Internet Subcultures and Political Activism
Subcultures
traditionally represent alternative cultures and practices to the dominant
culture of the established society. While they often construct themselves
within and against the governing culture from which they are born, their
comparatively smaller population size, their associations with emergent youth
culture and the manifold novelties of the day, and their occasionally
politically resistant and activist temperaments all serve to ensure that
subcultures are constructed so as to be more than mere reproductions of the
grander cultural forms, themes, and practices. If the dominant culture provides
the semantic codes by which groups attempt to transmit and reproduce themselves,
then subcultures represent a challenge to this symbolic order in their attempt
to institute new grammars and meanings through which they interpret the world,
and new practices through which they transform it.
In this sense, Dick Hebdige has spoken of subcultures
as a form of "noise" capable of jamming dominant media transmissions. Of
course, as Hebdige also notes, the eventual reality of oppositional
culture-jamming is not that it replaces dominant media representations with its
own. Rather, alternative subcultures strive to capture media attention, and in
so doing become involved in the Janus-faced process of attempting to transform
dominant codes even as they become appropriated, commodified, and re-defined by
the hegemonic culture which they contest (Hebdige 1979: 90-92).
Our present moment, however, is highly turbulent
and complex, and can be characterized as a "postmodern adventure" in which
traditional forms of culture and politics are being resurrected, imploded into
and combined with entirely new cultural and political modes in a global media
culture that is becoming increasingly dominated by the corporate forces of
science, technology, and capital (see Best and Kellner 2001). To speak of
post-subcultures, then, is to recognize that the emerging subcultures are
taking place in a world that is saturated with proliferating technologies,
media, and cultural awareness. Post-subcultures are constructed in new cultural
spaces and with innovative forms, entering into novel global configurations by
technological advances such as the Internet and multimedia which help produce
alternative forms of culture and political activism.
Thus, whereas many traditional subcultures, like
the Beat Generation, could aspire to the spirituality of "immediate" experience
and intimate face-to-face communal relations, this is increasingly difficult
for the post-subculture generation. Instead, the new subcultures that are
arising around the evolving Internet and wireless technologies appear as wholly
mediated and committed to the medium of network communication that they
correctly recognize as their foundation, while reaching out to help shape the
broader culture and polity of which they are a part.
However, as with previous generations of
subcultures, Internet subcultures seek a certain immediacy of experience that
strives to circumvent dominant codes in the attempt to access a wealth of
global information quickly and directly, and then to appropriate and
disseminate material further. The new subcultural immediacy, then, centers
around flows of information and multimedia, and post-subcultures can be seen to
be using the Internet as an environment that supports their attempts to gain
and provide access to information and culture that exists beyond the means of
control of the dominant order. In this fashion, subcultures associated with the
Internet are involved in the revolutionary circulation and democratization of
information and culture. In as much as this material is also part of the
media-process by which people come to identify and define themselves, the
emergent mediated post-subcultures are also involved in the attempt to allow
people the freedom to re-define and construct themselves around the kind of
alternative cultural forms, experiences, and practices which radical deployments
of the Internet afford (see Witheford-Dyer 2001; Best and Kellner 2001).
The Evolving Post-Subcultures of
the On-line Global Network
While there are a plethora of alternative
cultures at work on the Internet today, it would of course be a mistake to
categorize them all as concerned strictly with either democracy or progressive
politics. Rather, akin to the complexity of the postmodern era at hand, the
subcultures of the Internet would be better represented as multiplicitous, with
the Net being used for both progressive and reactionary causes by an abundance
of groups whose politics range from the far-left to the extreme right.
Indeed, while the overall tenor of the
revolution that is being brought about by the Internet is toward the
proliferation of alternative information and forms of culture and subjectivity,
many voices affiliated with both hate and violence have also found ready homes
amidst its cultural forum. The Internet allows a myriad of groups to propagate
and propagandize for their cause outside the media and norms traditionally
instituted by pre-Internet society. Our point here is certainly not to valorize
the gains made by such subcultural groups, but rather to note that the use of
the Internet as a media tool has allowed for the construction of a wide variety
of non-mainstream identities and communicative practices. Much like the
hyper-textual nature of the Web itself, the identities of Internet subcultures
are often hybridic and complex themselves, revealing a tendency to evolve through
constant reorganization and affiliation with other Internet subcultural groups.
In this sense, many post-subcultures of the Internet can be seen as dissolving
classical cultural and political boundaries that appear too rigid and
ideological for Net life. Still, groups also exist that have clearly defined
political orientations.
At work within all of these Net subcultures is
also the question of how they stand in relation to the dominant culture. During
the late 1980s, major Internet subcultures such as BBS (Bulletin Board Systems)
hubs represented the leading edge of the technology fringe. Populated mostly by
an underground network of technically sophisticated professional users and
computer literate youth, the bulletin boards proffered a veritable "gift economy"
of pictures, simple games, and message boards over extremely slow networks.
