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Chapter 9
And
so the Bush administration rejected any diplomatic conclusion to the Gulf war,
and the AirLand war began hours after the deadline. As the ground war began,
the TV networks revealed that during the visit of Colin Powell and Dick Cheney
to Saudi Arabia on the weekend of February 9 a decision had been made that 8:00
p.m. February 23 would be the "go date." Consequently, during the
time of the Soviet/Iraqi peace negotiations, Bush decided that if he was to
carry out the Pentagon's plan, he would have to set an ultimatum for noon
Saturday, so as not to postpone the ground offensive. Schwarzkopf therefore had
the go-ahead in his hand, and the White House and the Pentagon were just
waiting for the deadline to pass in order to begin the AirLand war. Thus, the
Soviet and Iraqi peace initiatives were just a sideshow that the war planners
sabotaged by delivering an ultimatum that it would be impossible for the Iraqis
to accept.
9.1 The Destruction of Iraq
By
noon on February 24, twenty-four hours after Bush's deadline and sixteen hours
into the ground war, it was obvious that the U.S. strategy was not just to
drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait, but to annihilate Saddam Hussein's military.
This was clear from pronouncements from the Bush administration war team who
spoke on the Sunday morning talk shows and from listening carefully to the
military experts as well as looking at the maps of U.S. troop movements into
southern Iraq aimed at cutting off the Republican Guards. Indeed, the allied
offensive made no sense whatsoever as a plan to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait,
though it could be seen as a comprehensive plan to cut off and destroy Iraq's
military. The French offensive in western Iraq, the U.S. envelopment of the
Republican Guard, and the British forces advance toward the Euphrates River in
a bid to cut off Iraqi forces in Kuwait from Baghdad, as well as the
establishment of a large refueling and supply base in western Iraq, all seemed
aimed at cutting off and destroying the Republican Guard rather than
facilitating the liberation of Kuwait.
Thus,
everything that the Bush administration said about the liberation of Kuwait was
camouflage, an ideological veil, for the final phase in the destruction of the
Iraqi army. The Bush administration did not seem to care if Kuwait burned or
bled and never supported democracy in the country anyway. The
"liberation" of Kuwait was a mere excuse for the destruction of the
infrastructure of Iraq and the Iraqi military, especially the Republican Guard.
The U.S. rejection of Iraq's February 15 offer to leave Kuwait, of the Soviet
proposal of February 22, and of Gorbachev's proposal to let the UN mediate
between the Soviet and U.S. peace proposals on the eve of the ground war made
it clear that the U.S. did not seek a diplomatic settlement, or merely the
departure of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, but a decisive military victory and the
destruction of the Iraqi military. Those in the Congress and the media pundits,
as well as U.S. allies, who believed that the Gulf war was about the liberation
of Kuwait were duped and taken in by U.S. rhetoric that stated over and over
that they were "only" aiming at the liberation of Kuwait, that they
were enforcing UN resolutions, and thus were pursuing limited goals when
actually they had a much more ambitious program in mind. It seemed that for the
U.S. government only a goal so significant as the destruction of Iraqi power
and the establishment of George Bush and the U.S. military as the superpowers
of the world would justify such an enormous undertaking. Merely pushing Saddam
Hussein out of Kuwait could hardly justify such an overwhelming marshaling of
resources, expense, and the risks involved in carrying through an all-out war.
The
goal of destroying Iraq and its military power explains why the bombing
campaign was so long, why Iraq's economic and communications infrastructure was
destroyed, why much in Iraq was reduced to rubble, and why the ground war was
the necessary culmination of the massacre. If the goal had been merely to push
the Iraqis out of Kuwait, this could have been easily achieved diplomatically,
or much earlier with military force. If the goal had been merely the liberation
of Kuwait, all of the coalition's firepower could have been aimed at Kuwait City
and Iraqi troop formations within Kuwait. Had the liberation of Kuwait been the
goal, the incredible concentration of coalition military power could have also
been aimed at liberating oil wells and other economic sites within Kuwait. In
fact, the liberation of Kuwait with military force could have been accomplished
weeks earlier and presumably have saved Kuwait much property and many lives,
and perhaps have avoided the environmental catastrophe from the burning Kuwaiti
oil wells. But, no, this was not what the Gulf war was all about and, as we
shall see, George Bush and his team were perfectly willing to sacrifice Kuwait
to achieve their goals.
Thus,
the stakes were much higher than the Bush administration and media let on.
Destroying the Iraqi military would be harder to achieve and more risky than
simply to liberate Kuwait, which, after twenty-four hours of the ground
campaign, was looking relatively easy. The elite of the British, French, and
U.S. coalition forces had embarked on a dangerous mission within Iraq itself,
in desert country without a water supply, full of dangerous diseases, and
possible environmental contamination from the destruction of its nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons facilities. The season of monsoon rains and
sandstorms was approaching and the coalition forces could have been overpowered
by the unpredictable forces of nature, impervious to the control of the war
managers. There were also thousands of Republican Guards and other hostile
forces who could harm the coalition troops as they rushed to cut off the Iraqi
military from escape to northern Iraq and as they prepared to draw them out to
fight and annihilate them. Obviously, the plan was to use U.S.-led coalition
troops as a bait to draw out the Republican Guards so that coalition air and
ground power could exterminate them. But it remained to be seen whether the
Republican Guards were paper tigers, whether they had been destroyed beyond the
point where they could mount an effective offensive, inflict heavy casualties on
the coalition forces, or even defend themselves.
Neither
the escalation of the war goals nor the risks involved in invading and
occupying Iraq were discussed in the mainstream media. The coalition propaganda
apparatus was well organized, and one observed throughout the day of February
24 a significant mobilization of world public opinion behind Bush's unilateral
decision to launch a ground war. The British prime minister, John Major, taped
a message affirming the need to enter the ground war phase, and Queen Elizabeth
made the first royal speech in favor of war since World War II. As we have
seen, the stakes were much higher than the befogged publics were aware, and an
all-out propaganda offensive was orchestrated by the White House. France's
President Mitterrand chimed in with some banalities about how the ground war
was inevitable, and at least some of the Arab allies--the Saudis, Kuwaitis, and
the Turks--came out in favor of the ground war. It was striking that the
coalition forces all said more or less the same thing, repeating the propaganda
line of the White House.
I
analyzed earlier how the White House propaganda apparatus mobilized the U.S.
government, its domestic friends, and coalition forces to support the
propaganda line of the day (Chapter 5). The goal now was to mobilize the entire
alliance behind the ground war. The mainstream media, especially television,
served this purpose with hardly any voices questioning Bush's escalation of the
war. The ground war began and Congress, the media, and much of the public
simply accepted and even welcomed it. The only discordant voices which appeared
in the mainstream media were the muted Soviet objections to the ground
campaign. Although the Soviets were probably extremely angry at Bush's
rejection of Gorbachev's peace plan, they bit their tongues, put on a good
face, and muttered banalities about the need to maintain good superpower
relations.[1]
The only criticisms of the ground war came from Iraq's allies--Yemen, Cuba, and
Jordan--, positioning any opponent of the ground war as pro-Iraqi. One would
see few, if any, media images of antiwar demonstrations or hear any voices of
dissent from this position until the end of the war, though there were, in
fact, many demonstrations and dissenters in the United States and elsewhere.
The media pulled behind the Bush administration and Pentagon and faithfully
advanced their war policies until the end, compliant servants of power.
The
dominant theme was the propaganda of an easy ground war and quick victory for
the allied forces--propaganda that accurately portrayed the outcome. The notion
of a quick victory was mobilized by the discourse of the application of sudden
and massive air, land, and sea power which would overwhelm the Iraqis. The
networks had prepared this concept by talking of the greatest mobilization of
military force in history. The rhetoric of the overwhelming military firepower
assembled was supported by their early claims about "remarkable
successes," "amazingly low casualties," and "meeting little
Iraqi resistance." In retrospect, it was fairly certain that this would be
the case, as the Iraqi forces within Kuwait were either destroyed or totally
demoralized after weeks of bombing. Thus, it was reasonably certain that the
U.S. war managers could justifiably assure the public of rapid success in the
opening phase of the ground war.
The
image of an easy AirLand war victory was bolstered by pictures of a blitzkrieg
across the Kuwaiti border and a triumphant march toward Kuwait City with little
or no resistance. There were numerous video reports of coalition forces racing
across the border uncontested.
There were frequent images of Iraqi POW's surrendering, including a
striking picture of what looked like hundreds of Iraqi prisoners marching
single file across the desert with their hands over their heads. Images of an
Iraqi prisoner kissing an Egyptian soldier before collapsing were shown
repeatedly, as were pictures of a group of surrendering Iraqis kissing the
hands of their U.S. captors and breaking into tears. The administration/media
line was that Iraqi troop morale was totally destroyed and that victory would
be easy--a discourse that turned out to be true this time.
But,
in a sense, the images of the blitzkrieg into Kuwait made it appear too easy and
could have raised the question as to whether the entire ground war was a
propaganda set-up, a cake walk carefully orchestrated and hyped by the U.S. war
managers and their media allies. In retrospect, the media greatly exaggerated
what forces the coalition troops would face as they crossed the Kuwaiti border.
Repeatedly, TV viewers saw graphics, sketches, and computer simulations that
portrayed the sand fortifications (berms), mines, barbed wire, ditches of
burning oil, tanks, and well-armed Iraqi troops armed with powerful armor,
artillery, and chemical weapons. For months, military "experts" had
pontificated about the "battle-hardened Iraqi army" and their
"elite Republican Guards." What one saw, by contrast, in the first
video footage of the allied invasion of Kuwait, was an almost empty desert with
Iraqi fox holes and primitive bunkers, scattered mines, a few ditches with oil,
and some abandoned rusty Iraqi tanks and vehicles.
In
interpreting the significance of the initial pictures of great numbers of Iraqi
prisoners, reportedly thousands in the first two days, commentators indicated
that the frontline Iraqi troops were cannon fodder: conscripts, who were poorly
trained, unmotivated, and miserable after months in the harsh desert. They were
poorly fed, though they did not appear to be starving, and had been subject to
weeks of bombing and torment. It was certain that thousands of these Iraqi
conscripts would surrender and it turned out that many of them were Shiite and
Kurdish troops hardly eager to fight for the Hussein regime. General
Schwarzkopf and his crew must have known this, as they had total air supremacy
and could fly over this region at will with their reconnaissance flights. The
coalition troops had also already taken thousands of prisoners, or deserters,
who had no doubt given them information on the pathetic state of the Iraqi
troops in Kuwait. Moreover, Schwarzkopf and his war team must have known that
these surrenders would create positive images of a quick allied victory.
