
With the death of Herbert Marcuse in 1979 the time has come for a comprehensive assessment of his work and its impact on contemporary thought and politics. Morton Schoolman undertakes this project in *The Imaginary Witness*. He claims to present "the first systematic and comprehensive exposition and interpretation of Marcuse's entire life work" (xii-xiii) and to offer critical analysis of Marcuse's theory. At stake in Schoolman's reading is whether his interpretation is correct and his critique justified. These questions will animate this review which will challenge Schoolman's interpretation and criticism at key points.

Schoolman begins by claiming that Marcuse's essays published from 1928 to 1938 "are extremely significant for contemporary social theory and politics" (1). Indeed, "from the standpoint of our own time the early period is the most important in Marcuse's life work" (2). Schoolman especially likes the emphasis in the young Marcuse on an individual consciousness free from ideological manipulation and dehumanization which is capable of becoming a subject of political practice. Confronting Lukács' theory of reification and false consciousness, Schoolman claims: "With the aid of Heidegger's concepts, however, Marcuse has begun very gently to pry the individual loose from the tightly secured ideological moorings erected by Lukács' theory of reification. Although capital invades and subjects to its rule the social forms of human existence, the existential inclination or fundamental human striving toward these forms endures because it is an essential attribute of each individual. Basic dispositions toward love, friendship, and community are increasingly denied and limited as their areas of expression are annexed by a commodity economy. Yet, as these inclinations constitute the individual, it not only remains possible but also is necessary to speak of an individual living apart from and against the reified world of
affairs; even though this individual now views the world in fetishized terms” (7-8).

This is, to say the least, a questionable reading of Heidegger and the early Marcuse. While it is true that Heidegger posits an “existential inclination” toward individual authenticity which Marcuse appropriated in his discussion of impulses toward radical action, neither Heidegger nor the early Marcuse valorize “basic dispositions toward love, friendship, and community” and it is precisely the absence of these features which constitute the limits of Heidegger’s existentialism. In fact, Heidegger’s theory of “das Man” and “inauthenticity” provides an even more pessimistic account of the domination of the individual by society than Lukács’ theory of reification. For Lukács, development of class consciousness, the party and revolutionary practice allows for the possibility of the overthrow of reification — which is posited as a historically specific feature of bourgeois society — whereas Heidegger ontologizes reification and alienation as determinants of all social being. Schoolman consistently downplays the extremely important influence of Lukács’ History and Class Consciousness on Marcuse’s work, and thus illicitly claims that Marcuse turned to Heidegger to escape from the pessimistic conclusion of Lukács’ theory of reification whereas in fact Marcuse thought that Lukács and Heidegger’s theories were compatible and could provide a powerful synthesis of social critique.


4. Schoolman argues that Marcuse’s early writings are directed against Lukács (5-11) and claims later that “It is doubtful that Georg Lukács contributed significantly to Marcuse’s mature investigations of the technological organization of modern society” (139). This is completely wrong for it is clear that Lukács was a decisive influence on both Marcuse’s early writings as well as on the problematic of One-Dimensional Man — points that Marcuse made amply clear to me in extensive discussions I had with him on the impact of Lukács’ thought on his own work. Curiously, Schoolman’s failure to perceive Lukács’ importance to Marcuse comes out in a mistranslation of a reference to Lukács in Marcuse’s “On the Problem of the Dialectic” which Schoolman and a friend translated in Telos, 27 (Spring 1976), 12-39. Whereas Marcuse’s German text stresses that Lukács’ importance for contemporary Marxism cannot be overemphasized, Schoolman translates the passage to the effect that Lukács’ significance is “not to be overemphasized” (p. 24).

5. See Marcuse’s interview with Frederich Olafson, “Heidegger’s Politics,”
Next, Schoolman claims that "historicity" is the most "important concept" in Marcuse's early writings and describes it as those "factors that dispose the individual to action" (8-9). Again, Schoolman is wrong, for historicity describes those ontological features of history (as opposed to Nature, God, or other ontological regions). Heidegger and Marcuse (in his early essays before he abandoned the term) claim that historicity permeates all human life and for the early Marcuse, historicity is the fundamental ontological-anthropological term which circumscribes determinants of all action, conformist or radical, as well as all inaction. If is, in fact, Heidegger's theory of authenticity, transposed into Marcuse's theory of radical action, which contains those "factors that dispose the individual to action," factors that Marcuse discusses in historical materialist terms as existential needs and potentialities.