There was little or no discussion of service charges and most BBSs relied upon
users to develop on-line reputations through which proven community service
would garnish greater access from friendly SYSOPs (System Operators). With the
advent of the 1990s, many successful bulletin boards, such as The Well,
transferred protocols onto the emerging World Wide Web of hypertext. Within
only a few years, corporate and government culture would begin colonizing the
web too, and by the time of the dot-bomb tech crash of 2000, early web pioneers
such as Yahoo, Amazon, and NCSA (National Center for Supercomputing
Applications), would be joined by a huge influx of companies selling everything
from advertising to zoo animals.
As the Internet went corporate and on-line
service providers like America On-line (AOL), Compuserve, Prodigy and Earthlink
sought to brand and sell the Internet experience, many subcultures formed
around the new on-line corporate behaviors with service providers becoming a
key to one's on and offline identity. Historically, similar subcultures had
formed around hardware computer manufacturers like Apple, Kaypro, and IBM, but
during the 1990s factions erupted within computers as well over software
domains such as web browsers (Microsoft vs. Netscape) and search engines (Yahoo
vs. Alta Vista). Still, the strongest user bonds seem to have solidified around
service providers, with AOL providing a sort of cultural benchmark for the
movement. During this time of relative infancy for the Internet, AOL helped to
bring millions of new Internet users on-line with its graphical user-interface
(GUI), "You've got mail" aesthetic, and limitless user chat-rooms wherein
people could find love, local gossip, trans-sexual vampires and anything else
available to users' imaginations!
However, behind the corporate branding and
growing of the Internet during the 1990s, non-corporate subcultures thrived
too. Multi-user Dungeons (MUDs) and their object-oriented relatives, the MOOs,
sprung up along side the WWW, allowing people to explore basic virtual
environments and interact with one another in real time. Newsgroups became a
rage and an important source of information, debate, and file sharing, as
people freely formed topical groups on the Internet's Usenet platform. Then, as
emailing grew readily popular, an equally large number of list-serves became
housed upon the web and available for free user subscription. Large, popular
list-serves like Nettime-L, or the Spoon lists housed at University of
Virginia, allowed a variety of diverse subcultures to form themselves through
group email discussions and opinion postings. And eventually, the WWW itself,
though rapidly transforming under the "tech revolution's" pay-to-play
capitalist ideology into a mainstream cultural movement, continued to support a
veritable carnival of alternative voices and cultures as well. Far beyond the
provocative web antics of Church of the Subgenius or Terence McKenna, the late
1990s revealed a web that people were actively helping to create and not simply
experience.1
The rise of the Internet, then, as cultural
and subcultural force, has been multi-faceted, and socially and politically
complex. While corporate forces rapidly built a larger and speedier Internet
for the new millennium, subcultural forces equally rapidly sought to borrow the
new on-line environment for their own socio-political intentions. Thus was the
case, infamously, with the peer-to-peer (P2P) client Napster, which allowed
approximately sixty million users at one point to share and trade a variety of
files directly with one another freely. However, when users began sharing large
volumes of copyrighted audio material, because the newly formed broadband networks
made such files easily accessible, corporate forces intervened and fractured
the movement. Yet a movement had been started that publicized the utopian
potential of the net as subcultural community and bearer of a gift economy.
Hence, despite Napster's fall, many continued to believe that the idea of the
P2P network signaled a form of cultural revolution and a number of new P2P
communities arose within the Internet space previously dominated by Napster.2
The music industry, however, has made every
attempt to block P2P trading of music on-line and there is now intense interest
in Hollywood's response to circulating videos and films. Less maliciously, but
equally exemplary of how mainstream corporate culture has re-situated
subcultural movements on the net, is the case of early on-line zines like Suck, Feed, and Salon. As these
on-line cultural spaces grew in popularity, corporate culture was quick to
import and copy elements of their style and reinterpret and reposition them.
Suddenly, the trendy use of neon colors like Feed's orange became an industry standard, which as
tech became "cool," lent itself equally as well to sneakers, clothing, and
record posters as it had to websites. Further elements of zine style such as
written and visual language became equally replicated and repositioned as
advertising norms. Under such intense corporate pressure many of the successful
on-line zines of the past decade have folded, unable to demonstrate or innovate
a particular cultural niche in the face of countless imposters. Even the widely
read and discussed Salon was
rumored to face the possibility of insolvency in 2002, and only Microsoft's
on-line journal Slate appears
financially secure.
Globalization and Net Politics
The present Internet moment remains a complex assemblage
of a variety of groups and movements, both mainstream and oppositional.
