, newspapers and print media responded to the demands of the growing audience with further simplification so that as many people as possible could decode the message (and buy the paper or pamphlet). This increase in the rationality of discourse, Gouldner claims, was highly subversive of tradition and required that an argument or report be assessed on its own grounds, rather than in terms of the transmitter or source of information, thus subverting truth by authority of person or office: "as they increased the decontextualization of discourse--strengthening the speaker's orientation to his grammar and focusing attention on discourse as embodied in printed objects, there was a corresponding defocalization of those persons to whom it was addressed and of the speaker making the address" (43).

News and print media, Gouldner argues, structured the development, grammar and defusion of ideology as well. The proliferation of ideas spread by the communications revolution required information-processing, evaluation and
and eventual theoretical syntheses. Since news fragments information by abstracting isolated events from the social totality, there arises the need to recontextualize and interpret the news events. It is ideology, Gouldner claims, which provides new totalizing theories to contextualize events, to integrate in a systematic theory the fragmented ideas and to interpret the meaning of current events. Ideologies clarify the significance of events in terms of their roles in dramatic historical scenarios. To the Marxist, for instance, Reagan's attempt to smash the air controller's union is a brutal move in a class war that requires a militant and unified working class response. To the conservative businessman, Reagan's position represents a legal and desirable attempt to put the workers in their place, while a more extreme rightist Reaganite would welcome the union-busting as part of a systematic attempt to weaken organized labor. In these ways, ideologies totalize, contextualize and interpret the news and mobilize support around certain positions in terms of an overall ideological scenario and world-view.

In addition to the increase of rationally fostered by print media and the rise of ideologies, there is a price paid in the spread of social irrationality and domination as well. As Gouldner argues, the dialogue character of discourse begins to decline as more and more people acquire information through the new media: "Talking and listening give way to a reading and writing that may take place along and apart from others. With the increased decontextualization of communication, and with the spread of depersonalizing print, communication becomes a kind of ghostly, disembodied voice separated from its speaker" (43-4). This transformation of communication encourages, Gouldner suggests, the myth of "objectivism" and it constitutes the limits to the rationality of ideology (45-57). "Objectivism", he proposes, "is discourse lacking in reflexivity; it onesidely focuses on the 'object' but occludes the speaking 'subject' to whom it is an object" (45). The transmitter and receiver of ideology does not see
how it is structured by language, print, the development of technology and the social position of its speaker. Ideology lacks reflexivity and self-critique; it takes its own grounds as unproblematical, thus failing to perceive its material and conceptual grounding. It focuses on the world, refusing "to put itself in question, and hence it generates silence about itself and about the limits on its rationality" (46). The ideologist is completely confident about the truth of his or her assertions which he or she feels no need to question. Rationality is defined by Gouldner as "reflexivity", "self-awareness", thinking about thought: "the capacity to make problematic what had hitherto been treated as given; to bring into reflection what before had only been used; to transform resource into topic; to examine critically the life we lead" (49). Rationality therefore requires dialogue about the assumptions, form and grounding of discourse. Since ideology (and social science) falls prey to objectivism that refuses self-critical, reflexive discourse, it has but a limited rationality (50-55).

Dialectic of ideology and technology: ideology arises from the need to synthesize and contextualize the "news" proliferated by print technology; moreover, ideology itself was structured by the logic of print as ideologies were formulated, printed and transmitted through print media. This process fosters, Gouldner argues, a "culture of critical speech" and produces an increase in social rationality. Although Gouldner's account provides a novel analysis of the origins, grammar and social functions of ideology, he does not analyze equally as well the process through which ideology gradually seeps into the forms and discourse of dominant media, or how it comes to shape everyday thought and discourse. Studies of the history of newspapers, print and broadcast media and popular culture could show how ideological discourse permeates dominant media and cultural forms. Gouldner does not discuss the process through which ideology is institutionalized and "normalized", becoming a culture of uncritical speech and lazy thought that is supportive of the established order.
control and censorship).

The development of newspapers and other so-called mass media of communication reveals how the bourgeoisie first used print media as a weapon of revolutionary struggle and then as a means of consolidating their power and class rule. The news, as Gouldner notes, began to play an increasingly important role in defining social reality and in creating a mass public which came to receive its view of the world from mass media, first the print media and later broadcast media. While initially the rise of print technology spread literacy and democracy, subverted traditional world views, increased rationality and encouraged dialogue and public discussion, it then began to diminish rational and public discourse and to serve as instruments of bourgeois hegemony sometime in the mid-nineteenth century. The news began to reflect the views and interests of the property owning classes which increased its control over the media, leading to increased concentration of the news media in the hands of the property class and conservative business interests. Although, as Gouldner argues, print media would publish accounts of social reality critical of political and economic elites in order to sell papers or magazines, print media also increased, for the same reasons, sensationalism, entertainment and "yellow journalism". These phenomena along with the phenomenal growth of advertising and growing influence of advertisers within print and later broadcast media---led to a decrease in the rationality of print media and ideology. Newspaper language consequently became less rational and more emotive, affect-laden and conservative.