Reports
had emerged by the third week of the war that more than a quarter of the
positions in Iraq's regular army in Kuwait were deserted and that an estimated
one-fourth to one-third of the troops in Iraq's regular army in Kuwait had
either defected, been taken prisoner, killed, or simply fled their positions (The
Los Angeles Times, Feb. 7, 1991). Many of these conscript troops returned
to the cities from which they were drafted, or went into hiding. But these
reports referred only to the regular Iraqi army in Kuwait and not to the
Republican Guards or the Iraqi troops who were currently fighting the U.S.-led
invaders in their own country. Would they, too, be such push-overs? And Kuwait
City itself? Would the Iraqis abandon it without a fight? What would be the fate
of the coalition forces in occupied Iraq and how and when would the liberation
of Kuwait be achieved? These were the questions that would be raised and
answered during the next days.
9.2 Desert Slaughter
After
the early morning news reports of February 24, there was no more significant
news the rest of the day. The information cap was so tight that even the
evening news programs had little new to report. Obviously, the opening day's
incursion into Kuwait went extremely well, but it was not yet clear how the
allied troops were faring in southern Iraq. For the next several days, the U.S.
military tightly controlled the flow of news from this field of operations, so
as to conceal the magnitude of the slaughter of Iraqi forces.
On
February 25, Day 40 in the Persian Gulf war, CNN depicted Marlin Fitzwater
saying that White House officials were suffering "the anxiety that comes
with war." One imagined that the coalition soldiers, spending the night in
an unfamiliar and dangerous desert environment were also feeling some anxiety,
as were their loved ones on the home front. CNN reported that Kuwaiti troops
were celebrating their independence day in Kuwait and hoping for the liberation
of their country that day. Saudi radio reported that Arab troops and U.S. Marines
were on the edge of Kuwait City. Images showed the relentless U.S.-led
coalition advance with troops moving across the border, clearing mines, and
inexorably moving toward Kuwait City. There were images of long lines of Iraqi
prisoners of war marching through the desert, hungry, in poor physical shape
and dejected. Fourteen thousand Iraqi soldiers had reportedly been taken
prisoner and no chemical weapons had been used. Allied petroleum and supply
lines were having trouble keeping up with the allied tanks because the advance
was so fast. The report once again was upbeat.
In
the first live Pentagon report of the day, CNN's Gene Randall recounted that
the news blackout was still in force, but a briefing would be coming up in the
morning. Randall noted that there was the prospect of heavy fighting ahead, as
it had long been thought that the Republican Guards would put up fierce
resistance. The Iraqis had fired a Silkwood missile at U.S. ships but missed
(later, the British claimed that their antimissile forces destroyed it). In a
report a bit later in the morning, Randall noted that the Republican Guard was
moving out and that this may be "the defining moment of the war" with
a major battle ahead. He indicated that one incident could bring significant
casualties and warned against premature euphoria.
CNN's
correspondent Greg LaMotte reported from Saudi Arabia that Saddam Hussein had
launched three Scud attacks on the desert kingdom, but the Scuds did not seem
to be working--they exploded in the air and caused no damage. In a report by
Jeremy Thompson from ITN, it was evident how easy it had been for the coalition
forces on the way up the road to Kuwait City. The video showed carcasses of
Iraqi vehicles littering the way, just fifty miles from Kuwait City. There was
an abandoned trench full of oil and Thompson reported that "Saddam's army
had fled without even lighting the fires." The allied forces have, he
said, charged forward meeting little resistance; British pilots were amazed by
the rate of the movement of Iraqi targets, fleeing from the allies. There was
little resistance from the Iraqis, and U.S. Apache helicopters played a key
role in snuffing out Iraqi equipment and troops, using Hellfire missiles to
destroy tanks at night. The passage through the mine fields had been carefully
marked by allied engineers and was not proving to be particularly difficult;
furthermore, the mine fields were in disrepair.
CNN's
Mike Chinoy reported from Saudi Arabia that up to eighty tanks of the elite
Republican Guards appeared to be coming out to fight in southern Iraq,
according to coalition pilots who had flown over them. This might be the long
promised great tank battle, hyped constantly as "the greatest since World
War II." But it would also bring the Iraqi tanks out into the open, which
was what the U.S.-led coalition wanted: Once the Republican Guard moved out of
their bunkers, Chinoy explained, coalition air power could bomb them. The
Republican Guard was reportedly moving out and the coalition forces were preparing
for the great battle.
Throughout
the day, CNN provided continuing reports of allied advances to Kuwait City. So
far, however, there was no amphibious landing, though the TV networks dutifully
reported that preparations continued on the boats off the coast. Marines were
ready and in position if called on. There were repetitive accounts of
remarkably large numbers of POWs, and Iraqis continuing to emerge from bunkers
waving white flags. Brian Jenkins of CNN reported from the border area that he
saw 500 Iraqi POWs who had been brought to his area; Jenkins had hooked up with
Saudi forces who were moving into Kuwait and provided, first, live satellite
radio reports and, then, live satellite TV reports. The Iraqi POWs, he claimed,
were kneeling and didn't look frightened, but resigned and almost happy, now
that the fighting was over. Jenkins was twenty miles inside Kuwait and stated
that resistance, based on the evidence of burned-out Iraqi vehicles, was not as
fierce as might have been expected, though the frontline Iraqis might be third
stringers and not Iraq's best.
At 8:00 a.m., on "CBS This
Morning", Paula Zahn reported that allied forces were within
"striking distance" of Kuwait City and could take it "within
hours." CBS had hooked up correspondent Bob McKeown with coalition Arab
forces going into Kuwait who had just experienced an artillery battle. He
reported that the coalition convoy was stopped when pockets of Iraqis resisted
with artillery fire, but U.S. air power came in to destroy the Iraqis. McKeown
described how there was some Iraqi artillery fire when they crossed the border
in the early morning, but that it was quickly silenced. He indicated that there
were mines and unexploded cluster bombs everywhere; Saudi troops had been
clearing the mines, and helicopters were also clearing mines by exploding them
from the air. The whole landscape appeared desolate in the satellite TV
footage, showing burned out vehicles, bombed roads, and downed power lines.
There were paths beside the road formed by Saudi engineers, and McKeown's
convoy was staying close to this safe path.
CBS
reported that the Republican Guards and allied forces may have been clashing
already. CBS's Robert Krulwich speculated that the Republican Guards may have
sent out a feinting force to fight so that the rest could escape, but CBS
military adviser General Bob Wagner smiled and claimed that they cannot escape,
that Iraqi troops are trapped in both Kuwait and southern Iraq; they are
"sealed off, blocked off." A major battle was shaping up and Wagner
claimed that "it will be a great success for our side." He believed
that there was probably already contact between the Republican Guards and
coalition forces in southern Iraq and that the battle for Kuwait City had also
probably begun, and that these would be the two battles to follow.
On
NBC's "Today," the headlines predicted that Kuwait City would be
liberated by the end of the day by 30,000 U.S. marines and paratroopers, who
along with Kuwaiti and Saudi forces, prepared to invade the city. Although
allied forces had met some resistance, they were still moving quickly toward
Kuwait City and amphibious feints by marines were continuing along the coast to
keep the Iraqis guessing. Conflicting reports, however, continued to circulate
about the movements of the Republican Guards. CBS's Jim Stewart reported that
89 Republican Guard tanks were advancing and that perhaps as much as a division
of the Republican Guard was moving toward a major confrontation and that this
would be the first time that U.S. forces were taking on the best of the Iraqi
armies.
Contradictory
information emerged shortly thereafter from NBC's Jim Miklasewski who said that
the Pentagon now claimed that the Republican Guards had not yet come out to
fight, that the earlier reports were false. NBC's Tom Aspell observed from
Baghdad that Iraq claimed that the reports about the capture of Failaka Island
by coalition forces were also false and that it was occupied by 4,000
well-armed Iraqi troops; later, it would turn out that this was true. CBS
predicted that the liberation of Kuwait City would not take place that day and
was most likely at least a day away. These slightly different spins on events
raised questions as to what was really going on and the suspicion that once again
the U.S. military was greatly exaggerating its early successes or covering over
setbacks. This time, however, it really was winning big and would end up
massacring the Iraqi forces.
The
next day the New York Times reported, that "Air Force officers at a
higher level said they doubted that the tanks spotted on the move belonged to
the [Republican] Guards" (Feb. 26, 1991, p. A7). Despite this denial, most
of the network correspondents and anchors continued to chatter throughout the
day about the great tank battle occurring between the coalition forces and the
Republican Guards. The media pundits had not yet figured out that there would
be no great battles in this war, that it was a one-sided slaughter and not a
war where opposing troops actually engaged and killed each other in combat.
Stories of Iraqi crimes
in Kuwait began early in the morning of February 25 and multiplied throughout
the day. Early telecasts repeated the stories of the previous day, and, during
the Saudi briefing, Gen. Khalid, Schwarzkopf's Saudi counterpart in girth, ego,
and instrumental relation to truth, reported that Iraqis in Kuwait were
"doing horrible things": "I hate to say it, but they are killing
people by axes, they rape females, cut certain parts of them and hang them in every
street" (see 10.1 for critique of these claims). Khalid, whose own people
still had courts of Islamic justice that sentence thieves to have their hands
cut off and adulterous women to be stoned to death,[2]
summoned up great moral indignation and threatened that Iraqis who commit
atrocities will be tried as war criminals. Bush's national security adviser,
Brent Scowcroft, appeared in news clips saying that the "Iraqis were
virtually producing genocide in Kuwait City."
There
was some skepticism, however. When told by ABC's Sam Donaldson that a fax from
the Free Kuwait group in London was circulating in Saudi Arabia indicating that
the coalition forces had captured and liberated Kuwait City, Peter Jennings
said that they had received a similar fax that they were dismissing. Reports
from inside Kuwait, Jennings pointed out, were "fairly dicey." CBS's
Dan Rather also had to warn his correspondent Eric Engberg that the reports of
Iraqi atrocities inside Kuwait City were not reliable. Yet these reports continued
to circulate through the day. Gen. Neal reported in his U.S. military briefing
in Saudi Arabia that Iraq was carrying out systematic terrorism against
economic sites in Kuwait and destroying buildings in Kuwait City. Throughout
the afternoon of February 25, CNN said that "reasonably reliable
sources" indicated that Iraq had orders to destroy 180 buildings in Kuwait
City, including the presidential palace (though that was already reported as
destroyed), and that Iraqi troops were destroying hospitals, schools, and
grocery stores. Obviously, the CNN news readers did not know that they were in
an intense propaganda war as well as a ground war.[3]
Raising
suspicions that coalition war aims were being dramatically escalated,
speculation began to circulate as to whether the elimination of Saddam Hussein
and his regime was now the goal of the war. On the early morning ABC news
program, Mike Schneider asked White House correspondent Ann Compton, "if
this is going as well as it appears, might they not expand their
objectives?" (that is, beyond merely taking Kuwait). Compton replied that
the United States had expanded its objectives long ago, they just hadn't
announced them publicly. ABC happy-talk host Charlie Gibson also made a point
of asking most of his guests if the elimination of Saddam Hussein was not
necessary to claim victory, as did NBC "Today" host Bryant Gumbel.