However, following the massive hi-tech sector bust at the start of the new
millennium, and with economic sectors generally down across the board with the
global economic recession, the Terror War erupting in 2001 and the disastrous
effects of Bushonomics, much of the corporate colonization of the new media has
also waned. Following "9/11," however, the politicization of the Internet again
emerged as a major cultural issue and new oppositions are forming around the
on-line rights to freedom of use and information, as well as user privacy, that
groups like the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Computer Professionals
for Social Responsibility (CPSR), and the Center for Democracy and Technology
(CDT) have long touted. For instance, it emerged in late 2002 that the Bush
administration was developing a Total Information Awareness project that would
compile a government data base on every individual with material collected from
a diversity of sources. Intense debate has erupted and the Bush administration
is being forced to make concessions to critics concerned about privacy and Big
Brother surveillance. Such on-line political oppositions directly pit
post-subcultural groups, many who did not previously have an obvious political
agenda, against the security policies of government. In this scenario, Internet
corporations are often left "in the middle" with the choice to either side with
the users who they would court as consumers or with the political
administrations. The latter are capable of making business either easy or
difficult depending upon which laws are enacted and prosecuted (e.g.
Microsoft's anti-trust battle under the Clinton administration and then again
under Bush).
Still, as the
culture of the Internet becomes more highly politicized, it is becoming harder
for corporations to portray themselves simply as "neutral" cultural forces.
Using the very on-line means that these corporations helped to popularize
against them, users are globally beginning to portray for each other a maturing
political awareness that perceives corporate and governmental behavior as
intertwined in the name of "globalization".3 As part of the backlash
against globalization over the past years, a wide range of theorists have
argued that the proliferation of difference and the shift to more local
discourses and practices define significant alternatives to corporate
globalization. In this view, theory and politics should shift from the level of
globalization and its accompanying often totalizing and macro dimensions in
order to focus on the local, the specific, the particular, the heterogeneous,
and the micro level of everyday experience. An array of discourses associated
with poststructuralism, postmodernism, feminism, and multiculturalism focus on
difference, otherness, marginality, the personal, the particular, and the
concrete over more general theory and politics that aim at more global or
universal conditions.4 Likewise, a broad spectrum of Internet subcultures
of resistance have focused their attention on the local level, organizing
struggles around a seemingly endless variety of identity issues.
However, it can be
argued that such dichotomies as those between the global and the local express
contradictions and tensions between crucial constitutive forces of the present
moment, and that it is therefore a mistake to reject a focus on one side in
favor of an exclusive concern with the other (Cvetkovich and Kellner 1997).
Hence, an important challenge for the emerging critical theory of globalization
is to think through the relationships between the global and the local by
observing how global forces influence and even structure an increasing number
of local situations. This requires analysis as well of how local forces mediate
the global, inflecting global forces to diverse ends and conditions, and
producing unique configurations of the local and the global as the matrix for
thought and action in the contemporary world (see Luke and Luke 2000).
Globalization is
thus necessarily complex and challenging to both critical theories and radical
democratic politics. But many people these days operate with binary concepts of
the global and the local, and promote one or the other side of the equation as
the solution to the world's problems. For globalists, globalization is the
solution, and underdevelopment, backwardness and provincialism are the problem.
For localists, globalization is the problem and localization is the solution.
But, less simplistically, it is the mix that matters, and whether global or
local solutions are most fitting depends on the conditions in the distinctive
context that one is addressing and the particular solutions and policies being
proposed.
Specific locations
and practices of a plurality of post-subcultures constitute perhaps what is
most interesting now about oppositional subcultural activities at work within
the Internet. Much more than other subcultures like boarders, punks, mods, or
followers of the New Age, Internet subcultures have taken up the questions of
local and global politics and are attempting to construct answers both locally
and globally as a response. Importantly, this can be done due to the very
nature of the medium in which they exist. Therefore, while the Internet can and
has been used to promote capitalist globalization, the current configuration of
on-line subcultures are interested in the number of ways in which the global
network can be diverted and used in the struggle against it.
Technopolitics and the Anti-globalization
Movements 5
Successful
use by the EZLN Zapatista movement in Mexico of the Internet dramatized
its importance for progressive politics (Best and Kellner, 2001). Beyond
deploying
the Internet as a technology for plotting political organization and for
furthering communication, activists quickly drew upon the Zapatista's
imaginative use of the internet to begin broadcasting their new messages
to a potential global audience. In the late 1990s, activists throughout
the world
began employing the Internet to foster
movements against the excesses of corporate capitalism, most dramatically
occurring in the protests in Seattle and elsewhere against the World Trade
Organization (WTO) meeting in December 1999. A global protest movement surfaced
that utilized the Internet to organize resistance to the WTO and capitalist
globalization, while championing democratization and social justice. Many web
sites contained anti-WTO material and numerous mailing lists used the Internet
to distribute critical material and to organize the protest. The result was the
mobilization of caravans from throughout the United States to take protestors
to Seattle, many of whom had never met and were recruited through the Internet.