"News" is after all a construct of reality, an interpretation and selection of what is "news-worthy". News is thus perspectival, dramatically accentuating some events, while passing over other events in silence. As the capitalist class came to control print and other mass media, they inevitably imposed their perspectives on the news--and not only on the editorial page. To be sure, there remained a plurality of news and information sources in capitalist society--which often offered conflicting accounts of social reality--but the dominant media came to be controlled by conservative business interests.
As Gouldner points out, one of the roles of the media is to mediate between the public and the ruling classes and its managers and although there are contradictions here which I do not want to deny, nevertheless, the news media became an important tool in the stabilization and reproduction of the bourgeoisie order.\textsuperscript{7}

This account suggests that the limits on rationality in print media are both technological and economic. While Gouldner chides Park and the Chicago school for neglecting the impact of material and class interests in the constitution and development of news,\textsuperscript{119ff.} I believe that Gouldner himself underestimates the restrictions that economic interests impose on newspaper communication and the growth and development of ideologies. The underlying problem here, I believe, is Gouldner's intention to develop a theory of "generic ideology" that conceptualizes the grammar and nature of all ideology. Ideologies for Gouldner are essentially rational projects of public persuasion and social reconstruction which politicize, mobilize and attempt to activate the public. In scattered definitions of "generic ideology" he writes: "All ideologies commonly imply the possibility of rational public projects to change society" (77); "all ideologies reject the world as it is" (85); all ideologies "require (1) the 'unity' of theory and practice, and stress (2) the power of consciousness, speech, the idea" (139). While this theory conceptualizes what I call accurately "ideology-as-ism", it does not describe "ideology-as-hegemony". Although Gouldner calls attention to rational aspects of political isms, he exaggerates the rationality and "activist" nature of hegemonic ideologies and underestimates the conservative nature of much ideology which attempts to pacify and render passive individuals who are coaxed to accept and adjust to the existing society. Gouldner does not therefore adequately develop the dialectic of ideology and history through which once progressive "ism ideologies" became hegemonic forms of mystification and domination.\textsuperscript{8}

Part of the problem is the paradigms which Gouldner chooses for ideology:
Marxism, liberalism and conservatism. Although these great political ideologies of centuries past, which continue to be operative in the present, contain rational and progressive moments that articulate, or anticipate, elements of a liberated humanity and good society, it is not clear that this is true of nationalism, imperialism or fascism. What are the rational and progressive moments of these ideologies? Gouldner sometimes places "nationalism" in his lists of "generic ideology" but does not confront aggressively irrational ideologies like fascism or imperialism. He also does not discuss such ideologies as sexism or racism which often from their origins serve to oppress women or racial minorities. These examples simply do not fit into Gouldner's paradigm of "generic ideology" and are, in my view, best seen as examples of hegemonic ideology where a ruling class, group or sex attempts to perpetuate their own interests at the expense of oppressed individuals and groups.

Another problem is that Gouldner de-psychologizes ideology, severing his concept of ideology from a theory of consciousness and a social psychology, while concentrating his analysis on ideology as a type of rational political discourse. This move could be compared with Gouldner's powerful analysis of the background and domain assumptions of social theory in The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology. Here Gouldner argued that all social theory assumes a "structure of sentiments", normative commitments, and a personal, subjective dimension in which the theorist's interests, values and emotions shaped his or her theoretical enterprise—which in turn helped shape the theorist's subjectivity. This analysis seems to be particularly relevant in characterizing ideology for ideological discourse is particularly rhetorical and affect-laden, appealing to the "structure of one's sentiments", subconscious prejudices, emotions and values as well as reason. Further, ideology can take imagistic, symbolic and even mythical forms. Indeed, careful analysis of actually existing ideology reveals that it is often conveyed through images and symbols of country
and race, class and clan, salvation and redemption, individuality and solidarity. A fine analysis of Marxism in an article on "The Metaphoricality of Marxism" suggests that much of Marxism's appeal and power result from the attractiveness of its metaphors: socialism and the proletariat, bondage and revolt, alienation and its overcoming, class struggle and community. Surely all ideologies owe much of their appeal to their metaphoricality and to their symbols, images and myths—themes advanced by Sorel, Pareto and Barthes. Hence, it seems wrong-headed to claim that "Hitherto the fundamental symbolic means of ideology has been conceptual and linguistic" (167). Moreover, it is misleading to make print and books the principal vehicle of ideology (80) for political meetings, rallies, posters, slogans and the electronic communications media are potent and important transmitters of ideology. In short, ideology also has a metaphorical, imagistic, and what Gouldner calls a "paleosymbolic" dimension which is not adequately accounted for in Gouldner's overly cognitive, conceptual and rational paradigm of ideology.