In any case, what Schoolman likes about Marcuse's early writings is his focus on "the concretely existing individual" who is free, or at least partially free, from ideological manipulation and who is capable of "radical action." The central thrust of Schoolman's entire book, in fact, is to elevate the "discontented, doubting, disaffected and ambivalent individual" (79) into the subject of radical action. Who, then, is this subject? Now, from Schoolman's account, it appears to be the subject of existentialism and liberalism and Schoolman wants to defend this (bourgeois) subject against its alleged neglect in Marxism and against Marcuse's ambivalence toward the already existing individual subject. For Schoolman, although Marcuse champions this individual in his early and some later writings, he "abandons" it in others. Unfortunately, Schoolman, like other one-time neo-Marxist fellow-travelers who in their disenchantment with Marxism are attracted toward more individualist theories, fails to specify what sort

Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Winter 1977). Interestingly, in reference to Lucien Goldmann's claim that there was a profound similarity between Heidegger and Lukács and that Heidegger transposed features of Lukacs' Marxian analysis into the language of "fundamental ontology," Marcuse states: "You know as far as I can say, it is today still open to question whether Heidegger ever really read Marx, whether Heidegger ever read Lukács, as Lucien Goldmann maintains. I tend not to believe it. He may have had a look at Marx after or during the Second World War, but I don't think that he in any way studied Marx" (op. cit., p. 28).


8. James Miller, for instance, in History and Human Existence (Berkeley:
of individual subject can carry out radical action and fails to see as well significant differences between the "individualism" of liberalism, existentialism, continental rationalism, and existing capitalist societies.

Throughout his early chapters, Schoolman conflates Hegel, Marxism, critical rationalism, philosophy of life (i.e., Dilthey's Lebensphilosophie) and existentialism into one amalgamated theory of the individual bursting with "critical insight," "a secret ambition to change the world" (17), and a "disposition to radical action." In fact, Marx, Hegel, Kant, Dilthey, and Heidegger had very different concepts of the individual and very different projects to change the world, but no one would know this from Schoolman's pastiche. In fact, Schoolman can write without irony or qualification, "Marx's theory, like Hegel's philosophy, is a theory of revolutionary praxis" (22). Obviously, Schoolman will not be able to specify any concrete goals, practices, or strategies for "radical action" with such an undifferentiated concept of "the individual" and "revolutionary practice," nor does he specify what features of the early Marcuse's project led him to abandon this enterprise of synthesizing Marx and Heidegger, dialectics and phenomenology, and radical individualism with class struggle. At the beginning of his discussion, Schoolman claims that "Marcuse did not abandon his project because it contained flaws that derived from his studies with Heidegger" (2), but Marcuse himself argues that it was precisely the Heideggerian flaws that led him to abandon the project, as well as the insight that all he found valuable in Heidegger was already in the early Marx. In Marcuse's words, "I first, like all the others, believed there could be some combination between existentialism and Marxism, precisely because of their insistence on concrete analysis of the actual human existence, human beings, and their world. But I soon realized that Heidegger's concreteness was to a great extent a phony, a false concreteness, and that in fact his philosophy was just as abstract and just as removed from reality, even avoiding reality, as the philosophies which at that time had dominated German universities." 9

University of California Press, 1979) claims that Marxism lacks a dimension of subjectivity and that thinkers such as Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and others can provide supplements for this deficiency; Miller, however, does not actually develop either a Marxian concept of subjectivity, nor any concept of subjectivity that is particularly interesting or attractive. Empty gestures toward "subjectivity" and the "individual" thus function as rhetorical devices to try to discredit Marxism which allegedly neglects subjectivity and the individual. This critical strategy is inappropriate when applied to Marcuse and one of the more bizarre elements of Schoolman's book is his dirge about Marcuse's "abandonment of the individual."

9. Marcuse, Interview with Olafson, op.cit., 28. See also Marcuse's conversation with Habermas and others, "Theory and Politics," Telos, 88 (Winter 1978-9), 124-153, where he states: "What Heidegger had done essentially was to replace Husserl's
A crucial problem with Schoolman’s approach to Marcuse is the lack of historical or biographical contextualizing of Marcuse’s work.\textsuperscript{10} Schoolman ignores Marcuse’s interviews and there is nothing in his book about Marcuse’s road to Marx. There is no discussion of his experiences in World War I that led him to join the Social Democratic Party; no mention of his experiences in the German Revolution that made him a Spartacus sympathizer who henceforth saw revolution as a dramatic upheaval and total social restructuring and who distrusted the reformism of established Social Democratic parties; and no analysis of his experiences in Weimar Germany that led him, successively, to study and commit himself to Marxism, to study comparative literature and to acquire a deep interest in aesthetics, and to study philosophy with Heidegger and Husserl, gaining thereby a life-long involvement with philosophy. The origins of Marcuse’s politics, aesthetics and philosophy are not adequately probed by School-