There were also significant numbers of international participants in Seattle
which exhibited labor, environmentalist, feminist, anti-capitalist, animal
rights, anarchist, and other groups organized to protest aspects of
globalization and form new solidarities for future struggles. In addition,
protests occurred throughout the world, and a proliferation of anti-WTO
material against the extremely secret group spread throughout the Internet.
Furthermore, the
Internet provided critical coverage of the event, documentation of the various
groups' protests, and debate over the WTO and globalization. Whereas the
mainstream media presented the protests as "anti-trade," featured the incidents
of anarchist violence against property, while minimizing police violence
against demonstrators, the Internet provided pictures, eyewitness accounts, and
reports of police brutality and the generally peaceful and non-violent nature
of the protests. While the mainstream media framed the protests negatively and
privileged suspect spokespeople like Patrick Buchanan as critics of globalization,
the Internet provided multiple representations of the demonstrations, advanced
reflective discussion of the WTO and globalization, and presented a diversity
of critical perspectives.
The Seattle
protests had some immediate consequences. The day after the demonstrators made
good on their promise to shut down the WTO negotiations, Bill Clinton gave a
speech endorsing the concept of labor rights enforceable by trade sanctions,
thus effectively making impossible any agreement and consensus during the Seattle
meetings. In addition, at the World Economic Forum in Davos a month later there
was much discussion of how concessions were necessary on labor and the
environment if consensus over globalization and free trade were to be possible.
Importantly, the issue of overcoming divisions between the information rich and
poor, and improving the lot of the disenfranchised and oppressed, bringing
these groups the benefits of globalization, were also seriously discussed at
the meeting and in the media.
More importantly,
many activists were energized by the new alliances, solidarities, and
militancy, and continued to cultivate an anti-globalization movement. The
Seattle demonstrations were followed by April 2000 struggles in Washington, DC,
to protest against the World Bank and IMF, and later in the year against
capitalist globalization in Prague and Melbourne; in April 2001, an extremely
large and militant protest erupted against the Free Trade Area of the Americas
summit in Quebec City and in summer 2001 a sizeable demonstration took place in
Genoa.
In May 2002, a
surprisingly large demonstration took place in Washington against capitalist
globalization and for peace and justice, and it was apparent that a new
worldwide movement was in the making that was uniting diverse opponents of
capitalist globalization throughout the world. The anti-corporate globalization
movement favored globalization-from-below, which would protect the environment,
labor rights, national cultures, democratization, and other goods from the
ravages of an uncontrolled capitalist globalization (see Brecher, Costello and
Smith 2000; Steger 2002). Similar demonstrations had taken place in Monterrey,
Mexico two months earlier and, more recently, two more occurred during June
2002 at Calgary and Ottawa to protest against the G8 Summit meeting in Canada.
Each of these demonstrations was comprised of people hailing from many
locations and intent on using the venue as an opportunity to promote their
voice, and fight in common cause against what is perceived to be the oppression
of a dominant mono-culture.
Initially, the
incipient anti-globalization movement was precisely that: anti-globalization.
The movement itself, however, was increasingly global, linking together a
diversity of movements into global solidarity networks and using the Internet
and instruments of globalization to advance its struggles. Following the Battle
for Seattle, the Internet witnessed the rise of independent media outlets like
the Indymedia network (http://www.indymedia.org), with major
global cities receiving web portals in which to document, organize and
proliferate information that would not otherwise be readily available through
the major media. Countless other organizations and sites have developed similar
websites and networks since, like Alternet (http://www.alternet.org),
turning the Internet from a valuable tool in the anti-globalization struggle
into the driving engine for a new global cultural vision for democracy.
Through the
practice of the type of large-scale organization and assimilation of
information afforded by the Internet, many opponents of capitalist
globalization evolved from a simple subcultural nihilism to recognize the need
for a global movement with a positive vision. Such alternative and oppositional
globalizations stand for such things as social justice, equality, labor, civil
liberties, universal human rights, and a healthy planet on which to live.
Accordingly, the anti-capitalist globalization movements began advocating
common values and visions, and started defining themselves in positive terms
such as the global justice movement.
Thus,
technopolitics became part and parcel of the involvement of Internet
subcultures, a mushrooming global movement for peace, justice, democracy,
rights, and other positive values. In particular, the subcultural movements
against capitalist globalization exploited the Internet to organize mass
demonstrations and to disseminate information to the world concerning the
policies of the institutions of capitalist globalization. The events made clear
that protestors were not against globalization per se, but were against neo-liberal and capitalist
globalization, opposing specific policies and institutions that produce
intensified exploitation of labor, environmental devastation, growing divisions
among the social classes and the undermining of democracy. The emerging
anti-globalization-from-below movements are contextualizing these problems in the
framework of a restructuring of capitalism on a worldwide basis for maximum
profit with zero accountability and have made clear the need for
democratization, regulation, rules, and globalization in the interests of
people and not profit.