Furthermore, Gouldner restricts ideology to that "part of consciousness that can be given words: it can be said" (81). In this view, ideologies are uniquely public, open and subject to rational scrutiny and public debate. This is, I would argue, an overly linguistic and rationalistic paradigm of ideology that underestimates again the irrational, subconscious and multi-modal nature of ideologies. Indeed, do not the symbols and myths of ideology resonate deeply within the human being, speaking to its primal hopes and fears which are often inarticulate and mute? Do not the images and rhetoric of ideology seduce the rational faculty into acceptance, often driving otherwise intelligent people into fanatic adherence to a dogma or creed? Moreover, as Gouldner notes, ideology not only selects, focuses and organizes our experience, but it suppresses and ignores other aspects as well in what he provocatively calls its "audible silences" (83).
Thus it seems wrong to claim that "ideologists propose to change the world" primarily "through 'ideas' and through the rational appeal these may have to consciousness" (83). For do not ideologies have both rational and irrational appeal, do they not combine rhetoric and logic, concepts and symbols, clear argumentation and manipulative propaganda techniques? Such ideological metaphors, for instance, as the "master race", "new deal" or "iron curtain" are effective both through the "idea" conveyed and the emotions aroused.

The crux of the problem is that Gouldner does not trace the historical development of ideology through the degeneration of relatively rational programs of social reconstruction into theories, ideas and images that legitimate a given social order and that mystify domination and exploitation. While Gouldner provides an excellent account of the origins and functions of political ideologies, he does not adequately describe the function of hegemonic ideology. Therefore, he cannot really describe the transformations of ideology in advanced capitalism and state socialism and thus lacks an adequate theory of the nature and functions of ideology today. In the next section, I shall attempt to show that the current phase of the communications revolution--the ascendancy of the electronic media--and the current dialectic of ideology and technology exposes the limitations of Gouldner's theory and the need for a theory of hegemonic ideology that conceptualizes changes in the nature and function of ideology under the impact of electronic media.

III.

Gouldner argues that: "In contrast to the conventional printed objects central to ideologies, the modern communication media have greatly intensified the non-linguistic and iconic component and hence the multimodal character of public communication" (168). While Gouldner argues that this new type of communication is antithetical to "generic ideology", I reject Gouldner's contrasted to equation of identification of ideology with print media / electronic media with non-ideological symbolic imagery, for I believe that the
electronics revolution has provided powerful new instruments for the production and transmission of hegemonic ideology. This phenomenon requires, I believe, a concept of ideology as hegemony and analyses of the new forms and configurations of ideology under the impact of the electronic media.  

In Gouldner's view, the electronic media, especially television, have created a "historically new mass experience", a new symbolic environment (168ff.). This leads to an increase in the importance of iconic imagery and symbols and a decrease in the importance of words. The new symbolic environment is increasingly pictorial, imagistic and mythical. Although Gouldner stresses this point, he juxtaposes symbolic (and paleosymbolic) imagery to ideology, while I see the symbolic environment providing new forms and configurations of ideology. Moreover, I believe that the new media of communication are undermining rationality and are creating a new consciousness with a new emphasis on what Gouldner calls "consummatory perceptual experience" (169)--leading to a decline of the importance of reading and writing. This new symbolic environment and reconstitution of consciousness and the senses contains a more serious threat to rationality and reflexivity than Gouldner admits. Gouldner, reformulating some points made by McLuhan, concedes that the shift from a "newspaper to a television-centered system of communications" leads to "altogether differently structured symbol systems: of analogic rather than digital, of synthetic rather than analytic systems, of occult belief systems, new religious myths" (170). He fails, I think, to draw appropriate conclusions, arguing, "In this, however, there is no 'end' to ideology, for it continues among some groups, in some sites, and at some semiotic level, but it ceases to be as important a mode of consciousness of masses; remaining a dominant form of consciousness among some elites, ideology loses ground among the masses and lower strata" (170).

Against this position, I would argue that ideology has had a remarkable new impact on the "consciousness of masses" through the technology of the
communications revolution, especially television. In my view, the iconic imagery of television contains a new form of symbolism packed with ideology and messages that constitute a new symbolic environment and a new everyday consciousness. To the decline in verbally transmitted ideology, there corresponds an increase in iconic, multimodal, symbolically transmitted ideology. Although verbal symbolism and discourse still plays an important role in electronic ideology, the synthesis of verbal and non-verbal symbolism, of image and language, in the products of electronic media is arguably displacing the primacy of print media and language as the fundamental transmitter of ideology. To decode this sort of ideology requires perceiving the dialectic of verbal discourse and iconic imagery and thus requires a paradigm of ideology as a synthetic amalgam which combines language, imagery and often stories.

The concept of "paleosymbolism" introduced by Freud, and developed by Habermas and Gouldner, helps describe the nature and mode of transmission of television ideology and points to the decline of both the family and print media as vehicles of ideology and socialization. Gouldner distinguishes between a "paleosymbolism I" which is constituted by images of "significant others", primarily parents, and is rooted in childhood experiences which help form the "characterological grounding of ideologies" (169). For instance, a child caught masturbating by its parents who is harshly punished may carry a paleosymbolic image of the masturbation/punishment scene that inhibits later sexual activity and makes one receptive to puritanical sexual ideologies. Gouldner suggests that media iconography is producing a new "paleosymbolism II" which strengthens the role of the media in socialization and weakens the social role of ideology. Reformulating Gouldner's point, I would suggest that media images of "significant others" provide role models and images of appropriate and inappropriate behavior which serve to transmit and inculcate ideology. In this context, images of television stars (or newscasters, politicians, etc.) compete with images of one's
parents as paleosymbolic agents of primary socialization and increase the power and social functions of the media against the family. In addition, I would argue that media socialization transforms the nature, function and effects of ideology in contemporary society.