\textsuperscript{10} Schoolman does not draw upon any interviews or secondary material to illuminate Marcuse’s life and works. He tends instead to focus solely on Marcuse’s texts, out of which he extracts “ideas” for his exposition. In addition, he rarely cites, discusses, or criticizes other interpretations, claiming that “Although this study was in part inspired by the need not only for a comprehensive evaluation of Marcuse’s social thought but also for a reevaluation of the majority of his arguments already examined in the secondary literature, many of the critical essays on Marcuse are clearly excellent. Because my study has assumed a course quite different from any taken by earlier investigations, to avoid the awkwardness of frequently interrupting discussions to summarize and entertain criticisms by others of particular aspects of Marcuse’s work, I have chosen to respond to critical arguments at an implicit level of analysis” (xiii-xiv). This lame disclaimer is typical of Schoolman’s muddled thinking and argumentation: in fact, few critical studies of Marcuse are “excellent”; most of Marcuse’s ideas and positions are the subject of heated controversy and a comprehensive book on Marcuse should sort out the various criticisms and interpretations, affirming the valid and insightful ones and criticizing the dubious ones. Moreover, Schoolman’s interpretation is not much different in its basic features from the criticisms of Marcuse’s “one-dimensional” social theory and pessimism that circulated in the aftermath of \textit{One-Dimensional Man} in the mid and late 1960s. By failing to discuss the literature which debates Marcuse’s work, Schoolman covers over the sources of many of his own positions and fails to articulate what is specific about his own position.
man who instead stays, for the most part, on the level of explicating and criticizing Marcuse's texts with only an occasional reference to the historical situation. The result is a shallow and ahistorical study which fails to perceive the evolution and development of Marcuse's thought in its interaction with the vicissitudes of his historical situation — a point I shall return to in the conclusion of this review.

An exception to Schoolman's ignoring the historical context of Marcuse's works and the shifts in his thought can be found in his references to fascism which he claims "did eventually lead to Marcuse's abandonment of the individual" (37). Although Schoolman indiscriminately tosses about "fascism" throughout his book as the alleged source of Marcuse's basic positions, he never adequately indicates how fascism supposedly caused Marcuse to "abandon the individual" and what similarities and differences Marcuse thematized between fascist and advanced capitalist societies. Instead, Schoolman uses "fascism" to describe a "terrible event" (36-7), "horrors," the memory of which "was seared deeply, grotesquely, into the structure of his thought" (45). "Fascism" thus serves for Schoolman more as a rhetorical device to signify a deeply traumatic event that radically modified Marcuse's thinking rather than as an analytic concept which describes a stage of the vicissitudes of capitalism and contemporary history.

Throughout the rest of the book, Schoolman tends to derive salient features of Marcuse's thought from his encounter with fascism. Obviously, Marcuse's response to history helped shape his thought and his experiences of fascism were certainly significant, but Schoolman totally neglects discussion of the impact of the work and projects of the Institute for Social Research which, in my view, were crucial both in constituting his 1934-1941 work with the Institute and in deeply influencing the constitution of his post-World War II social theory which he always defined as "critical theory." Excluding himself from the task of relating Marcuse's thought to Institute work, Schoolman writes: "For two reasons I have not attempted to analyze extensively the development of Marcuse's social theory in relation to that of Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and the other members of the Frankfurt School. To the extent to which this task is necessary and, I believe, possible, it has been accomplished ably and admirably by Martin Jay in The Dialectical Imagination.... Second, Marcuse's thought now seems to me to be distinctive in so many respects that drawing attention to views similarly held by his Frankfurt School colleagues would obscure his originality" (xiii). This is odd for Jay never claims or intends to "analyze extensively" Marcuse's thought in relation to the Frankfurt School and in fact Jay stresses the common project and features of the critical theorists and does not specify
differences in any detail between the “inner circle” of the Institute — topics that Schoolman neglects to the detriment of his interpretation of Marcuse. While it would be wrong to deny Marcuse’s “originality” and differences from other members of the Institute, it is impossible to grasp fully Marcuse’s turn to the critical rationalism and Hegelian Marxism of his 1934-1941 works without situating Marcuse’s thought in the context of Institute projects and writings.

Neglect of the impact of the Institute on Marcuse also keeps Schoolman from grasping the reasons that Marcuse turned to Freud in the 1950s. Moreover, the roots, genesis and development of Marcuse’s theory of “advanced industrial society” cannot be properly understood without perceiving its critical theory antecedents and sources. Schoolman claims that Max Weber was the decisive theoretical influence on Marcuse’s theory of technological rationality which provided the all-embracing framework and constituent of advanced industrial society, but it was in fact the Institute’s theories of technological rationality, state and monopoly capitalism, the decline of the individual, the culture industry, and a variety of other Institute theories about neo-capitalism that decisively influenced Marcuse. Against Schoolman, one could argue that Marcuse appropriated Weber’s work in the context of Institute discussions and that Marcuse himself carried out a Marxian critique of Weber.