The new movements
against capitalist globalization have thus placed the issues of global justice
and environmental destruction squarely in the center of important political
concerns of our time. Hence, whereas the mainstream media had failed to
vigorously debate or even report on globalization until the eruption of a
vigorous anti-globalization movement, and rarely, if ever, critically discussed
the activities of the WTO, World Bank and IMF, there is now a widely
circulating critical discourse and controversy over these institutions. Stung
by criticisms, representatives of the World Bank, in particular, are pledging
reform and pressures are mounting concerning proper and improper roles for the
major global institutions, highlighting their limitations and deficiencies, and
the need for reforms like debt relief from overburdened developing countries to
solve some of their fiscal and social problems. Nonetheless, others like the
world leaders involved in the G8 and related summits are resorting to hold
their meetings in ever more remote regions, their inaccessibility thereby
conveying a political reality that new subcultures are eager to reveal to
ever-wider audiences.
Indeed, in late 2002 and early 2003, global
anti-war movements began to emerge against Bush administration policies against
Iraq and the growing threats of war. Reaching out to broad audiences, political
groups like MoveOn (www.moveon.org) used the Internet to circulate anti-war
information, organize demonstrations, and promote a wide diversity of anti-war
activities. Thus, after using the Internet to successfully organize a
wide range of anti-globalization demonstrations, activists, including many
young people, are organizing massive demonstrations against the Bush and Blair
administrations' threats against Iraq. The global Internet, then, is creating
the base and the basis for an unprecedented world-wide anti-war/pro-peace
movement during a time of terrorism, war, and intense political struggle.
From Hackers to Terrorists: Militant Internet
Culture
To capital's globalization-from-above, the
subcultures of cyberactivists have thus been attempting to carry out
globalization-from-below, developing networks of solidarity and propagating
oppositional ideas and movements throughout the planet. To the capitalist
international of transnational corporate-led globalization, a Fifth
International, to use Waterman's phrase (1992), of computer-mediated activism
is emerging, that is qualitatively different from the party-based socialist and
communist Internationals. As the virtual community theorist Howard Rheingold
notes (2002), advances in personal, mobile informational technology are rapidly
providing the structural elements for the existence of fresh kinds of highly
informed, autonomous communities that coalesce around local lifestyle choices,
global political demands, and everything in between. These multiple networks of
connected citizens and activists transform the so-called "dumb mobs" of
totalitarian and polyarchical states into "smart mobs" of socially active
personages linked by notebook computers, PDA devices, internet cellphones,
pagers, and global GPS positioning systems. Thus, while new mobile technology
provides yet another impetus towards experimental identity construction and
identity politics, such networking also links diverse communities like labor,
feminist, ecological, peace, and various anti-capitalist groups, providing the
basis for a new politics of alliance and solidarity to overcome the limitations
of postmodern identity politics (see Dyer-Witheford 1999; Best and Kellner
2001; Burbach 2001).
Of course, as
noted previously, rightwing and reactionary forces can and have used the
Internet to promote their political agendas as well. In a short time, one can
easily access an exotic witch's brew of Web-sites maintained by the Ku Klux
Klan, and myriad neo-Nazi assemblages, including the Aryan Nation and various
militia groups. Internet discussion lists also disperse these views and
rightwing extremists are aggressively active on many computer forums, as well
as radio programs and stations, public access television programs, fax
campaigns, video and even rock music productions. These organizations are
hardly harmless, having carried out terrorism of various sorts extending from
church burnings to the bombings of public buildings. Adopting quasi-Leninist
discourse and tactics for ultraright causes, these groups have been successful
in recruiting working-class members devastated by the developments of global
capitalism, which has resulted in widespread unemployment for traditional forms
of industrial, agricultural, and unskilled labor. Moreover, extremist Web-sites
have influenced alienated middle-class youth as well (a 1999 HBO documentary on
"Hate on the Internet" provides a disturbing number of examples of how
extremist Web-sites influenced disaffected youth to commit hate crimes).
A recent twist in
the saga of technopolitics, in fact, seems to be that allegedly "terrorist"
groups are now increasingly using the Internet and Web-sites to promote their
causes. An article in the Los Angeles Times (February 8, 2001: A1, A14) reports that groups
like Hamas use their Web-site to post reports of acts of terror against Israel,
rather than calling newspapers or broadcasting outlets. A wide range of groups
labeled as "terrorist" reportedly use e-mail, list-serves, and Web-sites to
further their struggles, causes including Hezbollah and Hamas, the Maoist group
Shining Path in Peru, and a variety of other groups throughout Asia and elsewhere.