Television ideology is transmitted through dominant fixed and stereotyped images which legitimate existing institutions, social roles and practices, and values. Television comedy and drama contains morality tales which serve as vehicles for ideological indoctrination. Television images, scenes and stories transmit ideology through selective and partial images of the existing society which ignore, or gloss over, social contradictions and conflicts. In this way, they legitimate the existing society and mystify social relations. Television mythology either suppresses social problems and conflicts or ideologically resolves them. These ideological paleosymbolic extravaganzas produce models of conformist behavior, conventional wisdom, and operational cues to solve problems of everyday life. The repetitive ritualistic programming and formulas make media socialization a familiar and habitual experience which naturalizes the ideological messages transmitted. In those and other ways, television and popular culture provide surrogates for religion and traditional sources of ideology. In the words of Gerbner and Gross: "Television, the flagship of industrial mass culture, now rivals ancient religions as a purveyor of organic patterns of symbols...that animate national and even global communities' sense of reality and value. It comes close to fulfilling the dream of Scottish patriot Andrew Fletcher who once said: 'If a man were permitted to write all the ballads he need not care who should make the laws of the nation'."

Gouldner, I would argue, is mistaken in formulating a disjunction between ideology and paleosymbolic imagery. In my view, ideology has traditionally had a paleosymbolic dimension; ideology has been transmitted not only through print media but through an ideological apparatus in which the state has employed pomp and circumstance to promote nationalistic and political ideologies. Other
ideologies have been promoted by ceremonies and festivals, religious rituals, political campaigns, military regalia and other events which used music, festival, images, setting and symbols to promote ideologies. Ideological tracts, like Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* utilized stories and images of the pin factory and bartering in the market place to present ideologies of the increased productivity through the factory and capitalist division of labor and the social benefits of "free enterprise" in the capitalist market, while Marx's and Engel's *The Communist Manifesto* used a dramatically sketched philosophy of history to present their proletarian ideology. Later institutionalized ideologies are regularly presented in the pulpit, classroom, public arena and media through images, stories and other paleosymbolic devices that resonate to the audience's experience. Thus I would argue that paleosymbolism be conceptualized as an integral part of ideology and not as a factor extraneous to its "generic essence"—as Gouldner would have it.

Gouldner connects paleosymbolism with what he calls "paradigms" that are relatively concrete "experience-generated conceptions" of everyday life, rooted in more particular interests of relatively small groups than the more abstract and general ideologies (219ff.). This disjunction between "ideologies" and "paradigms" also seems to be questionable for it is not clear how one would distinguish between "ideologies" and "paradigms" in specific cases. Moreover, I believe that ideology contains what Gouldner calls "paradigms" and the "paleosymbolic". In my view, ideologies fuse images and ideas that various social groups and classes can resonate to and thus contains compromises, or negotiated settlements, between competing interests and "paradigms". Consequently, ideologies may be contradictory and are subject to historical change and modifications.

Crucially, I believe that Gouldner's theory cannot account for changes in the nature and functions of ideology in contemporary societies. The following description of ideology and the culture industries by Adorno and Horkheimer in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* indicates that new forms and configurations of ideology
are being produced today that are less rational, linguistic and conceptual than the print media forms of ideology which Gouldner takes as "generic ideology". Adorno and Horkheimer write:

"The less the culture industry has to promise, the less it can offer a meaningful explanation of life, and the emptier is the ideology it disseminates. Even the abstract ideals of the harmony and beneficence of society are too concrete in this age of universal publicity. We have even learned how to identify abstract concepts as sales propaganda. Language based entirely on truth simply arouses impatience to get on with the business deal it is probably advancing. The words that are not means appear senseless; the others seem to be fiction, untrue. Value judgments are taken either as advertising or as empty talk. Accordingly ideology has been made vague and noncommittal, and thus neither clearer nor weaker. Its very vagueness, its almost scientific aversion from committing itself to anything which cannot be verified, acts as an instrument of domination. It becomes a vigorous and prearranged promulgation of the status quo. The culture industry tends to make itself the embodiment of authoritative pronouncements, and thus the irrefutable prophet of the prevailing order. It skilfully steers a winding course between the cliffs of demonstrable misinformation and manifest truth, faithfully reproducing the phenomenon whose opaqueness blocks any insight and installs the ubiquitous and intact phenomenon as ideal. Ideology is split into the photograph of stubborn life and the naked lie about its meaning—which is not expressed but suggested and yet drummed it. To demonstrate its divine nature, reality is always repeated in a purely cynical way. Such a photologial proof is of course not stringent, but it is overpowering. Anyone who doubts the power of monotony is a fool....The new ideology has as its objects the world as such. It makes use of the worship of facts by no more than elevating a disagreeable existence into the world of facts in representing it meticulously". 21

In this analysis, ideology today is more iconic, paleosymbolic, imagistic and concrete than previous ideologies. Through creating a disjunction
between rational and critical theories of social reconstruction on one hand (i.e., contrasted with "generic ideology") / paleosymbolic "paradigms" and concrete but irrational imagery on the other, Gouldner cannot adequately analyze or interpret what I consider, along with Adorno and Horkheimer, crucial hegemonic ideologies produced and transmitted through the culture industries and media. Gouldner as well as the contrasts the ideologies in political debate, / legitimations of technocracy-- which he sees as both continuous and discontinuous with previous ideology--22 with media experience, consumerism and multimodal popular culture which he believes provides legitimation and social control independent of and alternative to ideologies. This model fails, however, to explicate how ideologies are transmitted through the media, popular culture, consumerism and other regions of everyday life. These new forms of ideology, I would argue, regress to more imagistic and paleosymbolic forms that lack the relative rationality and reflexivity characteristic of print media. Although in some quarters, especially among university intellectuals, print media paradigms of ideology prevail, on the whole conceptually mediated ideology and political isms are losing ground.