Most guests, such as a conservative British member of Parliament who appeared
on NBC, claimed that it would be necessary to remove Saddam Hussein in order to
declare victory and that this removal was a valid goal.
The
military news was generally upbeat. At
the U.S. military briefing in Saudi Arabia, Gen. Neal, gaunt and unsmiling,
described the battlefield as "dynamic and ever changing." He claimed
that during the second day of the ground campaign the allies continued to
attack Iraqi forces and continued to encounter only light to moderate
resistance, while engaging Iraqi armor and ground forces with "tremendous
success" in ongoing fights. Neal claimed the destruction of 270 Iraqi
tanks in the past two days with over 18,000 Iraqis surrendering and few U.S.
casualties (4 Americans killed and 21 wounded).
As
the afternoon of February 25 progressed, the news got better and better. CNN
reported on tremendous successes with U.S. forces preparing to engage the
Republican Guards. The French claimed to have totally "neutralized"
an entire division of Iraqi troops, and allied troops were reportedly marching
on Kuwait City. But then the greatest tragedy of the war for the U.S. forces
occurred. A Scud missile hit a residential complex outside of Dhahran where
U.S. soldiers were residing, producing a huge explosion and a tremendous fire.
In the initial report, Reuters claimed that twelve were killed and many were
injured; eventually, the death count rose to twenty-eight.[4]
Mike Chinoy of CNN said that he had talked to a Saudi who witnessed the event
and personally claimed to have pulled the bodies of four dead U.S. soldiers out
of the rubble and that many were seriously wounded. A Patriot was said to have
been fired at the Scud, but it was not yet certain if it hit or not, and
obviously an "intercepted" Scud, Chinoy explained, can be very
lethal. Later, the U.S. military claimed that the Scud broke up in the air so
that no Patriot was fired, and then that the Scud was out of the Patriot's
defense perimeter. Finally, after floating these two lies, the U.S. military
admitted that the Patriot computer system was down in the missile batteries
that were supposed to protect the region of the city in which the Scud landed (New
York Times, May 20, 1991, p. A1).
At
5:44 p.m., CNN interrupted its newscast to say that they had just received an
AP report of Baghdad radio announcing that Saddam Hussein had ordered his troops
out of Kuwait. Jeanne Moos reported on CNN from the UN that the Soviet
ambassador had stated that Iraq was ready to withdraw from Kuwait in a short
time, with no preconditions and with a stop in the fighting. Moos reported that
this made little sense to the U.S. officials who said that they wanted to hear
this directly from the Iraqis. Apparently, then, the Baghdad radio report was
the way of making public the resolve of the Iraqis to leave Kuwait and to bring
the war to a close. Moments thereafter, CNN transmitted an AP report that Tariq
Aziz had communicated to the Soviet leadership that Iraq was ready to start an
immediate and unconditional withdrawal. The endgame was beginning.
The
United States, however, had more in mind than merely driving the Iraqis out of
Kuwait and continued to fiercely keep up its military offensive, slaughtering
Iraqi troops even when they were fleeing. There was no way that the Bush
administration was going to allow Iraq's army to escape and its Republican
Guards to be preserved. On the other hand, it was now clear that Saddam Hussein
was a survivor after all, who finally saw that even in a ground war he could
not really achieve any success against the high-tech coalition forces. After
the announcement of the Iraqi retreat from Kuwait was broadcast, CNN, in the
interests of promoting rational discourse, cut to a congressman who was
promoting a bill to allow the assassination of Saddam Hussein. Rep. Bob McEwen
(R-Ohio) denounced the "evil" Iraqi president, attacked Gorbachev and
the Soviets, and said that the Soviet peace plan was totally unacceptable.
McEwen failed to perceive that Iraq had announced its withdrawal and
willingness to follow the key UN resolution concerning unconditional withdrawal
from Kuwait; in effect, Iraq was admitting defeat and was surrendering. For
McEwen, however, nothing except the statement, "I surrender" would
do. McEwen also worried about the specter of the Soviet Union selling military
hardware to Saddam in the future. Tobe Gati of the UN Association informed
McEwen that in effect Saddam was saying "I surrender" and that this
should wrap it up. Moreover, she argued, the goal of the UN resolutions was the
liberation of Kuwait and not to go to Baghdad to get Saddam Hussein. McEwen
responded that he himself did not hear Saddam say "I surrender" and
then added that Saddam should be brought immediately to Arab justice.
And
so once more Iraq had the Bush administration in a quandary. If Iraq started
pulling out its forces from Kuwait unconditionally, what should be the U.S.
response? The initial White House (non)reaction to the announcement of the
Iraqi withdrawal was typical; Marlin Fitzwater said, "We know nothing
about it. We've just heard the
press reports." But the White House, Pentagon, State Department, and U.S.
UN delegation immediately began planning their spin on the latest surprise move
of Saddam Hussein.
At
6:00 p.m., CNN White House correspondent Frank Sesno reported that he had been
told by a Bush administration official that large numbers of Iraqi tanks,
troops, and equipment were withdrawing from Kuwait, that the United
States was trying to "engage" the retreating Iraqi troops, but that
bad weather was "preventing a full engagement" of the sort "that
we usually enjoy." When asked
why the U.S. military was still attacking the fleeing Iraqis, a "senior
official" joked that "we are trying to destroy them. This will spur
them along." Sesno claimed that President Bush wanted a "public
avowal" of "total capitulation" from Iraq in order to end the
war. Operation Desert Storm had obviously metamorphized into Operation Desert
Slaughter.
From
within Kuwait, Charles Jaco interviewed some marine grunts preparing for the
battle for Kuwait City; they were pleased to hear the news but a couple of them
said that there could be no victory without "taking out" Saddam
Hussein. A Kuwaiti told Jaco that "Saddam Hussein has never told the
truth" so we don't know if we can believe him. But, the Kuwaiti
acknowledged that Hussein understood power, and that he probably understood
that his soldiers were about to get destroyed, so it would be reasonable to
conclude that he would actually accept the UN conditions to save his own skin
and that of his retreating troops. CNN then reported that orders were given to
the Iraqi armed forces to return to the positions where they had been stationed
before August 1, 1990 and confirmed again that Iraqi troops were fleeing the
country. But this would not be enough for George Bush and his war team.
CNN's
Charles Bierbauer reported from the White House that Marlin Fitzwater was
complaining that there was nothing that the Bush administration could respond
to, "no authoritative contact," and so "the war goes on."
Baghdad radio, he suggested, was not to be trusted. Bush was playing racquetball
at the time, and Brent Scowcroft stated that they had heard nothing to stop
them from prosecuting the war as planned. A senior White House official had
told Bierbauer that allied troops were already in Iraq planning to engage the
Republican Guard troops and that the destruction of the Republican Guard was a
"de facto objective," admitting that once the ground war began, there
was an "escalation in goals." The official also admitted to Bierbauer
that toppling Saddam Hussein, though not a written objective, was "another
de facto objective."
And
so, off the record, the White House was now admitting that its true goals were
the destruction of the Republican Guard and Saddam Hussein--though this could
have been merely a ploy to temporarily placate public opinion which was
overwhelmingly in favor of removing Hussein as the ultimate goal of the war.
Wolf Blitzer of CNN reported from the Pentagon that there was no official
response to the Iraqi withdrawal and that the war was continuing well ahead of
schedule. The Pentagon claimed that the Iraqis have not been able to organize
any significant counteroffensive. The Pentagon asserted that 300 Iraqi tanks
had been destroyed since the beginning of the AirLand war and that over 25,000
POWs had been taken. It also acknowledged concern that the retreating Iraqi
troops might be marching to engage the coalition troops in Iraq who were poised
to destroy the Republican Guards. Later, it was revealed, however, that the
Iraqi retreat was a complete rout and posed no military threat to the
multinational forces whatsoever, suggesting that the U.S. military was using
this hypothetical to legitimate the slaughter of the retreating Iraqi troops.
The
Kuwaiti ambassador, a member of the al-Sabah family, Kuwait's ruling oligarchy,
came on CNN to state that he did not "see anything in that message."
The Iraqi withdrawal was "too little, too late." This cliche, no
doubt written by the U.S. propaganda managers or his own PR firm Hill and
Knowlton, became the order of day and was repeated by Kuwaiti, Saudi, and other
parrots of the U.S. military machine throughout the night. The only reason that
the Iraqis were making such overtures, according to the Kuwaiti ambassador, was
that they were trying to "sow confusion." The Kuwaiti implied that
the Iraqis were trying to bring back the Soviet initiative, which all coalition
forces had rejected. From a tactical point of view, he said, they were trying
to escape before they were surrounded, and so the war should go on to destroy
the Iraqis. Getting indignant, he exclaimed that too many lives have been lost,
so we should not get excited about this peace proposal. We should instead, he
advised, keep the war going, because, in effect, Saddam "has to surrender
to the allied forces in Kuwait." The Kuwaiti then went through his litany
of atrocities and claimed that he had himself seen security reports of fires
and murder in the city. Once the city was liberated, it would be revealed that
the Kuwaiti propaganda apparatus greatly exaggerated the damage and violence
committed by the Iraqis during the last days of the occupation (see 10.1).
Admittedly, the Iraqis had greatly harmed Kuwait and committed many criminal
acts against its people, as George Bush and his military had been doing and
would continue to do in the theater of war.
9.3 The War According to Schwarzkopf
By
February 25, it was clear that the Iraqis were leaving Kuwait en masse and that
the war for all practical purposes was over. The U.S. military, however, said
that the Iraqi army was in a "fighting retreat" and was thus a
legitimate military target as they continued systematically to slaughter them.
On the evening of February 25, some hours after the Iraqis announced their
retreat, the TV networks showed Bush's war team arriving at the White House for
a meeting; soon after Marlin Fitzwater stated: "We will continue to
prosecute the war," thus robbing Iraqi mothers and wives of many more sons
and husbands. Fitzwater did say that "unarmed soldiers in retreat"
would be spared, but "retreating combat units" would be dealt with as
combat units and handled accordingly (that is, exterminated). As it turned out,
the U.S. military massacred everything in sight, including some British troops
mistaken for Iraqis, U.S. troops wiped out by "friendly fire," scores
of Kuwaitis and others who had been taken as hostages by the fleeing Iraqis,
and Palestinians and others who chose to flee with the Iraqis (see 10.2).