The Tamil Tigers, for instance, a liberation movement in Sri Lanka, offers
position papers, daily news, and free e-mail service. According to the Los
Angeles Times, experts are still
unclear "whether the ability to communicate on-line worldwide is prompting an
increase or a decrease in terrorist acts."
Since September
11, 2001, there have been widespread discussions of how the bin Laden Al Qaeda
network used the Internet to plan the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US, how the
group communicated with each other, got funds and purchased airline tickets via
the Internet, and used flight simulations to practice their hijacking (see
Kellner forthcoming). Since "Operation Enduring Freedom," news stories have
documented how many pro-Al Qaeda websites continue to appear and disappear,
serving as propaganda conduits and potential organization channels for
remaining terrorist cell members. By encrypting messages within what appear to
be simple web pictures, Al Qaeda (or any group or person) can transfer sensitive
information that only requires the receiving party to download the picture and
then decrypt it in order to reveal the secret message. The sheer volume of
video and still picture information on the Internet helps to ensure that the
information can be circulated even when perused by such powerful governmental
surveillance systems as Echelon and Carnivore. But, apparently in response to
the threat posed to US "war on terror" interests, the Bush administration has
begun the attempt to discontinue websites which it suspects terror cells are
frequenting to gain information that could be used in terrorist attacks.
In fact, despite
the expectation that any governmental administration would target the
information channels of its enemy, it is exactly the mammoth reaction by the
Bush administration and the Pentagon to the perceived threats posed by the
Internet that have the subcultural forces associated with the battle against
globalization-from-above fighting in opposition to US security policies.
Drawing upon the expertise of a subculture of politically-minded computer
hackers to inform oppositional groups of security threats and to help defend
against them, a technical wing has become allied to those fighting for
globalization-from-below. Groups like Cult of the Dead Cow (http://www.cultdeadcow.org) and Cryptome (http://www.cryptome.org) and the hacker journal 2600 (http://www.2600.org)
are figureheads for a broad
movement of exceptionally computer literate individuals who group together
under the banner of HOPE (Hackers On Planet Earth) and who practice a politics
called "hacktivism" (on hacker culture, see Taylor 1999 and Himanen 2001). The
hacktivists have been widely responsible for allowing oppositional subcultures
to understand how they may maintain on-line privacy and how their privacy may
be easily jeopardized by anyone seeking to do so.
Additionally,
hacktivists have been especially influential in educating the public about
governmental and corporate protocols that have been developed in order to
survey the habits and attitudes of those active on-line. Perhaps most
importantly, some of the hacktivists are involved in creating open source software
programs that can be used freely to circumvent the intervention of government
and corporate control into Internet experience. Notably, and somewhat
scandalously, the hacktivists have released programs like Six/Four (after
Tiananman Square), that combines the peer-to-peer capabilities of Napster along
with a virtual private networking protocol that makes user identity anonymous,
and Camera/Shy, a powerful web-browser stenography application that allows
anyone to engage in the type of secret information storage and retrieval that
Al Qaeda allegedly uses to combat the Pentagon. Moreover, associated with the
hactivist cause are the "crackers" who create "warez," pirated versions of
commercial software or passwords. While anathema to Bill Gates, there is no
software beyond the reach of the pirate-crackers and to the delight of the
alternative Internet subculture, their often otherwise expensive programs are
freely traded and shared over the web and peer-to-peer networks across the
globe. Hackers also support the Open Source movement, in which non-corporate
softwares are freely and legally traded, improved upon at large, and available
for general use by a public which agrees not to sell them in the future. Such
free Microsoft competitors, like the operating system Linux (http://www.linux.org), and the word processing
suite OpenOffice (http://www.openoffice.org)
provide powerful and economically palatable alternatives to the PC hegemon.
Another hacker
ploy is the monitoring and exploitation for social gain of the booming
wireless, wide-area internet market (i.e. wi-fi, WAN, or WLAN). Wi-fi, besides
offering institutions, corporations, and homes the luxury of Internet
connectivity and organizational access for any and all users within the area
covered by the local network, also potentially offers such freedoms to near-by
neighbors and wireless pedestrians if such networks are not made secure. In
fact, as the U.S. cybersecurity czar Richard Clarke noted in December, 2002, an
astounding number of wi-fi networks are unprotected and available for hacking.
This led the Office of Homeland Security to label wireless networking a
terrorist threat (http://wired.com/news/wireless/0,1382,56742,00.html).
Part of what the government is reacting to is the activist technique of "war
driving," in which a hacker drives through a community equipped with a basic
wireless antenna and computer searching for network access nodes (see http://www.wardriving.com). Many hackers
had been war driving around Washington D.C., thereby gaining valuable federal
information and server access, prompting the government
contractor Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to begin
monitoring drive-by hacks in the summer of 2002 (http://www.securityfocus.com/news/552).