Reflection on recent American political elections provides, I believe, indications of how the sort of previous ideological debate between political "isms"-- so brilliantly described by Gouldner-- / have been displaced by paleosymbolic and media politics. One could argue, for example, that both Jimmy Carter and then Ronald Reagan won the Presidency in the 1976 and 1980 elections by keeping Gouldnerian "generic ideology" out of the campaigns. After winning the New Hampshire primary that began his surprising ascent to the Presidency, Jimmy Carter remarked that his campaign had more to do with love than ideology! Carter used paleosymbolic ideologies of personality, God, country, morality, family and the pleasing smile in the 1976 campaign: an appropriate strategy in an era of television paleosymbolism. After the Republican loss, free-enterprise ideologue John Connolly suggested that the Republicans should take a less ideological approach to politics.
In the 1980 campaign, Ronald Reagan manipulated media images and slogans to successfully sell himself to the public. Reagan cleverly manipulated anti-government sentiment and promoted himself as a "nice guy" who wanted to cut taxes and government spending, strengthen the military to "catch up with the Soviet Union" and, above all, "to get government off our backs". What specific programs he had in mind never really surfaced during the election campaign which, it was generally agreed, trafficked more in symbols than substance. For instance, although Carter was, arguably, more effective in argumentation and in presenting his position than Reagan in the TV debate, it is generally agreed that Reagan came off as more appealing through his more relaxed manner, smiles and subtle criticisms of Carter. It is perhaps no accident that a former movie star and TV personality gained the Presidency in an age of symbolic politics and so far Reagan has proved himself to be a master of television ritual and symbolism in the speeches he used to gain support for his budget and tax programs and in the humor and good cheer he exhibited after the assassination attempt.
Gouldner's failure to see how ideology is a direct constituent of everyday consciousness, assuming new forms and functions in the mass media, paradoxically puts him in the same conceptual camp as the "end-of-ideology" ideologues, whom he criticizes throughout his book. The problem here is a limited paradigm of ideology as political discourse that led the end-of-ideology advocates to conclude that the relative absence of the kind of polarized political debate that characterized an earlier era signalled the end of ideological discourse and politics. What the end-of-ideology apologists failed to see—and what Gouldner's theory also occludes—is that new types of ideology were increasingly permeating the everyday consciousness and were helping to block critical discourse and radical political alternatives. Similarly, positivistic and technocratic ideologies were penetrating the university and administrative sectors, rendering the managers, bureaucrats and academicians of the advanced capitalist-technocratic society prisoners of ideologies which they did not conceive of qua ideology. Gouldner exposes some of the ideological forms of positivism and technocracy, but fails to articulate with such clear and penetrating insight how the everyday consciousness too is subject to new forms of ideological domination through new ideological forms.

IV.

Implications

The political of Gouldner's work are most evident in his discussion "Toward a Media-Critical Politics" (Chapter Six, passim). The primary emphases are on the need for change in linguistic codes and communication practices combined with vigilant struggle against all forms of censorship in order to create the space and need for radical social change. Gouldner argues for "reformation before revolution" and takes as his paradigm of revolution the gradual but momentous changes brought about by the industrial and communications revolution. He rejects traditional Marxist-Leninist models of political revolution based on the examples of the French and Russian models, where state power
was seized in a dramatic armed struggle and the tasks of the revolution are perceived as organizing for the seizure of state power. Gouldner thinks that this model of revolution is irrelevant in modern technological society, given the military and ideological power held by the ruling strata. He concludes: "The West therefore must have its reformation before it can have its revolution. The theory appropriate to such a social strategy is a critical theory focused on the problem of change in language, in communication, and in media" (148).

Gouldner's kinship with Habermas and with some European "Freudo-Marxist" semiologists should be apparent here. Like the radical semiologists, he stresses the repressive features of ideological language and the need for a new language and linguistic codes. This means that critical theory should demystify the dominant ideological codes and should develop new concepts and symbols. In Gouldner's view, "The central semiotic effort of modern politics is the capturing and evocation of a symbolism of freedom and/or equality" (152). This requires the creation of a counterculture of critical speech that cannot be easily co-opted by the established power structure and ideological discourse. Moreover, critical theory should devise a strategy of media politics and cultural revolution that will increasingly use the mass media to spread critical and subversive messages. This will require a concerted political effort against censorship and an attempt to open the media to alternative critical ideas. The struggle for the communication of radical ideas and struggle against censorship and distortion of and obstacles to free communication will both open the space for radical social change and constitute a locus of ideological struggle.