Moreover, Schoolman to the contrary, Marcuse never “abandons” the individual in his work with the Institute. Whereas it is true that


12. Schoolman claims that “Max Weber has certainly made the greatest single contribution to Marcuse’s efforts” (137). In my view, to claim that Weber is the single greatest theoretical influence on Marcuse’s theory is sheer nonsense and covers over the impact of Hegel, Marx and the Institute for Social Research on Marcuse’s theory. In fact, Marcuse’s theory of advanced industrial society — rather than merely replaying Weber’s theory of rationality and the “iron cage” — synthesizes analyses of state and monopoly capitalism from Friedrich Pollock and Franz Neumann; Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s theory of the decline of the individual, technological rationality, the culture industry; and theories of changes in the labor process, the role of technology, and changed class composition in advanced capitalism developed by the French Arguments group and others. The analysis also extends Lukacs’ theory of reification, commodity fetishism, and false consciousness to provide a critique of Marxian orthodoxy concerning the revolutionary role of the working class. Weber is thus but one source of Marcuse’s theory and, as the texts by Held and Marcuse himself argue, he is hardly as decisive as Schoolman claims; compare Held, op. cit., pp. 64-66 with Marcuse, “Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber,” in Negations (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).
Marcuse, quite realistically, saw little possibility of effective individual revolt against fascism, he continued to stress the importance of the preservation and development of the individual in his work with critical theory and criticized versions of Marxism that neglected the individual. In typical Institute writings, Marcuse claims: "[Critical theory's] critique is also directed at the avoidance of its full economic and political demands by many who invoke it. This situation compels theory anew to a sharper emphasis on its concern with the potentialities of man and with the individual's freedom, happiness, and rights.... The entire impetus of the theory came from this interest in the individual." 13 "We have [in Reason and Revolution] dwelt rather extensively upon Marx's early writings because they emphasize tendencies that have been attenuated in the post-Marxian development of his critique of society, namely, the elements of communistic individualism, the repudiation of any fetishism concerning the socialization of the means of production or the growth of the productive forces, the subordination of all these factors to the idea of the free realization of the individual." 14

In fact, I would argue that focus on the individual is a distinctive feature of all Marcuse's work, although he offers different conceptions of the individual in different stages of his work which successively depicts the vicissitudes of the individual in contemporary history. Schoolman, in his confused attempt to champion a "discontented, doubting, disaffected, and ambivalent individual" (79) as a subject of transformative political practice, fails to appreciate critical theory's socio-psychological analysis of the weaknesses of conformist and narcissistic individuals in contemporary society. 15 Although Schoolman claims that "Critical theory's implicit concept of subjectivity is impoverished" (78), he does not offer an appreciably richer concept of the individual himself. Moreover, while Marcuse and critical theory attempt to diagnose the social situation and cognitive-practical deficiencies of the individual — and, in Marcuse's case, those poten-

13. Marcuse, "Philosophy and Critical Theory," in Negations, op. cit., pp. 142 and 147. Such statements are found in most of Marcuse's Institute essays. See especially Marcuse's "Some Social Implications of Modern/Technology," in Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, Vol. IX (1941), 414-439. The essay was originally a lecture dealing with "the problem of the individual in present day society" — as Horkheimer put it in the Preface to the issue of the journal in which it was published (p. 865). This theme was in fact Marcuse's special focus within the Institute, thus Schoolman's claim that Marcuse "abandoned the individual" during this period is unfounded.


15. On this theme, see Russell Jacoby, Social Amnesia (Boston: Beacon Press, 1976); Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism (New York: Norton, 1979); and the symposium on Lasch and narcissism in Telos, 44 (Summer 1980, 49-126.)
tialities for social revolt and transformation — Schoolman, in the mode of "positive thinking" which Marcuse so despised, sees the already existing individuals as fundamentally "reflective and insightful" (25, 80, passim) and capable of transformative political action.

Schoolman begins his discussion of Marcuse's post-World War II writings with analysis of Marcuse's appropriation of Freud. Here Schoolman's sympathies for Marcuse dissolve almost completely as he systematically attacks Marcuse for his departures from Freudian orthodoxy.16 Schoolman assumes the absolute truth of Freudian theory and fails to appreciate Marcuse's imaginative, though problematiq, attempt to reconstruct Freud in order to bring Freudian psychology and anthropology into critical theory. He misses completely the adventure and sublimity of Eros and Civilization which, despite its faults, is one of the most ambitious and provocative attempts to provide a synthesis of Marx and Freud. Further, Schoolman misinterprets Marcuse's basic categories in Eros and Civilization. He claims that "by nature Eros is the dominant instinct, disposing human nature to a receptiveness to human relations and relations with nature" (91). Eros, however, is consistently defined by Marcuse, following Freud's usage, as the "life instincts [that]... continuously counteract and delay the 'descent toward death',... sexual instincts that are the great unifying force that preserves all life."17 Eros is thus activity that aims at the preservation, gratification, and enhancement of life and cannot simply be defined by the criteria of "receptiveness." Moreover, it is not necessarily the dominant instinct, for Thanatos, aggression and destruction, can overpower and dominate Eros.18 Further, there are in Marcuse's and Freud's theory "by nature" (Schoolman's emphasis) no dominant instincts that