During
the evening on the CNN talk shows, the two CNN military advisers, James Blackwell
and Perry Smith, urged on the coalition forces to more slaughter of Iraqis, as
did former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and an apologist for the massacre,
Michael Mandelbaum of Johns Hopkins University. Over the next couple of days as
the Pentagon continued to annihilate fleeing Iraqis and as the Iraqis, with
Soviet support, continued to affirm adherence to the UN resolutions, there were
debates about whether the coalition forces could legitimately fire on a
retreating army. The "official" position seemed to be that until a
cease fire was declared, the massacre of fleeing Iraqis was perfectly
legitimate, though some reporters and media commentators had some doubts about
its legality and morality. Interestingly, in a CBS report of February 25, CBS Pentagon
correspondent David Martin pointed out that the Pentagon had said repeatedly
that they would "not shoot retreating Iraqi soldiers in the back,"
although that was what they did. On my satellite dish that night, I picked up
the feed of a reporter who had been told by a "Pentagon official":
"We can shoot them in the ass as well as we can shoot them in the
head." For the next few days, the U.S. forces would indeed shoot and kill
fleeing Iraqis from the head to the toes, annihilating many of them with fuel
air explosives, carpet bombing, and missiles, as well as burying alive hundreds
more in trenches (see 9.4 and 10.2).
During
February 26, Saddam Hussein himself made a public commitment to withdraw from
Kuwait and to meet the UN resolution. This was, of course, not enough for
George Bush, who pressed for unconditional surrender and ordered his forces to
continue attacking Iraqi troops, which were now in total disarray. By February
27, it was announced that the U.S.-led coalition forces had blocked off Iraqi
escape routes and were engaged in two major battles with Iraqi forces. These
were hyped in the same terms as the opening day of the ground war as
"ferocious," with "tremendous fighting," "the fiercest
tank battles since World War II," but like the earlier "battles"
of the ground fighting, it was really a Desert Slaughter, with the coalition
forces systematically annihilating the outgunned and demoralized Iraqis. And
yet during the two days since the Iraqis began fleeing from Kuwait, there had
been little hard information, not much new video, and obviously the military
was not revealing what they were doing because they were engaged in one of the
greatest massacres in history, the details of which would only trickle out in
the days to come (see 9.4 and 10.2). It would be up to General Norman
Schwarzkopf to provide a triumphant version of this brutal episode in U.S.
military history, and Stormin' Norman was once again up to the task.
Wednesday
evening, Saudi time, on February 27, Schwarzkopf began a briefing to describe
the course of the war. Pleased as punch with himself and his punchy allied
forces, he stomped in with his charts to brief the world concerning the
marvelous success of the allied military operation. Schwartzkopf began with a
highly dubious statement, claiming that "what we started out against was a
couple of hundred thousand Iraqis that were in the Kuwait theater of
operations." As I indicated in Chapter 1, commercial satellite photos and
independent analyses of these photos suggested that there were far fewer Iraqi
troops in Kuwait than the United States claimed. By saying at this late date
that the Iraqis had a "couple of hundred thousand" troops,
Schwarzkopf doubled the number of estimated Iraqi troops that were claimed to
be in Saudi Arabia on August 7 when the U.S. troops officially began arriving
(see 1.1).
Schwarzkopf
then stated that in the middle of November the decision was made to increase
the U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia "because by that time huge numbers of
Iraqi forces had flowed in the area... and therefore, we increased the forces
and built up more forces." This claim also is highly dubious, as if the
buildup was a defensive move. Instead, if the commercial satellite photos were
accurate, it could be that Iraq increased their forces in the Gulf as a
response to the U.S. troop buildup; this point can and should be verified by
independent analyses and sources. There was good reason to believe that at the
time of the initial U.S. troop deployment, Iraq saw clearly that it faced a massive
military force as well as an international economic embargo and that it would
be suicidal to act in an offensive manner. There is also good reason to believe
that the U.S. had decided to go to war and destroy Iraq and that the additional
forces were sent over for this purpose. Senator Sam Nunn (D.Ga.) and others
began to speak at this time of the U.S. forces switching from a defensive to an
offensive posture, and a congressional debate ensued as to whether a Persian
Gulf war was a good idea, with Bush and the Pentagon winning the debate. Thus,
it appears that a decision was made that double the number of troops were
needed, in order to quickly and decisively defeat Iraq.
In
his briefing, General Schwarzkopf stated that he aligned his forces against Iraqi
forces stationed in Kuwait and built up a strong naval presence. He bragged how
he made it a key point to call attention to the naval forces in order to
utilize a threat of a naval amphibious operation to draw the Iraqis to fortify
the shore, and later described the feigned amphibious landing as a ploy to draw
Iraqi troops to the coastal region. Schwarzkopf may or may not have been
telling the truth here. Perhaps a failure to adequately clear the coastal
region of mines prevented the amphibious troops from participating; interviews
with the potential amphibious forces revealed that they were deeply
disappointed that they were not able to participate in the AirLand war. There
is good reason to believe that they were actually intended to participate and that
their inability to sweep the mine fields in a timely fashion prevented their
deployment. Obviously, all the major military forces would have liked to
participate in the AirLand war and the lack of participation of the amphibious
forces could have been due more to operational difficulties than to a conscious
ploy by Schwarzkopf to deceive Iraqi defensive positions.[5]
Trying
to make it appear that a fair fight was in the making, Schwarzkopf then
claimed:
Basically,
the problem we were faced with was this: When you looked at the troop numbers,
they really outnumbered us about 3 to 2.
And when you consider the number of combat service support people we
had, that's logisticians and that sort of thing, our armed forces, as far as
fighting troops, we were really outnumbered 2 to 1. In addition to that, they
had 4,700 tanks versus our 3,500 when the buildup was complete, and they had a
great many more artillery then we do.
I
think any student of military strategy would tell you that in order to attack a
position, you should have a ratio of approximately 3 to 1 in favor of the
attacker. And in order to attack a position that is heavily dug in and
barricaded, such as the one we had here, you should have a ratio of 5 to 1 in
the way of troops in the favor of the attacker.... We were outnumbered at a
minimum 3 to 2 as far as troops were concerned, we were outnumbered as far as
tanks were concerned, and we had to come up with some way to make up the
difference.
Once
again, Schwarzkopf's figures were highly dubious. BBC reporter John Simpson
argued that although the U.S. was claiming that the number of Iraqi troops in
the theater of war was over 540,000: "After the war was over it became
known that, when the Iraqi army was at full strength in early January, there
were fewer than half that number: approximately 260,000. Once the bombing
began, the desertions began in earnest. Tens of thousands simply headed home.
In the front line among the conscripted men the desertion rate was sometimes
more than 30 percent" (1991, p. 332). Thus Simpson concluded that by the
time the ground offensive began, the Iraqi strength might have fallen below
200,000 compared to 525,000 coalition forces, giving the coalition forces a 2
to 2 1/2 to one advantage.[6]
Moreover, the quality of the Iraqi forces was vastly inferior. They had little
or no intelligence capacity; much of their equipment was obsolete or
non-functional; their troops were poorly trained and motivated; and there were
even reports after the war that senior Iraqi officers taken prisoner had
indicated that the Iraqi army had no battle plan because their officers
believed that Iraq would pull out of Kuwait and there would be no war (Newsday,
March 26, 1991, p. 5).
Thus,
Schwarzkopf's presentation of seemingly superior Iraqi military forces
confronting underdog allied forces was highly misleading. His numbers also
ignored the decisive fact that U.S. air superiority made it possible to
demolish almost any Iraqi military target and thus to easily decimate and
demoralize the Iraqi forces, as actually happened. Schwarzkopf next explained
that the air campaign was to isolate the Kuwaiti theater of operations by
taking out bridges and supply lines that ran between the northern and southern
part of Iraq. "That was to prevent reinforcements and supplies coming down
into the southern part of Iraq and the Kuwaiti theater of operations. It was
necessary to reduce these forces down to a strength that made them weaker,
particularly along the frontline barrier that we had to go through." This
analysis was also propaganda, which legitimated the vicious destruction of
Iraq's economic and social as well as its military infrastructure. Schwarzkopf
justified the destruction of Iraq's infrastructure on military terms, claiming
that the destruction of Iraq's roads, bridges, communications facilities, power
plants, and industrial infrastructure would make it impossible for Iraq to
supply its troops in Kuwait. Critics of the U.S. bombing argued that the
massive destruction of Iraq's infrastructure was not justified militarily and
in fact constituted an excessive and criminal overkill, waging war against the
Iraqi people and not just their military.[7]
In
any case, it was clear that if Schwarzkopf merely wanted to get the Iraqis out
of Kuwait, he could simply have used his massive air power to bombard the
front-line Iraqi troops in Kuwait until they were destroyed or ready to
surrender, and then invade Kuwait with ground forces to finish off the job. But
instead Schwarzkopf's goal, which his comments here conceal, was the
destruction of the Iraqi military and its power in the region. He would later
admit this himself in the question-and-answer session; when asked if the war
was now over in the light of the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, General Schwarzkopf
responded:
I would say that
there's a lot more purpose to this war than just to get the Iraqis out of
Kuwait. The purpose of this war was to enforce the resolutions of the United
Nations. There are some 12 different resolutions of the United Nations, not all
of which have been accepted by Iraq to date, as I understand it... What else
needs to be done? If I am to render the mission which I've been given, we need
to put the Republican Guard out of business.
Here
the blunt Schwarzkopf admitted that his mission was not merely the UN mission
of getting the Iraqis out of Kuwait, but to destroy the Iraqi military,
especially the Republican Guard, and he would proceed to attempt to do
precisely that. When describing his campaign to sweep into Iraq to envelop and
destroy the Iraqi military, Schwarzkopf once again employed hyperbole. After
they eradicated the Iraqi Air Force, Schwarzkopf explained, the coalition
forces had eliminated his ability to see what the forces were doing. Once
"we took out his eyes," the coalition forces were able to send a
massive movement of troops to the far west, beyond where Iraqi troops were
deployed, for an invasion of southern Iraq. Schwarzkopf bragged that this was
"absolutely an extraordinary move, I must tell you. I can't recall any
time in the annals of military history when this number of forces have moved
over this distance to put themselves in a position to be able to attack."
Employing a dubious football metaphor, Schwarzkopf then compared his move to a
"Hail Mary" play in which the quarterback throws the ball downfield
as far as possible and all the receivers race toward the end zone as fast as
they can in the hope that someone can catch it in the scramble. This is, to say
the least, a highly bizarre metaphor, though no one pointed this out. One
employs the "Hail Mary" play in football as a desperate last ditch
attempt to pull victory from defeat. There was no chance of defeat in this
case, so Schwarzkopf's metaphor was completely misleading. Furthermore, the "Hail
Mary" play is a fundamentally irrational attempt to gain a last minute
victory. Schwarzkopf's technowar, by contrast, was a methodically planned and
incremental highly-rationalized destruction of Iraqi troops and equipment.