Gouldner's program requires analysis of how the state, educational system and media impact on politics, ideology, language and everyday life. Moreover, Gouldner calls for a renewed concern for direct, face-to-face interpersonal interaction as the model of authentic communication: "It needs remembering that an inescapable medium
of politics--its sociological infrastructure--is face-to-face communication. Such communication can, and commonly does, serve as an instrument by which established 'opinion leaders' transmit and reinforce media messages. But it can also foster a critical view of the media and implant a new language, a new set of values, skills, and a body of information, at variance with those supported by the dominant media. The elemental speech process remains a fundamental agency for the distancing of persons from old languages and unexamined lives; word-of-mouth is the ultimate medium of the masses, if not the newest innovation in mass media" (149).

Gouldner is urging here the desirability of increasing interpersonal dialogue as a means to counter the growing influence of the media. Thus, "it remains a central task of critical theory to focus on face-to-face communication" (150) in order to increase the vitality and efficacy of the public sphere. Gouldner counters those who, like Habermas, claim that the public sphere is increasingly obsolete: "The bourgeois public--far from being dead--remains a paradigm of vision, liveliness, honesty, and freedom" (161). This is debatable but it is plausible that the revitalization of the public sphere requires increased public communication, increased democratic participation and a renewed radical change in communication practices: a emphasis on public dialogue and participatory democracy to counter the isolating and manipulative effects of the mass media.

One might object that Gouldner overemphasizes the role of face-to-face communication in constituting/changing consciousness, and underestimates the role of the mass media. In one passage he writes: "In the end, there
is probably no more powerful mechanism of social change than people's talk. In a society where there is a constant tendency for the growth of centralized media, distant and unresponsive to persons who have no real opportunities for feedback, the real impact of the mass media will often be considerably less than it is thought to be by those who point with alarm to—or who profit from—their growth" (149). In support of the claim that the media are a secondary influence in opinion formation, etc. he cites Paul Lazarfeld's 1944 study of political persuasion that concludes that they found "the effect of the media to be rather small.... People appeared to be much more influenced in their political decisions by face-to-face contact...than by the mass media directly" (150). But this survey is more than thirty years old. Surely with the rise of television this situation has dramatically changed, for it is clear that television is playing an increasingly important role in political persuasion, as well as the shaping of everyday consciousness. 26

Thus I would argue that a radical media politics should focus on developing strategies for intervention in the mass media, especially television, film and other broadcast media. 27 The Left, including Gouldner, has been too bound to print media paradigms of political discourse and public debate and meetings—the locus of traditional conventional politics. While print media and political debate play an obviously important role in political mobilization and education, the Left has not adequately explored use of new communications media. Gouldner writes that "The 'long march through the institutions' must begin with, center on and recurrently exhibit, the concrete conditions of the mass media" (159), but stresses in his concept of "media critical politics" traditional ideological debate, struggles against censorship and correcting distorted media accounts of social reality. While these activities are important I would argue for focus on the electronic
revolution in order to try to conceptualize the social changes it is producing and to devise strategies for progressive use of these media. A critical theory of the media must abandon—as Gouldner argues—as one-sided views of the media as one-dimensional and omnipotent manipulators and should instead refocus media theory on contradictions in the media and their possible emancipatory uses. A critical theory of the media should ferret out and unfold contradictions between the media and the property system; between the media and the government; and should make clear the contradictions within the media themselves in order to, as Gouldner states, make media "a central issue of political struggle, rather than a peripheral question of the 'superstructure'" (159).

While—as the preceding remarks indicate—I disagree with details of Gouldner's "media critical politics" and theory of the dialectic of ideology and technology, I believe that he has specified crucial issues for social theory and politics today. He calls attention to central functions of ideology, communications and media in contemporary society and proposes that it is essential for social theory to clarify their nature and functions and for radical politics to develop an appropriate political strategy.
This requires abandoning those theories of the media which conceive of them solely as tools of manipulation and domination and requires seeing and seizing the emancipatory potential in new communications media. It also requires rethinking the levers of social change and sites of radical politics. In a media society, change does not necessarily originate solely at the "point of production" or through the ballot box. As both the struggles in Poland and the struggle of the American air controllers show, economic and political battles are themselves fought out in the media which mobilize support for certain forces or around certain issues. The outcome of such struggles often depends on winning public opinion and effectively using the media to win support for one’s side or issue. The dramatic resurgence of the Right in America during the late 1970’s and early 1980’s can be attributed in large part to their effectiveness in using new and old media to transmit their messages and to give their outrageously reactionary programs and ideas legitimacy through their repeated reproduction in electronic and other media. If the Left does not develop a media politics of equal force and efficacy they will continue to be marginal and isolated. Gouldner’s *Dialectic of Ideology and Technology* helps us to rethink the interaction between technology, ideology, politics and contemporary society and helps ———— alert us to phenomena central to understanding and changing contemporary society.
Alvin Gouldner has focused upon what is of central importance in his social and cultural environment for the last several decades. His analyses of bureaucracy, labor unions and technology in the 1950's called attention to central dynamics of contemporary society. In the 1960's Gouldner--appropriately enough for that decade--concentrated on theories of social change and renewed his study of classical social and political theorists. This work and his experiences of a tumultuous decade radicalized him and attracted him more and more to critical study of Marxism.