16. The same strategy was carried out in previous studies of Marcuse's relation to Freud. The most detailed is Sidney Lipshires, Herbert Marcuse: From Marx to Freud and Beyond (Cambridge: Schenckman, 1974) who documents how Marcuse's analyses of various issues differ from orthodox psychoanalysis. Lipshires, like Schoolman, completely accepts the truth of orthodox psychoanalysis and believes that he has scored telling points against Marcuse simply by showing where he differs from orthodox Freudianism. In contrast to those who take this position, Gad Horowitz argues in Repression (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1977) that many of Marcuse's basic ideas are more compatible with Freud than some critics allow and that Eros and Civilization should be read and evaluated as a provocative reconstruction of Freud rather than be denounced as a departure from Father Freud's orthodoxy (see note 19 below for an example).


predispose individuals to "a receptiveness to human relations and relations with nature" (91). Rather than "an erotic or nonaggressive sensibility" being the "dominant" instinct, Marcuse criticizes a social nature that tends toward aggression, competition, repression, domination of nature, etc., as dominant characteristics of human beings in advanced capitalist (and state socialist) societies. "Receptivity," "an erotic or nonaggressive sensibility," etc., are normative ideals for Marcuse which do, in his view, have an instinctual basis in human nature, but they are qualities which must be achieved through emancipatory practice and transvaluation of values.

Schoolman is incapable of grasping Marcuse's theory of liberation because once again he misreads Marcuse's fundamental ideas. Contrary to Schoolman's claims (99 ff.), Marcuse does not reject genital sexuality: he is aware that surplus repression can cripple genital sexuality and rather than replacing genital sexuality with an ideal of pre-genital sexuality as Schoolman implies, Marcuse calls for a reactivating and gratifying of "all erotogenetic zones." 19 Schoolman, on the other hand, defends an especially conservative version of Freud that champions sublimation (through labor) as the source of highest gratification (101 ff., especially 103 and 105); that equates "perversions" with pre-genital partial aim instincts of infantile sexuality (109 ff.); that biologizes (ontologizes) human psychic-sexual development (248 ff., especially 255); that defends critical autonomy over "libidinal rationality" (114); and that downplays the significance in Marcuse's theory of liberation of art, play, display, polymorphic sexuality, the new reality principle, and the transvaluation of values advocated in Marcuse's rich and fascinating theory. Stuck himself in the reality principle of the performance principle, Schoolman retreats to the sphere of sublimation and critical rationality, attacking Marcuse's most emancipatory notions. Whereas Marcuse wants another world and another way of life, Schoolman defends the "imperatives" of existing reality and thus ends up naturalizing surplus repression. Consequently, he fails to appreciate precisely what is most exciting and intriguing, however problematic, about Marcuse.

The overwhelming emphasis of Schoolman's book is concerned with Marcuse's theory of technological rationality explicated, inexplicably, under the rubric "Civilization Without Discontents" I, II, and III (181-288). This rubric is odd because Schoolman is describing, in fact,

19. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, op. cit., p. 201 (my emphasis). Gad Horowitz argues in Repression, op. cit., that Marcuse does not reject genital sexuality for a regression to infantile sexuality as Erich Fromm and others, including Schoolman, claim, but instead Marcuse proposes expanding the sphere of sexuality to reanimate "all erotogenetic zones" (pp. 66 ff.). In Horowitz's view, rather than abandoning Freud's theory of genital sexuality, Marcuse simply wants to expand and free sexuality, thus, in Horowitz's term, advocating an ideal of "polymorphic genitality" (p. 78).
repression in civilization under the reign of technological rationality throughout these chapters. Schoolman presents Marcuse as a technological reductionist who is primarily fleshing out Marx Weber's theory of technological rationality. Consequently, he downplays Marcuse's critique and reconstruction of Marxism which at once questions and rejects aspects of the Marxian theory while attempting to strengthen Marxism as a theory of advanced capitalism and the possibilities and obstacles to social change in the contemporary era. Schoolman outdoes these interpreters of Marcuse who see him as a prophet of "one-dimensionality" by claiming that for Marcuse a one-dimensional technological rationality fundamentally constitutes economic activity, politics, culture, consciousness, and everyday life with no possibility for escape from a condition of total domination. For Schoolman, "it is precisely this technological enclosure of the entire ...