Schwarzkopf
next described how the AirLand war began with an assault on the barrier at the
Kuwaiti/Saudi border, which Saddam Hussein described, according to Schwarzkopf,
"as an absolutely impenetrable tank barrier that no one would ever get
through." At 4:00 AM, on February 24, some marines launched attacks
through the barrier system and were accompanied by some army brigades on their
flank, with Saudi forces advancing on the easternmost front. Meanwhile a French
armored division launched an overland attack on the west to take the al-Salman
airfield, deep into southern Iraq. And by 8:00 AM, the 101st Airborne launched
an air assault deep into southern Iraq to establish a supply base within Iraq
to service the occupying allied forces.
Schwarzkopf
then went through each of these moves, describing the brilliance and heroism in
hyperbolic terms, leaving out some of the gorier details that would later
surface (see 9.4). As one saw on television, there were really no Iraqi forces
in any condition to resist and the invasion was simply a cake walk in military
lingo (see 8.5). Thus it is hard to imagine what was so brilliant or heroic
about the invasion of Kuwait in the face of visual evidence that showed forlorn
Iraqis in pitiful fox holes, surrendering by the hundreds. When a reporter
raised this question, Schwarzkopf exploded with anger, asking the poor fellow
if he'd "ever been in a mine field?" Schwarzkopf then recounted a
Vietnam experience in which he told of being stuck in a mine field under attack
and watched a young soldier get blown up by a mine. In the video footage, one
did see plenty of mines in the desert but the coalition forces had sufficient
equipment to clear these mines. There were few casualties from Iraqi mines, so
Schwarzkopf's bluster merely exaggerated the invasion of Kuwait as far more
dangerous and difficult than it really was. Indeed, television had shown
reports of the various ways in which mine fields had been cleared, ranging from
B-52 cluster bombing, fuel air bombs, and Miclic mine-sweeping machines to
other devices. Praising the Saudis, apparently for political purposes,
Schwarzkopf claimed:
First of all, the
Saudis over here on the east coast [he said pointing to a map] did a terrific
job. They went up against a very,
very tough barrier system. They breached the barrier very, very effectively.
They moved out aggressively and continued their attack up the coast.
TV
images, by contrast, showed no barrier system whatsoever but some isolated
foxholes, deserted trench positions, some mines that hadn't been exploded, and some
barbed wire. The TV reports indicated that the Saudis penetrated about eight
miles across the border before they drew any artillery fire from the Iraqis.
Allied planes then quickly took out the artillery and the Saudis moved on. So
again, Schwarzkopf's version of the Gulf war was pure bombast and propaganda.
He then lavished praise on the U.S. Marines:
I can't say
enough about the two Marine divisions. If I use words like brilliant, it would
really be an underdescription of the absolutely superb job that they did in
breaching the so-called impenetrable barrier. It was a classic, absolutely
classic, military breaching of a very, very tough minefield, barbed wire,
fire-trenches-type barrier. They went through the first barrier like it was
water. They went across into the second barrier line, even though they were
under artillery fire at the time. They continued to open up that breach. And
then they brought both divisions streaming through that breach. Absolutely
superb operation, a textbook [case], and I think it'll be studied for many,
many years to come as the way to do it.
Once
again, Schwarzkopf was elevating a cake walk into a brilliant military
achievement, and the media and TV audience fell for his bluster. The first
barrier, as was widely reported, had no Iraqi troops defending it and when the
marines encountered fire in the second barrier, coalition air forces eliminated
the Iraqi artillery readily and quickly. Some of Schwarzkopf's own troops
described the invasion as less dangerous and difficult than many of their
training missions. Had there been more defensive power on the Iraqi side,
obviously there would have been more casualties of the invading forces. The low
casualties clearly attested to the fact that the Iraqis were already licked and
all the coalition forces needed to do was to walk across the border, collect
dazed and grateful Iraqi soldiers as POWs, and kill anyone who put up a fight.
All during the day of the "brilliant" battle narrated by Schwarzkopf,
pitiful Iraqis in isolated foxholes in the desert surrendered to anyone,
whether military or journalists.
Moreover,
the Iraqis obviously had no capability to counter the allied flanking
operation. Numbers released by the Saudi government indicated that by February
23, Iraqi front units were 50 percent below capacity and second units were
reduced to 50-70 percent and cut off from all reinforcements. Schwarzkopf also
admitted that as soon as the allied troops crossed the border "we started
getting a large number of surrenders," a point dramatically illustrated by
the TV images of capitulating Iraqis. Previously, in a couple of border forays,
Iraqi troops had given up almost immediately without a fight and with almost no
casualties for the allied forces who engaged in operations behind enemy lines
just before the AirLand war. The United States also, as Schwarzkopf now
admitted, put special forces deep into enemy territory to reconnoiter and to
carry out special tasks like helping establish the U.S. logistics base or to
hunt for Scud missiles.
Over
and over, the Pentagon praised the high level of its intelligence capabilities
and I believe that therefore it knew perfectly well that it was going to
achieve an extremely easy victory in the AirLand war. Schwarzkopf told
reporters a few days before the ground war began that "[t]he Iraqi army
was overrated and on the verge of collapse" (quoted on ABC, Feb. 25,
1991). But in his briefing, Schwarzkopf dissembled the ease with which the rout
of the Iraqis took place, with few allied casualties and a slaughter of Iraqi
troops. Continuing his fable, Schwarzkopf narrated how on the morning of
February 24th, the coalition started to move its forces into the most heavily
defended area, starting with the marines, who rapidly went north, and the Saudi
forces on the east coast who were "also moving rapidly to the north and
making very, very good progress." More Egyptian, Syrian, and Saudi forces
went across the border into Kuwait at this time making "a headlong assault
into a very, very tough barrier system, a very, very tough mission for these
folks here." Whenever, Schwarzkopf multiplied his adjectives or adverbs,
or used nouns like "brilliant," he was invariably hyping his
operation and covering over the ease with which the coalition forces destroyed
the hapless Iraqis.
Schwarzkopf
then described in more detail the French, British, and U.S. invasion of
southern Iraq, noting that the French penetrated deep into the west of southern
Iraq and the 101st Airborne Division went as far as the Euphrates valley.
[W]e were 150
miles away from Baghdad and there was nobody between us and Baghdad. If it had been our intention to take
Iraq, if it had been our intention to destroy the country, if it had been our
intention to overrun the country, we could have done it unopposed for all
intents and purposes from this position at that time. But that was not our intention. We had never said it was our
intention. Our intention was purely to eject the Iraqis out of Kuwait and to
destroy the military power that had come in here.
It
is not clear what the consequences would have been of a an allied incursion
into Baghdad, but it is interesting that in this set of remarks Schwarzkopf
revealed the true intention and limitations of the entire "plan" when
he indicated that the goal was "to destroy the [Iraqi] military
power" and not to march to Baghdad to overthrow Saddam Hussein. On one
hand, Schwarzkopf admitted in his briefing that the goal of the U.S.
administration was not merely the liberation of Kuwait but the destruction of
the Iraqi military. On the other hand, he made it clear here that the overthrow
of Saddam Hussein was not part of the U.S. agenda, that they were prepared to
allow Hussein to survive. Indeed, in the eventual cease-fire negotiations and
weeks following the cessation of military hostilities, the United States
allowed Hussein to reestablish power in the face of powerful opposition
throughout his country, to the disgust of many who had previously
wholeheartedly supported the Bush administration's war policies.
Moreover,
it is significant that Schwarzkopf did not describe the details of the
destruction of the Iraqi military, much of which was going on as he was
speaking and which we shall analyze in as much detail as sources allow in later
sections. In fact, it is interesting that Schwarzkopf gave his briefing before
the slaughter of the Iraqi army was completed and before any details had been
revealed. Thus, there was little questioning concerning whether there was
overkill, excess, and a downright massacre in his attempted destruction of the
Iraqi army. Instead of going into the details and extent of the slaughter, he
quickly pointed to areas of movement of the Saudi and U.S. marine progress on
the eastern front, which had already taken over Kuwait City after the Iraqis
had fled. He then pointed on his map to the forces in southern Iraq who were
fighting the Republican Guard and to the 24th Infantry Division, who "made
an unbelievable move all the way across into the Tigris and Euphrates valley,
and proceeded in blocking this avenue of egress out of, which was the only
avenue of egress left because we continued to make sure that the bridges stayed
down. So there was no way out."
This
turned out to be only partially true. The U.S. forces had blocked major avenues
of retreat from Kuwait into Iraq and would thus be able to wipe out without
impunity much of the retreating Iraqi forces in what pilots described as
"a turkey shoot." After the war, it was claimed on March 1 that the
United States had destroyed thirty-one out of thirty-two Iraqi divisions and
had destroyed completely the Republican Guard. Later these figures would be
contested when thousands of Guards appeared to put down Shiite and Kurdish
rebellions in March and April. Thus, many more Iraqi troops and tanks escaped
than Schwarzkopf admitted, so there obviously was a "way out" for
these troops, who later helped Saddam Hussein suppress rebellion against his
regime (10.4).[8] Thus, Schwarzkopf consistently
exaggerated the extent of his destruction of the Iraqi military apparatus,
while at the same time trying to cover over the slaughter of Iraqi troops:
"To date, we have destroyed over 29 [Iraqi divisions]--destroyed or
rendered inoperable; I don't like to say 'destroyed' because that gives you the
vision of absolutely killing everyone, and that's not what we are doing, but we
have rendered completely ineffective over 29 Iraqi divisions, and the gates are
closed."
"Peace
is not without its cost," Schwarzkopf admitted, and then detailed some of
the U.S. casualties--a total of seventy-nine killed in action. Schwarzkopf
claimed that while the loss of one single life was intolerable, casualties of
that order of magnitude were "almost miraculous." When asked what happened to the rest of
the reported 200,000 Iraqi troops in the border area, Schwarzkopf answered:
There were a
very, very large number of dead in these units, a very, very large number of
dead. We even found them when we went into the units ourselves and found them
in the trench lines. There were
very heavy desertions. At one point, we had reports of desertion rates of more
than 30 percent of the units that were along the front here. As you know, we
had quite a large number of POWs that came across, and so I think it's a
combination of desertions, it's a combination of people that were killed,
there's a combination of the people that we captured and there's a combination
of some other people who are just flat still running.
The
most interesting points here involves the heavy desertions of Iraqi troops,
"perhaps 30 percent" along the front, and the miraculously low number
of allied casualties. This statement seems to verify that the forces were
totally unbalanced and that the whole ground war involved the exaggeration of
Iraqi forces to exaggerate and conceal the desert slaughter.