But there was nothing dogmatic or predictable about Gouldner's Marxism. In the 1970's, he focused on precisely those central features of contemporary society which were neglected, or not adequately conceptualized by Marxism: language, technology and technocrats, intellectuals and the "new class project", the media and the university. Gouldner's reconstruction of Marxism led him to reflect directly on the Marxian theory itself and to interpret Marxism in relation to the Enlightenment, the scientific revolution, the decline of religion, the communications and industrial revolution, the changing status of intellectuals and the major socio-historical shifts brought about by the developments of capitalism and later socialism. Gouldner's break with orthodoxy and novel perspectives invite debate and criticism and whatever the problems with his theories he is to be lauded for his overcoming the provincialism of American social theory. During the last decades, he situated himself in the turbulent currents of international sociology and his appropriation of Marxism and other European theories helped him to carry though a devastating critique of American academic sociology. His mastery in turn of American sociology, the entire tradition of classical social theory and Marxism provided an exemplary position from which Gouldner could develop historical reflection on contemporary social theory and provide what he calls a "sociology of sociology": an attempt to uncover the social roots and influences on the production of social theory. From his final
theoretical vantage point, Gouldner was able to expose the lacunae and benign
neglects of contemporary social theory, to probe its weaknesses and errors,
to indicate its implications in social crimes and to call attention to its
irrelevance to what matters: social reconstruction and human liberation.

In the Preface to The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology, Gouldner defines
himself as a "Marxist outlaw" (xii). He presents himself as an independent
thinker, outside Marxist orthodoxy, outside any Marxist establishments. He
sees his task as a "demystification of Marxism, which often proceeds by grounding
itself in certain Marxist assumptions" (xii). The fact "that Marxism today--
as a real historical movement--has not produced the human liberation it had
promised" requires a critical inquiry into how Marxism "has become increasingly
implicated in a world process of social mystification" (xii). His critique
of Marxism explored "the dark side of the dialectic", focusing on Marxism's
contradictions, anomalies and failures, as well as on those aspects of the
Marxian theory that had been ignored or repressed since the death of Marx:
the theory of ideology, epistemology, intellectuals and the methodology and
practice of radical social theory.

Gouldner presented himself in / as a "Marxist Socratic" (xvi) as well
who would annoy the epigones of all orthodoxies by following "the first
commandment of the dialectic": contradiction, negation and critique. Although
he chose to live outside of the nomos of orthodoxy he wished to live by the
law of logos: commitment to rationality and reflexivity; concern for the unity
of theory and practice; demystification and subversion of dominant theories;
and commitment to social change and human liberation: "The Marxist outlaw is
characterized by the fact that he also speaks about Marxism; that he is
reflexive about Marxism and that he does not simply view Marxism as a resource
but also takes it as a topic. The Marxist outlaw is attempting to speak the
rules by which Marxism lives; to discover and articulate the grammar to which
it submits. The Marxist outlaw, then, holds that even Marxism must be subject
to critique" (xiv).

Gouldner followed his own prescriptions and provided one of the great challenges to Marxist orthodoxy in our times while remaining loyal to what he perceived as relevant and emancipatory in Marxism. His probing critical spirit provided an exemplary model of intellect in action and he leaves us one of the most important bodies of work produced in the last two decades. Gouldner's legacy will therefore depend on how this work is appropriated, used and developed.
Notes

1 Compare the accounts of the communications revolution and impact of print technology on Western culture of Lucien Febvre and Henri-Jean Martin, The Coming of the Book (London: New Left Books, 1976); Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962); and Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (Neuwied and Berlin: Luchterhand, 1962). Gouldner once told me that he never got much out of McLuhan, although he found Habermas's work quite stimulating (conversation in St. Louis, April 1976).

2 See my article, "Ideology, Marxism and Advanced Capitalism", Socialist Review, No. 42 (Nov.-Dec. 1978), pp. 37-66 where I distinguish between "ideology as ism" and "ideology as hegemony".

3 Kellner, op. cit., pp. 45ff.

4 Gouldner does not discuss how relations of production shape technology. For a classical Marxian polemic against technological determinism and account of how technology is structured by class interests and imperatives deriving from the mode of production, see Georg Lukács's critique of "N. Bukharin: Historical Materialism" in Tactics and Ethics (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 134-42.

5 See Habermas, Öffentlichkeit, op. cit.


8 Kellner, "Ideology", op. cit.

9 Gouldner claims that he did not find much of use in the "theoretically sterile" social psychology which he examined (64). While it may well be that most existing social psychology analyses of ideology are not very useful, surely it is important to describe how ideology actually shapes consciousness
and is "lived" in everyday life. Gouldner himself does not ignore completely the dialectic of ideology and consciousness (see, for example, pp. 82f. and 273f.) but against his proposed shift from concern with consciousness to concern with communication and language, I would suggest that it is a mistake to sever communication theory and the sociology of language from social psychology, for concern with language, communication and consciousness will deepen our understanding of human experience and the attractions, power and functions of ideology.