20. Earlier theories of Marcuse as a "technological determinist" include the Marxist-Leninist Robert Steigerwald, *Herbert Marcuses dritter Weg* (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1969); Claus Offe, "Technik und Eindimensionalität: Eine Version der Technokratie?", in *Antworten auf Herbert Marcuse*, edited by Jürgen Habermas (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968); and Langdon Winner, who presents Marcuse as a theorist of "autonomous technology" and "technics-out-of-control" in *Autonomous Technology* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977). Although there are passages in *One-Dimensional Man* which give the impression that Marcuse assumes that technology is equivalent to domination and is the major constituent force of advanced industrial society, other passages discuss the "new technology" — which projects technology-as-liberation — and argue as well that the structure and functions of technology are in part determined by the "vested interests" that control advanced capitalism; see *ODM*, pp. 2 ff. In a conversation with me (La Jolla, California, December 28, 1978), Marcuse said that he regrets passages in *One-Dimensional Man* which suggest that he believes in any version of a technological determinism or that he is "against" science and technology. To clarify the issue, he writes in *An Essay on Liberation* (Boston: Beach Press, 1969): "not technology, not technique, not the machine are the engines of repression, but the presence, in them, of the masters who determine their number, their life span, their power, their place in life, and the need for them. Is it still necessary to repeat that science and technology are the great vehicles of liberation, and that it is only their use and restriction in the repressive society which makes them into vehicles of domination?" (p. 12). See also Five Lectures (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), pp. 67-8 and his comments on Charles Reich's *The Greening of America* which advocated the sort of theory of technological domination which Schoolman ascribes to Marcuse: "Charles Reich as Revolutionary Ostrich," in *The Con III Controversy*, edited by Philip Nobile (New York: Pocket Books, 1971), pp. 15-7. Given these stipulations, any critique of Marcuse as a technological determinist, technocrat, or technophobe is both obsolete and extremely misleading.

society that reduces it to a single dimension" (133).

Such a presentation of Marcuse as a technological reductionist fails to specify those elements of capitalist development which are targets of Marcuse's critique and fails to specify as well those contradictions and social conditions which make possible social change. Schoolman fails to point out adequately that it is false needs and commodities which in Marcuse's analysis play the crucial role in integrating the working class(es) into capitalist society and not any "iron cage" of technological rationality. For Marcuse, it is both technological rationality and capitalist relations of production which constitute advanced capitalist societies, and his analysis implies that capitalist imperatives structure technological rationality while technological rationality in turn helps structure advanced capitalism. Schoolman and others who see Marcuse as a technological determinist and reductionist, on the other hand, create a "vulgar Marcuse" who does not perceive the reciprocal interaction between capitalism and technology in the contemporary era.22

An underlying problem in Schoolman's interpretation, as well as in others who reduce Marcuse to the theorist of "one-dimensionality" and "technological rationality," is the tendency to use "one-dimensionality" as a totalizing concept used to describe an era of historical development which supposedly absorbs all opposition into a totalitarian, monolithic system. Against this interpretation, it should be emphasized that Marcuse rarely, if ever, uses the term "one-dimensionality," but instead uses the adjective "one-dimensional" to describe social structures and behavior without alternatives and thought which is incapable of perceiving either higher potentialities or alternatives to existing realities. In fact, Marcuse criticizes one-dimensional phenomena through alternatives which are to be fought for and realized. Consequently, it is wrong to read Marcuse as the theorist of a one-dimensional totality without any alternatives, higher potentialities, or prospects for change. Since much

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22. In his exposition of Marcuse's theory of technological rationality, Schoolman makes him sound like the technological reductionist and technophobe Jacques Ellul, author of The Technological Society (New York: Random House, 1964). Reading Schoolman's summary of Marcuse's thought on pages 133-177, I had the uncanny feeling that I was reading a rehash of Ellul's theory of technological society. While Marcuse was in Paris during the period that Ellul's work was in vogue, there are no references to Ellul in Marcuse's published writing and his student William Leiss told me in conversation that Marcuse never mentioned Ellul in his lectures and that it was an open question as to whether Marcuse had even read Ellul. In any case, it is a grave mistake to equate Marcuse's theory of advanced industrial society with those of Ellul or any other technological reductionist. On the relations between technology and capitalism in Marcuse, see Kellner and Roderick, "Recent Literature on Critical Theory," New German Critique, 23 (1981), 147-150.
of Marcuse's later work is explicitly directed against such an interpretation, it is a mistake to read Marcuse's work as an epic of total domination, or as a quasi-Hegelian attempt to subsume everything into one monolithic construct. Schoolman, however, simply identifies the theorist of technological rationality and one-dimensional society with Marcuse tout court.