During
the question part of the briefing, the reporters, by now putty in Schwarzkopf's
hands or intimidated by his bravado, asked their tame questions, giving
Schwarzkopf the opportunity to insult Saddam Hussein as a military strategist,
extol the brilliance of his plan, and assure the reporters that chemical
weapons hadn't been used. Schwarzkopf also made himself an agent once again of
the propaganda war, claiming that there were rumors of 40,000 Kuwaiti hostages,
which "pales to insignificance in the face of the Iraqi atrocities of the
last week," though he refused to give any details. He asserted that people
who could commit atrocities like the Iraqis "weren't members of the same
human race as the rest of us," again involving himself in racist
hyperbole. As it turned out, the stories of Iraqi atrocities in Kuwait City
during the last days of the occupation were greatly exaggerated, part of the
propaganda war, though the fleeing Iraqi troops did take many Kuwaiti hostages,
many of whom were perhaps slaughtered by Schwarzkopf's own forces, which seemed
to be killing everything in sight--an event that the Kuwaiti government and
media never explored and that I shall discuss in the next chapter (10.2).
During
his briefing, Schwarzkopf attempted to shape the historical record and
journalistic account of the war much as he shaped the battlefield: to use brute
power to impose his will upon the terrain. In retrospect, it is striking the
extent to which the Bush administration and Pentagon followed the politics of
lying in their discourses during the Gulf war. U.S. Throughout the war, lying
was as aggressive, systematic, and outrageous as in Vietnam and I have
documented a series of these lies in this book. Of course, Pentagon lying was
merely following the example of the Bush administration which lied about: (1)
the reason for sending U.S. troops to the Gulf in the first place (i.e., to
protect Saudi Arabia from Iraqi invasion whereas there is no evidence that Iraq
intended this; see 1.1); (2) the claim that it was seeking diplomatic
settlements when obviously it desired war (see 1.2); and (3) its orchestration
of the propaganda campaigns condemning Iraqi environmental terrorism (much of
which coalition forces were responsible for), Iraqi mistreatment of POWs (all
of which returned safe and sound), and denials of causing Iraqi civilian
casualties, despite much evidence to the contrary (see Chapters 4-7).
U.S.
hypocrisy and lying to cover over the fruits of its bombing missions could be
contrasted with the British, who openly admitted the failure of a precision
bomb after the worst civilian atrocities caused by their bombing. Some days
after the Amiraia bombing, the British attempted to bomb a bridge in the city
of Falluija and a precision bomb went astray and hit a market place in the
vicinity of the bridge. Rather than deny their complicity in these civilian
deaths, the British admitted that their bomb went astray, even showing the
videotape of a bomb veering away from its target and exploding off-camera on
the other side of the river. Unlike the U.S. military briefers, the British
were capable of admitting a mistake and apologizing.
9.4 Days
of Shame
Meanwhile,
the diplomatic charade continued and Bush refused to negotiate a settlement as
the ground war entered its fourth day. The Iraqis had proclaimed their
willingness to abide by the UN resolution to withdraw from Kuwait and actually
begin withdrawal on February 25; every day thereafter the Iraqis repeated their
willingness to abide by the UN resolutions, but every day, the Bush
administration rejected Iraqi and UN pleas for a cease-fire. Instead, as the
U.S. military briefer Gen. Neal put it on February 26, coalition forces would
continue to "attack and attack and attack," using "every means
available to destroy" fleeing or resisting Iraqis.
The
mainstream media consistently legitimated the U.S. high-tech massacre of the
fleeing Iraqis during this time. On February 25, "CBS This Morning"
host Harry Smith announced to Dan Rather that the Iraqis were "turning
tail and heading for their homeland," but were leaving with their weapons.
Rather commented that their destruction was justified because they were taking
their weapons with them and that the United States was currently encircling the
Republican Guards in order to destroy them. "The idea," Rather
explained, was not to leave "Saddam Hussein's power base intact" and
that Bush was saying that "we're not letting you come this far and when we
have a hammerlock on you say 'OK, you can go home.'" On ABC, Tony
Cordesman argued that, according to the "normal customs of war," the
United States "has been generous" in allowing Iraqis to "put
down their guns and withdraw" and that the Soviet effort to push for a
cease-fire in the United Nations was "totally unacceptable."
"The absolute custom and law of war," Cordesman said, "is that
the state involved must sue for a ceasefire or a surrender itself." On
NBC, Faith Daniels reported that the judgment in Washington was that "this
[that is, the Iraqi retreat] is a ruse, they're not sincere, they are just
regrouping." When asked if the U.S.-led coalition forces should go to
Baghdad to take out Saddam Hussein, NBC military consultant James Dunnigan
insisted that the problem in the Middle East was the "socialist Baath
party" and that this cancer would have to be ripped out (of Iraq and
Syria!) before the region would be safe from subversion.
Meanwhile,
as the media pundits tried to justify the high-tech massacre of the fleeing
Iraqis, General Schwarzkopf's troops appeared to be under orders to destroy
everything in sight. Newsday revealed on September 12, 1991, that
"[t]he U.S. Army division that broke through Saddam Hussein's defensive
frontline used plows mounted on tanks and combat earthmovers to bury thousands
of Iraqi soldiers--some alive and firing their weapons--in more than 70 miles
of trenches, according to U.S. Army officials" (p. A1). In a grisly story
based on eye-witness accounts, Patrick Sloyan described how the U.S. division "The
Big Red One" destroyed trenches and bunkers being defended by more than
8,000 Iraqi soldiers with a combination of airpower, artillery, tanks, and
vehicles with plows that buried alive hundreds, perhaps thousands, of hapless
Iraqi conscripts, placed in the harsh deserts without adequate training or
weapons. The U.S. soldiers interviewed indicated how defenseless the Iraqis
were, with one stating: "What you saw was a bunch of buried trenches with
people's arms and things sticking out of them." There were no U.S.
casualties in the slaughter, though Pfc. Joe Queen remarked: "A lot of
guys were scared. But I enjoyed it."
At
the height of the ground war, the U.S.-led forces were, according to official
figures, killing 100 tanks per day and countless Iraqi soldiers. Not only did
the U.S. use new high-tech precision weapons but they used new
"area-impact munitions" to annihilate the Iraqi army.[9]
In addition to napalm which explodes and hideously burns human flesh, the U.S.
used new fuel-air explosive bombs, "daisy cutters," and multiple
launch rocket systems to obliterate the Iraqis. Fuel-air explosives utilize
high-energy fuels such as butane which are dispersed from cannisters to produce
aerosol clouds which then explode rather than just burn. The resulting blasts are
several times greater than conventional weapons and have a devastating effect
on bunkers, silos, and people; they are sometimes referred to as "the poor
man's nuclear weapons." "Daisycutters" are 15,000 pound bombs
which contain explosives that can produce blasts almost in the nuclear weapon
range. Cluster bombs and missiles can spread 247 bomblets over more than an
acre, generating nearly 500,000 high-velocity shrapnel fragments. Cruise
missiles could also deliver a version of cluster bombs and B-52s could drop a
tremendous amount of munitions on an area the size of four football fields.
Finally, multiple-launch rocket systems carry two pods of six missiles that can
deliver nearly 8,000 bomblets over 60 acres in one salvo.
British
arms expert Paul Rogers (1991) pointed out that during the closing stages of
the war, the U.S. and British armies fired a thousand salvoes, or 12,000
missiles from their systems. These attacks were extremely lethal and a British
reporter describing shelling of Iraqi positions during the ground war claimed:
"It was this as much as the weeks of pounding from the air by the American
B-52 bombers and fighter-bombers that shettered the nerve of the Iraqis. An
Iraqi company commander captured after the first day's action said the rockets
had killed all but seven of his command of 250 in less than 10 minutes. A
captured artillery brigadier said fewer than 20 of his heavy guns had been
knocked out in the weeks of air raids, but the artillery bombardment had put
paid to the rest, all but six, in an hour" (in MacArthur 1991, p. 221).
On
April 8, the New York Times published an article on a battle that the
United States had fought on February 27, the day of Schwarzkopf's briefing and
the day before the cessation of military activity. According to Michael Gordon,
"When the 40 minute battle was over, American tanks and aircraft had
destroyed 60 T-72 tanks, 9 Iraqi T-55 tanks and 38 armored personnel
carriers" (p. A6). It was impossible to know how many Iraqi casualties
there were because, in the words of Col. Montgomery Meiggs, the tanks
"exploded and burned fiercely" so that "there were not a whole
lot of bodies." The Times article described the massacre as "a
showcase for the superiority of American-made weapons and tactics over Iraq's
Soviet-designed arms and static defense." It was "a one-sided
victory...an impressive tableau of destruction." Many U.S. soldiers were
horrified by the slaughter, however. According to Gordon, "Young American
soldiers, accustomed to destroying wooden tank targets at test ranges said they
were astounded to see the Iraqi tanks turn into fireballs." Sgt. Larry
Porter noted, "We have all had a chance to call our wives and most of the
guys could not talk about it to them. I don't think my wife needs to know what
took place out here. I do not want her to know that side of me."
During
the same period U.S. forces killed ten British troops, and CNN reported on
September 17, 1991, that on February 27 an undisclosed number of U.S. troops
were killed by "friendly fire." But probably the most appalling
episode in the shameful Persian Gulf war was the systematic destruction of the
Iraqi army as its individual soldiers desperately fled from Kuwait and southern
Iraq (see 10.2). General Schwarzkopf mentioned a couple of brief details of the
slaughter on February 27 when he claimed that there "was no way out"
and "the gates are closed," though none of the reporters followed up
on it, thus failing to gain insight into what was probably the most significant
military action going on during the ground war: the attempt to systematically
destroy the Iraqi army.
As
usual, the Bush administration and Pentagon created specious rationalizations
for the continued brutality and, as usual, their defenders in the media went
along with their actions and statements. In the debate concerning whether the
U.S.-led massacre of the retreating Iraqis--who were pleading for a cease fire
and who had indeed left Kuwait-- was "legitimate," the New York
Times published on February 27, 1991, an article by John X. Crossman, Jr.,
headlined: "Experts Back U.S. on Rules of War. They Assert Allies Have
Clear Right to Attack Retreating Iraqis Carrying Arms." With historical
examples going back to the Middle Ages and through the Civil War, the 1907 Hague
Convention, and the Geneva Convention of 1949, the Times's
rationalization of the slaughter indicated that it was clearly within the rules
of war to massacre retreating Iraqis (p. A8). But against such rationalizations
stands the fact that the Iraqi army was already decisively defeated and clearly
had no will to fight.[10]
The Iraqis had clearly appealed for a cease-fire through their official state
radio, their UN representative, their head of state, and the Soviet Union,
which tried to negotiate a cease-fire in the United Nations, but which was
blocked by the Bush administration. Instead, Bush's plan was apparently to
annihilate the Iraqi army, to inflict the maximum amount of destruction on the
Iraqis to establish U.S. military power as fearsome and relentless, and thus to
punish the Iraqis for refusing to bend to the will of the neoimperialist
superpower. Bush made his point and thousands of Iraqis died as a result.