But not all war drivers are
interested in sensitive information, and many more are simply interested in
proliferating information about what amount to free broadband Internet access
points -- a form of Internet connectivity that otherwise comes at a premium
cost (see http://www.freenetworks.org).
Thus, wireless network hackers are often deploying their skills towards
developing a database of "free networks," which if not always free of costs,
represent opportunities for local communities to knowingly share connections
and corporate fees. Needless to say, corporate internet service providers are
outraged by this anti-capitalist development, and are seeking government
legislation favoring prosecution of this mode of "gift economy" activism.
Hacktivists are
also directly involved in the immediate political battles being played out
around the dynamically globalized world. Hacktivists like the German "The
Mixter," who authored the "Tribe Floodnet" program that shut down the website
for the World Economic Forum in January 2002, routinely use their hacking
skills to cause disruption of governmental and corporate presences on-line. On
July 12, 2002, the homepage for the USA Today news site was hacked and altered content was
presented to the public, leaving the USA Today to join such other media magnets as the New
York Times and Yahoo as the
corporate victims of a media hack. In February 2003, immediately following the
destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia, a group calling themselves "Trippin Smurfs"
hacked NASA's servers for the third time in three months. In each case,
security was compromised and the web servers were defaced with anti-war
political messages. Another repeated victim of hacks is the Recording Industry
Association of America (RIAA), who because of its attempt to legislate P2P
music trading has become anathema to internet hacktivists. A sixth attack upon
the RIAA website in January, 2003, posted bogus-press releases and even
provided music files for free downloading!
But while a
revolutionary subculture of hackers has formed on-line, those involved in the
fight for an alternative globalization are far from comprising the totality of
the hacker population. The US government and Al Qaeda, as well as an increasing
number of different political groups, are all engaging in cyberwar as an
important adjunct of their political battles. Indeed, Israeli hackers have
repeatedly attacked the Web-sites of Hezbollah, while pro-Palestine hackers
have reportedly placed militant demands and slogans on the Web-sites of
Israel's army, foreign ministry, and parliament. Likewise, in the bloody
struggle over Kashmir, Pakistani and Indian computer hackers have waged similar
cyberbattles against opposing forces" Web-sites, while rebel forces in the Philippines
taunt government troops with cell-phone calls and messages and attack
government Web-sites as well.
Blogging: A Vision of the Democratic Future of the
Net?
On
an entirely different note, but equally political and contested in nature, a
vibrant new Internet subculture has erupted around the phenomenon of
"blogging." A blog, tech slang for "web log," is an extension of the World Wide
Web of hypertext pages. A blog differs from other web pages, however, in
certain key ways. Firstly, most blogs are created using a relatively easy to
use automated software interface, provided freely (or for a small fee) by
companies like Google's Blogger (http://www.blogger.com) or Radio
Userland (http://radio.userland.com). Some blog subcultures like the
more tech-oriented users of Moveable Type (http://www.movabletype.org), however,
disdaining any tinge of capitalism, provide their own interface freely as open
source. Whichever is chosen, the interfaces load like any other web page in a
user's web browser, but provide a template for users to fill in with their
blog's name, style, and features. Additionally, spaces for blog entries exist
which incorporate all of the standard features associated with hypertext. When
users fill in the information that they would like to post to their web log and
hit "publish," the blog interface automatically formats and posts the user's
information to their desired blog. This ease of use has made blogging a popular
sensation over the last year, with giants like Salon and AOL joining the
blogging craze, and with hundreds of thousands of new bloggers constructing
blogs and net journals in an increasing trend.6 Indeed, the highly
successful search engine corporation Google scooped up the small company that
makes Blogger, providing the potential for a major blogging explosion.
Another
feature relatively unique to blogs is their ability to integrate a variety of
Internet features into their pages. Thus, a typical blog will not only provide
postings from a blogger (or a team of bloggers), but it will also provide
readers the opportunity to reply to postings and begin discussions with each
other and the blog author(s) as would a messageboard. Blogs will also often
permit users to subscribe to them, like a list-serve, thereby allowing readers
to receive new blog postings directly to their email address. Blogs, and
bloggers, are also doing interesting things with the hyperlinks that link web
pages together. From the first, blogging has been about community, with
bloggers eager to read one another's entries, post comments about them on their
own blogs, and provide lists of links to the blog cartels that identify who
particular bloggers think is "who" in their blog world.