11 Compare, for example, Gouldner's theory with Clifford Gertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System", in Ideology and Discontent, editor David Apter (New York: Free Press, 1964); John Plamenatz, Ideology (London: Penguin, 1970); Lewis S. Feuer, Ideology and the Ideologists (New York: Harper and Row, 1975); and Roland Barthes, Mythologies (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972). While I do not agree with Barthes and Feuer that ideology is essentially mythical and accept Gouldner's account of its relatively rational features against their reduction of ideology to myth(ology), I believe that Gouldner in turn downplays the mythical aspects of ideology despite occasional references to ideology and myth (for example, pp. 221f. and 293).


16 See the articles in note 14.


19 In a penetrating critical review of Dialectic, Ray Morrow complains that Gouldner's use of the term "paradigm" is imprecise and confusing since the term is usually associated with Kuhn, while Gouldner claims his use of the term derives from Mannheim--without providing the source. See Telos 33 (Summer 1977), p. 195. Morrow asks: "Why the term 'paradigmatic' which already has established meanings in the sociology of science and applies equally well to ideology generally?" (ibid). I agree and would also argue that what Gouldner describes as "paradigms" are part of ideology rather than something separate from and other to ideology.


21 T.W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York:
Herder and Herder, 1972). Gouldner claims that "My relation to the first generation of the Frankfurt School, for and with whom I worked while they were in exile in the United States, has been a lasting, if hybridized influence" (22). Gouldner's account of ideology, however, differs fundamentally from that developed by Adorno and Horkheimer, as the long passage I cited indicates, and unfortunately Gouldner does not discuss his differences here from the earlier generation of the Frankfurt School. For a fuller account of the classical "critical theory" of ideology and the culture industries, see Kellner, "Ideology", op. cit., pp. 53-7 and "Critical Theory, The Culture Industry, and Theories of Mass Communications and Culture", in Wozu noch kritische Theorie?, edited by Wolfgang Bonss and Axel Honneth (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, forthcoming in 1981).

Gouldner, Dialectic, op. cit., pp. 241ff. and 255ff. Gouldner's account of "Technocratic Consciousness and the Future of Ideology" is brilliant, as is his discussion of the contradictions of technocrats--theories developed in The New Class Project.

Several sections of Dialectic are a critical dialogue with Habermas. Like Habermas, Gouldner wants to develop a theory of distortion-free communication and to criticize obstacles to communication, but he rejects central features of Habermas's model of "communicative competence" and the "ideal speech situation" (138ff.). Gouldner accepts Habermas's stress on the political importance of the public sphere but disagrees with claims that it is obsolete--advanced by some Habermasians if not Habermas himself (161). He appreciates Habermas's insights into science and technology as ideology, but disagrees with some of Habermas's psoition (257ff.). Gouldner defends Habermas against the charge that he lacks a politics but believes that it needs more elaboration and concretion (147-52 and 163-4). There has been some debate on Gouldner's relation to Habermas. While Paul Piccone believes that Gouldner's critique of Habermas is "devasting" (see "Paradoxes of Reflexive Sociology", New German Critique 8, Spring 1976, p. 173), Ray Morrow believes that "Gouldner himself scarcely fails to escape the
difficulties ascribed to Habermas. The deeper problem here is the undifferentiated, historically uninformed attempt at a political reading of Habermas which is based neither on a firm grasp of all of his texts nor his revisionist relation to the Frankfurt School. As a consequence, what we find is not so much a critique of Habermas as Gouldner wrestling with himself trying to decide what Habermas must be saying". Op. cit., p. 196. While Piccone accepts uncritically Gouldner's often problematic critique of Habermas, Morrow fails to appreciate Gouldner's attempt to reconstruct Habermas and does not perceive those areas where he provides an advance over Habermas. In my view, a critical confrontation between Habermas and Gouldner would be extremely interesting and could help point to ways to resolve problems in both projects. Such a confrontation would require, however, another paper and cannot be undertaken here.


27See my discussion of a radical media politics in "TV, Ideology and Emancipatory Popular Culture"/ My sense of the possibilities for radical intervention in the broadcast media is grounded in four years of experience of co-producing a public access television program "Alternative Views News Magazine". We have now produced over 125 hour-long programs for the local public access cable channel on the economy, energy sources and alternatives, civil liberties and
repression, the media, the labor movement, struggles by the Texas farmworkers, American Indian movement, and various other topics of current interest. We combine documentary video, slides and images with a talk show format and alternative news media presentations. Our guests have included John Stockwell criticizing the CIA, John Henry Faulk speaking of his blacklisting and the "new McCarthyism", Ralph Yarborough talking about his career in Congress and battles with special interests, Edward Dymtrk talking of his career in Hollywood and experiences with the Communist Party and HUAC, Helen Caldecott on nuclear energy, Ramsey Clark on Iran and American politics, George Wald on threats to survival of the species, Daniel Ellsberg on the arms race, Michael Klare on the dangers of World War III and the new counterinsurgency, as well as representatives from many other local and national groups. We have tapes of many of these programs and those interested in purchasing programs can write for a list of available tapes to Douglas Kellner, Department of Philosophy, The University of Texas, Austin, Texas 78712.