Seeking
to replace Henry Kissinger and Jeane Kirkpatrick as intellectual of choice to
justify the unjustifiable, Thomas Friedman, a former CIA intern and James
Baker's occasional tennis partner, wrote a front-page New York Times
story titled "The Rout Bush Wants.
A Disorderly, Humiliating Iraqi Surrender Will End Hussein's Power,
Officials Believe" (Feb. 27, p. A1). The slaughter was justified by
Friedman on the (dubious) grounds that only "unconditional surrender"
and the devastation of the Iraqi army would end Saddam Hussein's power and
eliminate Iraq as a military threat. This will help, Friedman wrote, pleasantly
conveying the official Bush administration line, "speed the withdrawal of
most of the 537,000 American troops in the gulf, and to make sure that they
will not have to come back to fight again some day." Friedman, of course,
neglected the fact that the massacre was intended to ratify the U.S. superpower
status in the region and he failed to discuss the messy facts concerning the
bloody slaughter of the retreating Iraqis. Instead, he provided a
rationalization for Bush administration policy. Such were the ways that
"journalists" and "scholars" compromised and sold
themselves to the victorious forces, helping to hide the brutality of the war.
To
get some sense of the magnitude of the massacre that Friedman was politely
justifying, one merely had to turn to the lead news story in the same day's
edition of the New York Times:
All
night long, American warplanes pummeled Iraqi tanks, armored personnel carriers
and trucks on the road leading north from Kuwait City as they sought to reach
Basra, pilots said. The movement created a column 25 to 30 miles long, three or
four abreast in place, and except for a few surface-to-air missiles, they were
defenseless against the F-15, F-11 and F-16 fighter bombers that came at them,
wave after wave, along with Navy planes.
In
the wind and driving rain, "it was close to Armageddon," an Air Force
officer said. (Feb. 27, p. A1)
And
that's it. Armageddon for the Iraqis but no details, no follow ups, and
certainly no outrage. Indeed, the only critical view of the Desert Slaughter on
network television during the Days of Shame was the pained anger of an Arab,
Hisham Sharabi, on the February 27 "MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour."
Instead, television focused on the glories of the liberation of Kuwait and the
atrocities of the Iraqis in Kuwait. No one bothered to focus on the atrocities
of the U.S. slaughter of the Iraqis. In the February 28 New York Times,
there was a mention in the lead story that Bush's speech to end the war was an
attempt to balance the U.S. position "that Iraq could not get off too
easily, with mounting international pressures to stop the assaults on an
obviously defeated army." There was no discussion of the international
pressures by civilized nations in regard to the U.S.'s barbaric behavior nor
were there any details on the slaughter of the Iraqis, except for a brief
mention of it at the end of a story glorifying the U.S. taking of central Iraq:
Once the barriers
were up, the troops zeroed in on a "killing zone" and blasted
anything that tried to drive through, including a truck filled with sacks of
flour. But most of the traffic was soldiers in civilian cars, heading away from
Kuwait, many carrying televisions, boxes of women's clothes and other looted
goods. On Tuesday night, the
explosives arrived and bridges and other parts of the road were blown up. (New
York Times, Feb. 28, p. A7)
The
Persian Gulf TV war thus ended up being a massacre of the Iraqi military in a
total mismatch through which the most powerful high-tech military machine ever
assembled slaughtered a Third World army. Those U.S. authorities who were privy
to military intelligence, knew full well that the Iraqi army was incapable of
fighting back. A Newsday dispatch from Susan Sachs indicated that the
Pentagon consistently and intentionally overestimated Iraqi capabilities (March
3, 1991). Lt. Gen. Walter Boomer told Sachs that they had "known for weeks
that the [Iraqi] lines weren't that formidable...But we wanted to let Iraqis
think we still thought they were big." This is nonsense as obviously the
military wanted the public to think that the Iraqis were "big" to
enhance the Pentagon's victory. Sachs indicated that one "senior commander
agreed that the information about Iraqi defenses...was highly exaggerated.
'There was a great disinformation campaign surrounding the war,' he said, with
some satisfaction."
Throughout
the war, the Bush administration and Pentagon consistently exaggerated the
power, the evil, and the magnitude of the Iraqi military which was obviously
out of its league militarily. The Iraqi army was hyped up as the "fourth
most powerful in the world" and its "battle-hardened troops,"
"elite Republican Guard," and massive array of weapons were
constantly extolled in the media. Even the highly touted Republican Guard were
overblown in the media discourse. As Simpson explained, "The Republican
Guard, which journalists and politicians insisted on describing as 'elite', was
increased by several divisions during the period of the crisis, largely by
means of taking men from regular units and giving them red berets. Anyone who
could march in step was considered eligible. The officers of the Republican
Guard were usually better trained, but that generally meant that they too had
to be taken from other units. The mass dilution meant that the Republican
Guards' standards, which in the war against Iran had been above average, were
little different from those of the rest of the Iraqi army" (1991, p. 334).
In
fact, many U.S. soldiers indicated to journalists their surprise that the Iraqi
army collapsed so quickly and one imagines that the front-line soldiers
honestly did not know that they were facing such badly outpowered and
demoralized forces. A British soldier told reporter Robert Fox that, "It
was more like an exercise with enemy in it than anything I had expected. A bit
like a stroll in the park" (in MacArthur 1991, p. 225). One U.S. soldier
said that their practice exercises were more difficult and dangerous than the
actual fighting, constantly described by Dan Rather and the media puff patrol
as "fierce," or "ferocious." The Pentagon hyped the
"formidable Iraqi enemy," primarily, I believe, for its own
bureaucratic purposes. By having in place the image of a strong Iraqi opponent
they could thus puff up and promote their great victory, they could produce the
image of a "brilliant" campaign, and would thus boost their own
careers and prestige.
In
so doing, they inflicted needless suffering on the families of allied troops
and the public deeply concerned about the well-being of the U.S. forces in the
Gulf. Indeed, both the military and media should be severely criticized for
their exaggeration of the dangers faced, thus terrorizing unnecessarily the
public worried about the fate of the troops, as well as needlessly terrorizing the
troops themselves.
The9.5 The Perfect War
The
United States and George Bush emerged from the Gulf massacre as leaders of a
Neoimperialist World Order. At a speech at an American Legion convention on
February 27, Dick Cheney praised the leadership of George Bush, saying that the
"bottom line is that this whole effort has been put together and held
together by the leadership of the United States" and that the man who
provided the leadership for the U.S. and the whole world in "rolling back
the aggression of Saddam Hussein" was George Bush. "This was one of
the most successful achievements, not only from a military but also from a
diplomatic and a political standpoint, that this country has ever seen."
If the systematic destruction of a small country and systematic lying,
manipulating, and killing is one of the greatest achievements of a country,
then that country is in bad shape. But neither imperialism nor neo-imperialism
have ever been ashamed to cover over crimes and aggression with the most
bald-faced lies and blatant hypocrisy.
I
am using the highly charged term "neoimperialist" quite deliberately.
Susan Sontag once wrote that during
the Vietnam war, it became possible, even mandatory, to use the word
"imperialism" in light of the massive U.S. assault on Vietnam,
thousands of miles away from the United States. From a more technical
standpoint of political theory, however, neither Vietnam nor the Persian Gulf
war were classical imperialist wars. Classical imperialism involved a stage of
capitalism in which the capitalist superpowers occupied foreign countries to
directly exploit their labor power, resources, and markets. Classical
imperialism usually involved the imposition of a government administered by the
imperialist country, supported by a military force from the occupying power,
often bolstered by "native" forces and sometimes administrators.
Neoimperialism, by contrast, involves the control of markets, politics, and
sociocultural developments through a combination of military, political, and
cultural power. Neoimperialism corresponds to the stage of capitalism in which
transnational corporations and superpower nation states attempt to dominate the
economic and political destinies of nations throughout the world by a
combination of military threats, covert actions, political diplomacy, and
cultural hegemony.
Indeed, one of the hidden agendas of the
Persian Gulf adventure from the beginning was to establish the United States
decisively as the world's number-one superpower based on the application of
crushing military power as an instrument of imposing political will and
domination on smaller countries who would not conform to the interests of the
hegemonic neoimperialist powers. To effectively carry through this object
lesson, the United States had to demonstrate an ability to assemble, organize,
and carry through an impressive demonstration of military power. To make this
lesson dramatically, Iraq had to be destroyed and this was the goal of the war
from the beginning. Successful
accomplishment would establish the U.S. as the most powerful military force in
the world and would demonstrate the threat of the use of military power to
establish U.S. political hegemony.
Indeed,
for Bush and his ilk, the most important result of the victory in the Persian
Gulf war was that it would once and for all allow the United States to overcome
the "Vietnam syndrome." During a "power walk" in Maine on
Sunday, February 17, about a week before the ground war and on the day that his
church service was interrupted by an antiwar protester, Bush explicitly claimed
that the coming U.S. victory in the Gulf war would overcome the Vietnam
syndrome. In one of his first speeches after the war, he exulted: "By God,
we've kicked this Vietnam syndrome forever!" By "Vietnam syndrome,"
Bush meant the unwillingness to commit U.S. military power for political
objectives on account of fear of failure, thus repeating the Vietnam debacle.
In fact, however, if one sees the Vietnam syndrome as a disease, as the
proclivity to use U.S. military power to solve political problems, then the
Gulf massacre was a classic expression of the Vietnam syndrome, of a militarist
compulsion to use U.S. military power to resolve political conflicts.
Iraq was the victim, therefore, of a
neoimperialist attempt to control its destiny. Iraq refused to submit to the
will of the Western neoimperialist superpower and its allies, who responded
violently and with determined resolution to pound Iraq into submission. The
Persian Gulf massacre made clear to upstart Third World countries that if they
refuse to play by the rules established by the capitalist superpowers, they
will be crushed by military force. The Gulf technowar also demonstrated the
efficacy of U.S. high-tech weapons systems and military power. Indeed, the
deserts of the Middle East were a perfect testing ground for new high-tech
weapons and military strategies that could restore U.S. military prestige and
establish the superiority of U.S. military technology and personnel.