This has led to
interesting networks of links, with dynamic maps of the most popular blogs and
the news stories that these blogs discuss being provided in real-time by such
sites as Blogdex (http://blogdex.media.mit.edu), Daypop (http://www.daypop.com)
and Technorati (http://www.technorati.com). Another result of bloggers' fascination with
networks of links has been the subcultural phenomenon known as "Google
Bombing." Documented in early 2002, it was revealed that the popular search
engine Google had a special affinity for blogs because of its tendency to favor
recently updated web content in its site ranking system. With this in mind,
bloggers began campaigns to get large numbers of fellow bloggers to post links
to specific postings designed around desirable keywords that Google users would
normally use to search. A successful Google Bomb would then rocket the initial
blog that began the campaign up Google's rankings to No. 1!
Thus, while those
in the blog culture often abused this trick for personal gain (e.g. to get
their own name and blog placed at the top of Google's most popular search
terms), many in the blog subculture began using the Google Bomb as a tool for
political subversion. Known as a "justice bomb," this use of blogs serves to
link a particularly distasteful corporation or entity to a series of keywords
that either spoofs or criticizes the same. Hence, thanks to a Google Bomb,
Google users typing in "McDonald's" might very well get a blog link entitled
"Lies About Their Fries" as the top entry.
Blogs have not
always been political, but post 9/11 the phenomenon of Warblogging appears to
be trumping the simple diary format. More blogs than ever are being created to
deal with specific political positions and alternative media sources than ever
before and group-style blogs like Fark (http://www.fark.com),
Metafilter (http://www.metafilter.com)
and BoingBoing (
http://boingboing.net),
wherein community users post and discuss information of the day, have become
extremely popular. But, it is perhaps the new ability to syndicate one's blog
that truly marks the blog subculture as a democratic and oppositional culture
with which the mainstream must reckon. News blogs like Google (http://news.google.com), NewsIsFree (http://www.newsisfree.com), and Syndic8 (http://www.syndic8.com) daily log syndicated
content and broadcast it globally to a diverse audience. This has resulted in a
revolution in journalism in which subcultures of bloggers are continually
posting and commenting upon news stories of particular interest to them, which
are in turn found, read, and re-published by the global media.
The examples in
this section suggest how technoculture makes possible a reconfiguring of
politics, a refocusing of politics on everyday life, and the use of the tools
and techniques of emergent computer and communication technologies to expand
the field of politics and culture. In this conjuncture, the ideas of Guy Debord
and the Situationist International are especially relevant with their stress on
the construction of situations, the use of technology, media of communication,
and cultural forms to promote a revolution of everyday life, and to increase
the realm of freedom, community, and empowerment.7 To a meaningful
extent, then, the new information and communication technologies are revolutionary, they do constitute a revolution of everyday life being
presently enacted by Internet subcultures. Yet, it has often been a revolution
that also promotes and disseminates the capitalist consumer society, individual
and competition, and that has involved new modes of fetishism, enslavement, and
domination yet to be clearly perceived and theorized.
The Internet is
thus a contested terrain, used by Left, Right, and Center of both dominant
cultures and subcultures to promote their own agendas and interests. The
political battles of the future may well be fought in the streets, factories,
parliaments, and other sites of past struggle, but politics is already mediated
by broadcast, computer, and information technologies and will increasingly be
so in the future. Those interested in the politics and culture of the future should
therefore be clear on the important role of the new public spheres and
intervene accordingly, while critical cultural theorists have the
responsibility of educating students around the cultural and subcultural
literacies that ultimately amount to the skills that will enable them to
participate in the ongoing struggle inherent in cultural politics.
Subculture
activism has thus materialized as a vital new space of politics and culture in
which a wide diversity of individuals and groups have used emergent
technologies to help produce new subcultures, social relations, and forms of
politics. Many of these subcultures may become appropriated into the mainstream
but no doubt ever-new oppositional cultures and novel alternative voices and
practices will appear as we navigate the always-receding future.
Notes
1. On MOOs, MUDs, Internet chat
rooms, and new forms of identity, culture, and community produced by
information and communication technologies, see Turkle (1996, 1997).
2. For a solid journalistic account
of the Napster and P2P story see Alderman (2001); for an optimistic account of
the continuing potential of P2P potentiality, see Barbrook (2002).
3. On globalization, see Cvetkovich
and Kellner (1997), Best and Kellner (2001), and Kellner (1998, 2002).
4. Such positions are associated
with the postmodern theories of Foucault, Lyotard, Rorty, and have been taken
up by a wide range of feminists, multiculturalists, and others. On these
theorists and postmodern politics, see Best and Kellner (1991, 1997, 2001), and
the valorization and critique of postmodern politics in Hardt and Negri (2000)
and Burbach (2001).
5. On technopolitics see Kellner
(1997); Armitage (1999); and Best and Kellner (2001).
6. For examples, see our two web sites. BlogLeft:
Critical Interventions (2002),
7. On the importance of the ideas
of Debord and the Situationist International to make sense of the present
conjuncture see Best and Kellner (1997: Ch. 3), and on the new forms of the
interactive consumer society, see Best and Kellner (2001).
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