Schoolman furhtermore attempts to defend and valorize precisely those elements which Marcuse criticized as "one-dimensional" in terms of their roles in reproducing and stabilizing existing society: empirical social science, liberal politics, analytical and ordinary language philosophy, and, of course, that "ambivalent individual" of whom Schoolman is so enamored. After an exhaustive, and exhausting, discussion of Marcuse's alleged theory of total technological domination in Chapter Four, Schoolman attacks Marcuse's "one-dimensional assumptions" and attempts to show that there are critical moments in "operationalism in Social Science" (190 ff.), "ordinary language" (198 ff.), linguistic analysis (206 ff.), the sphere of labor (208 ff.), politics (202 ff.) and so on. Although Schoolman occasionally scores a point against Marcuse's harsh and often one-sided criticisms of the phenomena listed above, Schoolman goes too far in defending the targets of Marcuse's critique, thus failing to note the degree to which Marcuse is justified in criticizing tendencies of "one-dimensional thought."

In the remaining chapters, Schoolman fails to appreciate the often significant changes in Marcuse's theories in his post-1965 writings. These contain, first, a mixture of his model of one-dimensional society alongside ultra-left celebration and defense of a variety of forces of opposition, followed by a series of 1970s works from Counterrevolution and Revolt up until his death in 1979, which largely overcome the limitations of Marcuse's theory of technological rationality and one-dimensional society in One-Dimensional Man that Schoolman so incessantly and repeatedly bludgeons. Schoolman spends so much energy and space presenting and attacking Marcuse's theory of one-dimensionality that he has little space to discuss adequately the changes in Marcuse's work under the impact of the New Left and the 1960s which produced many exciting departures in Marcuse's 1970s works. The result is that Schoolman fixates on the one-dimensional Marcuse and thus conflates a distorted version of one stage of Marcuse's theory into the "Marcusean" theory per se. Although Schoolman notes developments in Counterrevolution and Revolt (312 ff.), he neglects Marcuse's other 1970s writings which offer new perspectives on revolution asnd which criticize, explicitly and implicitly, traditional Marxism as well as his own theory in One-Dimensional Man.

Schoolman's main interpretive claim concerning Marcuse's 1970s
works is that his analysis in *Counterrevolution and Revolt* results in a "radicalized liberal politics" (320). Unfortunately, Schoolman never defines this notion and does not cite Marcuse's texts which would substantiate such a label. More careful examination of Marcuse's 1970s writings indicate that while he rethought the dialectics of reform and revolution and was more sympathetic to liberal reform, he never abandoned his Marxian revolutionary perspectives.\(^{23}\)

Symptomatic here is Schoolman's neglect of Marcuse's provocative essay on Bahro which systematicallysums up Marcuse's under-appreciated critique during the 1970s of Marxist-Leninist theories of revolution and that contains as well his own final revolutionary perspectives.\(^{24}\) Marcuse continues here his critique of fetishizing the working class as the privileged agent of change (the myth of the proletariat) and of perceiving revolution as a dramatic upheaval and overthrow of the existing order (the myth of October). Applying Bahro's analysis of existing socialist societies to advanced capitalism, Marcuse perceives the production of subjective and objective conditions within the existing society that might lead to radical structural transformation. Continuing his inquiries in *Counterrevolution and Revolt*, Marcuse searches for new needs and new consciousness capable of rejecting and transforming the existing society. This active and creative individual with "surplus consciousness" and "emancipatory needs" makes a mockery of Schoolman's repeated polemic against Marcuse's "abandonment of the individual" and "one-dimensional assumptions."

The overwhelming bulk of Schoolman's book is thus fixated on one moment in Marcuse's development, the theory of one-dimensional man. Schoolman fails even here to note how this theory was a response to the stabilization of capitalism, to affluence and to conformity in a specific historical era (the post-War "Great American Celebration," to use C. Wright Mills' phrase). Marcuse theorized this era in *One-Dimensional Man* and turned to revise his theory when socio-historical conditions changed. Far from being a "mind not to be changed by place or time,"\(^{25}\) Marcuse constantly revised his theories in

\(^{23}\) See my forthcoming study *Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism* for detailed elucidation of this point. Although Schoolman's book was published in 1980, it appears that it was more or less completed in the mid-1970s as there is little on the late Marcuse. In fact, Schoolman's bibliography which claims to be "the most complete that has been published to date" (359) lists less than half of Marcuse's 1970s publications (I am completing a bibliography that will contain many listings overlooked in all previous bibliographies).


\(^{25}\) Schoolman cites a passage from John Milton's *Paradise Lost* with this phrase to begin his discussion of Marcuse's theory of technological rationality and uses the phrase as a subtitle in that chapter (pp. 162 ff.). Use of this phrase to characterize
the light of changing social conditions. Schoolman's failure to situate Marcuse's work historically leads him to abstract an "ideal type" Marcuse as an apostle of one-dimensionality, whom he then cruelly attacks. Marcuse, however, was much more complicated, flexible, and protean than Schoolman's one-dimensional pessimist.