Bill
Gibson, whose work has greatly influenced the present one, called his book on
Vietnam, The Perfect War: Technowar in Vietnam. In conversations with
him I argued against this title on the grounds that the Vietnam war was messy,
convoluted, out of control, and ultimately a resounding defeat for the
technowar managers; Gibson, of course, intended his title ironically and used
it to expose the hubris of the war managers who thought that Vietnam would be
the perfect war to test their new weapons systems and counterinsurgency doctrines
and techniques. They failed in this earlier venture and needed a smashing
victory to reestablish their "credibility" and prestige. The Persian
Gulf war, by contrast, was the perfect war: it had the perfect enemy in
the Iraqi president who was the perfect villain whom the propaganda apparatus
could demonize. Iraq possessed a Third World army that appeared threatening in
view of the magnitude of men, tanks, artillery, and weapons, but which, in
fact, was a pushover, guaranteeing a sure win. In addition, the U.S.
orchestrated a media propaganda war with spin control for every eventuality and
had at its disposal a compliant media not only willing to transmit its every
lie, piece of disinformation, and propaganda, but positively affirming and
celebrating the war machine's every move.
The
Gulf War was celebrated by some commentators as a successful attempt to
reinvigorate the American psyche, to overcome doubts and confusions, and to
ally national anxieties. The Wall Street Journal commented that success
in the Gulf war "should create a new, upbeat temperament in a populace
that has been in the dumps since the 1960s" (cited in The Progressive,
March 1991, p. 10). There can be no doubt that people in the U.S. were angry
and confused, looking for someone or something to blame for their worries and
troubles. Saddam Hussein and Iraq were the perfect scapegoat and the Bush
administration exploited this to the maximum. As The Progressive put it,
"War offers an ideal scapegoat and escape. Saddam Hussein can be pressed
into service as the new Willie Horton, a focal point for the politics of
resentment that is built on cheap sloganeering" (March 1991, p. 10). In
this interpretation, the war served as a handy substitute for the collapse of
the Soviet empire, providing a new target for domestic fears and hatred.
The
Persian Gulf war was thus the perfect war to test Pentagon weapons and
strategies; to deplete their overstocked supply of weapons and to create the
need for new ones; to reestablish the prestige of the military against future
budget cuts; to militarize the culture and create new military myths and
ideology; to advance the careers of officers who could pose as heros; and to
promote the fortunes of George Bush and his war team. But this was not the
perfect war for the people and culture of Iraq, the environment of the Persian
Gulf, or any of the people who had to pay, and will have to pay, with their
lives and livelihoods. The war was hardly perfect or beneficial for the
casualties of the war on all sides: the foreign workers and other refugees
thrown out of Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, many of whom are now condemned to
a life of misery and perhaps horrible death; and Arabs who had to experience
yet another humiliation in their history of defeat by Western powers.
Other
victims of the war include those in the U.S. who will have to live in a culture
of militarism with declining social programs, a declining standard of living,
and increased public squalor for all. Indeed, although the troops of the
Persian Gulf were celebrated as national heroes who returned to hyped up
parades and victory celebrations, costing millions of dollars, they too were
victims of George Bush's Gulf war. Many had to spend months in the burning and
then freezing Saudi Arabian deserts, subject to incredible discomfort and
horrendous fears. Many reservists had to leave jobs and families, incurring
tremendous financial and emotional burdens, while being exposed to injury and
death. Their families at home experienced severe hardship with fathers or
mothers gone, leaving the other spouse and children at home, suffering many
emotional traumas, which were sometimes documented in the media. Many marriages
broke up from the strain and divorce rates for Gulf war troops were over 50
percent in many areas of heavy military concentration.[11]
In
addition, the troops in the desert were exploited in one of the largest medical
experiments in history, in which they served as guinea pigs for untested drugs
against chemical warfare agents.[12]
According to Laurie Tormey Hasbrook (see Note 12), several soldiers died from
these experiments and many are now sick from various diseases which they
contracted in the Gulf region. Joel Bleifuss discussed the administration of
untested drugs on the Gulf military guinea pigs, reporting that the
"Health Alert" section in the latest Military Families Support
Network (MFSN) indicates that at least a dozen military wives who got pregnant
after their husbands returned from the Gulf have had miscarriages. When one of
the soldiers asked whether his wife's miscarriage could be related to the
experimental drugs he took, he was told that the military was 'not allowed to
discuss the drugs'" (In These Times, Dec. 18, 1991, p. 4). Bleifuss
also notes that the MFSN reports that Gulf war veterans are already starting to
turn up in shelters for the homeless. The New York Times reported on
November 13 (p. A11) that the military has stopped accepting blood donations
from Persian Gulf war veterans because of a rare parasite brought home from the
region caused by bites from sand flies.
Thus
George Bush's war took a heavy toll on the domestic population as well as the
people of Iraq and other populations in the area. It was not, in the final
analysis, a perfect war at all, but just another filthy war expressive of a
world without logos and without the ability to resolve conflicts without
violence. Like all wars, it was therefore barbaric, primitive, and vicious
without, as I shall argue in the next chapter, any redeeming features at all.
Notes
[1]. The Soviet media, however, expressed outrage over the U.S. refusal to work with the Soviets to negotiate a diplomatic solution. The Soviet news agency Tass commented on February 24 that "this unique chance [offered by the Soviet peace plan] was allowed to slip away and the tragedy began fraught with great bloodshed." The commentary stated that the coalition forces wanted above all "to destroy fully Iraq's military-industrial potential and state structures to ensure a privileged position for the United States and its allies in the postwar arrangements." The milder official Soviet reaction the same day stated: "The instinct to rely on the military solution prevailed, despite the fact that Iraq's agreement to withdraw its forces from Kuwait in keeping with the United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 660 has created a basically new situation, clearing the way to transferring the Gulf conflict to the footing of a political settlement." The Soviet military and hardliners were even more outraged, and this rage contributed to the abortive coup attempt against Gorbachev some months later. Thus, Bush's refusal to negotiate a settlement risked the survival of Gorbachev's regime and could have destroyed perestroika and produced a new cold war. Bush thus appears as a gambler every bit as reckless as Saddam Hussein, but luckier.
[2]. The Associated Press reported on June 15, 1991 that the Saudi executioner was once again a busy man after the departure of Westerners. The report indicated that public executions had resumed in Saudi Arabia after a ten-month break during the time that Western reporters and troops were in the country. "The executions were stopped in order to avoid upsetting Western public opinion," the director of Middle East Watch, Andrew Whitley noted. "That to our minds, is a cynical manipulation of the legal process."
[3]. Interestingly, a caller from San Diego on the CNN "Larry King Live" show made the point that the Kuwaitis had hired a public relations firm and that these reports were carefully orchestrated propaganda. King cut her off and the issue was not discussed.
[4]. Dan Rather of CBS described the Scud attack as a "terrorist counterattack" and CBS correspondent Harry Smith described it as "Saddam Hussein's act of terrorism." It is not clear why Iraq's firing of a missile at Saudi Arabia during war was "terrorism" while the U.S. bombing of Iraq and slaughter of the fleeing Iraqi troops was good, clean war.
[5]. It could also have been the case that the United States noted that Iraqi defenses were too strong on the Kuwaiti shore and that an amphibious operation would have sustained intolerably high casualties. After the war, the TV networks showed models of impressive Iraqi fortifications along the shoreline, which could have produced many coalition casualties.
[6]. A Finnish military expert, Pekka Visuri, also independently estimated that there was "at most only about half of the 500,000 Iraqi troops purported by American officials or Western media" (Luostarinen 1991, p. 11). In addition, U.S. News and World Report estimated in Triumph Without Victory that Iraq probably only had 300,000 troops in the fields, and perhaps as few as 200,000 (1992, p. 405). Schwartzkopf was thus constantly guilty of transmitting "shamelessly doctored" statistics (Pierre Sprey) during the Gulf war and the shameless mainstream media let him get away with it to the shame of the nation.
[7]. Joshua Epstein claimed on ABC in February that the U.S.-led coalition's destruction of Iraq's economic infrastructure was totally unnecessary to the military campaign. Ramsey Clark would later carry out a War Crimes Tribunal claiming that Bush and his war team violated international law in their bombing of Iraq's civilian infrastructure and murder of civilians; see Clark et al. 1992. A November 1991 report by Middle East Watch claimed that both sides in the Gulf war committed "serious violations of the laws of war" and that "many hundreds of civilians needlessly lost their lives because U.S.-led coalition commanders failed to abide by the laws of armed conflict." Repeated U.S. violations included: daytime attacks on military targets in urban areas; excessive collateral damage; and systematic attacks on food, agricultural, and water-treatment facilities "appear to have violated laws against hitting targets that have no apparent military value." Similarly, attacks on Iraq's electrical system "may also have resulted in excessive civilian costs compared to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated....[T]he lack of electricity in Iraq has exacerbated food shortages, crippled the country's sewage-treatment and water-purification systems, badly hurt the medical apparatus, and impaired much of its ability to produce its own food." Finally, U.S. forces "appear to have repeatedly and indiscriminately attacked civilian vehicles on Iraqi highways and bedouin tents in Western Iraq, where they were seeking out Scud missile sites" (Middle East Watch 1991).
[8]. Defense Intelligence Agency and CIA estimates "suggest that about 1,430 of Iraq's armored personnel carriers got away, where originally it was believed that no more than 500 did. Similarly about 700 of Iraq's estimated 4,550 tanks in southern Iraq escaped, against an earlier estimate of between 500 and 600" (Cohen and Gatti 1991, pp. 296-297).
[9]. The following discussion is indebted to Paul Rogers, "The Myth of the Clean War," Covert Action Information Bulletin, No. 37 (Summer 1991), pp. 26-30 and to the transcription of an interview with Rogers on WBAI radio, September 16, 1991, transcribed in the PeaceNet bulletin board, misc.activism.progressive, Febr. 8, 1992. See also Paul Walker, "The Myth of Surgical Bombing in Iraq," in Clark et al. 1992, pp. 83-89.
[10]. The counterargument against the morality and legality of the slaughter is found throughout Clark et al. 1992 and Middle East Watch 1991.
[11]. See the article in the New York Times, May 5, 1991, and USA Today, January 16, 1992 which documented the high rates of divorce, spouse abuse, and post-war traumatic syndrome among the returning veterans of the Gulf war.
[12]. See the Los Angeles Times, Jan. 1, 1991, which had a brief notice "Unapproved Drugs Cleared for Troops." The Military Families Support Network newsletter Newswire, Vol. 2, Nr. 1 (February 1992) documented the parastic diseases found among Gulf vets, the administration of untested or not fully approved drugs, and other health and readjustment problems. Laurie Tormey Hasbrook, in a talk at the November 1991 Midwest Radical Scholars and Activist conference, claimed that this was the largest experimental use of untested drugs in history. Hasbrook had been interviewing a group of Gulf war veterans who had served months in the Gulf and who had then entered Kuwait but did not directly participate in ground war fighting. One member of the group had committed suicide, another had a nervous breakdown and as many as 50% were suffering traumas from their experiences, though many were not seeking psychological help as they feared this would harm their military careers.