For Schoolman, Marcuse emerges as a hapless intellectual who retreats from history into an imaginary aesthetic-philosophical dimension. If Schoolman would have accurately characterized the "second dimension" in this Marcuse, his book might have made some contribution. Schoolman's chapter on "The Aesthetic Dimension and the Second Dimension," however, is quite weak. Marcuse's aesthetic theory and theory of liberation are among the most fascinating and controversial aspects of Marcuse's thought, and Schoolman limits himself to a rather sparse and impoverished discussion (324 ff.). He is extremely perfunctory on Marcuse's dissertation *The German Artist Novel* (327-8) — which should have been discussed in detail at the beginning of his book — and offers dull and laborious summaries of Marcuse's other writings on art. He concludes with an inane claim that for Marcuse, "Modern art is conformist. It sacrifices the truth of the aesthetic dimension by transforming art into a language and experience that affirms and supports the established social order. Form, modern art contends, is a deadly obstacle to the artist's search for an aesthetic presentation of modern civilization that will display its horrors and spiritual poverty" (344). It is clearly not "modern art" which is conformist for Marcuse, but "mass art" and what he calls "anti-art." For instance, in *One-Dimensional Man*, Marcuse writes: "The real face of our time shows in Samuel Beckett's novels; its real history is written in Rolf Hochhuth's play *Der Stellvertreter*." 26 Explicitly championing the most modern art in "Art as a Form of Reality," Marcuse writes: "I believe that the authentic avant-garde of today are not those who try desperately to produce the absence of Form and the union with real life, but rather those who do not recoil from the exigencies of Form, who find the new word, image, and sound which are capable of 'comprehending' reality as only Art can comprehend — and negate it. This authentic new Form has emerged in the work (already 'classic') of Schönberg, Berg, and Webern; of Kafka and Joyce; of Picasso; it continues today in such achievements as Stockhausen's *Spirale* and Samuel Beckett's novels. They invalidate the notion of the 'end of art.'" 27

Marcuse's mentality reveals both Schoolman's fixation on one moment of Marcuse's analysis and his failure to note significant changes in Marcuse's thought. It also expresses a condescending and polemical stance which runs through the book.

Throughout his study, Schoolman distorts many of Marcuse's distinctive theories and provides a straw-man polemic which fails to assess the actual shortcomings and strengths of Marcuse's thought. He provides little sense of Marcuse's epic struggle with Marxism and of Marcuse's attempt to provide a neo-Marxist theory of contemporary society and proposals for radical change. He does not satisfactorily elucidate Marcuse's ongoing and constantly evolving synthesis of Hegel, Marx, Weber, Schiller, phenomenology, Heidegger, Freud and, of course, the critical theories of Adorno, Horkheimer, Pollock, Neumann and others. Schoolman fails to explicate the contradictory tensions within Marcuse's thought and the reasons why Marcuse appealed to so many people for so many different reasons. In fact, Herbert Marcuse, far from championing an "imaginary witness" as Schoolman would have it, was himself a real witness to the most significant historical and intellectual events of the 20th century. Far from retreating into an "aesthetic-philosophical sphere" as an "imaginary witness," Marcuse confronted the horrors and revolutionary possibilities of the century with uncompromising integrity. That Marcuse was able to produce revolutionary hope out of radical despair is one of his great legacies — a legacy that Schoolman cannot comprehend, in part, because he does not adequately situate Marcuse's thought as a sustained response to changing historical conditions. Consequently, Schoolman's Marcuse is a dull, lifeless, pessimistic reductionist who has little to offer to contemporary thought. From Schoolman's portrait, it is not clear that there is anything in Marcuse worth preserving. Such a peculiarly unsympathetic reading is hard to understand, coming from someone who claims that he wishes to present a sympathetic study (xiii).

In fact, Schoolman adds little to existing literature on Marcuse. His interpretation basically derives from those attacks on Marcuse which appeared after One-Dimensional Man when he was perceived as a subversive threat to existing logos and order. Schoolman takes the Marcuse of One-Dimensional Man as the Marcuse, substituting an imaginary ideal-type for the complex and contradictory corpus of work produced by one of the great thinkers of our time. Moreover, rather than letting Marcuse speak through citation, Schoolman presents Marcuse in his own words and convoluted prose — which is frequently more obscure than Marcuse's own admittedly difficult work. The result is an imaginary Marcuse more one-dimensional, pessimistic and boring than anything that has yet appeared in the Marcuse literature.

Hints of the reasons for the extent of Schoolman's failure come out in conclusion to his book. Here, in a rather brief discussion, Schoolman explicates as an antipode to Marcuse, William Connolly's analysis of "liberal moments" in the working class that might make it a